


A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

VOLUME II
A CENTURY OF
PREDOMINANTLY INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
SINCE 1830





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A POLITICAL AND
CVLTVRAL HISTORY
OF MODERN EVROPE

by

CARLTON J, H, HAYES,

Volume 2,
(Shorter Revised)

A Century of
Predominantly
Industrial Society,
Since 1830,

New York,
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
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LIBERAL AND ROMANTIC EUROPE
1830-1870

- XV. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
- XVI. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
- XVII. ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM

CHAPTER XV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

I. ITS NATURE AND BASIS



CONTEMPORARY European civilization derives in part from the French Revolution. Ideals of individual liberty, popular sovereignty, and national patriotism were clearly proclaimed in France toward the close of the eighteenth century. They were widely disseminated over the Continent during the eras of Napoleon and Metternich. They have constituted the goal for a vast deal of political, social, and intellectual endeavor in Europe—and throughout the world—down to the present day.

Another, and even more important, source of contemporary civilization is the Industrial Revolution. This may be defined as a fundamental change or series of changes in ways of working, travelling, and living. It was not sudden or spectacular, but slow and gradual. It originated in the eighteenth century. It was apparent in some noteworthy respects in the sixty years from 1770 to 1830. It went much farther in the forty years from 1830 to 1870. But not until after 1870 did it produce astounding world-wide effects. It was unattended, moreover, by popularly acclaimed events. Machines, on which its development depended, were not made overnight or by persons bulking large in the public eye; usually they were the work of relatively obscure men, the result of protracted improvement of preceding inventions; and once they were "invented" and "patented," considerable time might elapse before they came into general use.

Gradual-
ness of
Industrial
Revolu-
tion

The Industrial Revolution began in England, and England was the first country to be transformed by it. This fact may seem surprising when we recall that the leading country of Europe in the eighteenth century seemed to be not England, but France. Despite calamitous wars and royal bankruptcy from

which France suffered, her industry and trade were superior to Britain's as late as 1785. In that year France had a population of twenty-six million, to Britain's nine million, and hence almost three times as many persons at home to buy the products of her industry. In addition, her foreign trade was then valued at two hundred million dollars, while Britain's was valued at a hundred and sixty million. France, moreover, possessed the raw materials and the motive power for a mechanical revolution in the industrial arts; she had rich natural resources—silk, flax, coal, iron, and water-power.

On the other hand, French export-industry consisted chiefly of fine luxury manufacture, valuable commercially but ill adapted to machine production. From its very nature, it could best be carried on in the home or in the small shop and always by hand. In England, where there was no such long-established and carefully regulated tradition of artistic hand-work, there was a greater incentive for production in factory and by machine.

For embarking upon machine production, England had certain other advantages over France. In the first place, serfdom and the guild system broke down in England before they broke down in France, with the results that English workmen were freer to move from farm to factory and English manufacturers were less handicapped in what they might do and whom they might employ. Secondly, the English government was more responsive in the eighteenth century to the economic demands of large-scale producers. The parliamentary aristocracy was consistently devoted to the expansion of commerce as well as to the prosperity of agriculture; and the "enclosure acts," which were inspired by the development of "scientific" agriculture, tended to increase the size and productivity of large landed estates and to quicken the migration of small farmers from country to city. All this occurred in England at the very time when in France the royal government was collapsing and the peasants were preparing to divide the large landed estates among themselves.

In the third place, the protracted naval warfare which Great Britain waged with superior force against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France from 1793 to 1815 served to deprive the French of markets outside the European continent, and during those years the British, assured of almost a monopoly of ocean-borne

trade, forged at home the machinery for large-scale industrial production. Napoleon's career enabled the Industrial Revolution to go forward in England; and the Industrial Revolution enabled England to overthrow Napoleon.

Finally, England, rather than France, had the capitalistic means for accomplishing the Industrial Revolution. Wealth had gradually been accumulating in England since the sixteenth century—from piracy, plunder, and slave trading, from colonies in America and trading-posts in India, from the operation of navigation acts, tariff protection, and other mercantilist policies, from the checks successively administered to the competition of Spaniards, Netherlands, and Frenchmen, and also from the development of domestic agriculture and industry. Wealth had similarly been accumulating in France, but French capital was not so readily available for industrial experimentation. It tended, rather, to be diverted by loans or taxes to governmental hands and unproductive uses. There was no solid or adequate banking system in France in the eighteenth century, and the bankruptcy of the French monarchy in 1789 and of the French republic in 1799 spelled disaster, at least temporarily, to many a French capitalist. Not until the time of Napoleon, was the Bank of France established and some order introduced into French finance.

Its Connection with English Capitalism

English capital was better husbanded and put to more productive use. England expended a relatively small amount of money on her army, and her navy cost her much less than the French army cost her rival. English taxation was considerably lighter than that of the French and more equitably distributed, with the result that a much greater proportion of English wealth was available to individual owners. Besides, banking developed fairly early in England, steadying governmental finance and providing pooled funds for individual and corporate enterprise. By the end of the seventeenth century, London was competing with Amsterdam as the money-lending centre of the world. The Bank of England was first chartered in 1694. The London Stock Exchange was organized in 1698. Numerous important private banks were founded at London in the eighteenth century. The London clearing house was established about 1750.

Growing capitalism wrought an agricultural revolution in England in the eighteenth century. Wealthy landlords enlarged

their holdings and introduced "scientific" farming. By these means, and by such concurrent parliamentary aids as enclosure acts and corn laws, both the yield and the profits of English farming were increased. The agricultural revolution was at once an effect and a cause of the growth of English capitalism.

With the increasing profits from "scientific" farming in England were combined the mounting profits of the English East India Company, its agents and stockholders. As more surplus capital became available, and as markets for English manufactured goods widened, it was but natural that a considerable part should be applied to English industry. At first, this meant merely an intensifying of the "domestic" (or "putting-out") system which had characterized some part of European industry ever since the beginning of the sixteenth century. Thus, it had long been the practice of certain middle-men, outside the guilds, to buy raw materials in quantity, and to "put them out" to be made into manufactured commodities by farmers and poor townsmen in their several homes. The "domestic" workers, usually owning the necessary tools and combining industrial with agricultural pursuits, would receive wages for their industrial labor and would turn back the finished goods to the middle-man who would sell them and reap for himself whatever profits he could. By the eighteenth century these industrial entrepreneurs were numerous and influential in England; the "domestic" system was flourishing, and it was becoming ever more capitalistic. Most workers labored in their homes, but they labored to the profit less of themselves than of middle-men who provided them with raw materials and took their finished products.

Before long, certain industrial middle-men in England, desirous of supplying their expanding markets with a more copious production of goods than they could obtain through "domestic" and "putting-out" practices, were applying surplus capital to the exploitation of new methods, especially in the textile and mining industries. They were supplementing hand-work with machine-work. They were building factories for the making or housing of the novel instruments of production. They were seeking new motive power for their workshops. They were substituting for the domestic system a factory system of capitalist industry. Presently, they were urging and financing swifter means of transportation. The preliminary phase of the Industrial

Revolution was beginning. It was to last, roughly, from 1770 to 1830 and was to inaugurate the transformation of Great Britain into the first of modern industrialized countries.

2. THE PRELIMINARY PHASE, 1770-1830

During the years from 1770 to 1830, two major industries were profoundly altered in England—cotton and mining—while a third, transportation, was on the eve of revolution.

Cotton manufacture was not an old or well-established industry in England. It was youthful and exotic in comparison with the manufacture of other textiles—woollens, linens, and even silk. The world-centre of the cultivation and manufacture of cotton had long been, not England, but India; and not until the seventeenth century, when the English East India Company was developing direct commercial relations between India and England, was there any considerable demand for, or supply of, cotton goods in England. Once introduced into England, however, the “calicoes” of India quickly became fashionable; every lady had to wear them, and the styles set by ladies must be followed by women of the middle and lower classes. Soon, cotton goods were being made in England.

The
Cotton
Industry

Prior to 1770 cotton manufacture had been carried on in England in much the same way as the traditional manufacture of woollens, linens, and silks—by hand-spinning and hand-weaving under the “domestic” system. For all the textiles, there had been little improvement of tools, except that for weaving John Kay had patented in 1733 a “flying shuttle,” a simple spring device which saved labor and doubled production. But this was not immediately put to any considerable commercial use. Especially in the woollen and linen industries, most artisans were distrustful of novelties and hostile to their introduction by middle-men.

Kay's
Flying
Shuttle

In the cotton industry, conditions were exceptionally favorable to mechanical experimentation. It was a relatively new industry, unhampered by guild traditions or organized labor. It was a rapidly growing industry, whose demands outstripped its supply. To it the eighteenth-century interest in mechanics could be applied freely and with prospect of financial gain.

By 1770, Kay's flying shuttle was coming into considerable use, and the resulting increase of weaving was creating a demand

for more spinning. Many attempts were made to speed up spinning, but the first practical success was due to James Hargreaves, a weaver who was also a good carpenter. The story goes that he happened to see his wife upset her spinning-wheel, and, as he noticed the wheel continuing to spin, the idea struck him that several spindles might be set in a frame and operated by one wheel. At any rate Hargreaves about 1767 made a frame with eight spindles and devised a pair of clamps to take the place of human fingers in holding and guiding the threads, so that one person by turning the wheel and moving the clamps could spin eight threads at a time. He gave to his spinning appliance his wife's name and called it a "jenny." When his neighbors learned that he had made a machine which might rob them of their work, they broke into his house and smashed the jenny. But Hargreaves moved to another town and went into the business of building jennies and selling them to "progressive" spinners who wished to save time and make more goods. The jenny was an improved hand machine; it was employed by spinners in their own homes; it quickened the cotton industry and it enriched Hargreaves.

Another kind of spinning machine was patented in 1769 by Richard Arkwright, an uneducated but shrewd barber and horse-dealer, who knew how to exploit the inventive genius and the capital of other persons. Arkwright's machine drew out the fibres between pairs of rollers and then automatically twisted them into hard firm thread by revolving spindles. At first it was operated by horse-power, but, as water-power was soon substituted, it acquired the name of "water-frame." Unlike Hargreaves's jenny, the water-frame was too expensive and cumbersome to be purchased and housed by many individual spinners, but, by forming a partnership with two well-to-do manufacturers, Arkwright was enabled to install water-frames in factories for the large-scale production of cotton hosiery and then of cotton cloth. Soon the barber was a capitalist—a captain of the new industry—and in 1786 King George III created him Sir Richard Arkwright.

There were serious defects in both the jenny and the water-frame. The thread made by the former was fine but weak, while that made by the latter was strong but coarse. Combining the

machines so as to eliminate the defects of each was the achievement of Samuel Crompton, a young man who had learned to spin on a jenny and who thought he could improve it. After five years of experimentation, he brought out in 1779 the spinning "mule," so called because, like the animal of that name, it was a hybrid. The spinning mule in its first form required much attention and many of its parts had to be operated by hand; subsequently it was steadily improved and rendered almost completely automatic. It was a complicated machine, adapted to factory rather than to domestic production.

Crompton's
Spinning
Mule

A few years after Crompton's invention, Edmund Cartwright, a clergyman of the Church of England, chanced to hear a friend say that the new spinning machines—jenny, water-frame, and mule—would soon be producing far more thread than could be woven by all the hand-loom in England. Someone, he replied, ought to invent an automatic weaving machine. The thing was impossible, his friend said. The clergyman, however, had recently seen an automatic chess-player exhibited in London and was sure that an automatic loom could be devised; he himself would devise one, he declared. Though Cartwright knew little about weaving or about mechanics, he confidently grappled with the problem, thought out a plan, and employed a carpenter and a smith to give effect to his ideas. The resulting machine, which Cartwright patented in 1785, was clumsy, but it worked after a fashion. The clergyman turned industrialist and set up a weaving factory, in which his power-loom was operated at first by horses and after 1789 by steam. But neither he nor the few other manufacturers who tried to use his invention could make it pay. Only after a lapse of two decades and a series of improvements were the defects of Cartwright's machine remedied, and even then the hand-weavers, who in the meantime had adopted Kay's "flying shuttle," were so hostile to power-loom that they refused to operate them and frequently wrecked factories in which they were installed. Not until the 1820's did the power-loom largely supplant hand-weaving in the cotton industry.

Cartwright's
Power-
Loom

With revolutionary changes in spinning and weaving went similar changes in other processes of cotton manufacture. A carding machine to comb the cotton fibre in loose strands and

prepare it for spinning had been invented in 1748. A scutching machine for cleaning and opening the fibres preparatory to carding them was invented in 1797. A machine—the “cotton gin”—for separating the seeds from the raw material was invented in America by Eli Whitney in 1792.¹ In place of old and slow ways of bleaching cotton (or linen), such as steeping it in sour milk and exposing it to the air for months, rapid bleaching by chemicals was instituted. Moreover, chemical dyes were introduced—“Turkey red,” scarlet, green, yellow, etc. Then, to get the colors in patterns on the calico, a cylindrical printing machine was employed in 1785; a man and a boy could print as much cotton with this machine (driven by power) as two hundred persons using the earlier hand blocks.

Synchronizing with the development of machinery (and factories) in the cotton industry, but at first quite independent of it, was the development of metallurgy (and mines, furnaces, and foundries). There had long been some mining in England, but prior to the eighteenth century there was no great demand for iron or coal. Wood was the chief fuel, and wood was the principal building material. So great, indeed, had been the consumption of wood that by the latter part of the seventeenth century English forests were seriously depleted, and, despite governmental encouragement of timber imports from America, the supply of wood was not keeping pace with the demand. In the circumstances, attempts were made to extend the use of coal.

In the eighteenth century, coal mining developed fairly rapidly, in part because the demand for coal was steadily growing, and in part because capital was increasingly available for large-scale mining. Pumping water out of coal mines had been difficult as well as expensive, but in 1712 Thomas Newcomen built a steam-engine for the purpose. This engine, though crude and clumsy, could do the work of fifty horses at one-sixth the cost, and it proved a serviceable auxiliary to

¹ The cultivation of cotton as a staple crop in the United States dates from about 1770. In 1791 the export of raw cotton from the United States amounted to 200,000 pounds, and in 1800, after Whitney's invention, to 2,000,000 pounds. America was thus becoming an important source of supply for the revolutionized cotton industry of England. Incidentally, the development of cotton growing in the southern American states dampened the earlier humanitarian enthusiasm for the abolition of Negro slavery. Negro slaves were now needed on the cotton plantations.

English mining.¹ The production of coal increased from two million tons in 1700 to six million in 1770.

The development of coal mining was accompanied by progress in the iron industry. Newcomen's engines, as well as many other newer machines and tools, had to be made of **Iron** iron, and the growing scarcity of wood called for new methods of smelting iron ore. For centuries, smelting had been done in the so-called "Catalan forge," a simple oven in which iron ore was mixed with burning charcoal and heated to the desired temperature by the help of a hand-bellows. Since the sixteenth century, several significant books had been published on metallurgy, and some improvements had been made in iron manufacture. In the seventeenth century the "power furnace," with larger and higher oven and with bellows and hammers operated by water-power, had been devised on the Continent, and about the same time an English furnace-owner by the name of Dudley, alarmed by the scarcity of wood and hence of charcoal, had tried, though with only meagre success, to smelt iron with coal. What Dudley failed to do was achieved in the first half of the eighteenth century by two English iron manufacturers—father and son—both with the name of Abraham Darby. The elder Darby discovered in 1709 that if coal was heated and transformed into coke (corresponding to the transformation of wood into charcoal), the coke could be used for iron smelting, and the younger Darby made the venture a commercial success by employing a big water-driven bellows to blow a strong blast of air on the burning coke. The iron furnace thus became both a coke furnace and a "blast furnace." It is noteworthy that the younger Darby, in order to hoist the water over the wheel which worked his bellows, installed a Newcomen steam-engine.

**Darby
and Use of
Coke**

An improvement in the manner of getting air into the blast furnace was made in 1760 by John Smeaton, an engineer employed in a Scottish iron foundry, where coke was being used with rather poor results. For the leather bellows, Smeaton substituted an air pump, whereby coke could at last be used generally for smelting iron. The English produc-

**Smeaton's
Pump**

¹ The principle of the steam-engine had been described by a Greek (Hero of Alexandria) 130 B.C., and crude steam-engines of various types had been designed in the seventeenth century. Newcomen's, however, was the first commercially successful steam-engine.

tion of smelted iron—or “pig iron”—increased from 10,000 tons in 1700 to 50,000 in 1770.

When coke was used as fuel, the “pig iron” produced in blast furnaces was found to contain impurities which made it too brittle for many purposes. How to transform pig iron into the purer and tougher forms known as wrought iron and steel was for some time a puzzling problem. A solution of the problem was worked out about 1784 by Henry Cort, a purchasing agent for the British navy, who entered the iron industry as an experimenter rather than as a practical manufacturer. Cort invented, or at any rate patented, several “processes.” One was a new furnace—the “reverberatory furnace”—in which the coke, instead of being mixed with the iron ore, was burned in an adjacent but separate chamber. Another was a way of stirring or “puddling” the molten iron so that impurities could be skimmed off. A third was a device whereby the metal taken from the furnace, instead of being beaten out with hammers, was pressed into the form of bars or sheets by means of heavy rollers. These “Cort processes” marked a really revolutionary advance. Thanks to them, cheaper and better iron was made available for machinery, tools, and boilers.

With better iron, it was possible to make a better steam-engine. And one of the outstanding achievements during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution was the invention of James Watt’s steam-engine. Watt was making and repairing scientific instruments at the University of Glasgow when (in 1764) a model of the Newcomen steam-engine was brought to him for repair. Having put the model in order, he studied its defects, noting especially its waste of fuel, because, with each stroke of its piston, the steam in its cylinder had to be condensed by cooling, and then the cylinder had to be heated up for the next stroke. After puzzling over the matter for some time, and scientifically investigating the properties of steam, Watt evolved a new principle for the steam-engine. He would let the steam escape through a valve into a separate condensing chamber which should be kept cool while the main cylinder remained hot.

When Watt tried to construct such an engine, he encountered difficulties which would dishearten most men. No iron-workers seemed skillful enough to make the cylinders perfectly round or

the piston absolutely smooth and straight or the valves tight. He had just about given up his experiments when a wealthy friend, who thought the Watt engine might be used profitably in his own mines, paid the inventor's debts and persuaded him to persevere. In the year 1769 Watt patented his first steam-engine—"Beëlzebub," he appropriately named it—but hardly was it ready for use when his friend suffered reverses and was compelled to withdraw financial support. Fortunately, a well-to-do hardware manufacturer of Birmingham, Matthew Boulton, took an interest in "Beëlzebub" and formed a partnership with Watt for the manufacture of steam-engines. The first engines manufactured by the firm of Boulton and Watt were sold to proprietors of coal (and copper) mines and iron works, and took the place of the earlier Newcomen engines in pumping water out of mines or air into blast furnaces. Watt, however, continued to improve his steam-engine, with a view to rendering it still more economical and extending its use.

Such improvement of the steam-engine, and of iron machines of every sort, followed the invention of certain "tools of precision" in the 1790's, particularly Maudslay's "slide-rest" (1794). This was an iron lathe, which assured far greater smoothness and accuracy in shaping cylinders and pistons and valves than the earlier hand-work which had all but frustrated Watt's first labors with the steam-engine.

Tools of
Precision

By the year 1800 the production of coal and iron was reaching large proportions in Britain. Steam-engines and many other machines were being made of iron; and coal was being used as fuel for the engines and (in the form of coke) for the manufacture of iron. The annual production of coal had grown from 6 million tons in 1770 to 12 million in 1800, and of pig iron, during the same period, from 50,000 to 130,000 tons. Already Britain was producing as much iron and coal as all the rest of the world.

By the year 1800 a relationship was being established between the hitherto separate revolutions in metallurgy and in the cotton industry. Steam-engines were supplanting water-wheels as motive power for the new spinning and weaving machinery in cotton factories, and this machinery was beginning to be made of iron instead of wood. Moreover, as mechanical spinning and weaving were gradually adapted from cotton manufacture to

Relation-
ship of
Revolu-
tions in
Metal-
lurgy and
Cotton

the older and more conservative woollen industry, during the three decades from 1800 to 1830, a basic change in the whole textile business was promised—from home to factory, and also from wood and water to iron and coal.

The changes in the textile industry and especially in the coal and iron industries had a revolutionary effect upon transportation. Large-scale manufacturers and mine operators demanded better and faster and more economical means of getting their goods to their widening markets. And as such means were gradually forthcoming in the three decades from 1800 to 1830, they, in turn, stimulated the output of factories, foundries, and mines.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century, transportation had been more backward and primitive in England than in France. By the middle of the century, France had a fairly good system of highways and a network of canals. British highways long remained notoriously bad, and not until 1759 did Parliament authorize the construction of the first canal in England. Toward the close of the eighteenth century, however, canal-building was quickened in Britain, and the construction and repair of highways began to benefit from new methods applied by British engineers, especially John Macadam. By 1830 England possessed an adequate network of main roads and about 2,500 miles of canal.

The transport of such a heavy and bulky commodity as coal involved a special problem. Even before the eighteenth century, plank roads had been built on which cars of coal could be drawn by horses or mules from the mines to the nearest ports. Then, with the increasing use of coal (and iron) in the latter part of the century, the horse-drawing of coal cars was rendered easier by running the cars on flanged iron rails which were laid along plank roads or on cross-ties (first in 1776). Presently some mine owners began to speculate on utilizing the steam-engine, instead of horse-power, to pull the coal cars.

While this speculation was proceeding, a young inventor, Richard Trevithick, the son of a mine manager in Cornwall, was preparing the way for the steam locomotive. In the year 1800, aided by improvements in the handling of sheet iron, he con-

NOTE. The portrait opposite is from a sculptured bust of James Watt by Sir Francis Chantrey (1781-1842).

structed a steam-engine on a different principle from Watt's. Watt's was a low-pressure, condensing engine, while his was a high-pressure, non-condensing engine. Then Trevithick found that he could make his steam-engine into a locomotive, and this he patented in 1802, with the idea that it could be operated over the highways of England. Several highway locomotives were actually built by Trevithick; one was run ninety miles under its own steam. His locomotives were too defective, however, and he was not sufficiently business-like to make a favorable impression on Englishmen of wealth. He went off to South America to construct engines for the Peruvian mines, and when he returned a dozen years later, someone else had made a success of the steam locomotive and Trevithick died penniless.

Trevithick's
Highway
Locomotive

The success of the locomotive was due to George Stephenson (1781-1848), a workman in a colliery, who learned to read and write after he was seventeen years of age and by his own efforts became a professional engineer. In 1813 he prevailed upon the proprietor of the colliery at which he worked to try steam traction on the tramway connecting the mine with its port nine miles away, and in the following year a locomotive which he constructed on the principle of Trevithick's, and which he called "Blücher" in honor of the Prussian general who was then fighting against Napoleon, drew a train of coal cars over the tramway. During the next few years Stephenson's studies and experiments convinced him that the steam locomotive could not be used successfully on ordinary highways (as Trevithick had imagined), and that it would be necessary to prepare a level road-bed so as to reduce rolling resistance to a minimum. In 1822 he was appointed engineer for the building of a coal railway from Stockton to Darlington, and in 1823 he established a locomotive factory at Newcastle. He could not convince the owners of the Stockton and Darlington railway that they should spend the funds requisite to prepare a properly graded road-bed, and hence, when the railway was opened to traffic in 1825, it was operated on the level by steam locomotives but on hills by pulleys and stationary steam-engines. Yet the Stockton and

Stephenson's Rail
Locomotive

First
Steam
Railway,
1825

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a drawing by the English caricaturist, George Cruikshank (1792-1878). On Cruikshank, see below, pp. 119-120.

Darlington was the first railway on which animal power was wholly supplanted by steam power.

Almost immediately, a steam railway was projected to connect Manchester (the centre of the rapidly expanding cotton industry) with the important port of Liverpool. George Stephenson was put in charge of its construction, and this time he had his way about grading the road-bed; hills were cut through and swamps were filled. At length, in June 1830, an improved locomotive, designed by the son of George Stephenson and manufactured in the Stephenson locomotive works at Newcastle, traversed the line, a distance of forty miles, in an hour and a half. In September 1830 the Liverpool and Manchester railway was formally opened to public traffic—alike of goods and of passengers. From the outset it proved financially profitable to its promoters. The age of railways was opening.

In the meantime the steam-engine was being applied to water transportation. Several persons, as early as the 1790's, were grappling with the problem of how paddles and steam-engines might be substituted, in whole or in part, for the sails and wind which from time immemorial had been depended upon to propel ships. But the first inventor of a commercially successful steamboat was Robert Fulton, an American, who went to England in 1787 in order to study the art of painting under Benjamin West. In England he made the acquaintance of the Duke of Bridgewater (the proprietor of rich coal mines and the chief promoter of canal construction) and also of James Watt, and under the influence of these men he turned his attention from painting to engineering. In 1796 he published a *Treatise on the Improvement of Canal Navigation*. Then, taking up his residence in Paris, he launched his first steamboat on the Seine in 1803 and built a submarine boat which he vainly besought Napoleon to adopt. Returning to America and forming a partnership with Robert Livingston (who furnished the requisite capital), Fulton constructed a paddle-wheel steamer, the *Clermont*, which he powered with a Boulton and Watt engine and which began in 1807 to ply regularly on the Hudson River between New York and Albany. In 1815 the United States obtained from Fulton the first steam warship—a vessel of thirty-eight tons with central paddle-wheels. Simultaneously, other steamboats were invented and used.

Fulton's
Steam-
boat

The first steamboats were too small, and consumed too much fuel, for safe or profitable use on long sea voyages. For some years, therefore, steam navigation was confined to river craft and to boats for short voyages, such as coasters and cross-channel packets. When a steam-engine was installed on a trans-oceanic ship, as on the *Savannah* in 1819, it was employed as an auxiliary to sails rather than as a substitute for them. Nevertheless, a beginning had been made of revolutionary changes in transportation, by water as well as by land.

A beginning of revolutionary change in printing was likewise made prior to 1830. In 1800 a printing press was built entirely of iron. In 1811 was constructed the first steam-driven printing machine, and shortly afterwards the "cylinder" press was invented. In 1814 the London *Times* inaugurated the use of the new printing machinery, which produced 1,000 impressions an hour and thus quadrupled the output of the earlier hand press. By 1827 the machinery was so improved that it could produce 4,000 impressions an hour. And with the increasing output of printing presses went a growing demand for—and supply of—paper. Paper had always been made by hand, sheet by sheet, until 1803, when the first paper machine was erected in England.

Iron and
Steam
Printing
Press

Altogether, the Industrial Revolution was passing beyond its preliminary phase in England by 1830. Profound changes were apparent in the cotton industry and in the iron and coal industries; machines were taking the place of hand tools; steam was becoming an important motive power; locomotive, steamboat, and power press were heralding even more epochal changes. The main phase of the Industrial Revolution was at hand.

3. THE MAIN PHASE, 1830-1870

Sixty years—from 1770 to 1830—had been required to inaugurate the Industrial Revolution in Britain. During the ensuing forty years, it progressed by leaps and bounds. It carried further the transformation of the iron, coal, and cotton industries and the means of transportation. It also affected a wide range of other industries, altering old ones and introducing new ones, and leading in all fields toward the goal of mechanical mass production. Not only did it advance in Britain but it spread to the continent of Europe and to America.

Neglecting for the moment this geographical spread of the Revolution, let us trace its most significant aspects in Britain from 1830 to 1870. First of all must be noted the fundamental fact that without the growth of capital, which had been powerfully stimulated during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution, the subsequent developments could not have constituted its main phase. Nor could its main phase have been what it was without the rise of professional engineering and the coöperation of "practical" scientists.

The word "engineer" was originally employed to denote a person who constructed military fortifications and engines of war; and, in the eighteenth century, when some persons began to concern themselves with works which were neither exclusively military in purpose nor executed by soldiers, such persons were called, by way of distinction, "civil engineers." None of the early industrial inventors was professionally an "engineer," military or civil. But as industrial invention became more complicated and demanded greater technical competence, it gave rise to an important professional class of civil engineers, and after 1830 a specialization arose among these. Some, concerning themselves with steam-engines, machine-tools, mill-work, and moving machinery in general, became "mechanical engineers." Others, busying themselves with locating and working deposits of coal, iron, and other minerals, became "mining engineers." By 1870, there were appearing "marine engineers," "sanitary engineers," "chemical engineers," and "electrical engineers." Every industrial plant of large size or ambition had to have some kind of engineer for at least occasional consultation as to how it might produce more goods at less expense.

Similarly a close relationship was established between the Industrial Revolution and natural science, especially physics and chemistry. Natural science, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been primarily theoretical, was now drawn into the service of machine industry and rendered more "practical." Industrialists took a new interest in science, and scientists in industry. The Industrial Revolution received direct aid, during its preliminary phase, from such a scientist as Sir Humphry Davy, and inestimable advantages, during its main phase, from a considerable

Rise of
Engineer-
ing

Science
and
Machine
Industry

number of physicists and chemists of whom we shall have more to say in the course of this chapter.¹

One highly significant aspect of industrial development between 1830 to 1870 was the steady improvement of all kinds of machinery through the perfecting and the increased use of "tools of precision." Another was the quantitative expansion of industries whose revolution had clearly begun in the preceding era. There was an enormously quickened demand for iron and coal, and these commodities were produced in constantly augmenting amounts. The annual British production of pig iron rose from 750,000 tons in 1830 to six million tons in 1870, and of coal from 26 million tons to 110 million tons.

Increasing
Production of
Coal and
Iron

The production of iron was stimulated by the invention of new processes for its large-scale conversion into steel. One such process—the so-called Bessemer process—was patented in 1856 by Henry Bessemer, a prolific inventor and successful engineer. Bessemer used a large metal converter, somewhat the shape of an egg, which was heated to a very high temperature by burning coke inside it; then cast iron, taken from a blast furnace, preferably in a molten condition, was poured into the converter, which swung on a swivel to receive supplies and emit the product; next, a blast of air was blown from beneath, producing a pyrotechnic display and consuming the impurities in the iron; and finally, when the effervescence died down, the iron was taken out as hard steel. The other process—the Siemens or open-hearth process—was evolved, almost simultaneously, by William Siemens, a German engineer and scientist, who settled in England and in 1859 became a naturalized Englishman. Siemens introduced a special "reverberatory" furnace, on the open hearth of which the iron was heated by flames coming from coal or gas; the gases thus generated were themselves heated and brought into the fire box to help raise the temperature to such a point that the impurities would be burned out of the iron. Whereas the Bessemer converter used an air blast and was quick acting, the Siemens furnace relied upon great heat and proper mixture of ingredients

Steel
Processes
of
Bessemer
and
Siemens

¹ Davy (1778-1829), a largely self-taught chemist, made important practical contributions to agricultural chemistry and to electrical science. He was knighted in 1818 for his construction of the Davy safety lamp for coal miners.

and was slow acting. Both processes were speedily perfected, and a keen competition developed between them. Each contributed to the supplanting of cast iron with steel.¹

A large part of the growing demand for steel, which gave rise to the Bessemer and Siemens processes (and which these, in turn, served to supply), was for the construction of rail-
Extension of Steam Railways ways. The great success of the Liverpool and Manchester railway (opened in 1830) led to feverish activity in railway building in England and throughout Europe and in America. In Britain alone the mileage of steam-powered railways mounted from 49 in 1830 to 15,300 in 1870. Small lines were consolidated into large systems. London was linked by iron and steam with Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Plymouth, and, in 1847, with Edinburgh. Locomotives were improved and multiplied. Dozens of inventions were made to assure greater safety and efficiency to the new railway transportation.

Transportation by steamboat was similarly pushed forward—not only on rivers and along coasts, but also on the high seas.

Development of Steamboats In 1838 two ships crossed the Atlantic under steam power, and in 1840 Samuel Cunard inaugurated the regular trans-Atlantic passenger steamship line which has ever since been known as the Cunard line. In the 1850's screw propellers were widely adopted in place of the earlier paddle-wheels, and iron began to supplant wood as the favorite building material for the larger ships.

The cotton industry, already largely mechanized before 1830, advanced prodigiously after 1830. With the aid of railways and
Advance of Cotton Manufacture steamships, raw cotton poured into England, and machine-made cotton poured from English factories throughout Britain and into the outside world. There was steady improvement of cotton machinery; iron almost wholly replaced wood, and the "ring spinning frame,"

¹ Siemens invented his "reverberatory" furnace in 1856 and began to use gaseous fuel in it in 1861. In 1864 a French steel manufacturer, Pierre Martin, made such valuable additions to the Siemens process that it came to be known as the Siemens-Martin process. The Bessemer process, it may be added, had at first the one serious defect of not getting rid of phosphorus in the iron, but this defect was remedied in 1879 by Thomas, an Englishman, who lined the converter with lime or magnesia. The Thomas "lining" was subsequently employed in the Bessemer converter as well as in the Siemens furnace.

invented in 1830, produced coarse thread faster and more cheaply than Crompton's spinning mule. The value of British cotton exports almost tripled between 1830 and 1870 (from nineteen to fifty-six million pounds sterling).

Moreover, the revolution in the cotton industry was now communicated to the other textile industries. The new machinery for spinning and weaving had begun to be adopted by woollen manufacturers, despite the energetic protests of hand-workers, especially hand-weavers, in the years between 1800 and 1830; after 1840 its triumph in the woollen industry was assured. In the case of the linen industry, which had long been centred at Belfast in northern Ireland, power machinery was only casually employed before 1830, but thereafter it commenced to compete successfully with hand-work. The relation of the revolution in cotton to that in the other textiles may be indicated by reference to the fact that whereas the number of workers who tended factory machines constituted 65 per cent of the total number engaged in the cotton industry in 1830, and 88 per cent in 1870, the corresponding percentage in the woollen industry increased from 30 to 78, and in the linen industry from 5 to 70.

Revolution in
Other
Textiles

Among important aspects of the main phase of the Industrial Revolution from 1830 to 1870, note should be taken of the large number and great variety of traditional industries which were now mechanized for large-scale operation. Such were the textiles other than cotton. Such, too, were the boot and shoe industry, flour milling, brewing, laundering, etc.

Mechanizing of
Other
Industries

One of the most significant of these industries was the making of firearms. Alike for soldiering and for hunting, firearms had been in wide demand since at least the sixteenth century. There had been some gradual improvement in the manufacture both of cannon and of small arms but no really revolutionary change prior to 1830. The old-fashioned flintlock musket was still employed for fighting and fowling, as it had been in the age of Louis XIV. In 1836, however, the percussion cap, the principle of which had been worked out during the Napoleonic wars, was first substituted for the flintlock in the British army. At about the same time, the rifle, with its grooved barrel, was substituted for the musket, and elongated bullets for the ear-

Firearms

lier spherical ones. Breech-loading, applied first in Prussia in 1860, was soon embodied in an improved British rifle—the “Enfield.” And in 1862 Richard Gatling, an American inventor whose genius was directed toward firearms by the Civil War then raging in his country, devised a machine gun which would discharge 350 shots a minute. The Gatling machine gun definitively carried the Industrial Revolution into war and preparedness for war.

Still another important aspect of the Industrial Revolution during its main phase was the remarkable rise of certain new industries, particularly the development of food preserving, gas lighting and heating, electrical works, and photography. Each of these merits attention.

The canning of food had been attempted during the Napoleonic wars, with but indifferent success. In the 1840's, thanks to a variety of reasons—growing urban demand, greater agricultural supply, increasing experimentation and knowledge, better methods of manufacturing glass jars and tin receptacles,—canning began to be extensively and successfully practiced. By the 1860's, not only were fresh fruits and fish and vegetables being preserved by canning, but the condensed milk which an American dairyman, Gail Borden, had just patented, was being widely purveyed in cans.

The use of gas grew out of the discovery that, when coke was obtained from coal, a volatile matter—coal gas—was released which could be stored and burned. The first practical application of coal gas as an illuminant had been made early in the nineteenth century; a “gas light and coke company” had been incorporated in London in 1812; and the American city of Baltimore had contracted to light its streets with gas in 1816. After 1830 gas was generally employed for street lighting in large towns, and after 1860 for the lighting of private houses.¹

Electricity was another thing which, before 1830, had been theorized about and experimented with, but not put to much

¹ The invention at this time, by a famous German scientist, of the “Bunsen burner,” giving off an extremely hot but non-luminous flame, was useful immediately to chemists and subsequently to persons who derived from it the principle for the construction of gas heaters.

practical use. Benjamin Franklin, to be sure, had preached the blessings of "lightning-rods" back in the eighteenth century; and highly important discoveries about electricity had been made by two Italians—Galvani and Volta, by a Frenchman, Ampere, and by a German, Ohm. All these scientists gave their names to the terminology of electrical knowledge,¹ but commercial exploitation of such knowledge awaited other scientists who should be more concerned with mechanical invention.

Pioneer
Work in
Electricity

Such a scientist was Michael Faraday (1791-1867), whose father was a London blacksmith and whose formal education was of a very sketchy sort. Finding favor with Sir Humphry Davy, Faraday shared his patron's interest in "applied science" and soon surpassed him in originality of research and genius of invention. Becoming director of the laboratory of the Royal Institution of Great Britain in 1825, when the Industrial Revolution was rapidly developing, he was in a peculiarly favorable position to follow his natural bent toward practical industrial research. He made special studies of chlorine as an aid to the bleaching industry and of the chemical properties of carbon as a help to the coal industry. His most significant contributions, however, were in the field of electricity, where he took the largely theoretical findings of Volta and Ampère and deduced practical applications.

Faraday
and Elec-
troplating

Faraday's exact quantitative study of electrolysis gave rise about 1830 to the process of electroplating. By employing an electric current to induce chemical action, it was discovered that iron could be plated with nickel and thus protected against rust. Electroplating speedily became an important industry. By the 1850's it was superseding the older "Sheffield plate."

The telegraph was an even more epochal application of electricity. Ampère had suggested in 1820 that electromagnetism might be used for transmitting messages by wire between distant points, and in 1837 a practical system of electric telegraphy was patented in America by Samuel Morse, an artist by vocation and an electrician by avocation. Once begun, the building of telegraph wires spread with

The
Telegraph

¹ Besides the use of the term "galvanism," "volt" came to be defined as the electromotive force which produces a current of one "ampere" in a resistance of one "ohm."

a rapidity suggestive of the speed of the messages on the wires. In 1851 a telegraph wire was laid down in a specially prepared cable under the English Channel, thus providing almost instantaneous communication between London and Paris. Then, after several unsuccessful attempts, a submarine cable was laid across the Atlantic Ocean in 1866 and telegraphic communication was established between Britain and America. To the circulation of newspapers which railways increased and to the multiplying copies of newspapers which the iron and steam presses produced, the telegraph added a vast amount of up-to-date news from distant places for incorporation in the newspapers. A new mechanical journalism sprouted from the union of steam-engine with electrical telegraph.

Electricity also began to be applied as a motive force. In 1831 Faraday fashioned an electric dynamo or motor, but it was inefficient. Only after a long series of experiments and improvements, among which those of William Siemens and his brother Werner were probably preëminent, did commercial electric motors come into use.

It was likewise with the fourth major application of electricity—electric lighting. An electric arc had been made by Sir Humphry Davy during the Napoleonic era, but it was only a curiosity and was as commercially impracticable as Faraday's motor. A much better arc was designed by Bunsen, and during the 1860's lighting by electric arcs began to be employed commercially. Nevertheless, the recently acquired supremacy of gas for artificial lighting was not seriously threatened by electricity until after the invention of incandescent filament lamps about 1878.

Quite a different kind of new industry which arose between 1830 and 1870 was photography. It was a development, on the one hand, of the "magic lantern" or "camera obscura," which had been known since at least the sixteenth century,¹ and, on the other hand, of the eighteenth-century experimentation with silver compounds, which were sensitive to light. In 1822 a Frenchman managed to make the first photograph by exposing a specially prepared plate to the sun for six hours, and his primitive process was the starting-point for the more famous work of Daguerre (1789-1851).

¹ See Vol. I, p. 127.

Daguerre, a French painter and promoter, improved the process so much that in 1839 he could "take pictures" in thirty minutes and he advertised it so successfully that the word "daguerreotype" was long a synonym for "photograph." A quicker photographic process was evolved by Fox Talbot, an Englishman, in 1841; and, ten years later, Talbot devised a method of almost instantaneous photography. Henceforth the new art developed as a commercial industry swiftly and extensively.

If we bear in mind at once all the inventions and developments which we have sketched in the present section—machines of precision, steel making, railway building, iron steamboats with screw propellers, the application of machinery to all the textiles, rifles and machine guns, gas lighting, the canning of foods, electroplating, telegraphy, the electric dynamo and arc light, photography—and if we remember at the same time that dozens of other and older industries were being mechanized and reorganized on a factory basis for mass production, then it should be clear that the period from 1830 to 1870 truly constituted a major phase of the Industrial Revolution in Britain.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of the Revolution during this time was the unprecedented production of coal and iron. Of these minerals, there had been a remarkable increase of production during the sixty years from 1770 to 1830, but it was dwarfed in comparison with the gigantic increase during the next forty years. And naturally so. All railway locomotives and tracks and most ships were now built of iron; almost every new machine in almost every revolutionized industry now required iron for its manufacture. Moreover, for most of the new industry coal was now vitally necessary; coal was used in all the steam-engines that drove locomotives, steamboats, textile and other factory machinery; coal supplied coke for steel making and gas for lighting; coal was employed to heat food for canning and to warm factories and homes. Veritably, the age of coal and iron was come.

Age of
Coal and
Iron

A very obvious characteristic of the Revolution in its main phase was the quantitative growth of industry and commerce. Far more goods could be made by machine than by hand. Railways and macadam roads and steamboats could bring far larger stocks of raw material to factories, and distribute manufactured articles to far wider markets. Demand and supply—those ubiq-

uitous twins of modern economics—received a fresh start from every invention and ran on in a mad race with each other. As England's industry and commerce forged ahead, moreover, her population became more urban and less rural. Back in 1770 Arthur Young had estimated that the English agricultural class then comprised almost half of the country's population. By 1831 it comprised less than a third, and in 1871 hardly a sixth. It was obvious by this date that England was the workshop of the world, and that the masses of her people no longer harvested crops or tended sheep as their ancestors for countless centuries had done. They now lived in towns, dug minerals, or tended machines, and served as cogs in the wheels of the new industry or the new commerce.

Yet when we speak of the Industrial Revolution, we must not forget that agriculture was itself revolutionized into what is described today as an "industry." Agricultural change was, indeed, one of the outstanding features of the main phase of the Industrial Revolution.

On the one hand, England's agricultural population, relative to her total population, declined sharply, as we have just noted. On the other hand, the demand for agricultural products increased even more—the demand of multiplying factories for raw materials and the demand of rapidly growing cities for foodstuffs. More food and more materials (meat, milk, vegetables, wool, flax, cotton, leather, etc.) had to be supplied by fewer persons. The problem was solved in Britain, partly by importing a larger quantity of agricultural products from abroad, and partly by applying new machinery and new methods to agricultural production at home.

What has been termed an "agricultural revolution" had occurred in Britain in the eighteenth century. It had involved the introduction of capitalistic, large-scale, "scientific" farming, the putting of pasture lands under cultivation, the development of crop rotation and "horse-hoeing husbandry," the improvement of breeds of farm animals, the "enclosure" of common lands,¹ the growth of large private estates, and the consequent replacing of comparatively independent small-scale farmers with a class of agricultural laborers directly dependent for jobs and wages on a landlord or his "manager." This agricultural revolution soon

¹ The "enclosure" movement, developing rapidly in the latter half of the eighteenth century, culminated in the first four decades of the nineteenth century.

demonstrated that a large estate under scientific management could produce with fewer farm-hands more foodstuffs than had been produced by a large number of farmers working on the same area under the antiquated strip system. And farmers who were forced off their ancestral lands by the agricultural revolution helped to provide factory hands or mine workers for the Industrial Revolution, which just then was in its preliminary phase. England's agricultural revolution¹ certainly helps to explain why England had an industrial revolution.

For a time English agriculture (or, at any rate, English landlords) benefited greatly from the changes in industry as well as from those in farming. The "corn laws" and, even more, the Napoleonic wars served to limit, if not actually to stop, the importation of grain from the Continent and thus to preserve English markets for English grain, at the very time when a greater quantity of grain was required for the augmenting population of English industrial towns. In the circumstances, the price of foodstuffs went up and English landlords planted more grain and reaped richer profits.

By 1815, however, the prosperity of English agriculture was seriously threatened. The cessation of the Napoleonic wars brought a renewal of normal trade relations between Britain and the Continent and the subsequent modification of the corn laws permitted a considerable importation of foreign grain, with which domestic grain had difficulty in competing. English agriculture was in a slough of despond for almost twenty-five years after 1815.

Then came a great revival and development of agriculture—extending over the years from 1840 to 1874 and coinciding approximately with the main phase of the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, agriculture now became an "industry," marked by much the same developments as were revolutionizing the textile and metal and many other industries. One important factor in the process was the rapid construction, after 1830, of railways. These enabled the products of English farms to be carried to city markets more expeditiously and less wastefully than hitherto. And the fact that steam railways reached a high stage of development earlier than steamships was of special significance in explaining why for at least three decades English industrial towns were better

Industri-
alization
of Agri-
culture

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 466-469, 716-717.

markets for products brought by rail from English soil than for those transported by boat from foreign lands.

Another important factor was the application to agriculture of "practical science," particularly engineering and chemistry, which, as we have had occasion to remark, was closely allied to the Industrial Revolution during its main phase. Engineering science, as employed for the construction of railways and macadam roads, was backed by agricultural, as well as by strictly industrial, capitalists.

Landlords soon learned, moreover, that engineering science could be utilized directly for agricultural purposes, especially for systematic drainage and other works making for a material access of tillable land. In 1823, a certain James Smith, the manager and engineer of a cotton factory, inaugurated on a farm, near his factory, systems of drainage and deep ploughing which converted marshes into gardens and stimulated wide interest and considerable imitation; a book of his, *Remarks on Thorough Draining and Deep Ploughing* (1831), enjoyed a large sale. In 1845 a machine was patented for the manufacture of drain tiles. "Drainage works" speedily became a commonplace of English agriculture and a tie between it and the Industrial Revolution.

The basic contribution of chemical science to agriculture was made by a German professor, Justus von Liebig. He showed conclusively that plants take certain minerals from the soil, thus tending to "exhaust" it, and he urged that, as a preventive of soil exhaustion and an aid to plant growth, tillable land should be scientifically fed with fertilizers containing the requisite chemicals. Liebig's doctrines were propagated in Britain through the translation and circulation of his famous book, *Chemistry in its Bearing on Agriculture and Physiology* (1840), and also through the activity of an agricultural station which one of his disciples set up in England to conduct scientific experiments with soils and fertilizers. In 1843 the director of this station began the manufacture of superphosphate of lime, which was soon sold in quantity. Moreover, the importation of Peruvian guano, which had amounted to only 1,700 tons in 1841, rose to 220,000 tons in 1847; and the use of nitrate of soda grew proportionately in the 1850's. As the age of "chemical agriculture" advanced, the production of English farms (with fewer hands) increased.

Still another important factor in compensating English agri-

culture for the shortage of manual labor was the invention and adoption of farm machinery. Horse-hoes and horse-rakes were improved. Mechanical drills, ploughs, cultivators, and threshing machines were developed.

Agricultural Machinery

In 1853 the "Croskill reaper" was perfected in England, and at about the same time the "McCormick reaper" began to be imported from the United States. This latter, it may be remarked, was the invention of Cyrus McCormick, a farmer of western Virginia who took out his first patent in 1834 and, after effecting further betterment of his machines, set up at Chicago a factory for their commercial production.

With the advent of machinery and applied science, British agriculture was "industrialized." It became a prosperous business and attained to a high degree of technical excellence. Of some English landlords it was reported in 1870 that they offered a reward to anyone who could find a weed on their cultivated land. No other country could then show such yields of grain and root-crops per acre; and dealers came from all over the world to buy English live stock with which to improve the farm animals of their several countries. Such supremacy, to be sure, was not long maintained, but while it lasted—say from 1850 to 1870—it demonstrated that a basic alteration and advance of agriculture, hardly less than of transportation and manufacturing, characterized the main phase of the Industrial Revolution.

4. INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM

An impressive accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution in England during the century from 1770 to 1870 was the growth of capitalism. Capitalism did not originate with the Revolution, for it had been steadily developing since at least the sixteenth century, and without a considerable accumulation of wealth and a widespread desire for profits the Industrial Revolution could not have occurred.

Prior to the Revolution, however, capitalism had been mainly commercial or financial. Wealth had been accumulated in Europe principally from overseas commerce and had been applied, through such banking centres as Florence, Augsburg, Antwerp, and latterly Amsterdam and London, to the promotion of ever more pretentious overseas undertakings and likewise, within Europe, to the stimulation of

Previous Capitalism, Commercial or Financial

agriculture and the "domestic system" of industry. So obviously dependent was this capitalistic industry upon trade that in England the word "trade" came to denote not only commerce in general but any industry whose products were traded; thus, the "iron trade" meant the manufacture of iron as well as commerce in iron.

Moreover, the earlier capitalism had been managed and directed chiefly by landed nobles and upper middle-class persons, whose activities did not radically undermine the traditional society of Europe. As late as the eighteenth century the mass of Europeans were peasants, engaged in agriculture; and if an increasing number of them were engaging in capitalistic industry, they were doing so, through the "putting-out" system, in their own homes and in combination with farm-work. Certain industries, such as mining and metallurgy, had long been capitalistic (in the modern sense), owned and operated by capitalists and employing fairly large numbers of workingmen who were neither farmers nor guildsmen. Besides, certain other industries, such as cotton and pottery, had been developing outside the guilds and drawing workmen from the land. Yet in most industries a premium was put upon skilled artisans, and in most countries guild regulations about apprenticeship were respected.

England in 1770 was different from other European countries not so much in the kind as in the degree of its capitalism. England had relatively large capital, easily accessible through banks, to finance the manufacture and installation of such machinery as Arkwright's water-frame, Cartwright's power loom, Smeaton's pump, Cort's "processes," and Watt's steam-engine.

But such machinery, once in successful operation, served to enhance capitalism and to give it novel significance. It became distinctively *industrial*. How this happened may be learned from an examination of certain effects of mechanizing industry.

Most of the new industrial machinery was far too expensive to be owned by peasants or artisans and much too cumbersome and complicated to be housed in their cottages or operated by them without superintendence. Hence it was purchased by wealthy men, or by "promoters" with the backing of wealthy

NOTE. The picture opposite is from the engraving of a British warship, *The Fighting Temeraire*, by J. M. W. Turner (1775-1851). On Turner, see Vol. I, p. 748.

Newer
Industrial
Capital-
ism

men, and it was installed and operated in special buildings—factories or foundries—which the same wealthy men put up and to which they could bring numerous workingmen to tend the machines under expert central guidance.

In other words, the factory (or mill) came with industrial machinery. It is true that there had been some mills or factories before the Industrial Revolution, and some factory-like foundries and collieries in connection with metallurgical industry. The fact remains, however, that only with the advent of much machinery at the end of the eighteenth century did the factory become a common and usual centre of industrial production. Thereafter, we may speak of a *factory system* prevailing in the “great industry” and carried on by machines in capitalists’ factories. It was obviously very different from the *domestic system* of the older, and still continuing, “little industry” conducted by hand or simple tools in the workers’ houses. For a long time the new factory system and the old domestic system existed side by side, and even today the latter has not wholly disappeared in England or anywhere else. But in measure as an industry has been mechanized, the factory system has tended to dominate and then to supplant the domestic system.

Another important fact to be borne in mind is that the owners of machinery and factories were in a position to make far greater profits than the middle-men who utilized the hand-work and home-work of artisans and peasants. The domestic worker usually labored hard for a very small wage, but his employer could get from him only what he actually made with his own hands and tools, and he frequently alternated work for his industrial employer with agricultural work for himself. On the other hand, the factory worker, usually divorced from the land and deprived of any income from that source, labored exclusively for his industrial employer, and labored in such a way that his employer got from him much more than he could possibly have produced with his own hands. In the factory, it was the machine which really did the work, and it did an amount of work which, before its invention, could only have been done by ten, or a hundred, or a thousand human beings. The machine

NOTE. The picture opposite is from an etching, entitled “Things that Tower,” by an American artist, Joseph Pennell (1860-1926).

was thus equivalent to so many human beings; they were iron men because they were mechanical; and they were iron slaves to the employer because he owned the machine. The factory worker was merely an overseer of gangs of iron slaves; he tended them and made them work; and their multiplying production accrued less to his profit than to the capitalists who owned them.

Machine-owning capitalists were at first of two kinds. Some were persons who had already been enriched by the earlier commercial capitalism and who belonged to the upper middle class or the landed nobility. These were enabled by their ownership of extensive estates, as well as by their association with banks and their familiarity with joint-stock companies, to apply new machinery and new processes to coal mining and iron working. Such a gentleman as the Duke of Bridgewater, coal magnate and canal builder, is a good example of the aristocratic agricultural capitalist who during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution turned industrial capitalist. Other machine-owning capitalists, however, were "self-made men," drawn from the lower classes, without previous name or fame. These came to the fore, particularly in the textile industry, by reason of inventive genius and ability as "promoters." Arkwright, the ex-barber, was such a "self-made man," and such too, with the assistance of Matthew Boulton, was James Watt. In numerous like cases, the "self-made man" shared profits of factory production with established capitalists and often became an outstanding capitalist himself.

Early industrial capitalists were likely to be in close and direct contact with their business enterprises. Richard Arkwright, for example, was not so much a passive capitalist as an active "promoter," manager, superintendent, and dealer. As "promoter" he contracted loans, built factories, and installed machinery. As manager, he hired workmen and sought profits with which he could pay off the loans and amass wealth for himself. As superintendent, he sped from mill to mill in his "coach and four," seeing that the work was being done properly, that the laborers were not idle, that the machines were in good order. As dealer, he purchased the raw cotton and sold the finished goods. Richard Arkwright, like many other industrial capitalists of his day, was both shrewd and hard-working; the title of knighthood which King George III conferred upon the ex-barber seemed an ap-

propriate reward for his abundant qualities of assiduity and ambition.

As time went on and the factory system became more complicated, and especially as larger industrial enterprises, like railways, were undertaken, the individual capitalist tended to play a less active rôle. Ownership of large-scale industry passed from individuals and partnerships to joint-stock companies and corporations, which entrusted the superintendence and dealing, even the management and promotion, to salaried employees and which contented themselves with floating the necessary loans (in the form of stocks or bonds) and distributing the ensuing profits (in the form of dividends or interest) among their directing officers and among "investors" outside. In this way, many industrial capitalists came to have no personal relationship with the business from which their profits were derived. They were mere investors, delivering profits which they had obtained from one industry to a banker or broker for investment in another industry and receiving income, perhaps from several different industries, without serious expenditure of mental or physical energy on their part. There was, of course, a considerable element of gambling in this procedure. Individual investors might lose, as well as make, fortunes. Not knowing first-hand much about a given enterprise, they might invest in one which was badly conceived or badly managed. Even well-managed and normally profitable enterprises might occasionally experience "hard times" and suffer reverses. In such instances directors of large means could afford, better than small investors, temporarily to forego profits and patiently to await a revival of business.

By means of machinery and the factory system, the wealth of England increased prodigiously during the period of the Industrial Revolution. Just as previous and relatively modest accumulations of capital had permitted the Industrial Revolution to get under way in England, so larger accumulations resulted from every major advance of the Revolution and paved the way in turn for new progress. The quantitative growth of industrial capitalism from 1770 to 1830 carried England from the preliminary phase into the main phase of the Industrial Revolution, and its forward leap during the main phase, from 1830 to 1870, introduced

Multipli-
cation of
Industrial
Capital in
England

England to an even higher stage of industrialization, as we shall have occasion to show in a later chapter.

It is impossible to state precisely what the wealth of England amounted to at any given time, but from certain estimates which have been made¹ some notion of its growth may be obtained. According to these estimates, the value of English capital, fixed at 500 million pounds sterling in 1750, rose to 1,500 million in 1800, and to 6,000 million in 1865. If such sums had been distributed evenly among all the people, every man, woman, and child in England would have had £71 in 1750, £167 in 1800, and £275 in 1865. In fact, however, they were not distributed evenly. The portion of them representing the value of land and agricultural equipment—a portion which declined from 60 per cent in 1750 to 31 per cent in 1875—belonged to a relatively small number of titled aristocrats and country gentlemen, while the waxing remainder of English wealth, representing chiefly the value of mines, factories, and shipping, was owned by industrial capitalists—an undoubtedly growing group but growing proportionately less than the total population.

Hence, while the mass of the English people were not immediately benefited economically by the Industrial Revolution, the capitalist class, including landlords, as well as bankers, commercial magnates, and machine manufacturers (among whom must be reckoned some persons who had risen from poverty), were enormously enriched and rendered very powerful. These added wealth to riches. The new wealth came from coal, iron, machines, factory production. It came from improved means of transportation—canals, macadam roads, railways, and steamboats. It came from a rapidly expanding domestic market for the products of English industry; the population of England increased from seven and a half million in 1770 to almost twenty-three million in 1871. It came from foreign trade, which grew in value from 32 million pounds sterling in 1785 to 546 million in 1870. It came also from investments abroad, for especially after 1815 England exported capital as well as commodities.

We have said that the mass of the English people were not immediately benefited economically by the Industrial Revolution. Indeed, for a considerable time they were worse off under

¹ G. R. Porter, *The Progress of the Nation*, new ed. by F. W. Hirst (1912), pp. 694-705.

the new régime of industrial capitalism than they had been previously. The large number of them who had been engaged in domestic manufacture, along with agricultural work, gradually discovered that they could not successfully compete with factory manufacture. They could produce by hand an ever lessening fraction of what a machine could produce, and the wages which they received from middle-men correspondingly decreased. The lot of hand-loom weavers in competition with mechanical weaving, for example, was pitiable and tragic. Persons who clung to hand-weaving were reduced to incessant toil and the direst poverty. Some rioted vainly and attempted to smash machines and destroy factories. Others gave up the unequal contest, and, prevented by "enclosures" and the excess of agricultural laborers from making a full living on the land, they put away their hand-looms and spinning-wheels, packed up their few personal belongings, and with their families left the rural cottage and went off to seek employment in a factory town.

Little Immediate Benefit for the Masses

But if it was almost impossible to earn a living by hand-work in the country, it was by no means easy to earn a living in the city by machine-work. Machines, in order to do vastly more work than all the human beings in England, required, as we have pointed out, only a relatively small number of human workers to oversee and tend them. With the rapidly increasing population of England, which was concentrating in the cities, there were more persons seeking factory jobs than could be profitably employed.

Many persons did find employment in factories, mines, and foundries, on railways and steamboats, or in other novel undertakings of the Industrial Revolution. But even for the more fortunate, there was likely to be an anxious period of transition from one occupation to another, involving many difficulties of adaptation to unfamiliar environment and to strange ways of living and working. And such employees were degraded into the position of "proletarians," owning no property, possessing no land or tools or any capital of their own, dependent exclusively on daily wages, and living in rented rooms.

Lot of Machine-Operating Proletarians

The life and labor of the English masses under the earlier systems of manorial agriculture and domestic industry have sometimes been too glowingly idealized. Rural cottages of the

old régime were small and uncomfortable, and their inmates—women and small children as well as men—knew all about hard work, long hours, and small wages, and usually something firsthand about pestilence and famine. Yet the life and labor of the English masses under the factory system of industry, at least in its preliminary phase, can hardly be described too sombrely.

Congestion was one characteristic of the new system. Several big machines were huddled in one building—the factory—which was put up usually with haste and cheapness and with little attention to problems of lighting, ventilation, or sanitation. Then, about one factory so located as to avail itself most economically of motive power—water or coal—and of transportation facilities, other factories tended to cluster.¹ And then, around an ever-congesting industrial centre of machines, water-wheels, and smokestacks, would be grouped row after row of tenement houses, constructed for factory workers with even greater haste and cheapness and with even less thought of light and air than was bestowed on the housing of machines. In dark and dingy quarters, whose supply was usually behind the demand, lived in congestion and squalor an aggregation of human beings—a whole family in a room or two, a single block of tenements housing more persons than many a country village. Congestion involved not only the concentration of industrial plants but also the growth of ugly, insanitary city slums.

Monotony was another characteristic of the new system. There was monotony in the appearance of factory towns, in the rectangular blocks and the rows of box-like tenements; and there was monotony in factory labor. The factory worker did not daily alternate one kind of occupation with another; he was not weaving at one hour and hoeing at another; his time was not his own. He came and went at the sound of the factory whistle. He worked steadily for long hours—twelve, fourteen, and even more—amid the monotonous buzz and hum of machinery. Moreover, the work itself was monotonous. It was not, for the individual worker, the whole varied process of

¹ The northern and midland counties of England, which before the Revolution had been more sparsely inhabited than the southern counties, now became, thanks to their water-power and their deposits of coal and iron, the chief seats of industrial enterprise, and such cities as Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Newcastle, Glasgow, and Liverpool became the most populous, with the exception of London, in all England.

making cloth, but rather it was attention to one particular detail—tending some part of a machine, pulling a lever, brushing away dirt, mending broken threads. This was an outcome of the “division of labor,” which the Industrial Revolution emphasized and which undoubtedly contributed to speed and efficiency of production but which tended to make the worker almost an automaton, habitually repeating some special operation and suffering consequently from rustiness of mind and restiveness of body. Boredom and nervousness were further accentuated by the necessity of the worker’s keeping pace with the machine, no matter how tired he might be, for the machine seldom slackened its speed, and prompt accurate action on the part of the worker, no matter how trivial it might seem in itself, was vitally necessary to machine production.

Finally, insecurity of employment was characteristic of the new system, and it had several aspects. (1) The growing urban proletariat was utterly dependent on the wages of industry. Its members had no land, not even garden patches from which they could supplement their income and on which they could fall back at least for food if they lost their industrial jobs. (2) There was a surplus of urban proletarians who had nothing to sell but their labor. The result was keen and bitter competition among them for factory jobs, a fact which factory owners were not slow to perceive and profit from. Wages could be kept low, and factory workers could be discharged with the certain knowledge that at least equally competent and cheap workers would take their places. (3) The factory system put a premium on unskilled workmen. For most factory jobs, neither high intelligence nor a long period of apprenticeship was requisite. Indeed, there was a marked preference for persons who were mechanically rather than mentally inclined and who did not think they knew all about the industry.

(4) There was a marked preference for the employment of women and children, particularly in the textile industries.¹ They were used to smaller wages. They were more amenable to orders. They were apt to be nimbler and more conscientious. In some factories children of eight or nine years of age worked from five or six o’clock in the

Insecurity

Employment of
Women
and
Children

¹ In mining, too, women and children were employed to pull carts through underground tunnels and to the surface.

morning till ten or eleven at night, with very little time off for meals and none for recreation. Employment of women and children was no novel invention of the Industrial Revolution, but it was novel, under the factory system, to employ them away from home and in mass. It had, of course, disruptive effects on the family and on home life and sadly deleterious effects on health and morals. It also had the effect of lowering the level of wages and the standard of living and of depriving many able-bodied men of jobs. Not infrequently, in fact, the traditional relations of the family were reversed; wives and children became the bread-winners, while grown men kept what house there was and vainly sought employment or resigned themselves to chronic idleness.

(5) Before the Industrial Revolution almost anyone could work who would; the labor might be arduous and its returns meagre, but there was some remunerative work for everyone; unemployed persons were "rogues and vagabonds." With the Revolution, however, appeared a

Unemployment new social phenomenon, the product of the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs—the phenomenon of chronic unemployment. With the large-scale mechanizing of industry and the rise of the factory system, a considerable number of persons (sometimes larger and sometimes smaller) who could and would work were unable to find work to do. They constituted a jobless as well as landless element in the proletariat, and existed, in the midst of great accumulations of capital, only on public bounty or private charity. (6) A larger number of persons might obtain jobs but lose them through industrial depressions or crises, through age or impaired efficiency, through strikes and other labor disputes, through perfecting of machinery or invention of new processes. Whatever the cause, the result was a high degree of insecurity in employment and income for the mass of industrial workers. (7) Even workers who were fortunate enough to have steady employment were ordinarily in receipt of wages which barely sufficed for their immediate needs. They could not provide adequately for old age, for illness or accident, for schooling of dependents. They could have for themselves few of the comforts and luxuries which in ever greater abundance they were helping to produce.

In fine, the immediate economic effects of the Industrial Revolution were, on the one hand, to add enormously to English

wealth and capital and, on the other hand, to degrade the English masses and enlarge the urban proletariat. In time, as we shall point out in subsequent chapters of this book, much was done in England, and elsewhere, to better the lot of industrial workers and to improve the material conditions of their life and labor. The worst conditions undoubtedly prevailed in England during the preliminary phase of the Industrial Revolution, from 1770 to 1830, and some improvement was already perceptible during the main phase, from 1830 to 1870. Yet nowhere and at no time to the present day has any acceptable solution been found of the most basic problem which industrialization entailed, and which its continuing progress has only served to complicate, the problem of how, in the midst of multiplying abundance, to prevent poverty.

Against the undoubtedly unfortunate effects of industrial capitalism and the factory system must be set some real or potential advantages. Industrial capitalism, we must emphasize, was the historically vital force in the Industrial Revolution; and the Industrial Revolution represented an epochal attempt to subdue nature and make it serve human ends. Through the coming of machinery, a man could produce a wide range of luxuries as well as necessities, and he could produce them in a fraction of the time which had been required by previous hand-work. He could travel much faster and more cheaply. He could live more comfortably, with electric lights, steam heat, a profusion of mechanical conveniences. He could feed on the most varied products of the whole world. He could know quickly what was happening throughout the world. From routine toil he could be assured of leisure for recreation and for self-cultivation, mental and spiritual as well as physical. It must be noted that in reference to all these admittedly desirable ends, we have used the word *could*. We know that few of them were actually realized for the English masses by the coming of machinery. This sad fact, however, was not the fault of machinery. Machinery was *potentially* a great blessing to mankind. Its coming, together with the amazing development of industrial capitalism, held out to the masses, not less than to the classes, an inspiring and substantial hope.

Moreover, there were direct and perhaps more tangible advantages of the new system, even to the proletariat. In contrast

Potential
Advantages of
Industrialization

with the domestic system which kept industrial workers apart, the factory system brought them together and eventually led them to unite for the promotion of their common interests. The rise of trade unionism, with its certainly beneficial effects upon living and working conditions, was a concomitant of the rise of industrial capitalism. Then, too, the urban proletariat was a far more vocal and effective force than the rural workers had been in denouncing abuses and demanding reforms. And there can be little doubt that life in a factory town, with all its misery and squalor, was preferred to country life by a large number of persons. It was at once more sociable to those who liked company and more concealing to those who wished to live aloof. It was more casual and, to many, more exhilarating.

5. SPREAD OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

So far, we have spoken of the Industrial Revolution almost wholly as an English (or British) development. Such it was during most of its preliminary phase, from 1770 to 1830. It began in England, for reasons which have been set forth in the first section of the present chapter; and the advantage which England thereby gained was strengthened by the circumstances of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, from 1793 to 1815, by the continuing vigor throughout these years of rural economy and guild regulations on the Continent, by the confirming of peasant proprietorship of land in France, and by Britain's legal prohibition, until 1825, of the export of machinery.

With the increase of industrial capitalism in England, it was quite natural that some Englishmen should invest surplus capital in foreign enterprises. As early as 1781 an English iron-master established the famous Creusot ironworks in France and equipped them with a steam-engine. Then, while the Napoleonic wars were in progress, a goodly number of English mechanics coöperated with English capitalists (and foreign governments) to smuggle textile and other machinery out of Britain and to install it in factories, especially in the Netherlands, in order to profit from the exceptional demand of Continental peoples at that time for cheap clothing and for war munitions. For example, William Cockerill, an English mechanic and inventor, with the assistance of English capital,

constructed in 1799 at Verviers in the southern Netherlands (it then belonged to France and is now in Belgium) the first woollen machines on the Continent, and in 1807 he established a large machine shop at Liège.


After the restoration of peace and more normal trade relations in 1815, machine production was extended on the Continent.

For a long time the bulk of machine-made goods continued to come from English factories and foundries, but as a growing number of persons on the Continent were anxious to emulate English capitalists and as English capital and English engineers could be drawn

**Begin-
nings of
Industrial
Revolution
on the
Continent**

upon to finance and operate new industrial enterprises, Continental factories and foundries (usually equipped with machinery whose parts or designs were derived from England) began to spring up and to supply some of the Continental market. John Cockerill, the son of William Cockerill, formed a partnership with the King of the Netherlands in 1817; the King supplied confiscated church buildings and Cockerill additional funds and the brains for housing and developing a great iron foundry at Seraing (near Liège). By 1840, Seraing was the largest plant of its kind in the world, making steam-engines and employing 2,500 men. By this time, too, Cockerill owned cotton, woollen, and linen factories, and a paper mill in Belgium, spinning mills and zinc mines in Germany, forges in southern France, a cotton mill at Barcelona (in Spain), a cloth factory in Poland, a sugar plant in Dutch Guiana (in South America), and had important investments in other enterprises.

During the main phase of the Industrial Revolution in England, from 1830 to 1870, the Revolution became really impressive in certain Continental countries. The legal prohibition on the export of machinery from Britain was now removed. Moreover, the progress of the Revolution in Britain was providing an ever-growing amount of surplus capital for export abroad and an ever-increasing incentive to ambitious foreigners to visit Britain and to study and imitate its financial methods and industrial technic. Besides, the successful opening of the first important railway in England in 1830 created an enthusiasm for widespread railway construction, not only in Britain but also on the Continent, and railways speeded up the Industrial Revolution on the Continent as well as in Britain. Furthermore, thanks



to the patronage of Continental bankers and statesmen, considerable funds were now available outside Britain for supplementing the foreign investments of English capitalists.

Belgium was the first country on the Continent to be revolutionized industrially. Here the process began before 1830, but afterwards it went on rapidly, so that by 1870 Belgium was already the most densely populated country in Europe and a majority of its inhabitants were urban.

As early as 1834—only four years after the completion of the Liverpool and Manchester railway in England—the Belgian parliament adopted a plan (which had been drawn up by George Stephenson) for the construction of a national system of railways radiating from Liège and Brussels, and, through loans contracted in England, the plan was carried into effect speedily and profitably. Thenceforth, relative to her population, Belgium kept pace with Britain in industrial development.

France was more slowly and much less thoroughly industrialized. Her mineral resources were less plentiful, and her traditions of hand-work, luxury manufacture, and small-scale agriculture were more solidly entrenched. Yet the Industrial Revolution gradually penetrated France. At first it affected mining and metallurgy. The output of coal rose from 800,000 tons in 1815 (about the same as in 1770) to 1,800,000 in 1830, and of pig iron from 100,000 to 300,000 tons, while the number of steam-engines increased from 15 to 625 (still used mainly for pumping water out of mines). After 1830 the French government was more favorably disposed toward machine industry; and such industry was especially vitalized by railway construction, which began in France in 1842 with a line from Paris to Rouen and thence to Le Havre (built by an English company with English capital and English workmen), and was extended farther and farther during the 1850's and 1860's, radiating out from Paris to Strasbourg, Lyons, Marseilles, Brest, Bordeaux, and Toulouse. From 1830 to 1870, the output of French coal increased from 1,800,000 tons to 16,000,000, and of French pig iron from 300,000 to 1,400,000 tons, while the horse-power of French steam-engines (exclusive of locomotives and marine engines) rose from 20,000 to 336,000. After 1840, moreover, power-driven machinery began seriously to compete with hand-work in the French textile industries. Most of the new mechanical

industry in France was concentrated in the north of the country—in Alsace and Lorraine and in the regions about Lille, Rouen, and Paris. Nevertheless, despite the coming of railways and factories, with significant social and political consequences, France remained in 1870 predominantly agricultural, and the domestic system of industry still flourished widely.

Germany, despite vast resources of coal and iron, was even more backward than France. Although some machinery was brought in from England and a few factories were built prior to 1830, there was hardly the beginning of an industrial revolution in Germany until after that date. The formation of the *Zollverein* (the tariff union of most of the German states except Austria) in 1833, actuated by agricultural demands,¹ served to stimulate trade and simultaneously to foster the desire and provide some surplus capital for improving the means of internal transportation. In 1839, with the additional aid of English capital, the first important German railway was built from Dresden to Leipzig; and by 1848 Germany (including Austria) possessed some 4,000 miles of railway, connecting Berlin with Hamburg, the Rhine, Cracow, Prague, Vienna, and Laibach. In Germany, unlike England, Belgium, and France, railway construction preceded the real beginnings of industrialization; but just as railways speeded up foundries and factories in those countries, so it brought them into being in Germany. Here the coal output, less than France's in 1850, rose to 16 million tons in 1860 and to 37 1/2 million in 1870, while the production of pig iron jumped to half a million tons in 1860 and to almost two million in 1870. In the meantime power-driven machinery was being applied to cotton spinning, and textile factories were arising in Saxony, Silesia, Westphalia, and the Rhineland. Cotton weaving, as well as the manufacture of other textiles, still remained predominantly a hand industry in 1870, and at this date 64 per cent of the population of Germany were classed as rural and agricultural, as compared with 36 per cent urban and industrial. Yet the Industrial Revolution was clearly under way in Germany; its revolutionary consequences were to become obvious after 1870.

Elsewhere on the Continent, large-scale manufacturing appeared before 1870—occasionally and sporadically. There was

¹ On the formation of the *Zollverein*, see Vol. I, p. 794.

some development in Russian Poland, and a few factories were erected by English "promoters" at St. Petersburg and Moscow. There were some instances in the Dutch Netherlands,¹ in Sweden, in Spain. Bohemia (especially Prague) and German Austria (especially Vienna) participated somewhat in the mechanizing of industry, but other areas of the Habsburg Empire—and the vast expanse of the Russian and Ottoman Empires—were scarcely touched as yet by the Revolution. Into northern Italy (Piedmont), Count Cavour acquired his first fame—and large wealth—as a promoter of industrial undertakings; yet before 1870 the factory system was embryonic in the north and hardly existent elsewhere in Italy.

Elsewhere
in Europe

Overseas, English machinery and English capital helped to inaugurate the Industrial Revolution in the United States. Here, as we have noted earlier in the present chapter, there was a good deal of mechanical invention, and in the northeastern part of the country there was considerable factory production, before 1830. Afterwards, the progress of industrialization was more rapid. Factories for large-scale production of textiles and shoes sprang up in New England; extensive building and operation of railways between 1840 and 1870 led to a prodigious development of coal mining and iron-working in Pennsylvania and also of markets for machine-made goods of every kind. These markets continued to be served largely by British factories, and the majority of the American people continued to devote themselves to agriculture, but it was evident by 1870 that the United States was to become a great industrial nation.

In
America

In general, it may be said that the Industrial Revolution, occurring originally in England between 1770 and 1870, spread significantly to Belgium about 1815, to France about 1825, to the United States about 1830, to Germany about 1850, to Italy about 1860. With the exception of Great Britain and Belgium, all these countries were still preponderantly agricultural in 1870, but in all of them manufacturing was growing faster than agriculture, while machine manufacture, the factory system, and industrial capitalism were expanding at the expense of hand-

¹ The Dutch Netherlands (Holland) continued to be important economically, but by reason more of the older commercial and financial capitalism than of the newer industrial capitalism.

work, the "domestic" system, and the older and more traditional class distinctions.

The Industrial Revolution in its beginnings was evolutionary rather than truly revolutionary. The date of 1770 for its beginning in England is, of course, quite arbitrary, and so too are the several dates which have been assigned to its spread to other countries. But even so, it is much more defensible to maintain that the Industrial Revolution had definite beginnings than that it has had an end. The date of 1870 is not only arbitrary; it is purely imaginary. We have used it simply because by that time a leading country of Europe had been radically changed from an old agricultural and commercial basis to a new basis of industry and because the factors in producing such a change in one country were already operating to bring about a similar change in other countries.

Before following the later course of the Industrial Revolution, we shall do well to turn aside and consider the political and cultural developments which in Europe paralleled the progress of industrialization from 1830 to 1870.



CHAPTER XVI

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM

I. THE STATE-SYSTEM AND THE RISE OF LIBERALISM



AT LEAST superficially, the state-system of Europe in 1830 was about what it had been in the eighteenth or seventeenth century. There were numerous independent states. Certain of them, by reason of their size or strength, were accounted Great Powers—Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Others ranked as “second-class” powers—Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, and (latterly) the Ottoman Empire. Others, though aspiring to a higher position, could appropriately be described as “third-class”—Portugal, Denmark, Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, etc. Still others, constituting the largest number, were almost negligible in resources—minor German and Italian states, the loose federation of Swiss cantons, etc.

Great
Powers
and
Others

In 1830 the form of government in European states was as predominantly monarchical as it had been in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. There were still a few so-called republics including the Swiss cantons and four city-states in Germany,¹ but elsewhere—from England to

Preva-
lence of
Monarchy

Russia and from Sweden to Spain—government continued to be carried on under the old name and with the traditional etiquette of monarchy. The European monarchs of 1830, as of an earlier century, might differ in title—emperor, king, or grand-duke; they might be “limited,” like the king of Great Britain, or “autocratic,” like the tsar of Russia. But they remained a select little caste, belonging to famed families, such as Habsburg, Bourbon, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Saxe-Coburg, now much intermarried;² greeting one another as “brother” or

¹ Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfurt.

² For dynastic relationships in the nineteenth century, see the several genealogical tables, pp. 94, 124, 350, 392, 432, 450, 474, 494.

"cousin"; and solemnly talking at home and abroad about "my people," "my army," and "my government." Around these monarchs, moreover, were still grouped the traditional ranks of European society—titled nobility, privileged clergy, a bourgeois class (reckoned as "the citizens," that is, as respectable city dwellers), an artisan class, and a peasantry (still by far the largest part of the population of every European state except Great Britain and Belgium). In regions of western Europe, the nobility and clergy had recently suffered some loss of wealth and prestige, but this perhaps was only temporary, and elsewhere—in Britain, as well as all over central and eastern Europe—they appeared as indispensable props and decorous adornments of abiding European society and civilization.

Nevertheless, beneath the superficial appearance of the European state-system in 1830, four novel developments were to have, sooner or later, profound effects upon it. One was the Industrial Revolution, of which we have spoken in the preceding chapter. A second was the spread and intensification of nationalism, accompanied by ever more insistent efforts to base the state-system on the principle of nationality. This we shall discuss in the next chapter. The other two developments were quite apparent in 1830: the one had to do with the *conduct of government* in most European states; the other had to do with the rise, especially in western and southern Europe, of *liberal ideas* about the functions of state government and international relations. These two developments we shall here briefly sketch.

As to the *conduct of government*, it must be emphasized that the average European state was more governed and better governed in 1830 than it had been under the "old régime" before 1789. The French Revolution and the reforms of the Napoleonic era had served to carry the evolution of governmental administration a considerable distance beyond any achievement of the "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century. The French government was more substantial under Charles X and Louis Philippe than under Louis XIV; the Prussian government, under Frederick William IV than under Frederick the Great.

State government had been, until 1789, almost wholly a court government.¹ On the Continent, at least, it had usually been in

¹ Except, of course, in Great Britain, where the definite departure from court government dated from the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689.

the hands of courtiers who enjoyed the royal favor and were appointed directly by the monarch. The functions of government had been relatively few and inadequately discharged. Government finance had been disorderly; and state taxes, inequitably levied and badly collected, had barely sufficed to maintain the officials, the court, and the army. The state government as such had had little surplus to spend on public works, schools, or hospitals.

By 1830 the functions of state government were in the hands of comparatively competent officials, with an orderly organization into ministries under chiefs who were still customarily appointed by the monarch but who were now entrusted with a large measure of independence in choosing subordinates and determining policies. Even where the monarch was "unlimited" by constitution and in theory still exercised "personal rule," his powers were largely delegated to departmental heads. That these heads, and likewise their subordinates, were more competent, as a class, than earlier state officials had been, was due to the fact that they were chosen less because of court favoritism than because of special training and aptitude. Official service was now, in the phrase of the day, "open to talent." It was becoming a career for members of the bourgeoisie and the rural gentry on practically equal terms with the higher nobility. It was treated as of almost equal social status with the military profession. Hence it attracted the best elements of both middle and upper classes.

Profes-
sional
Govern-
ment

Besides, there was a new prestige of educated men, with the result that a university generation succeeded a court generation of state officials. An equipment of learning had to be superimposed on the baggage of good manners; and even aristocratic families of the greatest social pretensions prepared their sons for government service by sending them to a university. Indeed, the newer state officials represented a professional rather than a social type. They possessed or acquired a common background, and they naturally evinced a strong corporate spirit. Moreover, they were in fact, if not in name, servants of the state rather than of the monarch (who formally appointed them). By reason of their university training and their application to work, they were apt to share the ideas and aspirations of their generation; and in practice they, rather than the monarch, constituted the state and the government.

With such personnel and organization, "government of officials" was a much more solid structure, physically and morally, than had been the "royal absolutism" of the old régime. In some states it was more fully developed, and hence more solid, than in others—more in Prussia, Austria, and France, for example, than in Russia, and more in the Netherlands than in Spain. By and large, however, it may be affirmed that government within the European state-system was more efficient in 1830 than it had ever been before and that it touched a wider field.

More
Efficient
Govern-
ment

Contemporaneous with the emergence of more systematic and efficient agencies of government in Europe was the development of *liberalism*. This was a "radical" intellectual movement which had originated in France and England during the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century and which, reinforced by an economic liberalism attending the Industrial Revolution, flourished in western (and central) Europe during the decades from 1830 to 1870. It was vastly important in the evolution of European society and politics.

"Liberal-
ism"

Nowadays the word "liberal" is used vaguely and generally to describe many diverse movements. Immediately after 1830, however, it referred to a specific body of doctrines having intellectual, economic, political, and international significance. Intellectually, it championed freedom of thought, extolled technology, natural science, and "machine civilization," and treated religion as a private affair of the individual conscience. In economics, it stood for individualism, for freedom of occupation and profession, for freedom of trade, for freedom of contract between the individual employer and the individual worker, and for unrestricted competition in business and trade. As such it was hostile to economic privileges of the agricultural classes, to tariff protectionism, to guilds and trade unions (in so far as these inspired strikes or otherwise interfered with freedom of contract), and to governmental regulation of commerce or industry. In politics, liberalism regarded the ideal state as a "passive policeman," not concerning itself actively with the affairs of its individual citizens, but merely preserving order, protecting private property, fostering some public education, and promoting some public works. It likewise regarded as ideal a government which would be con-

Content
of Mid-
Century
Liberal-
ism

stitutional, representative, and parliamentary, in which the propertied middle class would predominate, and under which individual liberty would be large and taxation small. In international affairs, liberalism, while romantically sympathetic with efforts of "oppressed" peoples to win national independence for themselves, was generally pacifist. It condemned war as financially burdensome, as injurious to property and profitable trade, and as destructive of personal life and liberty. It inveighed against imperialism of the mercantilist variety, and for the sake of thrift, as well as of peace, it sought to reduce expenditure for armaments.

A great stir this liberalism made in the world in the nineteenth century, as we shall presently see. We shall begin with it in Britain between 1830 and 1865. Next we shall see it at work in France from 1830 to 1850, and then in central Europe in 1848. At the end of the present chapter we shall indicate certain elements of opposition to liberalism.

2. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BRITAIN, 1830-1865

While the society of Great Britain was being transformed by the Industrial Revolution between 1770 and 1830, while population shifted from country to town, and the industrial middle class grew rapidly in wealth and numbers, the British government underwent no corresponding alteration. It was still in 1830 essentially what it had been ever since the "Glorious" Revolution of 1689—
 an oligarchy of titled landlords, Anglican ecclesiastics, country gentlemen, and commercial magnates. The oligarchy dominated Parliament, House of Commons equally with House of Lords; and through its parliamentary majority, whether Tory or Whig, it dictated the choice of royal ministers and the determination of public policies. Ever since 1689, it is perhaps needless to add, policies had been pursued according to the wishes of the agricultural and commercial aristocracy—policies involving "corn laws," "enclosures," "navigation acts," etc.¹

Britain's
Oligar-
chical
Govern-
ment
since 1689

For a time, back in the eighteenth century, during and just after the American Revolution, there had been some liberal agita-

¹ On the British government and its policies from 1689 to 1830, see Vol. I, pp. 453-469, 490-494, 709-717, 758-764.

tion for "parliamentary reform." But hostility to the French Revolution and the ensuing protracted war with France aroused so much patriotic ardor in Britain that the Tory party, which was in office during the war and most vociferously patriotic, could continue its sway several years afterwards and without bothering about "parliamentary reform."

After 1815, however, the demand for "reform" was renewed and grew gradually louder. It came from "Radicals," such as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the economist James Mill, the cotton manufacturer Richard Cobden, all of whom wished a new political régime and were quick with voice and pen. But the effective strength of the general demand for reform lay with the waxing wealth and numbers of middle-class factory owners and with their tightening hold on the population of factory towns, like Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds, which already were large cities but which as yet had no representation in Parliament. Why should a "rotten borough," in which no one lived, be entitled to two seats in the House of Commons, while a city, in which hundreds of thousands lived, was entitled to none? Tory proprietors of "rotten boroughs" might ignore the question, but industrial capitalists of the cities would not, and in their reiteration of the question they swelled the chorus of the "Radicals."

The Tory party did ignore the question. But not so the other group which participated in the parliamentary oligarchy—the Whig party. The Whigs were just as aristocratic as the Tories, but as a group they were a bit more commercial and therefore a trifle more sympathetic with the new industrial capitalism. Besides, the Whigs had been out of office a long time; perhaps if they espoused the cause of parliamentary reform, they might get back into office. At any rate, in the late 1820's Earl Grey, the leader of the Whigs, formally committed his party to the support of reform.

In the late 1820's, moreover, a few of the governing Tories, notably Canning and Sir Robert Peel, sponsored certain "liberal" measures, such as lowering the tariffs, recognizing revolutionary governments in Latin America, refusing coöperation with Metternich's international police system, freeing Protestant dissenters from political disabilities (1828), and emancipating Catholics (1829). But

**Demand
for Parlia-
mentary
Reform**

**Supported
by Whigs**

**Some Lib-
eralism
among
Tories in
1820's**

the Tory party as a whole was adamant against any general parliamentary reform¹ and its leader, the Duke of Wellington, declared in 1830, with pugnacity worthy of the victor of Waterloo, that the existing régime was "perfectly satisfactory."

In this year, however, occurred at Paris the so-called July Revolution, substituting for the aristocratic government of Charles X the bourgeois government of Louis Philippe.² There were immediate repercussions in Britain. Outside Parliament, the demand for reform grew noisy and menacing; inside Parliament, some of the Tories showed signs of fear. The Duke of Wellington blustered and then resigned as prime minister. Earl Grey formed a Whig ministry and introduced a reform bill in the House of Commons. Upon the defeat of this bill by the Tory majority early in 1831, the House was dissolved, new elections were held, and Grey obtained a Whig majority. He then put a second reform bill through the House of Commons, but it was defeated by the Tory majority in the House of Lords. Then, upon the refusal of King William IV³ to create enough Whig peers to change the majority in the upper house, Grey resigned and the Duke of Wellington undertook to form a Tory ministry. He promised to scrap the reform bill and to coerce its supporters.

Reform
Bills of
1831 and
Tory Op-
position

"Radicals" and factory owners organized demonstrations in the industrial cities and stirred up the masses against the government. In the disquieting circumstances the Duke of Wellington regretfully had to abandon his attempt to form a hostile ministry; his Tory associates in the House of Commons were a minority; and some of them were very timid. Consequently, Earl Grey and the Whigs returned to power in May 1832, with a definite though most reluctant pledge from King William IV that, if necessary, he would nominate enough new peers to assure the passage of the reform bill by the House of Lords. The necessity did not actually arise, for the Tory lords yielded, somewhat ungraciously, and the reform bill received the royal assent in June 1832.

¹ "Catholic emancipation"—enabling Catholics to be members of Parliament—was accompanied by the actual raising of property qualifications for voting, so that almost 200,000 Irish electors were disfranchised. On the "liberal" tendencies in the Tory party during the late 1820's, see Vol. I, p. 764.

² On the July (1830) Revolution in France, see Vol. I, pp. 785-788.

³ William IV succeeded his brother, George IV, in 1830 and reigned until 1837.

By the Reform Act of 1832 three important changes were made in the system of parliamentary elections in Britain. (1) Certain boroughs containing fewer than 2,000 inhabitants—the so-called “rotten boroughs”—were entirely deprived of representation in the House of Commons, and boroughs with a population of from 2,000 to 4,000 were deprived of one of their two seats. Of the seats thus taken away from small towns, some were allotted to the more populous English counties and others to large industrial cities, including Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, and Leeds. (2) The qualifications for voting were simplified and made uniform in all the counties and similarly in all the boroughs. This did not mean universal suffrage; property qualifications, though slightly reduced, were retained, and the proportion of voters to the total population was only increased from one thirty-second to one twenty-second. (3) Qualified voters still voted publicly, so that there was no correction of the evil of intimidation; but by defining the period of voting and reducing it to two days, the Reform Act of 1832 helped to lessen the attendant evils of drunkenness and bribery.

The central fact about the Reform Act of 1832 was that it registered the passing of the political monopoly which the agricultural and commercial aristocracy had exercised in the British Parliament and over British policies since 1689. The British government was still an oligarchy, but the oligarchy now included not only agrarian aristocrats and commercial magnates but factory owners and the middle class generally. The reformed oligarchy could be expected to serve industrial as well as agricultural interests, and gradually to harmonize public policies with the precepts of economic liberalism.

Toward the fulfillment of such an expectation, events soon after 1832 contributed. In the first parliamentary elections under the Reform Act, the Whigs, with the backing of the new voters, won a victory; and then, as the grateful Whigs supported certain liberal demands of their new allies, they began to call themselves “Liberals.” Thus

NOTE. The picture opposite, showing Sir Robert Peel at the right and the Duke of Wellington at the left, is from a painting by Franz Xavier Winterhalter (1806-1873), a famous German artist who painted many European statesmen of the time.

it befell that in the 1830's the Whig party was transformed into the Liberal party, which now embraced a right wing of tolerant aristocrats (the old Whigs), a central group of ambitious industrialists, and a small left wing of doctrinaires (the Radicals). The handful of Radicals in the reformed Parliament displayed democratic and anti-ecclesiastical tendencies, and were frequently critical of the aristocratic Whigs, but, inasmuch as they were far more critical of the aristocratic Tories, they were content to remain in alliance with the Liberal party and usually to follow its Whig leadership.

On the other hand, the Tory party underwent an alteration after the Reform Act. The mildly "liberal" element in it which had sponsored minor reforms in the late 1820's was strengthened by the discomfiture of the Duke of Wellington and the widespread reaction against his ill-starred opposition to parliamentary reform. Now that the reform was accomplished, the Tories found a

Change of
Tory
Party into
Conservative
Party

new leader in Sir Robert Peel, himself a factory owner, who accepted the Reform Act as "final" and began to seek among the more "conservative" members of the new electorate a broader basis of support for the Tory party. Not all the Tories were enthusiastic about Peel, and some were belligerently opposed to policies which he advocated. Yet as time went on, almost all of them were willing to drop the somewhat discredited name of "Tory" and assume the more alluring label of "Conservative." In this way the Tory party was transformed, during the 1830's, into the Conservative party. Its right wing was still thoroughly agrarian, devoted to the interests of agriculture and of the Anglican Church, but its left wing, becoming permeated with industrial capitalism, was not unwilling to coöperate on occasion with the industrial group of the Liberal party.

Between Conservatives, mainly landlords, and Liberals, mainly industrialists, a kind of balance of political power was thus effected in Britain. The new industrialists could not have their way about everything, and the old land-

Political
Balance

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Queen Victoria, just after she came to the throne in 1837, by an American painter, Thomas Sully (1783-1872). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

time in favor of the Liberals.¹ Yet for many years there was no thought on the part of the majority of Liberals, any more than on the part of the Conservatives, of altering the Reform Act of 1832 in a democratic direction. On the contrary, Liberals and Conservatives alike argued that the reformed régime of 1832 was the most perfect political system which the world had ever known. Without sacrificing what was traditional, it harbored what was novel. While continuing to let landlords and country gentlemen "represent" all the agricultural and rural population, it enabled the well-to-do middle class to "represent" all the industrial and urban population. It was "representative" without being democratic, substantial and evolutionary without being revolutionary or demagogic. Altogether, it was, to the upper and middle classes, a most happy compromise. And so acceptable was it to the British nation at large that the political compromise of 1832—subsequently referred to as the "Victorian Compromise"²—lasted without material change until 1867.

Victorian
Compro-
mise,
1832-1867

Two minor alterations were made in Britain's political fabric between 1832 and 1867, but they were mere by-products of earlier reform. One was the "municipal corporations act" of 1835 which permitted the same industrial class as had recently obtained the parliamentary franchise to choose and control the local government in industrial cities. The other was Jewish emancipation; by an act of 1858 Jews were admitted to Parliament, as Catholics had been admitted in 1829.

A few Radicals in Parliament and a number of urban workingmen outside Parliament were not satisfied with the Reform of 1832 and the ensuing "compromise." The Radicals, inclining in a doctrinaire way toward political democracy, regarded the Reform as only a first step which should be succeeded by other steps along a democratic path. Urban workingmen, discovering that the Reform did not perceptibly increase their wages or shorten their hours of labor or even assure employment to them, came to believe that these benefits might somehow be procured if the Re-

Opposi-
tion of
Radicals
and
Working-
men

¹ Liberals headed cabinets 1832-1841, 1846-1852, 1853-1858, 1859-1866.

² Queen Victoria succeeded her uncle, William IV, in 1837 and reigned until 1901. The first thirty years of her reign were the period of the "Victorian Compromise" here referred to; they were also the years which in art and manners are sometimes called "Early Victorian."

form were radically extended so that the masses as well as the classes would have some direct say in Parliament. By 1838 a group of workingmen, with the support of middle-class Radicals, were demanding a "People's Charter," guarantying: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) annual election of Parliament; (3) equal electoral districts; (4) vote by ballot; (5) removal of property qualifications for members of Parliament; and (6) payment of salaries to members of Parliament.

For a time, these "Chartists" conducted an energetic agitation in the industrial centres of the country, holding mass meetings and drawing up petitions to present to Parliament. In Parliament, however, Liberals and Conservatives united to reject the petitions and to sanction military preparations of the ministry for putting down any revolt, while presently the Chartist leaders fell to quarreling with one another, and their followers split on the question of employing violence. After 1842, the Chartist movement declined in numbers if not in noise. Of the noise enough remained in 1848, when a revolution occurred at Paris and when at London the Chartists prepared to present a "monster petition" to Parliament, to arouse the aged but still courageous Duke of Wellington and bring him to the defense of the British government with regular troops and 170,000 special middle-class constables. It was the last exploit of the "Iron Duke," and the end of the "People's Charter." By this time the mass of British workingmen were more concerned with free trade and trade unionism. Almost another twenty years had to elapse before they would seriously reassert democratic demands.

The Chartist movement did not amend the Reform of 1832. Nor did it divert Parliament from legislating according to the desires of that middle class whom the Reform had enfranchised. The idealistic desires of the reformed Parliament appeared in two important measures of 1833. One was the abolition of Negro slavery throughout the British Empire, accompanied with financial compensation from the public treasury to persons who thereby were deprived of private property. The other was the inauguration of a system of subsidizing private (church) schools from the public treasury, with a view to spreading "liberal knowledge" and "sober piety."¹ Besides, steady progress was made through-

Chartist
Move-
ment

Legisla-
tion of the
Reformed
Parlia-
ment

¹ The subsidy at first was very modest—£20,000 a year from 1833 to 1839 and

out the 1830's and 1840's with humanitarian legislation, reforming the penal law, abolishing brutal sports, prescribing a more merciful treatment of debtors, creating a governmental bureau of public health, and bettering the civil service.

More strictly economic motives prompted the enactment of a significant poor law in 1834. This law was an amendment of the statute which since the reign of Queen Elizabeth had prescribed the treatment of pauperism in England.¹ It transferred the administrative direction of poor relief from local officials, who might be too charitably disposed and too prodigal with taxpayers' money, to a national commission which would be "scientific" rather than merciful. It assigned all paupers who could work to public workhouses, and it provided that, in giving money to persons who were too old or too infirm to work, the officials should be guided by the principle that the condition of such persons must be kept worse than the condition of the lowest class of laborer living without relief.

Similar economic motives actuated middle-class agitation for the abolition of restrictions on trade, especially for the repeal of the "corn laws." If import duties were done away with, manufacturers could procure raw materials, such as cotton, more cheaply and sell finished wares more profitably. If the protective tariff on grain were abolished, the free importation of cheap foreign foodstuffs would reduce the cost of living in Britain and enable the manufacturers to pay lower wages and obtain larger profits. As early as 1820 the leading merchants of London had petitioned Parliament to substitute a system of complete free trade for the long-prevailing system of tariff protectionism; and in the decade before the Reform Act of 1832, even the Tory government had experimented with a "sliding scale" of grain tariffs. But however willing English landlords might be to lower duties on certain raw materials which they did not produce and on occasion to make concessions to foreign grain, they were adamant against any drastic change in the "corn laws," from which they profited directly. Landlords constituted a majority of the Tory, and later of the Conservative, party; and Whig members of the Liberal party seemed more devoted to their

£30,000 from 1839 to 1846. After 1846, it was considerably increased, reaching £160,000 in 1852 and £840,000 in 1860.

¹ On the Elizabethan poor law, see Vol. I, p. 218.

Agitation
for Free
Trade

economic interests as landlords than to the philosophical doctrine of free trade.

In 1838, the very year in which the Chartist movement was launched by workingmen, factory owners organized an Anti-Corn-Law League, "to convince the manufacturers that the corn laws were interfering with the growth of trade, to persuade the people that they were raising the price of food, and to teach the agriculturist that they had not even the solitary merit of securing a fixed price for corn." With the executive genius of Richard Cobden, with the passionate oratory of John Bright, and with the financial backing of other interested industrialists, the Anti-Corn-Law League conducted vigorous propaganda throughout the country. Mass meetings were held in all the cities; pamphlets were distributed in quantities; petitions were drawn up and presented to Parliament.

Anti-
Corn-
Law
League

Nature assisted the free traders. In 1845 rain badly damaged the wheat crop in England and a blight ruined the potato crop in Ireland. Irish peasants died of famine by the tens of thousands,¹ and English workingmen had to pay dearly for the bare necessities of life. Popular clamor for the political objects of the "People's Charter" was speedily drowned in popular clamor for the economic demands of the Anti-Corn-Law League, and there were members of Parliament who, deaf to the former, were very attentive to the latter.

The Irish
Famine

Since 1841 the Conservatives had had a majority in the House of Commons, and their leader, Sir Robert Peel, had consequently been prime minister. Peel, it should be remembered, was not a landlord but a manufacturer, and in 1846, against the protests of the majority of his own party, but with the applause and votes of Liberals, he passed through Parliament a bill repealing the corn laws and establishing free trade in grain. The Anti-Corn-Law League had won its battle, and its leader, Richard Cobden, was rewarded by his grateful fellow-manufacturers with a purse of £80,000. As for Peel, his conduct cost him the leadership of the Conservative party, and with it the premiership of the government. The Conservatives separated into two hostile

Sir Robert
Peel and
Repeal of
Corn
Laws,
1846

¹ The population of Ireland declined from 8,500,000 in 1845 to 6,500,000 in 1851. This means that more than two million Irishmen died or emigrated during the period of the "great famine."

groups, the majority agrarian, and the minority—the so-called “Peelites”—industrially minded, while the Liberals returned to power and gave free rein to the advance of industrial liberty.

In 1849 the navigation acts were finally repealed and British commerce set free.¹ In 1851 the first international exposition of

Repeal of
Navigation
Acts,
1849

the fruits of industrial progress was held under the huge expanse of a machine-made “crystal palace” in Hyde Park, London, with Queen Victoria and her faithful prince-consort, the mechanically minded Prince Albert, in conspicuous attendance. During the 1850's, furthermore, Parliament abolished almost all of the remaining tariff duties, and, by retrenchment in expenditure and by regular imposition of direct income taxes, put Britain's internal fiscal system, as well as her commercial relationship with the outer world, squarely on the basis of economic liberalism. In 1860 Richard Cobden had the satisfaction of representing the Liberal government of Britain in the negotiation of a free-trade treaty with France.

To the serious labor problems which attended the Industrial Revolution, the doctrine of economic liberty was not fully or consistently applied. The industrial capitalists as a class

Opposi-
tion to
Economic
Liberal-
ism in
Labor
Domain

agreed, no doubt, with the leading economists of the period that there should be no legalization of trade unions or collective bargaining and no state regulation of conditions of individual employment. Yet the position of the urban working class was so degraded during the early phase of the Industrial Revolution that an increasing number of persons whose humanitarianism exceeded their devotion to liberal economics raised their voices in behalf of ameliorative measures for factory workers. Among such persons were to be found: (1) a goodly number of titled aristocrats and country gentlemen, who were accustomed to patronize the lower classes and who, suspicious of the swift rise of the industrial middle class and fearful of its hostility to agricultural interests, were doubly minded to espouse the cause of factory workers against factory owners; (2) some Anglican and “radical” clergymen, who reacted against the un-Christian “selfishness” and “individualism” of the prevalent economics; (3) some labor leaders, who sought to organize the workers into trade unions and coöperative

¹ On the navigation acts, see Vol. I, pp. 394, 442, 474-475.

societies and to promote collective bargaining; and (4) an occasional factory owner, who was exceptionally benevolent or who felt that his business would be more profitable if his employees were better off.

From different sources, therefore, came the stimulus for measures and policies which were directed toward improving the condition of the industrial proletariat. Some of these measures, notably a series of parliamentary statutes regulating employment, were contrary to economic liberalism and to the wishes of factory owners. As early as 1819, before the general admission of representatives of the industrial middle class to the House of Commons, the Tory majority in Parliament had responded to the pleas of Robert

Begin-
nings of
Factory
Legisla-
tion

Owen, a "socialist" manufacturer, by enacting the first significant factory act. This act applied only to cotton mills and contained slight provision for its enforcement, but it formally prohibited the employment of children under nine years of age and limited the working day of older children to twelve hours. Then, after the electoral reform of 1832, the Tory minority in the House of Commons obtained sufficient coöperation from humanitarian Whigs to enact in 1833 a more general and more effective factory act—despite the gloomy prophecies of liberal economists. This act restricted the employment of persons under eighteen years of age; it applied to all textile factories and provided for governmental "inspectors" with power to enforce the act. There followed the energetic propaganda of Lord Shaftesbury inside and outside Parliament, rendered more impelling, no doubt, by contemporaneous agitation of "Christian Socialists," of Robert Owen, of the Chartists, and of budding trade unions. During the Tory ministry of Sir Robert Peel (1841-1846), two important statutes were written into the law of Britain. The factory act of 1844 strengthened governmental inspection, fixed a twelve-hour working day for women, and prescribed that children should not work more than twelve hours a day on alternate days or "half-time" every day. The mines act of 1842—the first of its kind—excluded all women and girls, and boys under ten years of age, from underground working.

By 1846, at the very time when "freedom of trade" was becoming a national policy, precedents were pretty well established that the state might interfere with "freedom of contract."

Thenceforth, just as Conservative landlords were unable to prevent the extension of free trade, so Liberal industrialists were unable to prevent the extension of labor legislation. It must be said, however, that the extension of the latter was slighter and slower than the extension of the former. Yet some progress was made between 1846 and 1865.

In the meantime, trade unionism had been developing in Britain. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, factory workers had had no agency through which they could deal collectively with factory owners. The medieval guilds had broken down in Britain long before 1770; and it had been difficult, indeed impossible, for workers to create any new unions in the face of the common law of England against "combinations in restraint of trade" and in the face of a specific parliamentary statute of 1800 forbidding workers, under penalty of imprisonment, to combine "with others to advance their wages or decrease the quantity of their work, or in any way to affect or control those who carried on any manufacture or trade in the conduct or management thereof." Gradually, however, workers in particular trades did combine, first in local societies, and then in national unions; and in 1824, a bill was slipped through Parliament, repealing all restrictions upon the right of combination. When the factory manufacturers, who were not yet largely represented in Parliament, heard of this action, they protested so vehemently that Parliament, duly alarmed, reconsidered the matter. The result was a new act of 1825, which represented a compromise between the views of industrialists and those of workingmen. Its preamble warned against labor combinations as "injurious to trade and commerce, dangerous to the tranquillity of the country, and especially prejudicial to the interest of all who were concerned in them." But while prohibiting "threats or intimidation, molestation or obstruction," it partially legalized trade unions.

The act of 1825, imperfect though it was from the standpoint of labor, was the legal charter for British trade unionism for the next half-century. Under it, despite the hostility of most manufacturers and of a large part of public opinion, and despite repeated interference of police and law courts, trade unions developed fairly rapidly among the British workingmen, especially among the more skilled and thrifty.

Alongside trade unions appeared coöperative societies. As the former were designed to raise the wages of workingmen, so the latter were intended to lower the cost of living for workingmen by buying foodstuffs and other needful supplies wholesale and retailing them direct, without middle-men's profits, to the members of the societies.

Rise of
Coöpera-
tive
Societies

Early coöperative societies proved unstable and short-lived, but Robert Owen and the Christian Socialists persevered in encouraging their formation. And beginning with the foundation of a worker's coöperative society at Rochdale in 1844—the "Rochdale Pioneers"—success finally attended the movement. Coöperative societies, similar to the one at Rochdale, sprang up all over Britain. Gradually they broadened their functions and linked together their organizations.

The British working classes were still far from any millennium, but they were materially better off in the 1850's and 1860's than in earlier decades of the Industrial Revolution. This was owing in part, doubtless, to an increase of general British "prosperity"—quickenings of industry and lessening of unemployment—attendant upon the removal of commercial restrictions. It was also owing in considerable part to labor legislation and to the activity of workers themselves in trade unions and coöperative societies. It was owing in some part to the freedom and encouragement given to working-class people to leave England and seek their fortunes in English-speaking lands overseas.

Some
Amelio-
ration for
Working
Class

Throughout the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century there was an extraordinary migration not only from Ireland, but also from England and Scotland, to the United States, to Canada, and to the newer British territories of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Such migration was rendered easier by the Industrial Revolution; and this, in turn, through the impetus it furnished to the construction of railways and the large-scale production of raw materials and foodstuffs, was constantly opening up wider areas of America and Australasia for European colonization. The discovery of gold in California, British Columbia, and Australia, almost simultaneously about 1850, proved especially alluring to immigrants.

Emigra-
tion from
Britain

With the growth of English-speaking population and English commercial opportunities in the British Empire was associated

the development, among English liberals, of a new attitude toward the overseas empire, at least toward the predominantly English-speaking part of the empire. The same liberals who championed free trade and the abolition of Negro slavery were naturally inclined, by their economic beliefs and their humanitarian impulses, to look with favorable eye upon the self-reliance of colonists and to feel that it should not be hampered by economic or political interference from the mother-country. Some Englishmen, notably Cobden and Bright, went so far as to assert that Britain had no further use of an empire, that it was an anachronism in an age of free trade, that it was a luxury requiring undue financial expenditure for its administration and protection and a standing danger to international peace, and that consequently it should be dissolved. Most Englishmen did not go as far as this, but, whatever they may have thought about the empire, their support of the repeal of tariffs and navigation acts by the British Parliament actually served to assure to the British Empire quite a different economic basis from what had obtained at the time of the American Revolution in the eighteenth century. Moreover, almost simultaneously with cessation of economic interference with colonies, the mother-country began to surrender her political control over some of them.

New
Attitude
toward
English-
Speaking
Colonies

The beginning was made in North America. Here, in addition to the maritime colonies of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, there had been, since 1791, the two separate colonies of Lower Canada (centring in Quebec and overwhelmingly French) and Upper Canada (north of Lake Ontario and largely British), each with an assembly elected by the inhabitants and a governor sent out from Britain and empowered to veto acts of the assembly.¹ Alike in Upper Canada and in Lower Canada, conflicts were chronic between governor and assembly, especially over the responsibility of officials; and in Lower Canada the conflicts were the more acute by reason of the fact that the assembly was French while the governor was English. At length in 1837 a rebellion broke out in Lower Canada and spread to Upper Canada. The rebellion was easily crushed, but it succeeded in calling

Canada
and the
Revolt of
1837

¹ On the earlier history of British Canada, see Vol. I, pp. 404, 409-410, 412, 469 n., 480, 491.

attention to Canadian grievances and inducing the British government to send a High Commissioner to investigate them. Lord Durham, who was selected for this difficult mission, was an extreme Liberal, in politics as well as in economics, and was anxious not only to "pacify" Canada, which he did with a firm hand, but also to introduce radical reforms in its government.

Upon Lord Durham's recall to Britain in 1839 he published a lengthy report, containing a recommendation of epochal significance in the history of the British Empire. It was that in each of the Canadian colonies self-government should prevail in almost all matters (except the conduct of foreign affairs). The royal governor should be a figurehead, like the king in England; the local laws should be enacted by a colonial parliament and executed by a ministry responsible to the majority in the local parliament.

Lord
Durham's
Report

In 1846 the British Parliament acquiesced in the appointment of Lord Elgin, the son-in-law of Lord Durham, as governor of Canada and in the policy which he then pursued of giving full effect to his father-in-law's recommendations. In 1849, Canadian self-government was formally recognized by the British Parliament.

Once the principle of colonial self-government was sanctioned for Canada, it was applied rapidly to other British colonies where English-speaking population predominated. In North America, self-government was accorded to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island immediately, to Newfoundland in 1855, and to British Columbia in 1859. In Australia,¹ it was embodied in constitutions for New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania in 1853, for South Australia in 1856, and for Queensland in 1859. In New Zealand, which was formally annexed by Great Britain in 1840, it was fully established in 1856.²

Colonial
Self-Gov-
ernment

¹ On the earlier history of Australia (and New Zealand), see Vol. I, pp. 419-421.

² In South Africa, the grant of self-government was delayed by chronic conflicts between British immigrants and the earlier Dutch settlers—called Boers. The Boers bitterly resented the abolition of Negro slavery by the British Parliament in 1833, and a large number of them, making a "great trek" in 1836-1840 out of Cape Colony and northward over the Vaal River, eventually established the two Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange River Free State, whose independence was recognized by Great Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively. To British Cape Colony, self-government was granted in 1872.

Meanwhile, agitation had been growing in Canada for some sort of colonial union. The outcome was a series of resolutions adopted by a convention at Quebec in 1864, which served as the basis of the British North America Act passed by the British Parliament in 1867. It provided for a close federation of Quebec (Lower Canada), Ontario (Upper Canada), New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, to be known as the Dominion of Canada, with a governor-general (appointed by the British government and exercising only nominal power), a federal parliament (Senate and House of Commons), and a ministry responsible to the parliament, and with certain local powers granted to the several "provinces" within the Dominion.¹

In India, also, the era of British liberalism witnessed important changes. In 1833 the liberal majority in the British Parliament renewed the charter for the English East India Company for twenty years, but only on condition that the Company should abandon its commercial monopoly and permit Europeans to settle freely in India.² Although the English East India Company was thus shorn of special trading privileges, it continued to extend its military and political sway. It waged war with Afghanistan in 1841-1842, annexed Sind in 1842, and acquired territories in Burma and the Punjab.

Native unrest also developed in India. Both Moslems and Hindus were disquieted by the British annexations of territory, by the protests of deposed Indian princes, and by the importation of machinery from Britain, as well as of humanitarian liberal ideas which threatened to subvert the social and religious customs of India.³ In the year 1857 native unrest was fanned into fierce flame by the circulation of a story, subsequently admitted to be true, that British army officers were forcing their native troops, the so-called sepoys, to use cartridges greased with the fat of cows and pigs. This was revolting to the religious masses of India, for the cow was

¹ To the four original "provinces" within the Dominion of Canada were soon added Manitoba (1870), British Columbia (1871), and Prince Edward Island (1873). Newfoundland stubbornly remained outside the Dominion.

² On the English East India Company and the rise of British rule in India, see Vol. I, pp. 389, 398-399, 405, 410-412, 413-418.

³ Lord William Bentinck, who was governor from 1828 to 1835, attempted, for example, to abolish the practice of "suttee," a Hindu practice of widows' cremating themselves on the funeral pyres of their husbands.

sacred to Hindus, and Moslems might not touch pork. In May 1857 a native cavalry regiment, rather than use the sacrilegious cartridges, mutinously left their barracks and galloped off to the ancient imperial city of Delhi to offer the Grand Mogul—the surviving symbol of the once great Indian Empire of the Moguls—their services in driving out the British. Quickly the mutiny became general throughout the Ganges provinces and central India. At Cawnpore hundreds of European residents and British soldiers were massacred. At Lucknow the British garrison was closely besieged by a host of mutineers, and at Delhi the Grand Mogul came out of seclusion and asserted his rights. The British government rushed reinforcements to India, and these, with the aid of loyal native regiments and superior armaments, recaptured Delhi, Lucknow, and Cawnpore, and stamped out the rebellion. By 1859 the mutiny was over. Many sepoys were shot from the mouths of cannon. The feeble old Mogul was exiled to Rangoon, and his sons were put to death. “No mutineer,” said one of the leading British officials at the time, “ever surrenders; for directly he is caught he is shot or hanged.”

The Indian Mutiny sealed the doom of the English East India Company. An act of the British Parliament in 1858—the Better Government of India Act—deprived the Company of its political powers and provided that supreme control of Indian affairs should be vested in a cabinet minister (the secretary of state for India), assisted by a small council sitting in London, while the actual British administration in India should be directed by a viceroy, appointed by the British government and residing at Calcutta.

Replace-
ment of
East India
Company
by Vice-
roy, 1858

Despite some anti-imperialist talk on the part of advanced English liberals like Cobden and Bright, and despite an almost revolutionary change of governmental policy in respect of colonies, there was no actual disruption or diminution of the British Empire. It was quite as far flung in 1865 as it had been in 1815. Indeed, its vast Indian possessions were more numerous and more firmly cemented in 1865 than ever before. And it is not without significance that the one European war which Britain waged between 1815 and 1865—the Crimean War of 1854–1856¹—was waged to protect her imperial interests against possible Russian aggression.

¹ On the Crimean War, see below, pp. 134–136.

Altogether, the years of the "Victorian Compromise" in Britain were eventful, and, to persons who profited from them, quite satisfying. The Industrial Revolution steadily advanced. National wealth multiplied. Commerce was freed. The lot of industrial workers was gradually improved, without lessening the profits of industrial capitalists. And, thanks to the mounting demand for agricultural products and to the increasing use of agricultural machinery, the profits of landlords were not perceptibly diminished by the repeal of the corn laws. No wonder that landlords and industrialists united to maintain the political "compromise" which had been effected in 1832. Small wonder that in due time they agreed to a colonial "compromise," whereby the British Empire would be preserved and even extended, while its "progressive" parts would be granted novel rights of self-government.

Manufacturers and landlords, joint guardians of the "Victorian Compromise," were alike a sober and optimistic oligarchy.

Its Romanticism They dressed themselves in frock coats, long trousers, and high hats, all preferably black, and accentuated their gravity by wearing "mutton-chop" whiskers. They walked with precision and took seriously their heavy responsibility of setting the masses a good example in manners and morals, including the economic morality of making as much money and spending as little as they could. They talked earnestly about statistics and were as eager for "retrenchment" as for "reform." Perhaps because they were so sober and so prosaic in outward demeanor, they were certainly poetical in mind and impulsive of heart. They took to romanticism, as ducks to water. They read Tennyson with abandon. They looked with favor on medieval architecture. They felt a noble sympathy for the very word "liberty." Any nation aspiring to liberty, any Negro longing for liberty—particularly if the nation or the Negro was somewhat remote from British shores—was bound to evoke the compassion of knights-errant among British landlords and industrialists. And a close second to "liberty," as their favorite word, was "progress." To them there was obvious "progress" in machinery, in individual fortunes, in national well-being.

The outstanding English statesman of the "Victorian Compromise" was Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865), and he was notably "compromising." A proprietor of Irish lands, he was

English by birth and feeling. A loyal Tory at the outset, and secretary of war under a Tory prime minister from 1809 to 1828, he drifted in the wake of Canning into an espousal of a "liberal" foreign policy and into an alliance with the Whigs. Appointed foreign minister by Earl Grey, and serving in that rôle from 1830 to 1841 and again from 1846 to 1851, he proved himself a liberal by his support of revolutionaries on the Continent, and at the same time alarmed many of his fellow liberals in Britain by his warlike threats. It was the business of modern Britain, as of ancient Rome, he proclaimed, to protect with its strong arm the lives and property of its citizens everywhere.

Prominent
Statesmen

Palmerston

Lord Palmerston, if something of a scandal to staid Liberals, was rather refreshing to most Englishmen. These enjoyed his impulsive conduct of foreign affairs, especially as it did not actually bring war, and they delighted in his dandified appearance, his unruffled buoyancy, and his irrepressible gaiety. He was immensely popular, and prime minister of the Liberal government almost continuously from 1855 until his death in 1865. Liberal as he was in name, and popular as he was in fact, Palmerston remained throughout his long life a statesman of the old aristocratic type, "liberal" in sentiments, convinced of the "march of progress," but devoted to the "Victorian Compromise" and entirely opposed to democracy.

Another Liberal statesman came into prominence during the last two decades of the "Victorian Compromise"—William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898). Gladstone was of the commercial, rather than the landed, aristocracy. At first he had been regarded as the rising star of the Conservative party, but by supporting Sir Robert Peel in the repeal of the corn laws (1846) he alienated himself from the main body of his party. Joining the "Peelites," as the free-trade faction of the Conservative party was called, he became more and more critical of "Tory reaction" and favorable to "liberal" ideas. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer as a "Peelite" from 1852 to 1855, and as a full-fledged Liberal in the Palmerston ministry from 1858 to 1865. An important work Gladstone did during the 50's and 60's in transforming the taxation system of Britain from a protectionist to a free-trade basis, and the facility and eloquence with which he presented long columns of figures in the House of Com-

Gladstone

mons, together with his obvious anxiety to effect "retrenchment" in governmental expenditure, endeared him to the economically minded. But Gladstone had qualities which endeared him to wider circles. He was a flaming sort of person in speech and sympathy, a gifted orator and a robust humanitarian. He was deeply attached to the Anglican Church and to the social aspects of the "Victorian Compromise," but he was no standpatter. His liberalism was ever growing, and he occasionally hurried a bit to keep pace with "progress." He was an excellent politician.

Over against Palmerston and Gladstone must be set an astonishing "radical" who became a Tory and rejuvenator of the

Conservative party—Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881).
Disraeli

Disraeli was not altogether proper to the "Victorian Compromise." His grandfather was a Jewish immigrant from Venice, who made a handsome fortune in London, but this fortune Benjamin's father employed, not to promote any particular industrial enterprise, but to satisfy a taste for literature and a longing for "respectability." The Disraeli family joined the Anglican Church and purchased a country estate when Benjamin was a boy. Yet the boy, as he grew to manhood, displayed qualities which shocked respectable folks. He appeared at dinner parties in green velvet trousers and canary-colored waistcoat, with curled hair and much jewelry. He spoke with wit, and when, in 1831, he turned his attention to politics, he assailed the rising liberalism. Only after repeated failures did he get into the House of Commons in 1837, and there, as a Tory, he was long suppressed and eclipsed by Sir Robert Peel. His main achievement in the early 40's was not in Parliament but in the writing of two novels—*Coningsby* and *Sybil*—which exposed social ills of the day and preached the gospel that Tory aristocrats should take the lead in social reform and thereby bind the masses to the traditional institutions of Britain—the crown, the nobility, the Anglican Church.

Sir Robert Peel's "betrayal" of agricultural interests by his repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 gave Disraeli his political opportunity. He forced Peel out of office and out of the Conservative party. While the party was thereby weakened, and its titular leadership passed to the phlegmatic Earl of Derby,¹ Disraeli

¹ The 14th Earl of Derby (1799–1869) had been liberally inclined in the 1820's and had supported the Reform Act of 1832, but, great landlord as he was, he broke

assumed its real leadership in the House of Commons. Then, with such astuteness did he use his talents in Parliament and in the country that gradually he revived the Conservative party and rendered it a fairly formidable opposition to the dominant Liberals. In 1852 and again in 1858 Disraeli served as Chancellor of the Exchequer in fleeting Conservative ministries headed by Lord Derby, but his budget speeches were not as convincing as Gladstone's; they contained fewer figures and more paradoxes. Disraeli's forte was not finance; it was personality and an appeal to things which the "Victorian Compromise" neglected but which the British nation never wholly forgot.

The death of Palmerston in 1865 conveniently marks the passing of the "Victorian Compromise." He, in a sense, was its personification. The most fruitful achievements of both Disraeli and Gladstone were to come after 1865—and they would serve to inaugurate a new era in British history.

3. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, 1830-1850

In France, the revolutionary disturbance of July 1830 shifted the exercise of political power and the direction of economic policy from aristocracy to middle class, from conservatism to liberalism. Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, a kind of "bourgeois king," succeeded his old-régime cousin, Charles X, and made a few gestures to win the support of the groups who still cherished the democratic principles of the French Revolution of 1789 or who recalled with pride the national exploits of the Napoleonic era. The traditional title of "King of France and Navarre" was abandoned in favor of the newer and more popular title of "King of the French," and the qualifying phrase "by the grace of God" was supplemented with the words "and by the will of the nation." The revolutionary tricolor was restored as the national flag, and the stirring strains of the *Marseillaise* were heard again as the national anthem. Titled aristocrats were largely retired from public office, and their places taken by commoners.¹

Bourgeois
(or July)
Monarchy
of Louis
Philippe,
1830-1848

utterly with Sir Robert Peel in 1846, and from his own position in the House of Lords he thereafter inveighed equally against "Peelites" and Liberals.

¹ On the July (1830) Revolution in France, see Vol. I, pp. 785-788. On the relationship of Louis Philippe to Charles X, see the genealogical chart, below, p. 392.

From the circumstances of its origin, it was natural that the government of Louis Philippe should be bourgeois, and its policies liberal. The form of government was consciously modelled after Britain's: a king who would reign but not rule; a parliament, theoretically "representing" the nation, but actually chosen by a small minority of the people; and a ministry, responsible to the parliament. In practice, the French government from 1830 was strikingly similar to the government which Britain secured by the Reform Act of 1832. The franchise was so restricted by property qualifications that no workingmen and few peasants could vote. Members of parliament were elected by 250,000 individual owners of large property (industrial or agricultural), and this meant in France, where the old landed nobility had already lost much of its wealth and prestige, that the governing oligarchy was even more bourgeois than in Britain.

The chief minister of Louis Philippe at the outset was a banker, and he was succeeded by Casimir-Périer, who, in association with a brother, operated mines, textile factories, a sugar refinery, a distillery, and a foundry.¹ Casimir-Périer defined the policy of Louis Philippe's régime as that of the "just mean." The era of revolution, he said, was over. Henceforth, evolution would proceed very gradually and always legally along the lines of the compromise which had been finely arrived at. Conserving the constitution which vested political power in persons of wealth and brains, the government would pursue liberal policies in economic matters. In foreign affairs the government, of course, would be pacifist and favorable to free development of international commerce and comity. Though Casimir-Périer died prematurely in 1832, the principles enunciated by him remained the guiding star of French government during the whole reign of Louis Philippe.

The chief ministers of the "bourgeois monarchy" after 1832 were Francois Guizot and Adolphe Thiers. Both were middle-class persons, ambitious, aggressive, and markedly "self-made"; both wrote voluminous histories, and

¹ The brother, Antoine Périer, also introduced gas lighting into France and was a regent of the Bank of France.

NOTE. The picture of Guizot, opposite, is by an unfriendly critic and famous caricaturist, Honoré Daumier (1808-1879). On Daumier, see below, pp. 118-119.

both were "liberal." Guizot was a devout Calvinist (Huguenot), a bit cold in reasoning and speech, but ardently romantic about the virtues of individual thrift and international peace. Severely critical of popular movements, such as the one in his own country in 1793 which had been irreligious, bellicose, and socialistic, and which had put his father to death, he was an unqualified admirer of the political, economic, and religious institutions of middle-class "liberal" England. Thiers was something of a freethinker and more of an opportunist. He acquired wealth by marriage and was trained in politics by Talleyrand.

Distrustful of the masses from whom he had risen, Thiers temperamentally hostile to arbitrary government, and rationally attached to the "liberal" philosophy of the eighteenth century, he yet had a romantic predilection for "great men" in history, especially for Napoleon Bonaparte, while in his patriotism, which sometimes partook of chauvinism, he was a kind of bourgeois Palmerston. Thiers was the leading minister from 1832 to 1836 and prime minister in 1840. Guizot was minister of public instruction from 1832 to 1839 and chief minister from 1840 to 1848.

The régime of Louis Philippe encouraged industry. It fostered the importation of machinery from England and the erection of factories and foundries in France.¹ It commissioned an English company to construct a railway from Paris to Le Havre, and presently it planned a whole network of railways which should radiate from Paris. It guaranteed the cost of these public works but handed them over, as soon as they were built, to private companies for profitable operation. It rigorously refrained from any undertaking which could be called "socialistic" and constantly appealed to private initiative. The King set a good bourgeois example by simple living and by investing the income of his numerous family in stocks and bonds, preferably British.

Fostering
of In-
dustry

Laissez-faire was the governmental policy in respect of manufacturing and wealth-making. There was no interference by the state, and no serious interference by trade unions. Guilds and other combinations of workingmen had been banned back in 1791,

¹ For some statistics on the growth of French industry during the period of the bourgeois monarchy (1830-1848), see above, p. 44.

and the ban on them (and on collective bargaining) was retained and enforced in the name of "freedom of contract." Inasmuch as the Industrial Revolution was relatively backward in France, the number of industrial proletarians was proportionately smaller in France than in Britain, but their economic position was no better. Nevertheless, with one minor exception, the bourgeois monarchy enacted no labor legislation. The one exception was a factory act (1841), which prohibited the employment of children under eight years of age, limited the working day of children under sixteen years of age to twelve hours, and prescribed a minimum of schooling for children under twelve. This act, however, contained no provision for adequate enforcement.

The government, being liberal, promoted education, and, under the guidance of Guizot, an important school act was passed in

Educa- tion and Religion under Louis Philippe	1833. While leaving the church free to conduct elementary schools, it strengthened state control of higher schools, and required all educational institutions to teach "internal and social peace." The number of schools was increased, but attendance upon them was not made compulsory. In religious matters, the government, being liberal, tried to be neutral. The concordat, which Napoleon Bonaparte had concluded with Pope Pius VII in 1801, ¹ was retained; and, under it, the state continued to nominate the bishops and pay the salaries of the Catholic clergy. But the bourgeois monarchy would treat all religions alike; in 1831 it formally put Judaism on an equal footing with Christianity and paid the salaries of Jewish rabbis just as it supported Catholic priests and Protestant pastors.
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Unsuc- cessful Agitation for Free Trade	In commercial policy, the bourgeois monarchy was not so liberal. Political economists advocated free trade, and it was endorsed by some merchants, wine-growers, and silk-manufacturers. Generally speaking, nevertheless, industry in France was "infant industry"; and seemingly unable to compete on equal terms with the lusty machine industry of Britain (or Belgium), many French industrialists and French bankers (who were now supplying most of the capital for French industry) arrayed themselves against any change in the existing protectionist system. These prosperous bourgeois had their way with the government of Louis Philippe.
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¹ See Vol. I, pp. 653-654, 743, 765.

Hence, during the period there was no French legislation comparable with Britain's corn-law repeal.

In foreign (and colonial) matters, the July monarchy wavered between a liberal desire to promote peace and a more traditional anxiety to uphold "national honor." Louis Philippe was on friendly personal terms with Queen Victoria, though not with Palmerston; and Guizot, like most French economists and industrialists, was very pro-English. In the main, therefore, French foreign policy was directed in harmony with Britain's. In concert with Britain, France helped to establish the independent kingdom of Belgium, to find a liberal monarch for the new national state of Greece, and to maintain the *status quo* in the Near East against the Russian Tsar on the one side and the Sultan's pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, on the other.¹

Foreign
Policy:
Pacifism
vs. Na-
tional
Honor

But Thiers, with his admiration for Napoleon, and with the special thought of diverting the masses of his countrymen from criticism of the domestic policies of the bourgeois monarchy to enthusiasm for its foreign policy, did what he could, when he was in office, to be vigorous and ostentatiously independent of England. Thus, in 1836, he would have defied Britain by sending a French army into Spain to suppress an insurrection against Queen Isabella II, had he not been peremptorily dismissed from office by Louis Philippe. Again in 1840, when he was back in office, he threatened to intervene on the side of Mehemet Ali in the armed conflict which had newly broken out between the redoubtable Egyptian pasha and the Ottoman Sultan. The British government, together with Russia and Austria, was supporting the Sultan, and for a time it seemed possible that Thiers would plunge France into war with the

Halting
Policy in
Near East

¹ Mehemet Ali, an Albanian adventurer, had utilized the troubled conditions consequent upon Napoleon's intervention in Egypt to make himself master of this province of the Ottoman Empire and to build up a strong Egyptian army. Formally appointed "pasha" of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan in 1805, Mehemet Ali had later given military and naval aid to his suzerain against the Greeks on condition that Syria should be annexed to the "pashalik" of Egypt. The Greeks were not overcome, and the Sultan did not keep his promise to Mehemet Ali. Hence, in 1831 the latter sent out an army which overran Syria and Asia Minor and was turned back from Constantinople only through the intervention of the Tsar Nicholas I of Russia. After protracted negotiations, in which France coöperated with England, an arrangement was made in 1833 whereby Mehemet Ali secured the governorship of Syria, in addition to Egypt; the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan was reaffirmed; and Russia withdrew.

greater part of Europe. This time Louis Philippe threw his bellicose minister out of office with a finality that outlasted the remaining years of the bourgeois monarchy. The King and Guizot kept the peace by acquiescing in a naval demonstration by Britain and Austria against the Egyptian pasha and by agreeing to a settlement under which Mehemet Ali surrendered Syria but became "hereditary governor" of Egypt and practically independent of the Ottoman Empire.

Louis Philippe, if "liberal" and even "unpatriotic" in his anxiety to maintain peace in Europe, was sensitive to the dynastic and colonial traditions of the French monarchy. In **Hesitant Policy in Algeria** respect of colonial policy, he fell heir to an important question which had been posed just before the July Revolution of 1830. His predecessor, Charles X, had despatched an expeditionary force across the Mediterranean against Algiers, whose ruler (or "dey") had neglected to settle a dubious financial claim of two French citizens and had added insult to injury by striking the French consul on the face with a fly-slapper. The French force had only occupied Algiers and exiled the dey, when at Paris the reactionary Charles X was succeeded by the liberal Louis Philippe. What should the French government do with the territory of the deposed dey—not merely the city of Algiers but the extensive surrounding country of Algeria?

For several years Louis Philippe's government hesitated. From 1834 to 1839 it seemed committed to a policy of confining French occupation to Algiers and certain other coast towns. Gradually, however, the King authorized the **Conquest of Algeria, 1839-1847** penetration of the interior by French army officers; and when in 1839 a brave and resourceful native, Abd-el-Kader, proclaimed a "holy war" and aroused his fellow tribesmen against the French, Louis Philippe sent an army of 100,000 men to repress Abd-el-Kader and conquer Algeria. The ensuing struggle was protracted and destructive. Not until 1847 was the Moslem leader caught and Algeria pacified. But then it was finally a French possession, and some 40,000 French colonists were already settled in it. The acquisition of Algeria was the first step in rebuilding a French colonial empire.

In respect of dynastic ambitions, Louis Philippe was a worthy successor of the Bourbons of the old régime. He married one of his daughters to King Leopold I of Belgium and another

to the King of Württemberg. He also planned to reestablish dynastic ties between the sovereigns of France and Spain, and in 1846, in the face of British opposition, he married one of his sons to the sister (and at that time the heiress) of Queen Isabella II of Spain.

Dynastic
Policy of
Louis
Philippe

By 1846, however, the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe was very unpopular in France. It satisfied Guizot and some wealthy industrialists of the middle class, but there were not so many of these in France as in Britain, and not so many persons who, while accepting the existing régime, would seek peacefully to perfect it. The forces of opposition to bourgeois liberalism as exemplified in France by Louis Philippe were numerous and determined. At least six groups were highly critical, if not openly hostile.

Groups in
Opposi-
tion to
Bourgeois
Monarchy

(1) *Legitimists* comprised many persons of the old nobility, a considerable part of the Catholic clergy, some peasants (especially in Brittany), and certain intellectuals. They were still attached to the social and political institutions of the old régime as it had been before the great revolution of 1789, and they regarded Louis Philippe as a usurper and his government as "revolutionary" and quite too bourgeois. They regretted the deposition of Charles X, and after his death in exile in 1836 they looked upon his grandson, the Count of Chambord, as the legitimate king of France.

1. Legiti-
mists

(2) *Republicans* were to be found among radical commoners, peasants, and artisans who cherished recollections of the democratic republic of 1792. They criticized the form of Louis Philippe's government for being monarchical and undemocratic and its policies for being in the interest of the moneyed class rather than truly popular and national. They lacked organization and leaders, but the growth of the urban proletariat consequent upon the development of the factory system added to their numbers.

2. Repub-
licans

(3) *Socialists* emerged as a left wing of the Republicans. Some followed Louis Blanc, a popular agitator, in demanding that the state should foster coöperative factories and guaranty a living wage to all workers. Others followed P. J. Proudhon, a radical revolutionary, in calling for the destruction of private property and all authoritarian government and the establishment of a wholly new order on the basis of voluntary co-

3. Social-
ists

operation. The Proudhonians—or Anarchists, as they began to be styled in the 1840's—were a small but extremely radical group. The disciples of Louis Blanc put their faith in a democratic republic. As Blanc explained: "To the able-bodied citizen the state owes work; to the aged and infirm it owes aid and protection. This result cannot be obtained except through a democratic power."

(4) *Catholics* tended to be critical of the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe. Some of them longed for a restoration of the "legitimate monarchy." Others were "liberal,"

4. Catho-
lics accepting the revolutionary principles of popular sovereignty and individual liberty; but usually distinguishing between their own "true Catholic liberalism" and the "false liberalism" of Louis Philippe's régime. Some of these demanded drastic social legislation in behalf of the working classes, including the restoration of guilds. Others evinced a romantic enthusiasm for "Christian democracy." Most Catholics, whether "liberal" or "reactionary," disliked Guizot and particularly the restrictions which he put upon the freedom of Catholic education.

(5) *Patriots* were scandalized by Louis Philippe's foreign policy—his anxiety for "peace at any price," his subservience to

5. Patriots England, his indifference to national glory, his dismissal of Thiers whenever this statesman tried to pursue a more vigorous and adventurous policy. Moreover, there was a recrudescence of popular enthusiasm for Napoleon Bonaparte during the period of the bourgeois monarchy, attributable partly to the spread of the "Napoleonic legend"¹ by surviving veterans of the Napoleonic wars and partly to the idealization of "Napoleonic glory" by disaffected journalists in order to emphasize the contrasting inglorious régime of Guizot and Louis Philippe.

(6) *Reformers* there were among the middle class, men who were liberal in the general spirit of the bourgeois monarchy, who

6. Re-
formers had no desire to overturn it, but who did wish to effect gradual peaceful reforms in its political structure—to broaden the franchise, to do away with official corruption, to shift the existing compromise in a democratic direction. Such reforms might have served as a safety-valve for the developing explosiveness of the more extreme groups, but Guizot and Louis Philippe doggedly refused to entertain them, and

¹ On the "Napoleonic legend," see Vol. I, pp. 695-696.

thereby they alienated a part of the bourgeoisie in whose behalf they imagined that they were conducting the government. As the tide of disaffection rose even within the parliamentary oligarchy, Guizot felt obliged, in order to maintain his "liberal" régime, to resort to illiberal measures. He manipulated elections and employed bribery to secure a majority in parliament. He stilled outside criticism by censoring the press and limiting the right of free assembly. By 1848 his long ascendancy had the character of a dictatorship rather than a parliamentary ministry.

Against Guizot, the chief minister from 1840 to 1848, and against Louis Philippe, the stubborn "bourgeois monarch" whom he served, the opposition grew apace. Legitimists criticized the régime as illegal and narrow. Republicans attacked it as undemocratic. Socialists assailed it as individualistic. Catholics censured it as un-Christian and immoral. Patriots denounced it as cowardly. Liberals began to discover that it was illiberal. Of course, the French masses went their usual way in fields and workshops, with little serious thought of revolt, though with increasing indifference to the fate of the bourgeois monarchy which had come without their sanction and might go at any time without their regret. In Paris, however, the various forces of opposition were less passive, and here in 1847-1848 they converged on the demand for an extension of the franchise.

In 1847 liberal reformers, estopped by the existing censorship from press propaganda, began to voice their demand for electoral reform at large banquets which they held at Paris, and republicans and socialists, who attended, imparted a revolutionary tone to the proceedings. In alarm, the government prohibited a "monster banquet" which was scheduled by the reformers for February 22, 1848. This prohibition was the last straw. It precipitated a revolution at Paris—the February Revolution of 1848.

Reform
Banquets
of 1847-
1848

On February 22, the day appointed for the banquet, angry workingmen and reckless students crowded the Place de la Concorde, shouting for reform. On the next day, as the tumult continued and spread, Guizot ordered national guardsmen to restore quiet, but the guardsmen, instead of obeying orders, were soon joining in the popular cry, "Down with Guizot," and Guizot resigned from the ministry. The rioting might have stopped here, had not a de-

Paris
Revolution
of
February
1848

tachment of soldiers, guarding Guizot's residence, rashly fired on a crowd of boisterous demonstrators, killing twenty-three and wounding thirty others. For a moment the crowd was stunned. Then in rage it bore off the corpses on a wagon, blood-stained and ghastly in the glaring torchlight, for all Paris to behold. Reform could not now suffice. Revolution was in the air.

The dawning day of February 24, 1848, beheld the streets of Paris ominously barricaded by workmen and placarded with signs: "Louis Philippe massacres us as did Charles X, let him go join Charles X." Like the prudent man he had always been, Louis Philippe tarried only long enough to abdicate in favor of his grandson, the Count of Paris, and then took refuge in England, the asylum of superfluous French royalty.¹

The Count of Paris was ignored, and a "provisional government" installed itself at the city hall in Paris. It was a composite body, including a "liberal" Catholic leader, a Jacobin republican, and Louis Blanc, the socialist. What would it do? All its diverse members agreed that monarchy had failed—both the Orleans-Bourbon rule of Louis Philippe and the earlier Legitimist Bourbon rule of Charles X—and that consequently a republic was the only practicable form of government for France. So the "provisional government" proclaimed France a republic—the second republic in the country's history.² But what kind of republic would it be, bourgeois and conservative or proletarian and socialist?

At first the Second French Republic was impelled by the Parisian proletariat in a socialist direction. The "provisional government" decreed the election of a National Assembly by direct and universal manhood suffrage, opened the national guard (hitherto reserved to the middle classes) to all citizens, and undertook to guaranty work to everybody by creating national workshops, as Louis Blanc demanded, and by creating a special commission to elaborate a program of social reform. The "national workshops" did not function as Louis Blanc desired. He had contemplated a

¹ Louis Philippe died in England in 1850. He did not have the pleasure (or discomfort) of mingling there with his cousin whom he had supplanted in 1830, for Charles X had died in 1836.

² The First French Republic, it will be recalled, lasted from 1792 to 1804. The Second Republic, as we shall see, lasted from 1848 to 1852.

system of coöperative industrial associations established and guarantied by the state and managed by the workingmen which would manufacture goods and supplant private industry. But in the emergency of 1848 there was not time to build up such a system and give it a fair trial, and in any event there was too much opposition from private business men. The result was that the "provisional government" contented itself with putting unemployed proletarians to work on certain public improvements at Paris and paying them two francs a day from the national treasury. "National workshops" were thus only a name for a government subsidy to the unemployed of Paris. Yet from February to May 1848, there was the utmost enthusiasm in Paris on the part of socialists and radicals. "Liberty trees" were planted. The red flag was unfurled as the national flag. The principle of private property was openly and hotly assailed.

A different turn was given to the Second French Republic by the election of the National Assembly at the beginning of May 1848. It was a democratic election in which not only the Parisian proletariat participated but also the mass of peasants and the middle and upper classes all over France. The large majority of these, though quite unsympathetic with any restoration of Louis Philippe and willing to sanction a republican form of government, were anxious that the republic should be "conservative," that it should respect private property and cease to waste national funds on Parisian ne'er-do-wells. One of the first things which the Assembly did, when it met at Paris in June 1848, was to get rid of the so-called "national workshops"—the "abomination of abominations," as their critics feelingly described them.

National
Assembly
vs. Parisian
"Socialism"

The withdrawal of the government subsidy to workingmen, and the resulting economic distress in the poorer quarters of Paris, precipitated a rebellion at the capital. Workmen again built barricades in the narrow streets, while the Assembly entrusted dictatorial power to General Cavaignac. Cavaignac, resolute and proudly honest, called out regular troops and bourgeois national guards in overwhelming force to crush the working-class rebellion. The archbishop of Paris lost his life in a futile attempt to avert bloodshed. For three days—the terrible "June days" (June 24-26, 1848)—sanguinary street fighting went on in Paris. Eventually order was restored. Some

Parisian
Insurrec-
tion

of the rebels were shot, and 4,000 were transported to penal colonies overseas. Socialism as an organized movement was stamped out. Louis Blanc, threatened with prosecution, fled to England, and Proudhon was jailed.

The June
Days of
1848

With assurance of untroubled continuity to its labors, the National Assembly during the summer and autumn of 1848 laid

Triumph
of the
Republican
"Moder-
ation"

foundations for the Second French Republic in conformity with wishes of its moderate elements. Emphasis was put upon "the family, rights of property, and public order." At the same time, concessions were

made to Catholics by promising educational changes in harmony with their desires; to humanitarian liberals by abolishing Negro slavery in the colonies, by decreeing the freedom of the press, and by doing away with capital punishment for political offenses; and to Jacobin democrats by restoring the tricolor and the *Marseillaise* as national symbols and by adopting

Demo-
cratic
Constitu-
tion

finally a republican constitution. This constitution of 1848 provided for a president to be elected for four years by universal manhood suffrage and for a legislature elected similarly. The president would choose his own cabinet, as in the United States, but he might not veto an act of the legislature and he would be ineligible for reelection.

Of the various groups which had opposed the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe, all (except the extreme legitimists and the extreme socialists) got something from the Revolution of 1848. The "patriots" were the only large group for which the National Assembly made no specific provision. But the "patriots" more than compensated for any slight of them in the work of the

Election
of Prince
Louis Na-
poleon as
President,
1848

Assembly by electing as first president of the Second French Republic a nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte—Prince Louis Napoleon. So numerous did they become and such support did they secure from the middle and upper classes, from the peasantry, even from the proletariat, that in the presidential elections of December 1848, their candidate polled five and a half million votes as against one and a half million cast for General Cavaignac. Prince Louis Napoleon was a symbol of patriotism and of "order." How he rose to high office in the Second French Republic, and how he used his position, we shall indicate in the next chapter.

In the meantime, it should be pointed out that the Second French Republic did not mark such a revolutionary change from the bourgeois monarchy as might be supposed, that the February Revolution of 1848 was not basically different from the July Revolution of 1830. Both revolutions were chiefly Parisian affairs; both were essentially political and only incidentally social; both were primarily "liberal." One, it is true, set up a monarchy, with a very restricted franchise, while the other established a republic, with universal manhood suffrage. But both recognized the *principle* of popular sovereignty, and, much more significant, both eventuated in the triumph of property owners and the adoption of policies which reflected their wishes.

More
Evolution
than
Revolution

4. THE REVOLUTIONARY UPHEAVAL OF 1848 IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Liberalism, as we have seen, was triumphant in Britain and France (and Belgium) from the 1830's. The British adoption of free trade in 1846 and the French establishment of republican government in 1848 served to confirm the sway of liberalism in those countries. Elsewhere in Europe, however, it was more backward and less popular. Throughout central Europe, from Scandinavia to Italy and from the Dutch Netherlands to Hungary, social life remained in the 1840's much the same as it had been in the eighteenth century—a life of the "old régime," mainly agricultural, provincial, and class-bound, with numerous survivals of feudalism and serfdom; while political administration, though recently improved in personnel and efficiency, was still conducted in the name of absolute, divine-right monarchs. Central Europe retained, at least outwardly, all the characteristics of the society and government which the Bourbon King Charles X had vainly longed to restore in France. In eastern Europe—in the Russian and Ottoman Empires—liberalism was hardly existent. And in the 1840's, Prince Metternich was still optimistic that the old traditions could be indefinitely preserved in Europe.

Relative
Back-
wardness
of Liber-
alism in
Central
Europe

Prince Metternich was the implacable foe of liberalism.¹ He would have no written constitution intervening between a sovereign and his subjects; no guaranty of individual liberties dis-

¹ On the career of Metternich prior to 1848, see Vol. I, ch. xiv.

ruptive of traditional social classes; no grant of new rights to middle-class capitalists which might abate the old rights of landlords and clergy; no compromise with revolutionary demands for personal or national "self-determination." As long as he was in office, he would repress liberalism (and nationalism) within the extensive Habsburg Empire and wherever else he could.

Despite the precautions of Metternich, liberalism was the creed of an increasing number of persons in central Europe.

Some were heirs of the general "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century. Others were sympathizers with the great French Revolution or beneficiaries of the activity of Napoleon Bonaparte. Still others were drawn to liberalism by British example, by the liberating spirit of patriotic uprisings against Napoleon, by romantic yearnings for novelty, or by personal hostility to traditions and regulations which cramped the career of one's self or one's class. Most such persons were middle-class intellectuals, though they found allies among humanitarian landlords, among "progressive" clergymen, and, perhaps more naturally, among professional men and urban dwellers generally. But even so, liberalism did not assume serious proportions in central Europe until the Industrial Revolution entered, swelling bourgeois wealth and ambition, and providing the growing number of city dwellers—"citizens"—with an incentive to possess the state and determine its policies.

In 1847 liberal aspirations were voiced widely throughout central Europe. In Prussia, where King Frederick William IV was consolidating the various local and provincial diets into a "United Landtag" for the whole kingdom, the third estate of this body at its first meeting declared that it should be transformed into a parliament, assembling regularly and sharing with the King in legislative power. In Switzerland, radical liberals in the Protestant cantons employed force to break up a special federation of seven Catholic cantons—the so-called "Sonderbund," which had been formed for defensive purposes in 1845—and to oblige them to adopt liberal constitutions, expel religious orders, and consent to a closer and more democratic union of all the Swiss cantons. In Italy, liberal reforms were instituted by a new pope, Pius IX, and by the "enlightened" duke of Tuscany. In Lombardy, which was a province of the Habsburg Empire, Italian liberals, resenting the tobacco

Its


Gradual
Growth

Flood-
Tide,

1847-1848

monopoly of the Austrian government, boycotted the cigar shops and at Milan participated in "smoking riots" against Austrian soldiers who ventured to smoke in public.

In Hungary, liberal agitation was particularly acute. Here it was less the work of urban intellectuals (or industrialists) than of



CENTRAL EUROPE, 1848

patriotic landlords who utilized it to emphasize Hungarian separateness from Austria and their own solidarity with the middle classes and peasant masses of the Hungarian nation. In 1847 Francis Deák, a country squire, trained lawyer, and able statesman, united various factions in the Hungarian Diet in support

of demands which expressed the current ideas of liberals not only in Hungary but elsewhere in central Europe: constitutional government, with a parliament elected by individual taxpayers (rather than by traditional social classes) and with a ministry responsible to the parliament (rather than to the monarch); freedom of political assembly; religious liberty; equality of civil rights for all individuals regardless of class; revocation of monopolies and of exemptions from taxation; abolition of serfdom with financial compensation to landlords.

Central Europe was ripening for a general liberal harvest when across it, late in February 1848, following the easy new routes of railway and telegraph wire, blew swiftly the favoring winds which had been stirred up at Paris by the violent overthrow of Louis Philippe. Around Metternich at Vienna the winds eddied and swirled. On March 13, a turbulent mob of students and workingmen clashed with imperial troops in the streets of the capital. The middle-class civic guard, called out by Metternich, refused to disperse the crowds collecting about the imperial palace. Assured that his hour had at last arrived, the white-haired old minister, still very courtly in his blue swallow-tail coat, and still suavely ironical, requested Ferdinand I that since his presence was no longer required, he "might be allowed" to resign. His residence was already sacked and burning. On March 14, 1848, an elderly "Englishman" and his wife departed hurriedly from Vienna for London. Metternich, the veteran foe of revolution, was fleeing for his life before a revolution.

By the time that Metternich reached London a little more than a month later, the revolutionary storm was rocking not only the chief cities of the Habsburg Empire but all central Europe, and the liberal régime which Metternich had always detested and long repressed seemed to be supplanting the traditional régime which he loved and supported, in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Italy, Germany, Denmark, and the Dutch Netherlands. So widespread and so simultaneous were the manifestations of revolution in central Europe that it is difficult to tell a clear and accurate story of them. We may summarize them, however, by recalling first the triumphs of liberalism during the spring and summer of 1848, country by country; then its ensuing

**Liberal
Revolution at
Vienna,
March
1848**

**Quick
Spread of
Liberal
Revolution,
First
Half of
1848**

set-backs, country by country; and finally, the residue of its successes and failures in 1850.

At Vienna, promptly after the flight of Metternich, the Emperor Ferdinand I named a liberal ministry, annulled the press censorship, authorized the formation of a "national guard," and promised a constitution for Austria. A constitution was promulgated by him in April, guaranteeing civil and religious liberty and creating a bicameral legislature for the whole Austrian Empire except Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia. By this time a self-constituted committee of liberals, backed by the national guard, was in actual control of Vienna, and it was not willing to accept a constitution which was granted by the Emperor and might subsequently be revoked by him. The Viennese liberals, determined that constitutional government should be based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty, coerced the Emperor into convoking a Constituent Assembly. Ferdinand, still emperor in name but hardly so in fact, retired from Vienna to Innsbruck (in the remote province of the Tyrol); and in July 1848, the Assembly, which had been elected nominally by universal manhood suffrage but principally by bourgeois voters, met at Vienna to draw up a constitution. One of its first acts was to decree the abolition of serfdom.

**Liberal
Régime in
Austria**

Meanwhile, Hungarian liberals, taking advantage of the flight of Metternich and the fears of Ferdinand, effected a revolution within their country. The press was freed. A national guard was organized. Serfdom, feudal privileges, and the exemption of nobles from taxation were abolished. The Diet was to meet annually at Budapest and to comprise representatives of middle-class taxpayers as well as landlords; it would make the local laws for Hungary, and to it an Hungarian ministry, separate from the Austrian, would be responsible. Though no step was taken to depose the Emperor Ferdinand as King of Hungary, the liberal government at Budapest adopted a national flag and otherwise acted as though Hungary were a free national state.

**Revolution in
Hungary**

At Prague, too, liberals—both Czech and German—seized the opportunity afforded them by the difficulties confronting the Emperor in other parts of the Habsburg realm to set up a special ministry for Bohemia, to transform the local Diet into a parliament, and to create a national

**Revolution in
Bohemia**

guard. In April the Emperor agreed in general terms to an autonomous liberal régime for Bohemia. But as the German liberals at Vienna and the Hungarian liberals at Budapest appeared no more eager than the Habsburg Emperor to bestow real autonomy on Czechs, or other Slavs, the Czech liberals (and nationalists) convoked at Prague, in June 1848, a Pan-Slavic Congress, consisting of Czech, Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav, and Russian delegates, to concert measures which might assure liberty and autonomy to the Slavic peoples, especially those within the Habsburg Empire.

In Italy, a revolt had begun within the kingdom of the Two Sicilies even before the February Revolution at Paris, and in January, King Ferdinand had been forced to accept a liberal constitution. Immediately after the revolution in France, King Charles Albert of Sardinia-Piedmont (the Italian state nearest to France and most independent of Austrian influence) promulgated a liberal constitution—the *Statuto*, March 4, 1848—which provided for a parliament elected by taxpayers, for ministerial responsibility, for the suppression of feudal survivals and the guaranty of the usual individual liberties. Then, with the collapse of Metternich's power at Vienna and the ensuing confusion in Austrian affairs, the tide of liberal (and national) revolution rolled all over Italy. At Milan, the populace, after five days of street fighting, expelled General Radetzky with his 18,000 Austrian troops and cheered for the transfer of Lombardy from Austria to the kingdom of Sardinia. At Venice, the townspeople, under the leadership of Daniele Manin, a patriotic liberal, drove out the Austrian officials and garrison and proclaimed the restoration of the independent Venetian republic. Austrian troops still held certain fortified towns in Lombardy—the so-called "Quadrilateral"—whence they might set out again, when conditions improved at Vienna, to reestablish Austrian supremacy in Italy. In order to rid the peninsula once for all of this danger, Charles Albert of Sardinia declared war against Austria (March 23, 1848). To his army of 60,000 men were soon added detachments from the Two Sicilies, the Papal State, Tuscany, and Lombardy. It seemed certain, in the enthusiasm of the moment, that Italy would obtain national independence and liberal government.


Revolu-
tion in
Italy


Liberal
Régime in
Sardinia

Sardinia
at War
with
Austria



THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE - 1850





Throughout Germany, where Metternich's influence, as in Italy, had been predominant since 1815, the downfall of that statesman was the signal for liberal (and national) rejoicing and revolution. The most sensational upheaval (outside the Habsburg Empire itself) was in Hohenzollern Prussia—the largest of the German states (except Austria), notoriously aristocratic in government, but with a fast-growing middle class at Berlin and in the more recently acquired provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland. King Frederick William IV of Prussia was a versatile and histrionic prince, arbitrarily paternalistic, and romantically attached to the art and what he imagined to be the social and political institutions of the middle ages. He was quite surprised when his “beloved” Berliners, in imitation of the Viennese, took to rioting and erecting barricades (March 15–17, 1848). To allay the excitement, he promised to reconvene the United Landtag as a Prussian Parliament and to forward plans for German national union; but when crowds of workingmen and students flocked to the palace square to applaud him, they were received with musket-shots from his royal guardsmen. Again, resort was had to barricades and street fighting, in which two hundred citizens lost their lives. On March 19, Frederick William IV displayed a change of heart; he called off the troops, appointed a liberal ministry, convoked a Constituent Assembly, and, donning a scarf with the revolutionary colors of black, red, and gold (which he wore well), he theatrically paraded the streets of his capital. In ecstasy over the popular acclaim which attended his change of front, he wrote to the indignant Tsar Nicholas of Russia in fulsome praise of “the glorious German revolution.” The Assembly, which was to draft a constitution for Prussia, was elected by universal manhood suffrage and met at Berlin in May. It was overwhelmingly liberal.

Revolution at Berlin, March 1848

In the smaller German states, liberals came to the fore. In Bavaria, they compelled King Louis I, who had treated the constitution of that state rather cavalierly, to abdicate in favor of his son, Maximilian II, who swore to observe and liberalize the constitution.¹ In Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, and most of the other states,

Revolution in Minor German States

¹ The Bavarian constitution had been promulgated by royal decree in 1818. See Vol. I, p. 753.

the princes were frightened into appointing liberal ministers and agreeing to constitutional government and freedom of the press.

Beyond the confines of Germany, the liberal upheaval affected Denmark and the Dutch Netherlands. In Denmark, King Frederick VII acceded to the demand of liberal rioters at Copenhagen by pledging himself (March 21, 1848) to convoke a constitutional convention. The convention was elected and met in October, and the constitution which it drafted, providing for a parliament in part elected by middle-class taxpayers, was accepted and promulgated by the King in June 1849. In the Dutch Netherlands, King William II put himself at the head of the liberal movement and sanctioned in October 1848 a constitution under which the States-General became a parliament, elected directly by well-to-do individuals.

With the apparent triumph of liberalism throughout central Europe, and with liberal ministries directing the policies of Austria, Prussia, and the other German states, it was but natural that steps should be taken to transform the loose "German Confederation," which had been created in 1815 by the princes and conducted thereafter as an agency of Metternich's reactionary policy,¹ into a close union, which would be both national and liberal. In April 1848, responding to popular demands and to instructions of the new governments of the several states, the Diet of the German Confederation at Frankfurt² authorized the democratic election of a German National Assembly to devise a new federal government for the whole of Germany. Elections were duly held; and inasmuch as many conservatives refrained from voting, the liberals obtained a large majority. The Assembly met at Frankfurt in May. The Diet of the old German Confederation ceased to function. And the new Assembly, reflecting the national enthusiasm and liberal aspirations of the time, proceeded to proclaim a national German Empire, to select a temporary administrative head in the person of a liberal Habsburg prince, Archduke John of Austria, and to elaborate a constitution.

Revolutions in Denmark and Holland

Liberal Attempt at German National Union

Frankfurt Assembly, May 1848

¹ On the German Confederation of 1815, see Vol. I, pp. 727, 752, 754.

² Frankfurt on the Main was an old "free city." It had been the "capital" of the Holy Roman Empire, and after 1815 it was the meeting-place of the Diet of the German Confederation.

From the outset, it was assumed by the majority in the National Assembly at Frankfurt that the new Germany, like the old, would include Austria—not the whole Austrian Empire, but the German part; that it would be a federation; that the central government would be monarchical and parliamentary, with one of the German princes (preferably the ruler of Austria, and, failing him, the ruler of Prussia) as emperor, with a parliament consisting of a chamber representing the states and another chamber representing the people, and with a ministry responsible to the parliament; and that, against encroachments of government, whether state or federal, there should be a clear statement of individual liberties. To write all these assumptions into a constitution and to get necessary support for them from both the German people and the German princes, was a difficult task, at which the Frankfurt Assembly labored for a year. After protracted debates, and in the midst of delicate negotiations about the headship of the contemplated federation (whether it should be the Austrian or the Prussian monarch), the Assembly adopted the "Fundamental Rights of the German Nation." This was a classic expression of the European liberalism (and liberal nationalism) of the middle of the nineteenth century.

We must now turn from our survey of the revolutionary progress of liberalism in central Europe—in Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Italy, and Germany—to an account of its retrogression. It made phenomenal gains during the first half of the year 1848; thereafter it suffered set-backs, with a cumulative effect which fell little short of complete disaster.

Liberal
Set-
Backs,
Second
Half of
1848

It may appear strange, on first thought, that revolution, enthusiastic and widespread, should have been followed by reaction so quickly and on such a broad front. It should be remembered, nevertheless, that the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 in central Europe was primarily an urban and middle-class affair. The cities spoke first and spoke loudly in behalf of a new régime. Then, in due course, the countryside spoke—less noisily but with greater weight—and the countryside was more devoted to traditional usages than to abstract liberty. Despite recent industrialization, the large majority of the population of Germany, Italy, and the Austrian Empire still lived in rural communities, worked in the fields, distrusted townsfolk, and deferred with confidence


and trust to landlord, pastor, and government official. Most landlords and clergymen were hostile to fundamental or revolutionary change; and the staff of government officials which had been growing in numbers and efficiency, and likewise the regular army officers, were not used to an unstable parliamentary ministry. Moreover, the urban population did not give united and continuous support to revolution. Cleavage appeared early between middle class and proletarians, and the more the latter rioted, the greater was the willingness of the former to sacrifice "liberty" to "order and security." Besides, patriotism, which was emphasized by liberals, was a sentiment which could be—and was—utilized by conservatives to wean the masses, urban as well as rural, from revolution. In the circumstances, it should occasion no great surprise that the long-acknowledged "pillars" of conservative society and government, recently toppled over, were soon propped back into their customary places.

The first serious set-back to the liberal revolutionary movement in central Europe was in Bohemia. Here, in June 1848, the


Counter- Revolution in Bo- hemia	Austrian governor and army commander, Prince Windischgrätz, angered by fresh Czech rioting at Prague, in which his wife was killed, acted swiftly to restore "order." His troops, with the sympathetic coöperation of the German element in the province, subdued Prague, dispersed the Pan-Slavic Congress, and overthrew the revolutionary liberal government. Liberal reforms were revoked and all Bohemia was placed under martial law.
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The next important set-back was in Italy. Here, the army of Charles Albert of Sardinia had already been weakened by the withdrawal, in May, of the auxiliary troops of the Pope and the King of the Two Sicilies. Both of these

Failure of War for Italian Liberation	Italian sovereigns had become alarmed by the "excesses" of the revolutionaries and the continuing disorders in their states. Pope Pius IX repudiated war as a means of obtaining national unity, while the recall of Neapolitan troops enabled King Ferdinand to abrogate the constitution which he had granted and to restore absolutism in the Two Sicilies. Now, in July 1848, the Austrian army under General Radetzky; reënforced from the Tyrol, decisively defeated the Italian army of Charles Albert at Custoza. Charles Albert felt obliged to agree to an armistice, and Radetzky reoccupied Lombardy.
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ITALY
1850



This set-back to Italian liberty and unity incited Italian extremists to furious and frantic endeavors. At Rome a liberal minister was assassinated (November 1848); Pope Pius IX fled, thoroughly disillusioned and in fear of his life; and in February 1849, a republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Mazzini. Radical republicans likewise got the upper hand at Florence and at Naples and transformed Tuscany and the Two Sicilies into dictatorial republics. Charles Albert, threatened with a similar republican outbreak in the kingdom of Sardinia, renewed the war with Austria, but in March 1849 suffered a second and quite overwhelming defeat at Novara at the hands of Radetzky. Forced then to conclude an humiliating peace with Austria, Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his son, Victor Emmanuel II, while the victorious Austrian army was free to move against the revolutionary republics.

In May 1849, the King of the Two Sicilies and the Grand-duke of Tuscany were restored to their respective thrones, and Venice, which had been blockaded by land and sea, capitulated to the Austrians. As for Rome, the prince-president of the French republic, Louis Napoleon, in response to pleas of French Catholics and in order to

Counter-
Revolu-
tion in
Italy, 1849

prevent Austria from becoming too powerful in Italy, sent thither a French military force, which overthrew Mazzini's republic at the end of June 1849 and reinstated Pope Pius IX. By mid-summer of 1849 all Italy was at last under traditional control. Republicanism was no more; and, except under Victor Emmanuel in Sardinia, liberalism was no more. The Pope was protected in reactionary policy by French bayonets; King Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies was filling his prisons with such revolutionaries as he did not put to death; and General Haynau, who had succeeded Radetzky in command of the Austrian troops in northern Italy, was earning by the cruelty with which he inflicted penalties the popular nickname of "General Hyena."

Meanwhile conservatives had triumphed in Austria—which was the main reason for the culminating Austrian restoration in Italy. The success of General Windischgrätz in Bohemia in June 1848 and the first success of General Radetzky in northern Italy in July heartened the conservatives in Austria and revived the drooping spirits of the Emperor Ferdinand at Innsbruck. It was apparent

Army vs.
Liberal-
ism in
Austria

that armies under loyal and able commanders could shortly be employed to overawe the revolutionary liberals at Vienna. It also became apparent that developments in Hungary might contribute to a similar end. The revolutionary Hungarian government at Budapest, under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, was nationalist as well as liberal; while it was outraging the Emperor and Austrian conservatives by its "radical" and separatist tendencies, it was arousing the active opposition of its numerous non-Magyar subjects by refusing to grant their demands for national autonomy and by taking steps to "Magyarize" them.

Slavic
National-
ism vs.
Liberal-
ism in
Hungary

These anti-Magyar nationalists, many of them "liberals," found an astute champion in Joseph Jellačić, a Croatian soldier and patriot. Pointing out to the Emperor at Innsbruck how the Croats (and other Slavs in the Habsburg Empire) could be counted upon

to make common cause with Austria against Hungarian pretensions, Jellačić was appointed governor of Croatia and commissioned (September 1848) to attack Hungary with a Slavic army, which would be reinforced by the German garrison from Vienna.

The liberals at Vienna, sympathizing with the liberals at Budapest, vainly sought to prevent the despatch of the imperial garrison to the aid of Jellačić. A mob hanged the minister of war and despoiled the armory. But upon Vienna converged two Austrian armies—that of Windischgrätz from Bohemia and that of Jellačić from Croatia—while to the assistance of the Viennese


Counter-
Revolu-
tion in
Austria
October
1848

"rebels" an Hungarian army marched. Jellačić defeated and turned back the Hungarians, and on the last day of October Windischgrätz beat down the resistance at Vienna and occupied the city in force.

A score or so of radical leaders were executed, and the liberal government of the Austrian Empire was supplanted by a ministry headed by Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, soldier and diplomat, brother-in-law of Windischgrätz, and worthy successor of Metternich.

Schwarzenberg's first important act, after assuring order in German Austria as well as in Czech Bohemia,¹ was to prevail

¹ The Czechs, it should be remembered, were Slavs; and they showed a readiness to support any Austrian government which would espouse the cause of fellow Slavs against "oppressive" Hungarians. Thus, even "liberal" Czechs rallied to Windischgrätz and Schwarzenberg and ceased to create trouble for them in Bohemia.



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HABSBURG AND RELATED FAMILIES

Including Sovereigns of Austria-Hungary, Spain, etc.

MARIA THERESA m.
(1717-1780)

Archduchess of Austria
Queen of Hungary and Bohemia

JOSEPH II
(1741-1790),
Holy Roman Emperor
1765-1790

LEOPOLD II
(1747-1792),
Holy Roman Emperor
1790-1792

Marie Antoinette
(1755-1793),
m. LOUIS XVI,
King of France

FRANCIS II
(1768-1835),
Holy Roman Emperor
1792-1806
Emperor of Austria
1804-1835

Joseph
(1776-1847),
Palatine of
Hungary

John
(1782-1859),
Imperial Vicar
of Germany
1848

Charles
(1771-1847),
"Archduke
Charles,"
Duke of Teschen

Marie Louise
(1791-1847),
Duchess of Parma,
m. NAPOLEON I,
French Emperor

FERDINAND I
(1793-1875),
Emperor of Austria
1835-1848

Francis
(1802-1878),
m. Sophia
of Bavaria

Albert
(1817-1895),
Field-Marshal
of Austria

Charles Ferdinand
(1818-1874)

Napoleon III
(1810-1832),
King of Rome
Duke of Reichstadt

FRANCIS JOSEPH
(1830-1916),
Emperor of Austria
King of Hungary
1848-1916,
m. Elizabeth of Bavaria

MAXIMILIAN
(1832-1867),
Emperor of
Mexico
1864-1867

Charles
(1833-1896),
m. Maria
Annunciata
of Sicily

Maria Christina
(1858-1929),
m. ALPHONSO XII,
King of Spain

Rudolph
(1858-1889)

Francis Ferdinand
(1863-1914),
m. Sophia Chotek

Otto
(1865-1906),
m. Maria Josepha
of Saxony


ALPHONSO XIII
(1886-),
King of Spain
1886-1931

CHARLES
(1887-1922),
Emperor of Austria
King of Hungary
1916-1918
m. Zita of Bourbon

John
(1913-),
Prince of Asturias

Otto
(1912-),
Heir to Thrones
of Austria and Hungary

Pr
Crov



upon the Emperor Ferdinand I to abdicate in favor of his eighteen-year-old nephew Francis Joseph (December 2, 1848) and to get the new Emperor to annul the liberal commitments which the old one had made. He allowed the Austrian constitutional convention to continue its debates for several months longer, but he ignored the document which it prepared and eventually repudiated any idea of a liberal constitution.

The second important act of Schwarzenberg was to direct an energetic offensive against the Hungarian revolutionaries. To the support of Jellačić, already invading Hungary with a Croatian army, he sent Windischgrätz with a German (and Czech) army. Kossuth, the Magyar leader, replied by proclaiming the independence of Hungary (April 1849) under a republican form of government and by stirring the masses to fiercely patriotic resistance. For a time Kossuth's forces held the invading armies at bay, but Schwarzenberg successfully besought aid from the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, who was anxious not only to ensure the suppression of revolution in central Europe but also to check the danger of another national uprising in Poland. By August 1849, the combined armies of Austria and Russia were in complete control of Hungary. The republic collapsed, Kossuth fled, other revolutionaries were slain or exiled, and the liberal constitution was abrogated. Hungary was again ruled as an Austrian province.

Hungarian Republic and Its Overthrow

The successive victories of political (and social) reaction in the Habsburg Empire—in German Austria itself and in its dependencies of Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary—could not fail to exert a profound influence on the course of events in Germany. Next to Austria, the most important German state, we know, was Prussia; and the traditional governing classes of Prussia were essentially as hostile to liberalism as were those of Austria. In Prussia, landlords and Protestant clergymen and military and civil officials were particularly influential with King Frederick William IV and also with the masses of the rural population and with many conservatively minded individuals in the cities, and by the summer of 1848 they were regaining confidence in their ability to do what their fellows in Austria were doing.

Counter-Revolution in Prussia

Two developments in the late summer of 1848 moved Frederick William IV to defy the liberals who had been in control of the

Prussian government since March. One was foreign pressure on him to terminate the war which, on the request of the National Assembly at Frankfurt and in accord with liberal sentiment throughout Germany, he had been waging with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.¹ The other was the pressure on him from conservatives within Prussia to halt the work of the Prussian Constituent Assembly whose liberal majority was voting to abolish the nobility, to make the King a mere figure-head, and to despatch a Prussian army to the assistance of the revolutionaries at Vienna. In the autumn of 1848 Frederick William IV acted. He supplanted his liberal ministry with an ultra-conservative one under the leadership of Count Brandenburg, nobleman, large landowner, and resolute reactionary, and at the same time he utilized the troops whom he withdrew from Schleswig-Holstein to overawe the Constituent Assembly and the populace at Berlin. Finding that these actions elicited no serious tumult, he presently dissolved the Assembly and drafted a constitution of his own, under which the chief political power would remain in the hands of the King and his ministers, though on certain matters—as a sop to liberalism—he would consult with a parliament representing the upper classes and the wealthiest part of the middle class.

The triumph of reaction in Prussia as well as in Austria left the liberal majority in the German National Assembly at Frankfurt in an embarrassing situation. In a desperate hope that the Prussian King's romantic attachment to nationalism might outweigh his aversion to liberalism, they provided in the constitution which they finally adopted in April 1849 that the head of united Germany should be an hereditary emperor and that he should be none other than the King of Prussia.

Final National Efforts of Frankfurt Assembly ¹ These duchies, on the peninsula between Denmark and Germany, had long been ruled by the King of Denmark, though Schleswig was half German and Holstein was peopled almost wholly by Germans and after 1815 was a member of the German Confederation. In March 1848, German liberals in the duchies attempted a revolt against King Frederick VII of Denmark, while the King attempted to make Schleswig an integral part of Denmark. The German Confederation thereupon commissioned Prussia to go to war with Denmark, and thus it befell that "liberal" Prussia fought "liberal" Denmark over a nationalist problem. Soon, however, Prussia was faced with threats from Great Britain, France, and Russia, signatories of the treaty of 1815 guarantying Schleswig and Holstein to the King of Denmark, that unless she stopped the war they would intervene on the Danish side. A truce was concluded at Malmoe in August 1848, and Frederick William IV withdrew his troops—to the disgust and discomfiture of German liberals.

Frederick William IV hesitated. He was enamored with the prospect of national unity and eager to enhance the prestige of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty. But he had no stomach for the liberal constitution which came with the imperial crown from the Frankfurt Assembly—it came from the “gutter,” he said. He was well aware that any assumption of an imperial title by him would evoke jealous opposition from the Kings of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and Hanover, and especially from the Habsburg Emperor of Austria. And he received ominous expostulations from the Tsar Nicholas of Russia. On April 28, 1849, Frederick William ended the period of uncertainty by repudiating the Frankfurt constitution and refusing the imperial crown.


Repudia-
tion of
Frankfurt
Assembly
by Prus-
sian King,
1849

In mad protest against the obvious failure of the Frankfurt Assembly, extremist groups tried in May 1849 to dethrone princes and set up republics in various parts of Germany. These had an even briefer duration than the contemporary republics in Hungary and Italy. They were suppressed by Prussian troops with speed and no little cruelty. Surviving German republicans and liberal extremists were jailed or exiled; many found refuge across the Atlantic in the United States.

Frederick William IV, though now a bitter foe of liberalism, was still haunted by the dream of creating a German union under Prussian (and Hohenzollern) leadership. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Frankfurt Assembly and the suppression of republican rioting, he invited the other German states except Austria to form a new and close union under his presidency, with a council representing the princes and a parliament representing the nation. Seventeen of the lesser states accepted the invitation, and the parliament of the “German Union” met at Erfurt in March 1850. By this time, however, Austria was in a position to follow up the triumph of conservatism at home and in her dependencies of Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary with the forceful reassertion of her hegemony in Germany. Count Schwarzenberg, her dominating statesman, was quite sympathetic with the conservatism of Frederick William IV and Count Brandenburg, but Schwarzenberg would brook no attempt on the part of even these fellow conservatives to oust Austria and the Habs-


Prussian
King's
Own
“German
Union,”
1850

Austrian
Opposi-
tion



GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1815-1866

dotted line shows the boundary of the Confederation after 1839.



and in Austria itself were henceforth legally free to buy land for themselves or to move at will from country to town. From the upheaval, moreover, survived some form of constitutional government, not in the Austrian Empire, but in other states of central Europe—in Sardinia, Switzerland, the Dutch Netherlands, Denmark, and Prussia.

Excep-
tional
Liberal
Gains

Only one of these constitutional governments was democratic, and few were really liberal. Switzerland emerged from the revolution of 1848 with a democratic federal constitution.¹ In Sardinia, the liberal régime which was instituted by King Charles Albert in March 1848, and which was patterned after England's, was retained by King Victor Emmanuel II despite the protests of Austria and of Italian neighbors. In the 1850's, Sardinia was the only constitutional and liberal state in Italy, as Switzerland was the only democratic republic in Europe.²

Constitu-
tions in
Switzer-
land and
Sardinia

The Dutch constitution which King William II granted in 1848 and the Danish constitution which King Frederick VII finally promulgated in 1849 were somewhat less liberal than the Sardinian, in that they did not make the royal ministers completely responsible to the parliaments which were set up. On the other hand, all three constitutions were equally liberal (and not democratic) in that they imposed property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and thereby restricted direct parliamentary representation to the upper and middle classes.

In Hol-
land and
Denmark

In this latter sense, the Prussian constitution which Frederick William IV decreed in 1850 was "liberal." It pretended to base the choice of the lower chamber of the Prussian parliament on the principle of universal manhood suffrage, but by means of a complicated three-class system of indirect election it actually limited the membership of the chamber to landlords and wealthy bourgeois. It remained the royal charter of Prussian government from 1850 to 1918.

In
Prussia

Such were the enduring monuments of the Revolution of 1848

¹ The "modern" political system of Switzerland dates from 1848. The constitution of this year strengthened the authority of the federal government and entrusted it to a bicameral legislature.

² France was a democratic republic until 1852, but was then transformed into a Napoleonic Empire. See below, pp. 128-129.

in central Europe. They may appear slight in comparison with the noise and confusion which liberalism (and nationalism) made in that year from Sicily to Schleswig and from Holland to Hungary. We must remember, nevertheless, that the noise and confusion were out of proportion to the number of liberals. There can be no doubt that in central Europe, generally speaking, liberalism was discredited by its manifold failures in 1848, and during the ensuing decade liberal actors were rarely seen on the public stage. Yet, behind the scenes, liberalism was not dead. Its following, indeed, grew more numerous, as the Industrial Revolution proceeded. And if the liberals of the 50's and 60's were less vocal than the liberals of 1848 had been, they were, indirectly and in the long run, more influential. We shall speak further of liberalism in central Europe when in the next chapter we discuss the developments of nationalism. In the meantime we must indicate the forces which at this very time were opposing, or tending to modify, "pure liberalism."

Continuing
Liberal
Movement in
Central
Europe

5. THE OPPOSITION TO LIBERALISM

As one looks back over the "Victorian Compromise" in Britain from 1832 to 1865, over the bourgeois monarchy and the second republic in France from 1830 to 1852, and over the revolutionary upheaval throughout central Europe in 1848-1849, one is struck with many evidences of a common liberal ideal which influenced all those phases of European history.

Liberal-
ism in
Europe,
1830-1860

Nowhere was the ideal of liberalism completely realized. It came nearest to realization in Britain, where the Industrial Revolution and resulting urbanization were most advanced, where long existing political institutions were peculiarly favorable to liberal adaptation, and where a large part of the nobility and the most articulate portion of the proletariat coöperated with the middle class. In Belgium, too, the ideal of liberalism came near to realization; here was a similarly intensive industrialization, and the importation of constitutional machinery (along with other machinery) from England largely compensated for the lack of indigenous parliamentary experience. In France, liberalism was a very real faith of the upper bourgeoisie, especially of the industrial bourgeoisie, but this class was proportionately

less numerous in France than in Belgium or Britain, and for most Frenchmen liberalism was not so much an inspiring faith as a seemingly necessary compromise between the aristocratic ideals of the old Bourbon monarchy and the democratic ideals of the First Republic. In central Europe, where machine industry was distinctly backward and where there had been little tradition of forceful opposition to noble landlords and divine-right monarchs, liberalism was earnestly championed by only a comparatively small number of persons.

Wherever liberalism penetrated, it served as an important leaven in society and government, a leaven which kept on working after the Austrian repressions of 1849, after the subversion of the Second French Republic in 1852, after the formal termination of the "Victorian Compromise" in 1865. More and more, as time went on and the Industrial Revolution developed, the basic liberal concept of individualism permeated all classes and helped to shape public policies, breaking down traditional barriers of social and commercial intercourse and prompting an ever wider extension of public works and popular education.

On the other hand, liberalism encountered from the outset various forces of opposition or criticism which in some instances quite suddenly halted its onward march and which in general gradually modified its nature and altered its course. Such paralyzing or qualifying forces were most obvious in central Europe, but they were by no means lacking in France and Britain. There were four principal kinds.

Kinds of
Opposi-
tion

(1) *Agrarian Opposition*. This came from landlords, usually titled noblemen and country gentlemen, who for centuries had been in the habit of owning large agricultural estates, patronizing the peasants who were their tenants or laborers, serving as officers in the army or civil administration of a monarch who was normally a great landlord like themselves, and receiving from state and church many marks of favor and distinction. Landlords were apt to oppose liberalism. They objected to its economics, which preferred industry to agriculture, the factory town to the rural village, the individual to the class, competition to coöperation. They objected to its politics, which tended to put the despised urban middle class into power under the "revolutionary" banner of

1. Agrar-
ian

popular sovereignty and through novel constitutional limitations on monarchy and aristocracy.

(2) *Religious Opposition*. It should be borne in mind that parallel with the development of liberalism during the first half of the nineteenth century went a noteworthy revival of Christianity. The intellectual class, which in the eighteenth century had been impregnated with scepticism about any supernatural religion, now furnished numerous apologists for Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, and many of the bourgeoisie as well as of the nobility resumed worship in their traditional churches.¹ The majority of the bourgeois churchgoers seem to have managed to be "religious" and "liberal" at the same time, and many clergymen, particularly among the Radical Christian sects in Britain and among the Calvinist churches of Holland, Switzerland, and Hungary, were sincere supporters of political and economic liberalism.

But many Christian clergymen and many lay believers were opponents of liberalism in one way or another. Some of the opposition was to the "un-Christian" implications of economic liberalism—its materialism, its selfishness, its willful neglect of the poor, its condemnation of private charity. Other opposition, especially marked on the Continent, was to the political aspects of liberalism. Some Christians thought it not democratic enough; others thought it too democratic; and Christians of diametrically opposite views on what should be the form of modern government were prone to agree that the "liberal state" was not a "Christian state." Pope Gregory XVI (1830-1846) issued several encyclicals against "liberalism," and in political conviction and action he was ultra-conservative. His successor, Pius IX (1846-1878), was at first, as we have seen, rather favorably disposed toward political liberalism, but after his first practical experience with revolutionaries at Rome in 1848 he condemned the "new liberalism" and found fault with "modern progress."² Individual Catholics went on being democratic or even liberal, but the weight of authority in the Catholic Church, like the weight of opinion in the Lutheran Church (and

¹ On the religious revival of the early nineteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 741-743, and below, p. 314.

² Papal condemnations of "liberalism" were resumed in the celebrated *Syllabus of Errors* which Pius IX issued in 1864. See below, pp. 302-303.

to a lesser extent in the Anglican Church), was in formal opposition to mid-nineteenth-century liberalism.

(3) *Democratic and "Socialist" Opposition.* While political liberalism was assailed from one side by reactionaries, who would have no parliamentary régime, it was attacked from the opposite side by radicals, who would establish a parliamentary régime that would be thoroughly democratic. A large part of this democratic radicalism, especially on the Continent, was an heritage from the eighteenth century—from the political philosophy of Rousseau, from the American Revolution, and, most specifically, from the Jacobinism of the First French Republic. As such, it was reënforced in the first half of the nineteenth century by the growing romantic concern of intellectuals with the "people" and the "nation." Its apostles were usually liberal in general philosophy, but they constituted a left wing of the liberal movement. Alike as humanitarians, romantics, and logicians, they were impelled to teach that the doctrine of popular sovereignty justified, not a parliamentary franchise limited by property qualifications, as right-wing liberals contended, but universal manhood suffrage. Some went so far as to condemn limited monarchy along with limited suffrage and to espouse republicanism as well as democracy.

3. Democratic
Opposition

From
Radicals

As the Industrial Revolution spread out from Britain, it gave rise to an urban proletariat, with similar democratic aspirations, in every country which it penetrated. This meant that after 1830 the earlier philosophical democracy was supplemented and reoriented by a democratic movement among workingmen for social ends not wholly in keeping with economic liberalism.

From
Working-
men

In response to the trend of thought among "radical" proletarians, "socialist" movements appeared in the 1840's: utopian coöperative socialism; the state socialism of a few of the Chartist leaders in Britain and of Louis Blanc, with his "national workshops," in France. Most of these socialist movements were unimpressive in immediate achievement. Louis Blanc's, which secured the largest popular support of any, was wiped out in blood during the "June days" of 1848. Yet, in contradiction to the ideal of "individualism" entertained by liberals, an ideal of "socialism" entered permanently

"Social-
ism"

CHAPTER XVII

ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM

I. THE HEYDAY OF ROMANTICISM, 1830-1878



MARKING the second and third quarters of the nineteenth century was a significant era in European history. It was an era when the Industrial Revolution developed and liberalism flourished. It was also a romantic age.

Leaders of thought and wealth might be concerned with the establishment of parliamentary government, with the discovery of "laws" of political economy, or with the operation of a factory or a railway; they might seemingly be absorbed in mechanical inventions, in rows of figures about production and shipping, private income and public expenditure, or in other details of material "progress." Most of them, however, had poetry, as well as prose, in their souls, and they were not so absorbed in factual routine as to be precluded from flights of fancy. Industrialists, of course, tried to be wholly mundane about their business affairs, and liberal parliamentarians were famed for the seriousness with which they debated national budgets and the responsibility of ministers. Yet outside office-hours, so to speak, even the most conscientious profit-seekers were wont to indulge, along with less weighty persons, in romantic moods and tastes. Perhaps to the middle class, as to proletarians and landlords, romanticism afforded welcome relief or necessary escape from a world of machinery, commodities, ledgers, and parliamentary majorities. At any rate, romanticism was fashionable. It was the cultural mode of the era.

Rise of
Romanti-
cism

Romanticism had appeared in the eighteenth century as a rival of long-established "classicism." During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, it had extended its scope and influence.¹ Now, in the era from

¹ On romanticism in the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 565-566, 570-572. On romanticism from 1800 to 1830, see Vol. I, pp. 734-751.

1830 to 1878, it all but routed its old rival and put its own impress upon art, scholarship, and philosophy.

Romanticism was no simple or single phenomenon, and its influences were as complex as its elements were diverse. No two of its apostles were exactly alike, and between some of them wide chasms yawned. Among its disciples were liberals and conservatives, revolutionaries and reactionaries, religious and anti-religious persons, those who were severely conventional in morals and those who were not conventional at all. The two things on which all romantics agreed were: (1) that sentiment and emotion should be prized as guides to what is "true"; and (2) that the "beautiful" should be sought in departure from classical models.

Its
Essence

In other words, romanticism, when reduced to the lowest common denominator, was a reaction against the "rationalism" and "classicism" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It called for "different" forms of thinking and doing. But what should be the substance of romantic thought or art? Toward what positive end should the romantic "react"? On these questions there was no consensus of opinion.

Some romantics turned to the "natural" for what was true and to the "primitive" for what was beautiful. Others, in their reaction, turned for like stimulus to the "historical," and frequently to the "medieval." Still others found inspiration in an imaginary utopia of the future or in an exciting quest for "freedom" in the present. A few took to cultivating art just for "art's sake," and a larger number seemed to entertain a fondness for revolution for the sake of revolution, or for reform for the sake of change. Finally, patriotic emotions entered freely into the complex.

Its
Varieties

With these general reflections in mind, we may now consider in some detail the varied aspects of romantic culture during the era from 1830 to 1878.

It was perhaps in national literature that romanticism was most strikingly and variously expressed. During the era from 1830 to 1878 romantic literature flourished all over Europe, not merely in Britain and Germany, where it represented a continuation of eighteenth-century romanticism, but also in Latin and Slavic countries, where it was less indigenous but hardly less popular.

Romantic
Literature

In Britain, the earlier romantic poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth, of Byron, Shelley, and Keats, was now succeeded by the romantic poetry of Robert Browning (1812-1889) and English Poetry: Alfred Tennyson (1809-1892). Browning adhered to Browning, general to the "naturalist" tradition of Wordsworth, Tennyson but he infused "nature" with bourgeois morality and invested it with a dramatic revolutionary quality, and he displayed at times a special fondness for the grotesque, even for the horrible. Tennyson was an even bigger figure among his contemporaries. He sang the glories of the new industry, the coming of perpetual peace on the heels of free trade, the heroic virtues of English patriotism, the noble courtly exploits of such legendary medieval characters as King Arthur, Sir Galahad, and the Lady of Shalott. Tennyson was a highly cultured Englishman and possessed a wizardry of words. No wonder that the classes and the masses read his verse with avidity, and that Queen Victoria (and the Prince-Consort Albert) admired him and made him poet laureate.

In the case of the English novel, the eighteenth-century Richardson, with his sentimental romanticism, had already been followed by Sir Walter Scott with his historical romanticism. And at the height of Scott's career was English Fiction: Dickens born the chief English novelist of the era of liberalism and industrialization, Charles Dickens (1812-1870). Son of a lower middle-class father who was so unheedful of the provident admonitions of liberal economists as to be imprisoned for debt, Dickens was the humorous, sympathetic portrayer of the whole lower middle class of contemporary England. His *Oliver Twist* was a particularly telling exposé of the wretched condition of the poor in Britain, and his *Tale of Two Cities* was a moving story of the French Revolution. Dickens was very English in his patriotism, in his affection for good old national customs, and in his distaste for religious non-conformity. He was quite radical in his zeal for the reform of justice and education and in his denunciation of the oppression of the poor by the rich, of the weak by the strong. He loathed selfish individualism, but he was sufficiently under the spell of current liberalism to represent the most unfortunate of his characters as becoming wholly fortunate through the simple device of emigrating from England to the colonies.¹

¹ Other English novelists of the period, we may recall, were Thackeray (1811-1863), Charles Reade (1814-1884), and George Eliot (1819-1880).

French literature of the era was likewise rich, and predominantly romantic. Perhaps the outstanding genius was Victor Hugo (1802-1885), the son of a French general in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. He began his literary career in the shadow of Chateaubriand, writing romantic poetry about the twilight, about the leaves of autumn, and also a play about Cromwell. Then, in 1830, he brought out his famous romantic drama of *Hernani*, the production of which on the Paris stage led to riotous demonstrations on the part of its classicist critics. Hugo wrote several other dramas, but he achieved his greatest contemporary fame by his novels, *Notre Dame de Paris* (a medieval story), *Ninety-Three* (a tale of the French Revolution), and *Les Misérables*, which dealt with the characters and actions of common people. Hugo was an intellectual liberal and a political democrat; he did not like the bourgeois monarchy, and, though a fervent panegyrist of Napoleon I, he was contemptuous of Prince Louis Napoleon and exiled himself from France during the latter's ascendancy.

French
Fiction:
Hugo

Another romantic was Alexandre Dumas (1802-1870), similarly the son of a general in the French revolutionary war, but the grandson of a West Indian negress. He was a thrilling person—passionate, boastful, always getting into scrapes, yet always writing at breakneck speed. A prodigious number of exciting volumes he turned out—plays, short stories, novels. His masterpiece, *The Three Musketeers*, was published in 1844. Dumas was an untamed Jacobin, who rejoiced at the overthrow of the Bourbon-Orleanist king in 1848 and the erection of the Second French Republic.

Dumas

Far greater than Dumas or Hugo in the portrayal of individual character was Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850). Balzac came, like Dickens, from the lower middle class, and the "de" in his name was not a sign of nobility but rather of the romanticism which impelled him to pretend that he was noble. Balzac began as an admirer and imitator of Sir Walter Scott, but his powers of observation were greater and his interests were different; and he soon showed a genius of his own in depicting all sorts of second-rate persons among the French bourgeoisie of his day. The numerous volumes of Balzac's *Human Comedy* constitute a marvellous panorama of the vices and weaknesses, the stupidities and foibles, of the middle class in the 1840's, when

Balzac

the Industrial Revolution was permeating France and influencing the public policies of the bourgeois monarchy.

A fourth French novelist of the era should be mentioned—a woman who was even more romantic than her predecessor,

Madame de Staël¹—Madame Dudevant, known best by her pen-name of George Sand (1804–1876).² George Sand

Sand diverted herself with a succession of tuberculous young men whom she caught firmly and played with briefly, but her real occupation was the pouring out of volumes of fiction which enjoyed a great but fleeting vogue. Some were characterized by the spirit of revolt against moral and social arrangements. Some were pseudo-philosophical or pseudo-psychological. Some were merely melodramatic.

Among the nostalgic young men whom George Sand commanded was Alfred de Musset (1810–1857), who wrote poetry in the Byronic manner, both passionate and graceful. A patriotic outburst of his muse about the River Rhine brought dozens of challenges to duels from German army officers.

In Russia, a noteworthy literary development occurred, quite romantic in style and mood. In the footsteps of Pushkin³ followed three great novelists. (1) Gogol (1809–1852)

Russian Literature published his masterpiece, *Dead Souls*, in 1842; it comprised a series of humorous unflattering sketches of Russian provincial society. Gogol, in later life, became a devotee of religion and mysticism. (2) Turgenev (1818–1883), a contemporary of Dickens and Hugo, was melancholy and pessimistic; he wrote with pathos of abuses in Russian society, and his masterpiece, *Fathers and Children* (1862), treated of the revolutionary agitation which was then gathering headway in Russia. (3) Dostoevski (1821–1881) was perhaps the most romantic of this group. He liked common people and he perceived much good in the midst of poverty and evil. He was patriotic and thought the Russian peasantry superior to every other class in society. Among his famous books were *Poor People* (1846) and *Crime and Punishment* (1866).

¹ See Vol. I, p. 747.

² George Sand's paternal grandfather was a natural son of Louis XV and her paternal grandmother was a natural daughter of Maurice de Saxe, who was a natural son of Augustus the Strong of Saxony. George's father was an army officer and her mother was the daughter of a Paris bird-fancier. A romantic pedigree!

³ See Vol. I, pp. 747–748

Contemporary with the Russian novelist Gogol was the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855)—the national poet of nineteenth-century Poland. Mickiewicz dealt in his verse with the medieval prowess of Polish arms, with the good old customs of Polish nobles and gentlemen, and with the natural beauty of Polish skies and forests. He was an intense patriot and, becoming professor of Slavic literature at the Collège de France in 1840, he devoted his last years to nationalist propaganda. He died in 1855 at Constantinople, where he was assembling a Polish "legion" to fight with France and England against Russia in the Crimean War.

Polish Lit-
erature:
Mickie-
wicz

What has been said of poets and prose writers during the era from 1830 to 1878 in Polish, Russian, French, and English, may be said in general of literary lights who contemporaneously contributed to other European literatures—German, Italian, Scandinavian, Czech, Spanish, etc. Their poems, novels, dramas, and essays likewise reflected the current interest in common people, in national history, in medieval customs, in the "good old days," in "local color," or in sentimental grief, natural beauty, or glorious liberty.

General
Vogue of
Romantic
Literature

Architecture, from its very nature, was more conservative than literature. During the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth, when literature was beginning to reflect the new romanticism, architecture had remained staunchly true to the older traditions of classicism. The romantic writing of Rousseau and Goethe, of Chateaubriand and Byron, had been paralleled by the neo-classical building of the Bourbon and Napoleonic periods; and the use of classical models for new national monuments in America and England, as well as in France, had promised permanently to house the concededly romantic spirit of the new nationalism in temples of severely classical form. In England, it is true, a few attempts had been made in the eighteenth century to depart from time-honored patterns of classical architecture and to adopt other models—either Chinese or the so-called "Gothic"—but the results were regarded by most contemporary "persons of taste" as merely freakish.¹

Architec-
ture of the
Era

¹ As early as 1740 Chinese pagodas were being built in English gardens in the midst of classical surroundings. Presently, fantastic "Gothic" tea-houses appeared, symbolizing the ideals of rusticity and primitiveness which were becoming fashion-

From 1830, however, the sway of classical architecture was challenged by a "Gothic revival," a going back for inspiration, not to the domes and columns of classical antiquity, but to the pinnacles and pointed arches of the middle ages. To the strengthening and spread of romantic influence was due the interesting fact that medieval architecture, which artists and intellectuals for the past three hundred years had despised, became fashionable once more in the nineteenth century.

A prominent leader of the Gothic revival was Augustus Pugin, a native of London and the son of a French father and an English mother. As a boy he conceived an enthusiasm for everything medieval, an enthusiasm which his later reception into the Catholic Church tended to confirm. Pugin designed "medieval" scenery for romantic operas; he designed furniture in the medieval style for Windsor Castle; he designed several new Gothic church buildings. At the same time began a marked interest in "ritualism" in the Anglican Church, and the study of church architecture in relation to ritual arrangements. Almost simultaneously Ruskin contended that modern art should return to the methods as well as the forms of medieval art, and this for moral as well as religious and ritualistic reasons. The individual craftsman would be enabled to free himself from machine industry and aid modern society to attain to true beauty. For true beauty, Ruskin proclaimed, lay not in abstract "classical" qualities, such as proportion and restraint, but in honesty of materials and structure and in evidence of personal devotion. Ruskin failed to shake modern industrialism, but he communicated to many a modern industrialist an admiration for medieval architecture.

The "Gothic revival" in England was exemplified most strikingly in the rebuilding of the palace at Westminster, with the houses of Parliament, which was accomplished, under the guidance of Sir Charles Barry, between 1840 and 1860. It was further exemplified at Manchester, the centre of the cotton industry and

able in literature and philosophy. The first modern Gothic building of any pretentiousness was the country residence of Horace Walpole, a son of Sir Robert Walpole and an enthusiastic admirer of the middle ages and author of the first "Gothic romance"—*The Castle of Otranto* (1764). Walpole's building, a jumble of "castellated" battlements and details copied from various medieval castles, was imitated by several other English aristocrats.

of economic liberalism, by the court-house and the town hall; and at London by the national law courts.

In France the "Gothic revival" was championed by Viollet-le-Duc, a native of Paris and an especially appreciative reader of Victor Hugo's *Notre Dame de Paris*. He became a distinguished architect, scientist, and scholar, and was employed by the successive French governments of Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon to "restore" many a medieval building which had fallen into decay or ruin. One of Viollet-le-Duc's major achievements was the restoration of the Gothic cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris; another was the preparation of a monumental *Dictionary of French Architecture from the 11th to the 16th Century*, which guided other architects in making Gothic designs.

Viollet-le-Duc and Gothic Revival in France

The "Gothic revival" did not succeed, however, in really dominating European architecture. It was more in the nature of an incidental supplement to prevailing classical traditions. These traditions, nevertheless, underwent some modification under romantic influences, so that the "classicism" of the era from 1830 to 1878 was "eclectic," varying from country to country and frequently embodying peculiar features which were not strictly classical but which were supposed to represent a special "national" culture.

Predominance of "Eclectic" Classical Architecture

Of eclectic classical architecture, the main inspiration came from Italy, where romantic patriots found models for a modern "Italian style" in structures at Florence dating from the period of Dante and Petrarch, of the transition from medieval to early modern art. This "primitive classical" was utilized in Italy itself, and likewise in other parts of Europe where sympathy for "Italian art" was so habitual as to be deemed a national characteristic. Into England it was introduced by Sir Charles Barry (who in another mood used Gothic, as we have seen, for the parliament building at Westminster) and was applied by him to new club-houses in London and by other architects to banks and railway stations. In Germany it was adopted as the basis for the architectural embellishment of Munich, Dresden, and Vienna, though as time went on this embellishment assumed an increasingly ornate character. At Munich, under the pa-

In Italy

In England

In Germany

tronage of art-loving Bavarian Kings, new art galleries and governmental palaces were put up with arcades and other details borrowed from Florentine designs. At Dresden, the sumptuous Saxon court theatre was built in the manner of the Italian classical renaissance. At Vienna, the Ringstrasse was transformed into one of the most magnificent streets in all Europe—with its reconstructed imperial palace, its court theatre, and its museums of art and natural history.

In France, there was less direct borrowing from Italian styles and more independent development of peculiarly French classical models. Especially with the advent of Louis Napoleon to political power, there was a pronounced tendency among French architects to resuscitate the "empire style," with its imperial Roman (and Egyptian) solemnity, and to invest it with a profusion of baroque detail which would proclaim the continually increasing wealth and grandeur of French civilization. To achieve this end, Louis Napoleon had the assistance of a great "city planner," Baron Haussmann, who spent years of hard work and huge sums of money in laying out parks and broad boulevards in Paris, rendering the whole city a suitable setting for public monuments. Likewise, Louis Napoleon had the service of an excellent architect, Charles Garnier, whose luxurious opera house at Paris was at once the crowning glory of the Second French Empire and the inspiration for much subsequent "French" architecture.

In countries touched by the Industrial Revolution, it seemed as though architecture became ever more imposing, as it borrowed increasingly now from the Gothic of the middle ages, now from the classical of the renaissance, or now from the "Baroque" or the "empire." An extreme of such borrowing (and fusing) was reached in the gigantic Palace of Justice at Brussels, in highly industrialized Belgium. But, all over Europe, whatever might be the forms of architecture, the art itself was more and more regarded as an expression of *national* life. As such, it was, even in its "classical" aspects, quite "romantic."

Sculpture and the other decorative arts showed more obviously the influence of romanticism. In sculpture, the baroque religious spirit of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the "Greek" intellectual spirit of the eighteenth century gave way in the nineteenth century to a more

Romantic
Sculpture

sentimental feeling. Simultaneously, a new type of memorial, that of a statue put up in a public street or square, was replacing the indoor sepulchre as a major object of the sculptor's art, and the new type invited treatment of more popular and less formal appeal. Of course, in private gardens the somewhat old-fashioned nymphs and goddesses were still in evidence, but interspersed with them were likely now to be quite modern little boys and girls, holding umbrellas perhaps, and some more or less lifelike dogs and lions; and the newcomers might be, not in stone, but in iron!—romantic contributions of the Industrial Revolution!

One of the foremost sculptors of the era was François Rude (1784–1855), whose best work was done on the ornamentation of the Arch of Triumph in Paris; his group was intensely nationalist in subject and highly dramatic in effect.¹ A pupil of Rude, Jean Baptiste Carpeaux, was equally gifted and equally romantic; he had great talent and a marked fondness for vehement and passionate action.² David d'Angers was less talented, but the numerous statues of famous Frenchmen with which he bestrewed the streets of French cities—all the figures being represented in chaste modern dress and with gestures and expressions in supposed harmony with their natures and activities—may be taken as typical of what was done by scores of sculptors all over Europe in catering to the widespread current interest in national history and national heroes. The best sculpture of the era was undoubtedly French, but similar motives and mannerisms characterized many contemporary sculptors in Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States of America.³

Rude and
Carpeaux

The household arts received special stimulus from a number of contemporary developments. One of these was the Industrial Revolution, which expedited mass production of furniture, ornamental iron fences and park benches, and jig-saw woodwork for porches and railings, cornices and doorways. Still another was the improving means of communica-

House-
hold Arts

¹ For an example of Rude's art, see the picture facing p. 743 in Vol. I. The Arch of Triumph was planned by Napoleon I but was completed and adorned during the reign of Louis Philippe.

² For an example of Carpeaux's art, see the portrait bust of Napoleon III facing p. 130, below.

³ Note, for example, memorials erected in the United States after the Civil War (1861–1865).

tion and trade throughout the world, with a resulting increased flow of the most diverse art-objects from the most distant lands to European middle-class homes, in the "parlors" of which were set up "what-nots" to accommodate the "curios." Finally, note should be taken of the growing fashionable influence of the bourgeoisie, especially of bourgeois ladies, who were apt to be both staid and industrious. They were romantically staid. They chastely wrapped themselves in yards of crinoline and lace flounces, and their long hooped skirts and carefully balanced curls required them to walk primly. Likewise they were industrious. They plied their needles in embroidery and "fancy" sewing; they became amateurs at painting and stencilling and adepts at making artificial flowers of wax or tinfoil; they worked hard to be decorous in appearance and behavior. And they were appropriately sentimental. Tears were shed by them, sighs were heaved by them; they could readily "swoon"; and their favorite wood was black walnut.

All the newer "domestic art" was well intentioned, but some of it strikes us nowadays as being pretty bad. Much of the machine-made furniture and jig-saw work seems as ugly and dreadful as Ruskin said it was. Yet it is historically important, for it clearly indicates that the middle classes were becoming arbiters of art at the very time when they were becoming arbiters of finance and politics. Moreover, it betokens a widening interest in household arts and a broadening conception of them. We should remember in this connection that the era from 1830 to 1878 witnessed a great expansion of public art-galleries and national museums and also a series of international exhibitions at which were displayed not only the latest triumphs of machine industry but also the best (as well as some of the worst) examples of cultural change.¹

In France, household arts were remarkably developed during the career of Louis Napoleon, from 1848 to 1870. Some attempts were made to apply "Gothic" styles to them, but more popular and more usual were the revivals of the "empire" style of the first Napoleon. From France

¹ Such international exhibitions, or "world fairs," were held at London in 1851, at Paris in 1855, at London in 1862, at Paris in 1867, at Vienna in 1873, at Philadelphia in 1876, and at Paris in 1878. The attendance ranged from six million at London in 1851 to sixteen million at Paris in 1878.

the new vogue of "empire" furniture and "empire" decorations spread to other European countries.

In England, alongside of "empire" efforts in imitation of the French, an earnest attempt was made, particularly by William Morris, to revive a peculiarly medieval and English handicraft in household art. William Morris (1834-1896) was an able artist and a devoted romantic. As a student at Oxford, in the early 1850's, he was drawn into the Anglo-Catholic movement which Newman had inspired, and thence into an enthusiasm for medieval painting and poetry, for Gothic architecture, and also for Tennyson. After leaving Oxford, Morris wrote poetry and painted pictures in the medieval manner, but his principal achievements were in the designing and manufacture of "Gothic" household equipment—furniture (including "Morris chairs"), wall paper, tapestries, carpets, glass, and tiles. It is not without significance that Morris was led by his medieval interest and his handicraft experience into active opposition to modern capitalism and "liberalism," and that in his later years he acquired fame (or infamy) as a propagandist of Marxian socialism in Britain.

Morris
and
Handi-
crafts

Of all the era's decorative arts, that which reached the highest perfection and showed the most consistent romanticism was painting. Delacroix, the French painter, and Constable and Turner, the English painters, had already, just prior to 1830, departed radically from classical traditions and established new fashions in subject-matter and form.¹ Classical traditions, of course, survived; they were meticulously cherished by the distinguished Ingres,² who lived until 1867, and were utilized by other French painters to tie the age of Louis Napoleon with the age of the great Napoleon—and with that of Louis XIV. Nevertheless, from 1830 Delacroix, rather than Ingres, symbolized the predominant element in French painting, and in the painting of other countries also.

Romantic
Painting

Portrayal of historical scenes, in bright colors and with plenty of emotion and action, became one of the outstanding features of romantic painting. Most of the historical scenes so portrayed

¹ On Turner, Constable, and Delacroix, see Vol. I, pp. 748-749. For an example of Turner's art, see the picture facing p. 30, above. There is an example of Delacroix's in Vol. I, facing p. 790.

² On Ingres, see Vol. I, p. 736.

were of patriotic import. Some had to do with a nation's supposed advance in the past toward political liberty; many, with episodes in the lives of national heroes or anecdotes of a people's military prowess. Just as Victor Hugo and Schiller took Mary Stuart, Don Carlos, or William Tell as subjects of romantic dramas, so romantic painters pictured English barons wresting Magna Carta from King John, or Oliver Cromwell bestriding the bed of Charles I, or Joan of Arc at the coronation of Charles VII or in the presence of her judges at Rouen, or Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, or the charge of the Guard at Waterloo. There was a big demand for such pictures. The newer parliament buildings, innumerable government buildings of every kind—including Windsor Castle and the palaces at Versailles and Potsdam and Schönbrunn—the enlarged museums, all must be filled with canvasses depicting the great and glorious feats of the country's past.

A special feature of romantic painting was the portrayal of nature in poetical beauty. The great master in this respect, after Constable and Turner, was the Frenchman Corot (1796-1875). Of a well-to-do bourgeois family, Corot was wealthy and fortunate, so generous and kindly to others that in his old age he was popularly called "Papa Corot," and his fame has not lessened with the lapse of time. He painted the most exquisite landscapes, charming in composition and dream-like in detail. He inspired a notable school of landscape painters. He died still dreaming of landscapes.

The "school" which Corot inspired was the Barbizon school, so called by reason of the fact that the group who composed it lived not in Paris or in any other large city but in the little French village of Barbizon at one end of the lovely forest of Fontainebleau. Among its members the greatest and most original was Jean François Millet, who in such masterpieces as "The Sower" and "The Angelus," combined with sincere love of the land a deeply religious feeling for the dignity of the lowliest human beings and their labor.

Quite a different sort of artist was Honoré Daumier (1808-1879). He was the "man about town," with an eye for the ridiculous and occasionally for the sublime in city streets, in railway

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Wheelwright's Yard on the Seine," is by Corot.

stations, in the haunts of the urban multitude, which he portrayed with as much vigor and in as varied moods as the contemporary Barbizon school portrayed the countryside.

Some of Daumier's chief work was in lithography rather than painting, and took the form of caricature. Of the art of caricature he was a supreme master, and with it he did what Dickens and Balzac were doing in their novels. He portrayed, *in extenso* and with ludicrous extravagance, the foibles of the bourgeoisie, the corruption of the law courts, and the incompetence of blundering and "unpatriotic" middle-class government. Besides, though he was more of a "realist" than a "romanticist," he mercilessly caricatured the surviving classicism which, in his opinion, still held modern art in fetters.¹

France, it will be observed, was the seat of the best and most distinctive painting (as well as sculpture) of the era from 1830 to 1878. Indeed, there was almost no distinguished painting during the era in Italy, Spain, Germany, or the Netherlands—countries which in earlier periods had been important centres of pictorial art. In all these countries, there was now a good deal of historical painting, but it was imitative and second-rate.

Only in England was there a "school" of painting of some independent distinction. It was the "Pre-Raphaelite brotherhood," and it was even more romantic than the contemporary French painters. It included Burne-Jones, Rossetti, and Holman Hunt, and aimed to ignore all "classical" development in art since the time of Raphael, to go back for inspiration to Giotto and Fra Angelico, and to be as medieval as possible in theme and style.

In England, as in France, the art of caricature was highly developed. Probably the most famous English caricaturist of the era was George Cruikshank. Satirical capital came to him from every public event and from extensive private observation—from army, court, parliament, church, low life and high life, the humors of the common people and the follies of the governing classes. He pro-

Daumier

French
Supremacy in
Decorative ArtsEnglish
Pre-RaphaelitesCaricature
in England:
Cruikshank

¹ For examples of Daumier's caricature, see the tailpieces on pp. 46, 577, 808, and the pictures facing pp. 72, 73, 131.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Churner," is by Millet.

vided noteworthy humorous illustrations for many books, including Dickens's *Oliver Twist*. Cruikshank also devoted his talents to a campaign against "the demon rum" and in behalf of "total abstinence," a campaign which was developing at the time in English-speaking countries, thanks in part to an idealistic surge of evangelical Christian sects toward "sober piety," and in part to an equally romantic conviction on the part of Radical capitalists (such as John Bright) that, if money were not spent on "drink," poverty could be cured.¹

Music during the era from 1830 to 1878 was the most thoroughly romantic of all the arts (except perhaps literature). The

**Romantic
Music**

mighty genius Beethoven had set the pace for the newer style of music during the Napoleonic era, and in the 1820's and 1830's romanticism had suffused the songs of Schubert, the compositions of Weber and Mendelssohn, and the operas of Rossini.² With such a start, it was well-nigh inevitable that music in the succeeding generation should express and confirm the current tendencies. Composers indeed came forward in all European lands with sentimental and frequently melancholy music, with mournful chords and plaintive arias, with heroic operas, and with symphonies descriptive of woodland scenes or religious exaltation or stirring historical events. Everywhere, moreover, a patriotic note was sounded. National anthems were written, folk songs were discovered (or invented) and

**National
Music**

enshrined in concertos. Operas—and most other musical forms—were no longer accounted "European," as the music of Mozart and Bach had been, but "German," or "French," or "Italian." French composers, for example, were expected to express French character, to treat of French subjects, or, if they employed other subjects, to deal with them in a "French manner." Opera in particular became a national institution, and the size and sumptuousness of opera houses an object of rivalry among national governments.

The era appropriately opened with sentimental "light" opera.

**Light
Opera**

In 1830 was produced at Paris the witty, picturesque, bourgeois *Fra Diavolo* of Auber, and the production of the same popular composer's *Masaniello* at Brussels precipitated the liberal revolution of that year in Belgium. At

¹ For examples of Cruikshank's caricature, see picture facing p. 15, above.

² On this earlier romantic music, see Vol. I, pp. 749-751.

about the same time there came to Paris a German Jew, Jacob Beer (known as Meyerbeer), who turned from banking to operatic imitations of Rossini and staggered France with his scenic effects and melodramatic choruses. At Paris, too, an Irishman, Balfe, contributed to the vogue of sentimental opera with the honeyed ballads and cadences of his *Bohemian Girl*.

Across the lightness (and shallowness) of the opera of the bourgeois monarchy fell Chopin like a shadow, and from Paris as a centre the shadow, as well as the light, was soon bewitching all Europe. Chopin (1810-1849), half-French and half-Polish in parentage, was a most unlucky person. After the failure of the rebellion of 1831, he was an exile from the Poland which he loved, and he was one of the love-sick tuberculous young men whom the masterly George Sand took in tow and then set adrift. But Chopin was a great pianist and a great composer for the piano, and he expressed his grief and melancholy in a profusion of compositions characterized by finish of detail, delicacy of nuance, and expressive charm.

As the period proceeded, music became more grandiose. A richer and more involved orchestration was employed, and efforts were consciously made to invest the themes with "local color." These newer tendencies were fostered by a galaxy of famous composers who shone brilliantly in the 50's, 60's, and 70's. The form of their music was apt to be baroque, but its inspiration was romantic and the effect of much of it was nationalist.

Of the "French" school, two members are particularly noteworthy. One was Charles Gounod, who, besides composing a good deal of sentimental church music, provided in his *Faust* and *Romeo and Juliet* the most renowned examples of romantic French opera. The other typically "French" composer of the period was Georges Bizet, whose *Arlésienne* and *Carmen* were replete with "local color."

Franz Liszt (1811-1886) was a romantic pianist and composer from Hungary. After touring Europe as an unrivalled piano virtuoso for eighteen years, he settled at Weimar in 1848 and thenceforth exerted a commanding influence over many younger men by his lessons, his literary activity, and his varied musical compositions—piano pieces, songs, symphonies, cantatas, masses, and oratorios. One of his daughters married Richard Wagner.

Richard Wagner (1813-1883) was born at Leipzig (in Saxony) in the very year when the Battle of the Nations was being fought there between Napoleon and the Germans, and he lived to see the Franco-German War of 1870-1871 and the political unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. It is not surprising, therefore, that Wagner should have devoted his very great musical talents to the cause of German nationalism in thoroughly romantic manner. He derived the subjects of his operas from medieval German literature and folklore, and he labored to clothe them with a striking musical form which should be not only beautiful and novel but distinctively "Teutonic." Wagner was patronized by the madly romantic Louis II of Bavaria, who erected at Bayreuth, in the years immediately following the establishment of the German Empire (1871), a huge temple for the special presentation of Wagnerian operas.

Born in the same year as Wagner was Giuseppe Verdi, an Italian, who began as an imitator of Rossini but who remained in Italy and came to be regarded as the outstanding exemplar of national (and romantic) "Italian" opera. His *Trovatore* (1853) won him fame as a sensationally tuneful and dramatic composer; and *Aida*, his most grandiloquent opera, full of rich "local color," was written at the request of the Khedive of Egypt and first produced (1871) at Cairo just after the opening of the Suez Canal.

It must be apparent that the art of the period from 1830 to 1878 was predominantly romantic. It was manifest in the music of Verdi, Wagner, Gounod, and Chopin; in the painting of the Pre-Raphaelites and of Corot and Delacroix; in the sculpture of Carpeaux and Rude; in the "Gothic" architectural revival; in the novels of Dostoevski, Hugo, and Dickens, and in the poetry of Tennyson, Musset, and Mickiewicz. And like the finest art, the best scholarship of the period was tinged with romanticism.

In the realm of scholarship, historical interests held first place. The era, indeed, was characterized by its historical mindedness. There was new and widespread curiosity about the middle ages, about the continuously developing nature of government and society and culture from "primitive" men through antiquity and the middle ages down to recent times. There was ubiquitous enthusiasm about

Scholar-
ship in the
Age of
Romanti-
cism

the past of one's nationality, its old tribal organization, its medieval evolution, its historic language and literature, its historic manners and customs. There was also novel emphasis on "scientific method," on the collecting and critical editing of source-materials and on the objective narrating of events.

Historical
Minded-
ness

This meant that historiography of the nineteenth century not only was richer and more plentiful than that of the eighteenth century; it was also different in kind. It was less "rational" and more pragmatic in spirit. It was less cosmopolitan and more national in scope. Generally speaking, too, it was more "scientific," more intent on telling what really happened than on teaching a philosophy.

History,
Scientific
in Method

But if the method of the newer historiography was increasingly "scientific," the use to which it was put, the subject-matter with which it dealt, was inspired less by the older rationalism than by the newer romanticism. Much the same romantic stimuli as directed the fancy of artists between 1830 to 1878 toward the national, the medieval, the local, and the popular guided contemporary scholarship toward the same goals.

Romantic
in Subject

Only in the field of economics was the prevailing scholarship neither historical in method nor nationalist in implication. Here the rational tradition of the eighteenth-century, enshrined in the economic liberalism of Adam Smith and the French Physiocrats, was peculiarly potent, and the newly developing Industrial Revolution seemed to point rather to cosmopolitanism than to nationalism. Hence, while the period from 1830 to 1878 abounded in economists, most of them belonged to the so-called "classical school" who neglected history in favor of *a priori* reasoning and minimized national peculiarities in their advocacy of free trade. Yet even here, in the realm of political economy, some scholars and writers rejected the teachings (and method) of the predominant "classical school" and gradually evolved "national" or "historical" schools.

Eco-
nomics

A pioneer of "national economics" was Friedrich List (1789-1846), a German who lived for several years in the United States and, returning to his native land, took a leading part in promoting railway construction. List's *National System of Political Economy* maintained that no two peoples were in the same stage

of economic development and that each government should pursue such particular economic policies (including tariff protectionism) as would contribute most to national well-being.

When we associate in our minds the patriotic implications of the scholarship and art which we have outlined in the present section, we shall not be surprised to find that nationalism in deed as well as in thought was an outstanding attribute of the era from 1830 to 1878. Cultural nationalism paved the way for the advance of popular, political nationalism, and as this advanced step by step it inspired more nationalism in scholarship and art. Under the joint influence of cultural and political factors, and in the midst of a reviving militarism, nationalism conquered "liberals" and "conservatives" and took possession of Europe. It dominated the Second French Empire from 1852 to 1870. It builded national states in Italy and Germany. It created commotions in eastern Europe. These things we shall now consider in turn.

2. THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE

Prince
Louis
Napoleon
Bonaparte

Of all the statesmen of the era, the most romantic was Prince Louis Napoleon. His career and the tale of his empire occupy a central place in nineteenth-century history. They merit a somewhat detailed description.

Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was the son of Louis Bonaparte, brother of the great Napoleon, and of Hortense Beauharnais, daughter of the Empress Josephine and step-daughter of Napoleon. He was born in Paris in 1808, and his uncle, then at the height of his power, stood sponsor for him at baptism and inscribed his name in the family register of the imperial Bonapartes. With the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1815, the Bonapartes were exiled from France, and Prince Louis Napoleon was taken by his mother to Switzerland. He attended school at Augsburg (in southern Germany) and was instructed in military science by a Swiss general.

Brought up to regard the tradition of his family as identical with that of the great French Revolution of 1789, Prince Louis Napoleon would have gone straight to Paris in 1830 and there claimed the fruits of the overthrow of Charles X, had not the bourgeois government of Louis Philippe been formed too quickly. As it was, he joined in Italy the revolutionary society of the Carbonari and participated in the insurrection of 1831 in the

BONAPARTE, BEAUHARNAIS, AND

Ca

François Clary

Eugénie
(1781-1860)
m. Marshal Bernadotte
(1764-1844),
King of Sweden as
CHARLES XIV
1818-1844

Julie m. JOSEPH

(1768-1844),
King of Naples
1806-1808
King of Spain
1808-1813

Alexandre m. (i) Jos
Beauharnais
(1760-1794)
Tas
la l
(176

Eugene Beauharnais
(1781-1824),
Viceroy of Italy 1805-1814

OSCAR I m. Josephine
(1799-1859),
King of Sweden
1844-1859

Charlotte m. Napoleon I
(1806-18

CHARLES XV
(1826-1872),
King of Sweden
1859-1872

OSCAR II
(1829-1907),
King of Sweden
1872-1907

Louisa m. FREDERICK VIII
(1843-1912),
King of Denmark
1906-1912

GUSTAVUS V
(1858-),
King of Sweden
1907-

CHRISTIAN X
(1870-),
King of Denmark
1912-

HAARON VII
(1872-),
King of Norway
1905-

Gustavus
(1882-),
Crown Prince of
Sweden

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Papal State. The uprising, as we know, was suppressed,¹ and Prince Louis Napoleon, taken prisoner by Austrian soldiers, was released only through his mother's tearful entreaty. The prince then intrigued simultaneously with French republicans and Polish patriots, but the watchfulness of Louis Philippe on one hand, and the firm action of the Russian Tsar on the other, imposed on Louis Napoleon the necessity of wielding the pen rather than the sword.

In a series of writings which culminated in the *Napoleonic Ideas* (1839), he set forth his political doctrines. The Napoleonic Empire, he declared, had been the perfect realization of the principles of 1789. It had rested upon a foundation of national sovereignty. It had been solidified, directed, and rendered glorious by its "cæsarism," that is by entrusting power to an emperor the success of whose dictatorship depended upon his ability to promote the public welfare and to retain popular support. Such, according to Louis Napoleon, had been the aims of the first Napoleon and such would be his own aims in endeavoring to reëstablish the Empire in France.

These writings of Prince Louis Napoleon presented a falsely idealized picture of the First Empire, but they fitted in quite nicely with the Napoleonic legend, which the great Napoleon had begun to spin on sea-girt St. Helena before his death in 1821,² and which thereafter romantic French writers like Victor Hugo and Adolphe Thiers wove more elaborately for the delectation of their countrymen. The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe (1830-1848) actually fostered the memory of Napoleon. It replaced the lilled white flag of the Bourbons with the tricolor which Napoleon's armies had borne in all their glorious exploits. It removed from the Vendôme column, which Napoleon had erected at Paris to commemorate the victory of Austerlitz, the fleur-de-lis with which the restored Bourbons had topped it, and fittingly substituted an iron statue of the "little Corporal." The same government dedicated the magnificent Napoleonic Arch of Triumph at Paris (1836); and Louis Philippe paid the crowning tribute to the Napoleonic legend when he had the bones of the Emperor ceremoniously brought back from St. Helena (1840) and piously

The
Napole-
onic
Legend

¹ See Vol. I, p. 791.

² On the "Napoleonic legend," see Vol. I, pp. 695-696.

laid to rest under the stately dome of the Invalides, just as the great national hero and exile had willed, "on the banks of the Seine among the people whom he had so dearly loved."

Twice during the reign of Louis Philippe, Louis Napoleon attempted to take personal advantage of the growing Bonapartist sentiment in France. The first time, in 1836, he appeared at Strasbourg and called upon its garrison to help him reëstablish the Napoleonic Empire; he was speedily arrested and expatriated across the Atlantic to America. The second time, in 1840, landing at Boulogne with the declaration that the Emperor's bones should rest only in a "regenerated France," he was condemned to life imprisonment and shut up in the fortress of Ham. In prison, he wrote another book, the *Extinction of Pauperism*, promising, as the cornerstone of his projected régime, the material prosperity of the whole nation. It would be his business, he said, to assist capitalists by opening up new fields of industrial enterprise, to help peasants by stimulating agricultural production, and to aid urban workingmen by providing them with abundant employment. Thereby, under a national democratic empire, everybody would profit and poverty would eventually disappear. "The triumph of Christianity abolished slavery; the triumph of the French Revolution abolished serfdom; the triumph of democracy will abolish pauperism."

Prince Louis Napoleon was lucky. In 1846 he contrived to escape from the prison of Ham, in the guise of a workingman, and to make his way to England. Two years elapsed, and then his great opportunity came with the revolution of February 1848 at Paris—the overthrow of the bourgeois monarchy, the flight of Louis Philippe, and the proclamation of the Second French Republic.¹ Louis Napoleon, this time, refrained from any demonstration in behalf of reëstablishing the Empire, and so as not to "embarrass" the Republic, he ostentatiously remained in England. He was thus aloof from the terrible fighting at Paris in June 1848 and could not be blamed by "radicals" for their bloody suppression. At the same time, the offer of his services to the aged Duke of Wellington, then gallantly overawing the British Chartists in London,² bespoke a devotion to "law and order."

¹ See above, pp. 79-80.

² See above, p. 57.

Louis Na-
poleon's
Early At-
tempts to
Seize
Power

His Op-
portunity
in Revolu-
tion of
1848

In the circumstances, the name of Prince Louis Napoleon presented itself as a common symbol to Frenchmen of diverse political opinions—to radicals and reactionaries, to democrats and liberals, and, above all, to the mixed patriotic emotions of all classes. In June 1848, Louis Napoleon was elected to the National Constituent Assembly, and in December he was raised to the presidency of the Second Republic by an overwhelming popular majority.¹ At the close of the eventful year, he took the oath "to remain faithful to the democratic republic; . . . to regard as enemies of the nation all those who may attempt by illegal means to change the form of the established government."

President
of Second
French
Republic

As president of the Second French Republic (1848-1852), Prince Louis Napoleon pursued policies which were calculated to heighten his personal popularity with different elements in the nation. While he praised the urban workmen and prevailed upon the Assembly to enact in their favor a scheme of voluntary old-age insurance (1850), he was especially solicitous for certain measures advocated by the bourgeoisie and by Catholics. On one hand, industrial interests were safeguarded and promoted. On the other hand, a French military expedition was despatched to Rome (1849) to reinstate Pope Pius IX in the temporal sovereignty from which the revolutionary movement of the preceding year had deposed him,² and an educational act of 1850—the so-called Falloux law—restored the privileges which the Catholic clergy had exercised in the days of Charles X over the schooling of French children.

His Bour-
geois and
Religious
Policies

These conservative measures might have cost the President the support of radical elements throughout the country, had he not taken advantage of a constitutional question which arose between him and the Assembly to demonstrate his own loyalty to the principle of democracy. It will be recalled that both the President and the Assembly had been elected in December 1848 by universal manhood suffrage. In the voting for the Assembly, the bourgeoisie and the peasantry had swamped the urban proletariat, and the elected deputies, chiefly middle-class persons, felt a repugnance to radical democracy and were minded, while they

His
"Demo-
cratic"
Policy

¹ See above, p. 82.

² See above, p. 93.

had the chance, to restrict the suffrage of workingmen for the future. In 1850, accordingly, the Assembly passed a law prescribing that henceforth no one might vote who had not lived and paid taxes for three years in the same district. This meant the practical disfranchisement of the ever-moving artisans of the large towns; it threatened to take the ballot away from three million adult males, out of a total of nine million. There were immediate protests from the cities, particularly from Paris; and to the protests Louis Napoleon gave willing ear. He declared that as the elected representative of the entire French nation he was under a national mandate to prevent the Assembly from disfranchising Frenchmen. For a year the conflict between President and Assembly continued. In November 1851, the President delivered to the Assembly an ultimatum, that it must reestablish universal suffrage at once, and, upon the Assembly's refusal, he executed in December a *coup d'état* which in its general purposes and results resembled the celebrated *coup d'état* of 1799, when the first Napoleon Bonaparte had overturned the government of the First French Republic.¹

On December 2, 1851, the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz, Prince Louis Napoleon issued a manifesto, proclaiming a temporary dictatorship, the dissolution of the Assembly, the restoration of universal manhood suffrage, and the submission to popular vote (*plébiscite*) of a proposal to entrust the Prince-President with the task of revising the republican constitution. The President had guessed correctly that most Frenchmen would acquiesce in his *coup d'état*. Loyal troops overawed the minority and easily quelled a few riots. Press censorship and police activity prevented the spread of counter-agitation. And the most notorious critics of the President, such as Adolphe Thiers and Victor Hugo, were seized and hustled out of the country. In the circumstances, the French people decided, on December 21, 1851, by 7,500,000 votes against 640,000, to empower Louis Napoleon to prepare a new instrument of government for the Second Republic.

In January 1852 the new constitution was promulgated. It retained republican forms, and specified that universal manhood suffrage should be employed in electing a legislature. Its chief

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 644-645, 649-650.

departure from the constitution of 1848 was in respect of the President and his powers. His term of office was lengthened from four years to ten. He would appoint a Council of State, which should draft all bills to be considered by the legislature, and a Senate, which might revise existing laws and propose new ones and which alone might interpret the constitution. The President, moreover, would appoint all military and civil officers; and the democratic legislature was rendered strictly subordinate to him. It might not initiate legislation or amend bills presented by him, and it might not interfere with his choice of ministers.

New "Republican"
Constitution, 1852

The year 1852 marked the transformation of France from republic to empire. Louis Napoleon, still nominally President of the Second Republic, put his effigy on the national coins and restored to army and national buildings the gilt eagles and other insignia of the Napoleonic Empire. He made state processions through the provinces, speaking honeyed words to peasants, to artisans, to capitalists, to rich and poor, to reactionaries and revolutionaries, to believers and agnostics. And his reward was speedy and complete. On December 2, 1852, he became in name what he already was in fact, and was proclaimed, with the sanction of a new plebiscite, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. The Second Republic was thus changed into the Second Empire, and the "republican" constitution of 1852 became, with necessary minor alterations, the new "imperial" constitution.

Emperor
Napoleon
III,
1852-1870

The Second Empire, according to Napoleon III's initial declaration, was to be "the final flower of the French Revolution," and the Emperor himself was to be "the beneficent motive force of the whole social order." For eighteen years (1852-1870) the Empire lasted; and during this period Napoleon was the central figure in France, and France was the chief power in Europe.

In internal affairs, Napoleon III proved himself, for several years, a consummate "politician," a clever manipulator of public opinion, and an adroit harmonizer of seemingly conflicting philosophies. He organized an effective secret police; he rigorously controlled the press; he dominated the legislature and the whole governmental system, local as well as national;¹ and he jailed or exiled his outspoken

Internal
Affairs of
Second
Empire

¹ In the elections to the national legislature, the government paid the expenses

enemies. But while he ruled with a strong arm, he endeavored to make his rule acceptable to both "radicals" and "conservatives." On the one hand, he preserved universal manhood suffrage, however illusory it might be in practice, as the theoretical foundation of his government; he frequently boasted that his Empire, like that of the first Napoleon, rested upon the popular sovereignty of the nation.

On the other hand, he fascinated many conservatives by the brilliance of the imperial court which he reestablished and maintained. In the drawing-room and over the tea-cups, Napoleon III was more at home than his uncle had been; and his marriage in 1853 with Eugénie, Countess of Montijo, a Spanish lady, gave him an Empress whose beauty and charm were of the utmost service in rendering the French court once more the focal point of European styles and fashions.

The Second Empire, in its economic policies, represented a continuation and development of the preceding bourgeois monarchy. Economic liberalism was taught in the French universities and was applied to legislation in the interest of the industrial middle classes. Governmental regulation of private business was steadily lessened. The introduction of machinery and the organization of industrial corporations were facilitated. A system of savings banks was established. Tariffs were gradually lowered, and in 1860 Napoleon III negotiated with Richard Cobden an Anglo-French commercial treaty facilitating trade between the two Great Powers of western Europe.¹ Moreover, the Emperor sponsored a series of remarkable public works as indirect means of stimulating industry and commerce (and providing employment for proletarians). In particular, vast sums of money were spent on constructing broad boulevards and magnificent public buildings (including the imposing opera house) in Paris, under the supervision of the Emperor's devoted friend, Baron Haussmann, and on making the French capital

of "official candidates," that is, of those who were acceptable to Napoleon III, while other candidates had to pay their own expenses. Moreover, the electoral machinery was almost completely in the Emperor's hands.

¹ See above, p. 85.

NOTE. The portrait bust of Napoleon III, opposite, is by J. B. Carpeaux (1827-1875). On Carpeaux, see above, p. 115.

the most beautiful and attractive city in the world. Many were the private fortunes made or swelled during the Second Empire. And for a goodly number of years, the bourgeoisie, who were the chief beneficiaries, were loyal to Napoleon III.

Napoleon III, unlike Louis Philippe, was not so engrossed in economic liberalism and the cause of the industrial bourgeoisie as to ignore the sentiments and demands of the growing industrial proletariat in France. It was for the Favors to
Workmen working class, he affirmed, that his government of cheap bread, public works, and holidays existed. He gloried in the appellation, "Emperor of the workers." There was some actual labor legislation during the Second Empire—just enough to encourage workingmen and not so much as would alienate bourgeois liberals. One law permitted laborers to form co-operative societies, as in England, for collective buying and selling (1863). Another partially legalized trade unions and recognized for the first time the right of strikes (1864). A third extended workmen's voluntary insurance, with state guaranties, to death and industrial accidents (1868).

Of the French peasantry, especially of the numerous peasant-proprietors, Napoleon III was also mindful. He recalled frequently to them his devotion to the principle of private property, his intense interest in their vineyards and wheatfields, and the prosperity which was assured them by his improvement of transportation and his Favors to
Peasants
and
Catholics enlargement of markets. He also took pains to cater to the traditional religious convictions of many of the peasants, as well as of persons of the upper and middle classes. Napoleon III was not deeply religious, but his Empress was, and he himself recognized, as Louis Philippe had not recognized, the political desirability of enlisting Catholics in support of his government.

For the first time since the advent of the first Napoleon, it seemed as though France had a government which would rise superior to factional quarrels and could be depended upon to reconcile the most divergent interests, political, social, and intellectual. In fact, the words which Napoleon III addressed to the French people on one of his trips across the country just prior to his assumption of the imperial dignity, appeared peculiarly

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The New Democracy," is by Honoré Daumier, concerning whom see above, pp. 118-119.

prophetic of his achievements in domestic policy. "I would conquer," he had said, "for the sake of religion, morality, and material ease, that portion of the population, still very numerous, which, in the midst of a country of faith and belief, hardly knows the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of the most fertile country of the world, is hardly able to enjoy the primary necessities of life. We have immense uncultivated districts to bring under cultivation, roads to open, harbors to construct, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, and our network of railways to bring to completion. . . . This is what I understand by the Empire, if the Empire is to be reëstablished. These are the conquests which I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who, like myself, wish the good of our common fatherland, you are my soldiers."¹

In another part of the same speech, the prospective Emperor had sought to allay a fear which might haunt equally the economic liberal and the pious Christian. "There is, nevertheless, one apprehension, and that I shall set at rest. A spirit of distrust leads certain persons to say that the Empire means war. I say the Empire means peace. France longs for peace, and if France is satisfied, the world is tranquil. Glory is rightly handed down hereditarily, but not war." This part of the prophecy was not fulfilled. In foreign affairs, Napoleon III was not as fortunate as in domestic policies. The Second Empire, whatever he meant it to be, involved real war—several colonial wars and three European wars.

Napoleon III was pacific at heart. He was a product of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism and romanticism. He lacked the fiery martial zeal of the born soldier and he had a most un-Napoleonic aversion to the smell of gunpowder and the sight of bloodshed. He liked to display arms, but he hesitated to use them. Inherently, he was timid.

Yet, this same Napoleon III was impelled to war by the circumstances of his rise to power and by the nature of the policy he chose to follow in order to retain power. He was a nationalist *par excellence*. It was his nationalism—and his name—which had attracted the French masses to him after they had gotten rid of the "unpatriotic" bourgeois monarchy; which had raised him to the post of President and then of Emperor; and

¹ The Bordeaux address, October 9, 1852.

which required him to do his utmost to obscure factional bickerings behind a showy front of national solidarity. If factions quarrelled within France, or if one grumbled because he was temporarily favoring another, he was quick to perceive that he could silence the grumbling and stop the domestic squabbling, at least for a time, by embarking the nation on a foreign enterprise. Besides, his nationalism—and his romanticism—made him the centre of intrigues and the object of constant pleas for active assistance in forwarding the freedom and unity of “oppressed” nationalities in Europe. Liberal patriots throughout the Continent looked to him for support, as reactionary sovereigns had formerly looked to Metternich; and he imagined that by supporting nationalism abroad he might secure for France “compensations” of territory and prestige which would heighten patriotic pride at home and strengthen the Napoleonic Empire.

One forceful policy, short of European war, appealed to Napoleon III from the outset, and that was the rebuilding of an overseas colonial dominion for France. He injected new vigor into the administration of the remnants of the old empire¹—Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, Cayenne on the Guiana coast of South America, Senegal in western Africa, and the trading posts in India. He did not hesitate, as Louis Philippe had done, about annexing the whole of Algeria to France:² he completed its pacification in 1857; he established a permanent civil government for it in 1858; and under the governorship of one of his ablest generals, Marshal MacMahon, Algeria became the most important dependency of France.

In the meantime, the Emperor was sending out naval expeditions to appropriate islands in the Pacific; New Caledonia, the most noteworthy, was acquired in 1853. In 1856 France joined Great Britain in a military demonstration against China, and, after four years of spasmodic fighting, culminating in an allied advance on Peking, the Chinese government agreed by the treaty of Tientsin (1860) to open several ports to European trade and to protect Christian missionaries in the interior. South of the Chinese Empire—in the peninsula of Indo-

¹ On the collapse of the earlier colonial dominion of France, see Vol. I, pp. 412-413. On the unsuccessful efforts of Napoleon I to reestablish it, see Vol. I, p. 656.

² On the preceding French occupation of Algeria, see above, p. 76.

China—Napoleon III laid at this time the foundation of French dominion; he avenged the murder of French missionaries by sending punitive expeditions into Annam and Cochin-China (1858) and by erecting a French protectorate over Cambodia (1863). In 1863, also, he initiated, alike for commercial and religious motives, a French intervention in Mexico, which was not so fortunate and of which we shall presently say more. Yet despite the disastrous outcome of the Mexican enterprise, the Second Empire witnessed the rehabilitation of the French as colonizers and traders on a scale second only to the British. The real restorer of the French colonial empire was, indeed, Napoleon III.

In Europe, Napoleon III had begun his reign by most pacific protestations, which served to reassure the Great Powers that they could safely suffer a Napoleon to sit once more on the throne of France. And so careful was the Emperor to harmonize the foreign and commercial policies of France with those of Britain that for some years he could count on a virtual alliance with the Power which had been most stubbornly and fatefully hostile to the first Napoleon. Against one Power in Europe, however, Napoleon III was arrayed almost from the outset. That Power was Russia, then ruled by the most reactionary sovereign on the Continent, the Tsar Nicholas I. The Tsar, ever the foe of revolution and democratic principles, distrusted the upstart Emperor of the French and most grudgingly recognized his title and government. Not only was Napoleon III personally piqued by the Tsar, but the French people disliked Tsarist Russia: business men found fault with its tariff restrictions and economic backwardness; Catholics complained about its religious intolerance; liberals inveighed against its autocracy and its oppression of the Poles.

Quarrels at the holy places in Palestine between monks of the Catholic communion and those of the Orthodox faith provided the spark for igniting the train of ill-feeling toward Russia on the part of France (and Great Britain). The Tsar, as the champion of Orthodox Christianity, denounced the inability or unwillingness of the Sultan to preserve peace at the holy places and demanded that he recognize the "right" of Russia to a protectorate of Christians within the Ottoman Empire. But Napoleon III promptly pointed out that such a "right" would violate the long established treaty-

Friendly
Relations
with Brit-
ain,
1852-1860

Support-
ing
Turkey
against
Russia

rights of France to the protection of Catholics, and called upon the Sultan to resist Russian "aggression." The Sultan was only too happy to comply with the French Emperor's request, for he well knew that the Tsar Nicholas had been describing him as the "sick man of Europe" and proposing to England the partition of his empire.

Napoleon III, though naturally pacific, could not let slip such a highly favorable opportunity for a war of glory. He knew that he would have the French nation solidly with him, and the sympathy of all liberals throughout Europe—Polish, Italian, even German. He knew, too, that the international situation was auspicious. Not only would he have an ally in the Ottoman Empire, but he would have far more significant assistance from Great Britain. British liberals were pacific in theory, and some of them were stridently so in utterance; but they were also anti-Tsarist. Many of them, together with the British masses, shared the fear of the British government of the day that a Russian protectorate over Christians in the Ottoman Empire would be speedily followed by Russian appropriation of European Turkey, and that Russia, ensconced at Constantinople, would be an infinitely graver menace than the Turks to British communication with India and to British trade in the eastern Mediterranean. So, despite some opposition from Cobden, Bright, and other radical pacifists, and considerable divergence of counsel within Parliament and the ministry, Great Britain backed France in the demand for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. The Franco-British cause was espoused, moreover, by the little kingdom of Sardinia, for reasons of its own which will be indicated later.¹ The Austrian government preserved a troubled neutrality, wavering between a desire to repay Russia for its recent help in putting down the Hungarian revolt of 1849² and a lively apprehension of Russian territorial expansion. King Frederick William IV of Prussia alone was really "benevolent" toward Tsarist Russia, but he was in no mood to complicate affairs in Germany by going to war with France and Britain.

War began between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in 1853; it was joined, on the Ottoman side, by France and Great Britain in 1854 and by Sardinia in 1855. The struggle, confined mainly

British
Coöpera-
tion
against
Russia

¹ See below, pp. 155-156.

² See above, p. 95.

to military operations in the peninsula of the Crimea, including a protracted siege of Sevastopol, has been known in history as the

Crimean War, 1854-1856 Crimean War. There were many evidences of unpreparedness and bungling on both sides. The Russian military machine proved itself corrupt and inefficient and might have been disposed of fairly quickly, had not the Allies been equally inefficient in providing arms, food, and sanitation. There was some severe and heroic fighting, but sickness and starvation wrought more havoc than bullets.¹ In 1856 Russia sued for peace. The Crimean War had cost half a million lives and at least two billion dollars.

Peace Congress of Paris, 1856 At Paris, Napoleon III's capital, a peace congress of European Powers arranged a general settlement. Russia agreed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to renounce any claim to a protectorate over its Christian inhabitants, to restore to it a strip of Bessarabia,² and no longer to build or maintain warships on the Black Sea. Simultaneously Russia joined with the other Powers in creating an international commission to supervise the free navigation of the Danube. These results of the Crimean War were not very startling. But at any rate, Russia was checked; the Ottoman Empire was preserved; Great Britain felt safer; and Napoleon III was cheered by returning veterans and acclaimed by all French patriots.

Question of Italian Freedom and Unity While the Congress of Paris was in session, the delegate from Sardinia—the masterful Cavour, of whom we shall soon take special note—was already urging Napoleon to aid Sardinia in expelling Austria from the peninsula and creating a free and united state for the Italian people. The Emperor was receptive: his uncle had erected a “kingdom of Italy”; he himself had been a *Carbonaro*; the Bonapartes had Italian blood in their veins; Austria had given no active assistance to France in the Crimean War; a war with

¹ Some improvement in camp sanitation and in the health of soldiers resulted, in the latter part of the war, from the devoted labors of the famous English nurse, Florence Nightingale, “the angel with the lamp.” It was about one of the heroic episodes of the Crimean War that Tennyson, whose romantic patriotism could outweigh his romantic pacifism, wrote the *Charge of the Light Brigade*.

² Bessarabia, lying on the Black Sea between the Dniester and Pruth rivers, was peopled largely by Rumanians. It had been acquired by Russia in 1812 (during the Napoleonic War) and a part of it was now, in 1856, reincorporated in the Rumanian principality of Moldavia, under the nominal suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan.

Austria for the unification of Italy would be popular with French liberals; and Napoleon III might get some decent tangible "compensations" for French effort. Yet the Emperor hesitated: an Austrian war was risky in view of Austria's repeatedly displayed prowess; a united Italy might prove to be a strong and perhaps dangerous rival to France in the Mediterranean; and—most alarming consideration—many French Catholics were heeding the protests of the Pope against any Italian unification which might deprive him of his temporal power.

To Napoleon III, it was soon obvious that whatever he did he ran the danger of antagonizing one or the other of the major French groups on whose united support he had hitherto relied. If he championed Italian national unity, the Catholics would be disaffected; if he held aloof, the Liberals would be disappointed. Good politician as he was, he temporized and postponed the decision, until an attempt on his life in January 1858 by a crazed Italian, Orsini by name, touched a little chord of cowardice which was usually concealed beneath the Emperor's sphinx-like features and stung him into action. He would remove the grievance of potential Italian assassins and cater to the liberal patriots of France and the world. He would temporarily risk the reproaches of Pope and French Catholics.

At an "accidental" meeting between Napoleon III and Cavour at Plombières in July 1858 an informal agreement was reached, whereby France would assist Sardinia in driving the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and sanction the formation of a single north Italian state, and, in return, Sardinia would cede to France the Alpine duchy of Savoy and the Mediterranean port of Nice. To cement the alliance, Prince Victor Napoleon, cousin and next of kin (after the infant Prince Imperial) to the Emperor, would marry the daughter of King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia. Presently, Sardinia began to mobilize.

Franco-
Sardinian
Alliance,
1858

In April 1859, the Austrian government presented an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization. The prompt rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the outbreak of war, which, with Austria on one side and France and Sardinia on the other, lasted from April to July 1859, and constituted the first successful step toward Italian liberation and union. French troops entered

War of
1859
against
Austria

Piedmont, where they were received with enthusiasm and were joined by the Sardinian army. The allies then advanced into Lombardy: the victory of Magenta early in June, which delivered Milan to them, was shortly followed by that of Solferino; and the Austrians fell back upon their strong fortresses in Venetia.


The successes of the allies inflamed Italian nationalism and led to popular demands for the incorporation of the states of central Italy, including the Papal State, in a united Italy under the King of Sardinia. This was more than Napoleon III had bargained for. In attempting to obtain Lombardy and Venetia for Sardinia, he was inspiring a far more extensive Sardinian expansion, which threatened serious danger to France. For French Catholics naturally attributed the nationalist movement in the Papal State to their own Emperor's sacrilegious intervention in Italy, and an eloquent and influential French bishop branded Napoleon as "the modern Judas Iscariot." Other considerations worried the Emperor. Prussia was mobilizing along the Rhine. The Austrian armies, entrenched in Venetia, were being reënforced. French losses were comparatively heavy.

Consequently, the Emperor of the French, without previously informing Cavour, stopped short in July 1859, and concluded at Villafranca an armistice with the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, whereby Lombardy would be ceded to Sardinia, Venetia would remain Austrian, the princes in central Italy would be reinstated, and the Pope would become president of an Italian federation. It was now the turn of Italian patriots and French liberals to assail Napoleon as a traitor. Loud were their protests. King Victor Emmanuel, left in the lurch by his powerful ally, felt obliged to accede to the truce, but Cavour denounced it and resigned his office in disgust. The terms of the truce of Villafranca were confirmed by the treaty of Zürich in the following November between France and Austria.

Napoleon, however, had not reckoned with the resolution of Italian patriots. Under the influence of radical leaders and with the connivance of the Sardinian government, the inhabitants of the duchies of central Italy and of part of the Papal State would not hear of any Italian federation under the Pope or of the reinstatement of their former rulers; they held plebiscites and voted to join the kingdom of Sardinia. At first Napoleon III

categorically refused to recognize such an exercise of the "right of national self-determination." Presently, however, Cavour, who had swallowed his pride and returned to his post, persuaded the Emperor to change his mind. By the treaty of Turin, signed in March 1860, between Napoleon III and Victor Emmanuel II, Sardinia ceded to France both Savoy and Nice, just as if Napoleon had carried out

His Com-
promise
with
Sardinia



ITALY AT END OF FRANCO-AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1859

the original bargain and freed Italy "from the Alps to the Adriatic," and, in return, France recognized Sardinia's annexation not only of Lombardy but also of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, and of the papal province of Romagna.

In accordance with the treaty of Turin and with the wish of their inhabitants expressed through plebiscites, Savoy and Nice were annexed to France—or, as Napoleon III said, "restored to France." For they

French
Annexa-
tion of
Savoy and
Nice

had belonged to the First French Republic and to the First Napoleonic Empire and had been handed over to Sardinia by the Viennese peace settlement of 1815. Now, in 1860, they were back in the Second Napoleonic Empire. They represented tangible gains for France from Napoleon III's intervention in Italy.

Other results of his intervention in Italy were less advantageous to France and the Napoleonic régime. To the enmity of Russia, Napoleon III had now added the ill will of Austria, the disaffection of Sardinia, and the suspicion of Great Britain. He was isolating France and establishing an unenviable reputation for himself as an ambitious schemer. At the same time, the example which he had given of aiding Italians was not lost on patriotic Rumanians, Poles, and Germans; they beset him more than ever after 1860 with pleas for French assistance to their respective causes, and they certainly complicated his foreign policy.

Especially troublesome were the effects of the Emperor's Italian war on French domestic politics. Until 1859, marked success had attended Napoleon III's astute appeals to all Frenchmen—rich and poor, radical and conservative, religious and irreligious—to unite in “one great national party.” But his intervention in Italy split the “national party.” French Catholics blamed him for going too far; French Liberals abused him for not going far enough. After 1859 the breach between these important factions widened, and the Emperor's efforts to keep his grasp on both, for a time grotesque, ended in tragedy.

In 1860, to appease the Liberals, Napoleon made a show of “liberalizing” his government. He permitted the legislature to discuss his policies and to criticize his ministers. He removed some of the restrictions on the freedom of speech both inside and outside the legislature. He authorized the full publication of parliamentary debates. Simultaneously, to appease the Catholics, he declared his firm determination to uphold the temporal sovereignty of the papacy and never to allow the Italians to appropriate Rome. But on neither side were these concessions wholly satisfactory.

Some minor and temporary prestige Napoleon III won, at least with liberal patriots, by his foreign policy in behalf of the Rumanians. This nationality inhabited the Ottoman principal-

ties of Moldavia and Wallachia (and the Russian province of Bessarabia); it spoke a Latin language akin to French, Italian, and Spanish; and its leaders, actuated by the ubiquitous rise of romantic nationalism, were intent upon establishing a free and united Rumania. At the conclusion of the Crimean War, Napoleon III had insisted on adding a part of Bessarabia to Moldavia and on guarantying to the Rumanian principalities a large measure of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. In 1858, on the eve of his intervention in Italy, he had secured from the Great Powers (and the Sultan) a general recognition of the right of each of the Rumanian principalities to elect its own parliament and choose its own prince, though with the express proviso that Moldavia and Wallachia should not be united. This proviso the Rumanian leaders obviated by having the two principalities choose one and the same prince, Alexander Cuza. And in 1861-1862 Napoleon III demonstrated his continuing interest in Rumania by prevailing upon the Powers to recognize not only the one prince but also the fusion of the two parliaments into a united "Rumanian" parliament. The Second French Empire thus helped to create the modern national state of Rumania as well as that of Italy.

Helping
Rumania,
1856-1862

Less success attended Napoleon III's sympathy for Polish national aspirations, which, touched off by developments in Italy and Rumania, burst into open flame in 1863 with a revolt against Russia. France was the traditional ally of Poland, and Poles had fought for the first Napoleon. Why should not the third Napoleon, the friend of oppressed nationalities, assist the Poles? French Liberals urged him to do so because the Poles were fighting for the liberal principle of self-determination, and French Catholics besought him to do so because the Poles were a Catholic people. It was clear that in this case he would have the united support of the French people. Yet the general European situation was now against him. He knew that if he went to war with Russia on behalf of her rebellious Poles, he would find Prussia and Austria, because of their own Polish populations, in alliance with Russia against him, and that such a big war could only be calamitous to France and to Napoleonic fortunes. So he contented himself with filing a feeble protest with the Tsar about "atrocities"; and as Great Britain did likewise, the Poles were left, despairing and unfriended, to be

Inability
to Help
Poland,
1863

overwhelmed by Russian soldiery. As Napoleon III stood helplessly by, French Liberals and French Catholics alike heaped reproaches on him.

It was in large part for the purpose of restoring the prestige which he was conspicuously losing at home from his Italian and Polish policies that Napoleon III launched a far-away Mexican adventure. The opportunity was afforded him by troubled conditions in the republic of Mexico and by the American Civil War (1861-1865) which seemed to preclude the United States from interfering with his project. In Mexico, chronic ill feeling between the poor half-breed or Indian peasantry on one hand and the wealthy land-owning Spanish-Mexicans on the other had been exploited by rival chieftains, of whom one faction championed conservatism in religion and politics, while the other advocated violent radicalism. In 1861, after a protracted struggle, Benito Juarez, a radical leader and full-blooded Indian, overthrew a conservative government and inaugurated a drastic ecclesiastical "reform" in the country. Religious communities were suppressed and all ecclesiastical property was confiscated. The Juarez government also repudiated the public debts which its predecessor had contracted.

Ostensibly to protect French owners of Mexican bonds, Napoleon III then turned his eyes across the Atlantic. At first he merely negotiated an agreement with Spain and Great Britain—countries likewise affected by the Juarist repudiation of debts—for joint seizure of Mexican customs houses until satisfaction of the debts should be obtained. Within four months financial adjustments were made satisfactory to Great Britain and Spain, and the forces of these Powers were withdrawn. But the French tarried. In the autumn of 1862 Napoleon despatched to Mexico an army of 30,000 French veterans, who, with the aid of a constant stream of reinforcements from France, captured Mexico City in June 1863 and drove Juarez into the mountain fastnesses of the north. Instead of annexing the country outright to France, Napoleon preferred to control it indirectly. He prevailed upon the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, to become "Emperor of Mexico" (1864), and supported him with French funds and French soldiers, in the expectation that he would undo the anti-ecclesiastical work of Juarez and grant economic concessions to Frenchmen.

But "the great idea of his reign," as Napoleon termed it, proved disastrous. From the outset, Maximilian's position in Mexico was precarious. Many Mexicans who had no special liking for the radical Juarez preferred him to a "foreign" emperor. The French troops, on whom Maximilian relied, were unaccustomed to the guerilla warfare waged against them and were handicapped by the nature of the country and the lack of transportation facilities. Then, too, the ending of the Civil War in the United States (1865) enabled the American government to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and add very real threats to its protests. Whereupon, the French Emperor faced about and gradually recalled his expeditionary forces. The French completed their evacuation of Mexico in February 1867. Maximilian, who was gallant or foolhardy enough to remain, was soon captured and shot, and the victorious Juarez reinstalled himself as president.

The Mexican enterprise of the French was not only disastrous in itself; it was a veritable boomerang against Napoleon III. The restoration of Juarez involved in Mexico the enforcement of anti-Catholic legislation and the annulment of numerous profitable franchises recently acquired by French financiers. In France, the natural result was a redoubling of criticism of the Emperor by both Liberals and Catholics.

Such criticism came to be shared generally by Frenchmen, as these beheld how the Emperor's failure in Mexico contributed to the waning of French prestige in Europe. At the very time when Napoleon III was absorbed in the enterprise overseas and some of his best troops were fighting in far-away Mexico, a vigorous and resourceful Prussian statesman—Otto von Bismarck, of whom we shall soon have much to say—was perfecting plans for the expulsion of Austria from Germany and for the establishment of a national state under the Hohenzollern King of Prussia. Important reforms were effected in the Prussian army between 1862 and 1866, without parallel reforms in the French army. In 1865 Bismarck had an interview with Napoleon at Biarritz. The Prussian statesman knew how to work upon the French Emperor's romantic attachment to the principle of nationality, upon his personal vanity, and upon his desperate readiness to clutch at any chance to obtain a little glory for France and the Napoleonic dynasty.

Question
of Ger-
man
Unifica-
tion under
Prussia

The Emperor did not oppose Bismarck's scheme for a joint attack of Prussia and Italy on Austria and for a closer union of the states of north Germany with Prussia. He was vaguely given to understand that France might seek "compensation" toward the Rhine—perhaps Belgium or some of the Rhineland. And he doubtless imagined that the parties to the impending struggle in Germany would be so evenly balanced as to render subsequent French intervention easy, decisive, and highly gainful.

The German war came suddenly in 1866, with Prussia (and Italy) arrayed against Austria (and several smaller German states). Of the general significance of the war, we shall treat at greater length in the next section. Here it suffices to remark that the war was short and decisive—so short that it is known as the "Seven Weeks' War" and so decisive that Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and (more important for our present purposes) to yield the hegemony of Germany to Prussia. Prussia annexed some of the lesser German states, brought the others north of the Main River into a compact "North German Confederation" under her own domination, and contracted defensive alliances with the remaining and nominally independent south German states.

Napoleon III got no "compensations" for France. In vain he intrigued to obtain Belgium. In vain he besought Bismarck's kind offices to help France get the Rhenish Palatinate. For a time he thought he might at least secure Luxembourg. This was a small grand-duchy adjacent to Belgium on the northern frontier of France; since 1815 it had been a member of the German Confederation and had been governed by the King of the Netherlands and garrisoned by Prussia. Early in 1867 the French Emperor negotiated with the Dutch King for the purchase of the grand-duchy; the King was willing, but Bismarck objected. As Napoleon was not prepared for war, he could only refer the matter to a conference of the Powers signatory to the treaties of Vienna under which the status of Luxembourg had been fixed and abide by the arrangement accordingly reached at London (May 1867). The Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn and the grand-duchy released from any formal tie with Germany, but the King of the Netherlands was to retain his sovereignty and Luxembourg be neutralized and put under international guaranties.

Prussian
Triumph
over Aus-
tria, 1866

No Com-
pensations
for France

Napoleon II was aging. He was tired and sick. He was sadly disappointed. Distrust of him was widespread throughout Europe, and disaffection was growing within France. Here, especially after 1867, many conservatives who had previously supported or acquiesced in the Second Empire regarded with increasing favor the prospect of bringing about another royalist restoration. Simultaneously, many middle-class liberals underwent a conversion to republicanism and gave leaders and strength to a party which hitherto had been struggling along against Napoleon III with the aid only of a few doctrinaire radicals and of groups of ill-organized workingmen.

Disaffec-
tion
within
France

The domestic danger to the Second Empire was disclosed by the parliamentary elections of 1869, which, despite governmental manipulation, returned fifty royalists and forty republicans. To maintain his throne, Napoleon III at once made liberal concessions. He reduced the rigors of press censorship. He promised to abandon the practice of paying the election expenses of "official" candidates for the legislature. He agreed to recognize the responsibility of his ministers to the legislature. And he appointed as prime minister Émile Ollivier, who had been a liberal royalist critic of the Napoleonic régime but who now seconded Napoleon III's scheme for establishing a "Liberal Empire."

Liberaliz-
ing the
Second
Empire

Through the collaboration of Ollivier and Napoleon III, a new "liberal" constitution was drafted for the Second Empire. It might partially conciliate the liberal royalists, but hardly the republicans. These, in fact, redoubled their subversive agitation, with ominous results apparent in the plebiscite of May 1870. Although over seven million votes were cast in favor of the new constitution, not all of them could be reckoned as endorsements of the Empire. Besides, one and a half million votes were cast against the constitution, and nearly two million voters absented themselves from the polls.

Constitu-
tion of
1870

On one matter it was still possible for any French government to command the almost unanimous support of Frenchmen. That was the matter of the political unification of Germany under Prussian auspices. French Liberals detested Prussia as a reactionary state. French Catholics disliked Prussia as an intolerantly Protestant state.

French
Feeling
against
Prussia

French patriots—the mass of Frenchmen—were jealous and fearful of the sudden emergence on their northeastern frontier of a strong state, more populous and perhaps more powerfully armed than their own. For centuries, a disunited Germany had been of advantage to France. Would not a united Germany be a grave menace?

Napoleon III had no stomach for a war with Prussia. He was broken in health. He was troubled, rather than reassured, by his recollections of his wars with Russia and Austria and his expedition in Mexico. And he was aware of the inauspicious appearance of the international scene. The Russian Tsar had not forgotten the French Emperor's part in the Crimean War, and was distinctly pro-German. The Austrian Emperor, if humiliated by Prussia, had first been humbled by France. The Italian King could feel no enthusiasm for a former ally who had "betrayed" the cause of Italian freedom and who, by keeping troops at Rome, still prevented the fruition of Italian unity. British statesmen now thoroughly distrusted Napoleon III and British public opinion was pronouncedly hostile to him. Even Bavaria and other south German states, which had been traditional allies of France, were suspicious of the French Emperor and in alliance with Prussia. To wage war with Germany would be a big and unpleasant gamble for Napoleon III. Yet just such a gamble seemed to be the only recourse left to him, if he would check the growing opposition to himself in France and the waning prestige of France in Europe. If the gamble were successful, if France won the war and prevented Prussia from consolidating Germany, French hegemony would be guaranteed and the Napoleonic Empire would be maintained in glory by a grateful French nation.

Bismarck, the Prussian statesman, believed that a Franco-German war was inevitable and that the defeat of France was

Question
of a Prus-
sian King
for Spain

prerequisite to the completion of German freedom and unity.¹ He therefore worked for war. And, in the midst of mounting patriotism on both sides of the Rhine, a pretext for war was not long lacking. It was supplied by Spanish liberals, who, having precipitated a revolution in their country (1868) and deposed Queen Isabella II, were seeking a new sovereign. After receiving more or less polite

¹ The German side of the matter is given below, pp. 173-174.

refusals from several European princes, the Spanish liberals offered the crown to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a cousin of the King of Prussia. Prince Leopold was not eager for Spanish adventures and at first declined the offer; but Bismarck, who scented the possibilities of the situation, procured a renewal of the invitation and its acceptance by the Hohenzollern prince.

Napoleon III, urged on by his wife and his ministers, professed to see in the Hohenzollern acceptance a projected union of Germany with Spain reminiscent of the sixteenth-century empire of Charles V and menacing to French security. He addressed strong protests to the Prussian and Spanish governments; and on July 12, 1870, it was announced in Madrid that Prince Leopold of his own accord had revoked his acceptance of the Spanish crown. Here the business might have ended, but the French Emperor was pressed by his advisers to utilize the occasion to administer a diplomatic defeat to Prussia. Hence the French ambassador at Berlin was instructed to obtain from the King of Prussia a solemn public promise that he would never permit a Hohenzollern to become a candidate for the throne of Spain. The ensuing interview of the ambassador with the Prussian King, then at the famous watering-place of Ems, was indecisive; and when the persistent ambassador requested another interview, the King stated that he was leaving Ems that night and could not receive him. The news of this rebuff was telegraphed by the King to Bismarck, who after consulting the military chiefs and satisfying himself that Prussia was prepared for war, communicated the despatch to the public press—not, however, in the exact original form in which he had received it from the King but in a form so edited as to convey the impression to Germans that the Prussian King had been insulted by the French ambassador and to Frenchmen that their ambassador had been insulted by the Prussian King. The telegram was calculated to have the effect, in Bismarck's own cynical words, "of a red rag on the Gallic bull."

The report of the Ems interview, published in Paris on July 14, 1870, the French national holiday, threw France into a paroxysm of anger and a frenzy for war. Napoleon III that night acquiesced in the popular demand and in the counsel of his ministry, and decided on war. The next day the French parliament, with but ten dissenting votes, au-

Interview
at Ems
and Its
Editing by
Bismarck

Franco-
Prussian
War,
1870-1871

thorized a formal declaration of war against Prussia. The third—and last—of the European wars of the Second Empire began.

The Empire entered the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) with enthusiastic shouting, but with little else. Foreign sympathy was largely on the other side, and foreign allies were conspicuously lacking. For a few days Napoleon III imagined that Austria and Italy might join him. But his unwillingness, in the face of Catholic opposition within France, to withdraw the French garrison from Rome deprived him of any bargaining power with King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy; and veiled threats from the Russian Tsar convinced the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria that he should await actual French victories before casting his lot against Prussia. So far as the other German states were concerned, they promptly joined Prussia—to the delight of Bismarck and the chagrin of Napoleon.

Nor was the French army prepared for the war. While the Prussian military machine was operating with precision and effectiveness, the French soldiers were slowly mobilized, badly led, and hopelessly outnumbered. Napoleon III, now quite ill, was excessively timid, and his entire military establishment was sadly defective; it was without adequate organization, plans, or supplies, and was overrun with dishonest officials and corrupt contractors. The outcome could not long remain in doubt.

Early in August 1870, Marshal MacMahon, who had been hurriedly recalled from Algeria to command the French army near Strasbourg, suffered such reverses at the hands of the invading Germans that he was obliged to evacuate the greater part of Alsace and fall back upon Châlons. On August 18, another French army under Marshal Bazaine was defeated by the Germans (under Moltke) in a bloody battle at Gravelotte (in Lorraine) and shut up in the fortress of Metz. In the emergency, Marshal MacMahon counselled Napoleon III, who had just joined him at the front, to order a general retirement of the French armies upon Paris, where they could be concentrated, reënforced, and properly prepared to give decisive battle to the Germans. But when the Emperor wired the plan to the Empress, whom he had left as Regent at Paris, she wired back that a general retreat would mean the overthrow of the Empire and that he should go forward at once to the relief of Metz. So Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, with heavy hearts, moved their inferior

forces down the Meuse River, endeavoring to find a place where they might cross and thence drive back the Germans.

At Sedan, almost down to the Belgian border, they made the despairing attempt, September 1-2, 1870.

French
Defeat at
Sedan

Outnumbered and finally encircled, they surrendered themselves with 81,000 men, having lost in killed and wounded about 25,000. The battle of Sedan terminated the first phase of the Franco-Prussian War.

The battle of Sedan also ended the Second Empire. On September 4, 1870, when it became generally known in Paris that Napoleon III, together with the main French army

in the field, was a prisoner of the Germans, a self-appointed group of republicans, among whom Léon Gambetta was conspicuous, proclaimed at the city hall the deposition of the Emperor and the establishment of a republic—the Third French Republic. The Empress

Supplant-
ing
Second
Empire
with Third
Republic,
1870

Eugénie fled to England, and a "government of national defence" was hastily constituted to rule France until peace could be restored and the nation consulted on the permanent form of government. About what this should be, there was difference of opinion among Frenchmen—between republicans and royalists, between radical "socialist" republicans and moderate "liberal" republicans, between "legitimist" royalists and "liberal" royalists—but there was a consensus of opinion that the Empire had finally failed and that the Napoleonic dynasty was permanently deposed. The Second Empire had done much for internal development of France, but its foreign policy, after securing transient glory from the Crimean and Italian wars, had led to the frightful year of 1870 and the terrible disaster of Sedan.

Of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871—the phase following Sedan—we shall speak elsewhere.¹ Here we may note the last chapter in the personal career of Napoleon III. He was released from his German prison at the close of the war (1871) and joined his wife and son at Chislehurst in England. He protested against the verdict of the French National Assembly that he was "responsible for the ruin, invasion, and dismemberment of France," and he penned some apologetic pamphlets. But his cause was too hopeless and he was too ill. He died in 1873. His son—the Prince

Last
Years
of Louis
Napoleon

¹ See below, pp. 174-175.

Imperial, "Napoleon IV"—was trained in the British army and met an early death fighting Zulus in South Africa in 1879. The Empress Eugénie long survived husband and son; she outlived by two years the triumph of republican France over imperial Germany in 1918. But there was no renewal of the extraordinary fortune which had enabled the romantic nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte to dominate France from 1848 to 1870.

3. NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE

The era of the Second French Empire was marked in central Europe by national movements, which were highly fruitful for Italians, Germans, and Hungarians, though less so for Poles and Czechs. In 1848, at the beginning of the era, the revolutionary upheaval throughout central Europe, which we have already described, was both liberal and nationalist. Thereafter, liberalism declined, at least in Germany, but nationalism grew, so that by 1871, at the close of the era, there were national states of Italy and Germany and an autonomous state of Hungary. We shall now see how the new political order was established.

Italy was the first to erect a national state, and Italian patriotism during the era was closely associated with liberalism. The kingdom of Sardinia, about which the new Italy was built, had acquired a typically liberal constitution in 1848,¹ and the most influential patriots in the peninsula, no matter how they might differ about the ideal form of national government, were agreed that its practical substance should be liberal. This was the conviction of the group of playwrights, poets, and novelists who contributed to an Italian literary revival—the "risorgimento"—and to the spread of patriotic ardor among literate Italians. A common liberalism likewise characterized the foremost Italian champions of political union, though at first these were divided into three factions on the question of the form of national union.

One faction, radically liberal, was republican. Its chief exponent was Joseph Mazzini (1805-1872), a native of Genoa and the son of a university professor. As a young man he joined the revolutionary society of the *Carbonari* and was jailed and then exiled for participating in one of its riots. In 1831 he projected a new and

Move-
ment for
Italian
Liberty
and Union

Mazzini
and Re-
publican-
ism

¹ See above, p. 88.

non-secret organization—"Young Italy"—which, composed of intellectuals under forty years of age, should conduct an incessant campaign among all classes of Italians for the purpose of instilling in them the duty of liberating their country and unifying it under a popular "Roman republic." At least 50,000 young men were enrolled in Mazzini's "Young Italy," and, though its republicanism proved ineffectual, the patriotic and liberal ideas in back of it became a major factor in Italian developments from 1831 to 1870.

The most celebrated disciple of Mazzini was Joseph Garibaldi (1807-1882), a native of Nice, who as a sailor in the royal Sardinian navy was attracted to "Young Italy"—its nationalism and republicanism, and especially its incentive to heroic feats in which by temperament he revelled. Garibaldi
 Condemned to death for participating in a mutiny on his warship, he escaped and fled to South America, where he enlisted in an "Italian legion" and for fourteen years fought valiantly in revolutionary wars on that continent.¹ Returning to Italy, a romantic figure in a red shirt, he led a volunteer army of 3,000 personal followers in the Sardinian war of 1848 against Austria, and in Mazzini's struggle of 1849 against the Pope. Following the dismal failure of this last venture, Garibaldi took refuge in the United States (at New York), where, first as a candle-maker and afterwards as a trading skipper, he managed to amass a small fortune. In 1854 he returned once more to Italy, awaiting a new opportunity to strike for national liberty.

A second faction, seeking to reconcile traditional conservative religion with modern liberalism, was led by Vincent Gioberti (1801-1852), a Piedmontese priest, who, like Garibaldi and Mazzini, lived many years in exile but, unlike them, was never a republican. His chief book, the *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* (1843), urged a confederation of existing Italian states, each provided with a liberal constitution, and all presided over by the Pope. A considerable number of upper-class persons, including patriotic members of the Catholic clergy, shared Gioberti's dream, and for a brief time Pope Pius IX appeared to sympathize with it.

The third faction, and the one which eventually predominated,

¹ Victories of Garibaldi in 1846 helped to assure the independence of republican Uruguay from monarchical Brazil.

was that of liberal royalists, particularly those who looked for leadership to the Kingdom of Sardinia.¹ This kingdom included the fertile and progressive district of Piedmont, which, of all districts in Italy, was first affected by the Industrial Revolution, and in which, consequently, the nobility and the bourgeoisie were most naturally devoted to liberalism and in the best economic position to promote nationalism. In 1848, as we have learned, the Sardinian King, Charles Albert, acceded to liberal demands by establishing free constitutional government within his state and going to war with Austria.² Sardinia, we know, was crushed by the weight of Austrian arms, and Charles Albert despairingly abdicated in the dark days of 1849. Yet Sardinia's liberal constitution remained, and so too did the memory of Sardinia's efforts for national liberation.

If royal Sardinia had failed against Austria, Mazzini had failed even more egregiously with his Roman republic of 1849. He had demonstrated that the Italian masses were not really with him; that they were too steeped in monarchical traditions to support his radical republicanism. By his "excesses" at Rome, moreover, he had alienated the order-loving middle class, disgusted the clergy, and helped to transform Pope Pius IX from a liberal patriot into a reactionary protected by French troops. Republicans there were in Italy after 1849, but they were a dwindling sect of rather wild-eyed intellectuals and workingmen. Mazzini, living in exile, engaged ever more in vain plots and conspiracies. And Garibaldi showed an ever greater willingness to subordinate his own republican sentiments to the practical task of creating a united Italy.

Even more striking than the decline of republicanism was the collapse of Gioberti's scheme for a federal union of the Italian states under the Pope. Pius IX, on whom the scheme depended, repudiated it after the overthrow of Mazzini's Republic and the

¹ It must be borne in mind throughout this section that the words "Sardinia" and "Piedmont" are both used to designate the state in northwestern Italy ruled by the royal family of Savoy, whose head, since 1720, had been officially entitled "King of Sardinia." Technically, Sardinia and Piedmont were different areas of one state—the former being an island, and the latter being the mainland about Turin.

² On the liberal Sardinian constitution of 1848, see above, p. 88, and on the war of 1848-1849 with Austria, see above, pp. 88, 92-93.

restoration of the Papal State. He called on Italian Catholics to resist the "encroachments" of Sardinia and on foreign Catholics to help him retain his temporal sovereignty at Rome. There was sympathetic response to his pleas among foreign Catholics, especially in France, and French troops were kept at Rome by Napoleon III. In Italy, however, Pius IX found that he had to deal with patriots as well as with Christians, and that a large number of his fellow-countrymen who confessed the spiritual supremacy of the Bishop of Rome were bent on disregarding his political counsels and on coöperating in the unification of Italy.

Two personalities in the Sardinian government of the 1850's made significant contributions to the royalist cause. One was King Victor Emmanuel II, who succeeded his father Charles Albert, in 1849. He endeared himself to liberals by retaining, alone of all the Italian princes, the constitution which had been granted in 1848; and in the eyes of all patriots he gained favor by doing so in the face of persistent Austrian protests. Victor Emmanuel, moreover, had several qualities which won him wide popularity: his sober common-sense, his soldierly bearing, his loyal support of his ministers, and his bluff manners which earned him the title of "the honest king."

The other was Count Camillo di Cavour (1810-1861). Born in the very year that Metternich became chancellor of Austria, and belonging to a noble Piedmontese family, Cavour was to become a greater, at least a more permanently successful, diplomat than Metternich and to acquire fame as the foremost liberal nation-builder of the nineteenth century. In his teens, while he was serving in the Sardinian army, he imbibed liberal ideas, which an extensive reading of English authors and a subsequent sojourn in Great Britain confirmed. Indeed, the liberalism which Cavour espoused was that of contemporary England: individualism; material progress; a king who would reign without ruling; and a parliament which would represent the educated classes and promote liberty in political, ecclesiastical, intellectual, and economic matters.

During the reign of Charles Albert (1831-1848), Cavour took no part in government. He helped to manage his family estates. He travelled and studied. He interested himself and many of his fellow nobles in the new English industrial machinery. He be-

Wane of
Federal-
ism

Victor
Emman-
uel II

Count
Cavour

came a director of steamship and railway companies, of factories and banks. He became part owner and joint editor of a famous journal, *Il Risorgimento*, which urged upon Sardinia constitutional reform and leadership in the national cause. After the grant of the constitution and the accession of Victor Emmanuel II, Cavour came rapidly to the fore in Sardinian politics. Entering the cabinet in 1850, he became prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in 1852; and at these posts he remained, with but one brief interruption, until his death in 1861.

As premier, Cavour strove to promote the material welfare of his country in accordance with English liberal models. Tariffs were lowered. The building of factories and the importation of machinery were encouraged. Roads were improved and railways constructed. The public budget was reorganized, and the taxes, though increased, were more equitably distributed. At the same time, Cavour sought to lessen the influence of the church in Sardinia and to restrict its privileges. He expelled the Jesuits from the country and suppressed many monastic establishments. His ideal, he said, was "a free church in a free state," but in practice he subordinated the church to the state.

Cavour directed liberal reforms in Sardinia at the very time when other parts of Italy were in the throes of reaction against the revolutionary upheaval of 1848-1849. Pope Pius IX was now pursuing a reactionary policy in the Papal State in central Italy. In southern Italy, a despotic sway was exercised by the Bourbon King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand II (1830-1859), who was nicknamed "King Bomba" in reference to the bombardments which he decreed against towns that offended him and who kept some 30,000 political prisoners in filthy jails. In the three duchies of north-central Italy—Tuscany, Parma, and Modena¹—the local governments were more benevolent but quite arbitrary. In the important lands of northern Italy east of Piedmont—Lombardy and Venetia—an Austrian governor carried out instructions from ultra-conservative ministers at Vienna. In all these regions, na-

¹ In addition to the six nominally "independent" Italian states mentioned in the above paragraph—Sardinia, the Two Sicilies, the Papal State, Tuscany, Parma, and Modena—the infinitesimal republic of San Marino still survived from the middle ages. It still survives as an enclave in united Italy.

tive Italians were infected with a revolutionary spirit, but they appeared powerless to act. Austria maintained large garrisons in the provinces of Venetia and Lombardy, which she owned outright; and thence she might despatch troops to support the King of the Two Sicilies, who was her ally, or to safeguard the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena, all of whom were related by family ties to the Habsburg Emperor of Austria. Outside Sardinia, the one state in Italy not directly protected by Austrian soldiers was the Papal State, and this was guarded by French soldiers.

In the circumstances, Italian liberals and patriots turned ever more expectantly, during the 1850's, toward Sardinia, toward its King and his prime minister. Sardinia could set an example of liberalism, but could it free and unite all Italy? It had failed to do so and had been terribly beaten by Austria in 1848-1849. It was still comparatively weak, and its population aggregated less than five million. The national task before it was difficult and seemingly impossible.

Cavour, however, was not easily disheartened. Reforms within Sardinia, in his mind, were but a prelude to a far more ambitious plan—the political union of the entire Italian peninsula under Victor Emmanuel II—and the greater the obstacles to it, the more dogged was Cavour's determination to surmount them. He coöperated with the King in reorganizing the Sardinian army and improving its discipline. He had mysterious conversations with Garibaldi. He patronized secret societies which aimed at binding together throughout Italy the scattered elements of resistance to Austrian control. Above all, he utilized his great diplomatic talents in order to enlist foreign aid for Sardinia.

Cavour's first significant step in foreign policy was to cause diminutive Sardinia in 1855 to join France and Great Britain (and the Ottoman Empire) in the Crimean War against Russia. He expected Austria to side with Russia in this war, and in joining France and Britain he counted on their support against Austrian rule in Italy. The persistent neutrality of Austria rendered abortive this part of his scheme, but Cavour had the satisfaction of reaping other rewards which he had foreseen. Sardinia gained the sympathy of liberals all over western Europe, and Cavour was enabled to attend the

Cavour's
National
Policy

Participa-
tion in
Crimean
War

peace congress at Paris (1856) and there denounce Austrian rule.

His next step was to cement the alliance between Sardinia and France. for he had made up his mind that French assistance would be most practicable in expelling the Austrians from Italy. The difficulties were great, and only in July 1858 was an agreement reached between Cavour and Napoleon. France would coöperate in "freeing Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic," in driving the Austrians from Lombardy and Venetia and sanctioning the union of these provinces with Sardinia. In return, Sardinia would cede to France (subject to confirmation by plebiscite) the border duchy of Savoy and the border city of Nice. It still required a nice exercise of Cavour's diplomatic talents to pick a quarrel with Austria in such a way that to the world at large Sardinia and France would appear justified in fighting a war. Finally, in April 1859, the Austrian government was led to present an ultimatum to Sardinia, demanding immediate demobilization of its army. The rejection of the ultimatum was the signal for the beginning of hostilities.

The actual war between Sardinia and France, on one side, and Austria, on the other, lasted only from April to July 1859. Its course and its significance for France and for the fortunes of Napoleon III have already been sketched.¹

We know that the allies won notable victories at Magenta and Solferino, and that the French Emperor stopped short and made peace with Austria before he had fulfilled his promise to "free Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic." In fact he fulfilled only half of his promise: he turned over Lombardy (including Milan) to Sardinia, but he left Austria in possession of Venetia (including Venice). Cavour and other patriotic Sardinians were bitterly disappointed by Napoleon's "betrayal."² Yet the French Emperor had enabled Sardinia to annex Lombardy and thereby to double her area and population, and simultaneously his military intervention had incited in central Italy a patriotic outburst which Cavour could reasonably expect to utilize for further annexations to Sardinia. The defeat of Austria left the rulers of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena without their custom-

¹ See above, pp. 136-140.

² Cavour was so angry that he resigned his office. However, he continued to advise Victor Emmanuel unofficially, and soon formally returned to office.

ary foreign support, and against the rioting of their subjects they could not stand. Wherefore they abdicated and fled, while revolutionary governments took charge of the respective duchies and petitioned for their union with Sardinia. In parts of the Papal State, likewise—at Bologna and throughout Romagna, for example—rioting occurred against the Pope and in favor of the Sardinian King. Cavour responded by sending commissioners to administer all these regions of north-central Italy in the name of Victor Emmanuel.

After protracted negotiations, Cavour and Napoleon III arrived at a new agreement in March 1860. Napoleon consented to the annexation of the duchies and papal Romagna by Sardinia. Cavour paid the Emperor's price by surrendering Savoy and Nice to France. Plebiscites were formally held and the annexations were made.

Acquiring
Duchies
and
Romagna,
1860

Close upon the heels of the unifying movement in northern and central Italy came a similar movement in the south, the credit for whose guidance belongs, however, less to Cavour or Victor Emmanuel than to Garibaldi. The tyranny of the Bourbon Kings of the Two Sicilies was notorious; Ferdinand II, the infamous "Bomba," had been succeeded in 1859 by Francis II, but the change of sovereign meant no change of system. The very next year groups of Sicilians, aroused by the stirring events in northern and central Italy, rose in revolt. Forthwith, Garibaldi assembled at Genoa a volunteer army—the celebrated "redshirts"—in preparation for a filibustering expedition in aid of the Sicilian rebels. As the governments of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies were at peace with each other, it was the duty of Cavour as the responsible minister of the former to prevent the use of the Sardinian port of Genoa as a base of attack against the latter. But Cavour was willing to sacrifice the obligations of international law to Italian expediency. While openly he threatened the "redshirts" with arrest, secretly he intimated to Garibaldi that the expedition might proceed.

Abetting
Garibaldi's
Expedition
against
Sicily and
Naples,
1860

Garibaldi left Genoa with his picturesque volunteers in May 1860, and was received by the Sicilian revolutionaries with enthusiasm. Within three months he was master of the island. Thence he crossed over to the mainland and in September took possession of Naples. Francis II, deserted by many of his own

troops and unable to procure Austrian soldiers, retired with a small force to the fortress of Gaëta. Garibaldi's swift and almost complete conquest of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies exalted him to the position of a popular idol, and for a time it appeared as though he would become a republican dictator. To offset the danger of an Italy divided between a royalist north and a republican south, Cavour and Victor Emmanuel then decided that Sardinia should actively intervene. A Sardinian army invaded the Papal State, defeated the papal troops, and passed on into the Neapolitan territory, besieging Francis II at Gaëta and joining the Garibaldian volunteers at Naples. Cavour, despite the protests of Pope Pius IX, announced Sardinia's appropriation of the whole Papal State except Rome and its immediately surrounding territory (September 1860), and in November Victor Emmanuel II rode side by side with Garibaldi through the streets of Naples amid the bravos of the populace. Garibaldi was a republican but he was more a patriot; for the sake of national unity, he put aside personal preference and turned over the Two Sicilies to his king. A plebiscite confirmed Garibaldi's action. The surrender of Gaëta and the exile of Francis II in February 1861 removed the last internal obstacle to the unification of Sicily and Naples and the major portion of the Papal State with the already enlarged Sardinian kingdom.


There were no serious external obstacles. Austria was in no position, since her recent military reverses, to play her traditional rôle as protector of separate Italian states; she was now concerned far more vitally with Germany and Hungary than with Italy. British public opinion was favorable to Italian unity, and Palmerston, the British foreign minister, was on the best of terms with Cavour. Only the French Emperor might make trouble. Napoleon III, however, was too worried about the situation in France to pursue any consistent policy about Italian affairs. He contented himself with strengthening the French garrison at Rome and warning Sardinia not to trespass on what remained of the Papal State.

Thus it befell that within the two years from 1859 to 1861 all the disparate Italian states, except Rome and Venetia, were politically united under Sardinia's patriotic king and liberal constitution. Sardinia, with its previous population of barely five million,

Annexing
Southern
Italy and
Most of
Papal
State

was enlarged into an Italian state with a population of twenty-two million. The Sardinian parliament was transformed into an Italian parliament, and on March 17, 1861, Victor Emmanuel II dropped the title of King of Sardinia and assumed that of King of Italy. Less than three months later Cavour died, a victim of his own restless energy, but his ambitions were already largely realized.

Creation
of King-
dom of
Italy, 1861



ITALY, 1861-1866

Most of Italy was united, and the new Italian régime was liberal.

The successful issue of the struggle for Italian national unity had important effects on the Habsburg Empire. Austria's defeat in the war of 1859 deprived her of the preëminent position which she had held in Italy since 1815 and obliged her to surrender all her possessions there (except Venetia). It also cost her a loss of prestige in Germany

Effect on
Austria

and a growth of disruptive spirit within her own realm. This spirit, at once nationalist and liberal, had been kept in check by Metternich from 1815 to 1848. It had broken loose in 1848, but, after threatening to subvert the whole empire, it had been suppressed in 1849.¹ Now, in 1859, following the failure of Austria's conservative government to keep its hold on Italy, there was a notable recrudescence of liberal and nationalist agitation in Hungary, in Bohemia, and in German Austria.

To allay the unrest and stave off revolution, the Emperor Francis Joseph made concessions. In 1860 he extended the powers of the provincial diets in Bohemia and Croatia and restored the Hungarian Diet (or parliament) as it had been prior to 1849. Then, in 1861, he promulgated for the whole Habsburg Empire a constitution, according to which the levying of taxes and the enactment of laws would be subject to the approval of a central parliament elected by the provincial diets and meeting regularly at Vienna. This Austrian constitution of 1861 did not work well. The central parliament proved to be a cockpit for spokesmen of rival nationalities within the Empire rather than an orderly and effective legislative body; and the Hungarian leaders particularly demanded the substitution of a federal for a centralized system of government. Nevertheless, Francis Joseph had made a gesture of "constitutionalism," and the new ministry which he instituted in 1860-1861 pleased many liberals throughout his dominions and likewise in Germany.

Throughout Germany, especially in Prussia, the Italian developments of 1859-1861 had a profound influence. German liberals, who had been depressed and silenced since their fiasco of 1848-1849, were heartened to speak out anew in behalf of liberal institutions in the several German states and in behalf of a close union of the German people. Moreover, the weakness which Austria displayed in 1859 convinced many Germans that not she but Prussia must be the standard-bearer of German unity, and that, just as Sardinia had unified Italy by forcing Austria out of the peninsula, so Prussia could unify Germany by forcing Austria out of the German Confederation.

This latter conviction was entertained not so much in the

¹ See above, pp. 86-95.

South German states or by liberals as in Prussia and by conservatives. Conservatives and reactionaries had dominated Prussia since 1849—not only the King and his ministry but also the nominally “liberal” parliament which had been provided for in the Prussian constitution of 1850.¹ Prussian conservatism remained strong, but while it combated the political and economic doctrines of liberals, it appropriated their patriotic ardor and applied it against Austria. Austria had humiliated Prussia in 1850 and compelled King Frederick William IV to agree to the reestablishment of the German Confederation which was loose and weak and presided over by Austria.² What a blow that had been to the pride of Frederick William and all good Prussians!

Now, however, Austria was weakening; and the hopes of Prussian conservatives, as well as of German liberals, expanded. On the eve of Austrian defeat in Italy, the direction of Prussian affairs had passed from the romantic, volatile Frederick William IV to his prosaic and soldierly brother, William.³ William was not brilliant, but he possessed qualities which endeared him to the governing classes of Prussia. He was industrious and honest, rigidly conservative, deeply religious, and fully convinced of the divine right of kingship. Above all he was a soldier; in military matters he had an absorbing interest which recalls the Hohenzollerns of the eighteenth century. As soon as he was in power, William began a reform of the Prussian army. He chose as its chief of staff the gifted General Helmuth von Moltke, and in 1859 he appointed a remarkable organizer, Albrecht von Roon, as minister of war. Then, William zealously backed the recommendations of Roon that steps should be taken forthwith to extend the principle of compulsory military training, so that 63,000, instead of the prevailing 40,000, young men should be conscripted annually.

The King and his conservative advisers were eager for military reform, but the lower house of the Prussian parliament was less so. This body was responsive to the liberal sentiment which was then resurgent among the middle classes of Prussia. The liberal leaders were not acutely hostile to military reform as such, but they were anxious to

William I,
King of
Prussia

Question
of Military
Reform in
Prussia

¹ See above, pp. 96, 99.

² See above, pp. 96–98.

³ Frederick William IV went insane in 1858 and died in 1861. William was prince-regent from 1858 to 1861, and king as William I from 1861 to 1888.

make Prussia a constitutional monarchy with responsible parliamentary government, and they believed that by holding up the financial appropriations for military reform they could compel the King to acquiesce. With the liberals in the lower house combined enough moderates and conservatives of pro-Austrian proclivities to embarrass the King and his ministers. At first, the parliament authorized a temporary trial of the reform, but in 1861 it refused further appropriations. Whereupon, the King dissolved the lower house and ordered new elections, but the result was a majority for a new political party—the Progressive—consciously patterned after the British and Italian liberal parties and resolved to make the King pursue liberal policies and submit to real parliamentary government. The Prussian parliament was now definitely arrayed against King William and his conservative ministers. There was resolution on both sides, and an open conflict between them.

The *impasse* was broken through by a statesman whom Roon prevailed upon King William to appoint as his chief minister in 1862. The statesman was Otto von Bismarck, and the policy which he would pursue he announced to the Prussian parliament promptly and a bit ominously: "Not by speeches and majority resolutions are the great questions of the time decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood."

Bismarck belonged, like Roon, to the country gentry, still the most influential social class in Prussia, whose members for centuries had divided their attention between their own landed estates and the public service, military or civil, of their Hohenzollern sovereigns. Born in the manor-house at Schönhausen, some forty miles west of Berlin, in 1815, the year of the Congress of Vienna, he had been brought up to combine the aristocratic traditions of his class with the enthusiastic patriotism stimulated by Prussia's rôle in the overthrow of the first Napoleon. As a young man he had acquitted himself but illy at the universities of Göttingen and Berlin, and had been dismissed from the civil service for "deficiency in regularity and discipline." His marriage in 1847 with the pious daughter of a neighboring landlord had steadied him and confirmed his attachment to the Lutheran state church and to ultra-conservative principles.

**Bismarck
to the
King's
Rescue**

**Bis-
marck's
Earlier
Career**

During the revolutionary upheaval of 1848-1849 Bismarck had consistently defended the existing Prussian state against the liberals. He offered to bring his peasants to Berlin to protect Frederick William IV, and, when the King promised the grant of a Prussian constitution, Bismarck voted in a minority of two against returning thanks. He scoffed at the efforts of the Frankfurt Assembly to unify Germany on a platform of constitutional liberties and rejoiced at the refusal of Frederick William to take the imperial crown "from the gutter." Out of fealty to his King, he acquiesced in the one permanent concession which Frederick William IV made to liberalism—the Prussian constitution of 1850, with its parliament and its curious three-class electoral system—but he was active in forming a Conservative party which would resist any further liberalizing of Prussia.

In 1851 Bismarck had entered his King's diplomatic service, hugely enjoying it and evincing a marked aptitude for it. As Prussian representative in the revived Diet of the German Confederation from 1851 to 1859, he acquired an unrivalled knowledge of general German politics and deepened his earlier dislike of Austria. As ambassador at St. Petersburg for the next three years, he learned Russian and won the warm regard of the Tsar. As Prussian ambassador at Paris for a few months in 1862, he obtained a pretty accurate insight into the complexities of Napoleon III's character.

Now, in the autumn of 1862, Otto von Bismarck was summoned to Berlin by King William I, chiefly on the advice of Roon, in order to "tame" the self-willed majority in the Prussian parliament. It was a task after Bismarck's own heart. With the King's military policy he was in full sympathy; he felt it essential to the leadership which he believed Prussia should assume in the unification of Germany. For a brief time he tried to negotiate with the Progressive majority. They stubbornly resisted him, and in 1863 they declined to vote the budget unless the King should dismiss him.

His Dictatorship in Prussia, 1862-1866

Whereupon Bismarck, with the King's consent, proceeded to govern Prussia without a legal budget and without a parliament. As virtual dictator and in flat violation of the constitution of 1850, he decreed the levy and collection of taxes and the execution of the whole program of military reform. The Prussian Progressives grumbled, of course; and liberals in the other German

states, contrasting the reactionary dictatorship of Prussia with the recently inaugurated constitutionalism in Austria, heaped abuse on Bismarck and loudly demanded to be saved from any national union which would exclude Austria and put Prussia and her swaggering minister at the head. Yet neither abuse nor grumbling altered Bismarck's course. For nearly four years he maintained the unconstitutional régime in Prussia under the questionable maxim that the end justifies the means. He knew from earlier experience that the Prussian liberals were more given to words than to action; that while, under the electoral system, they might have a majority in the parliament, they did not necessarily have one in the country at large. He knew, too, that they were not likely to resort to violence in a state where there was no tradition of successful revolution and where the masses were habitually deferential to king, aristocracy, and army. So far as the other German states were concerned, he would temporarily flout their liberalism and their pro-Austrian sentiment and act on the assumption that most of their citizens, like most Prussians, would not care, in the long run, how a German national state was achieved so long as it was achieved. Bismarck's estimate of the situation proved correct. To the undoing of his Progressive opponents, patriotism was a more basic attribute of the mass of Prussians (and eventually of other Germans) than liberalism, and the reformed Prussian army—splendid machine as it was—served as a safeguard against revolution.

The reformed army could also be used—and this was Bismarck's basic interest in it—to create a national German state

His Aim: in which Prussia would occupy the chief position.
a Prussian This undoubtedly would involve a war with Austria,
Unifica-
tion of for the Habsburg Emperor would not voluntarily sur-
Germany render the German primacy which his ancestors had held for centuries. With the reformed army, however, Prussia should be able to beat Austria as decisively as Sardinia and France had recently defeated her. It might be regrettable to exclude German Austria by force of arms from the contemplated German nation; but it was the price which Bismarck would gladly pay for the establishment of a Prussianized Germany. An excuse for using the Prussian army against Austria, he soon detected in a reopening of the dispute with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein.

It will be recalled that these duchies, ruled by the King of Denmark and peopled mainly by Germans, had been a bone of contention in 1848 between Germany and Denmark; that Prussia had then championed the German cause; and that, through the diplomatic intervention of the Great Powers, a compromise had been effected in 1852 highly favorable to Denmark: the duchies were not to be incorporated in the kingdom of Denmark, but the King of Denmark would remain their sovereign.¹ Now in 1863, following the death of Frederick VII of Denmark, his successor, Christian IX, responded to patriotic demands of his Danish subjects by accepting a new constitution which, contrary to the agreement of 1852, unified the political institutions of Denmark and the duchies. The German response was an opposing wave of patriotic agitation and combined threats from Austria and Prussia, neither of which would be outdone by the other in bidding for leadership of the German cause. Christian IX refused to budge. And in 1864 ensued a brief war between Denmark on one side and Austria and Prussia on the other. The Danes fought furiously, but, unable to obtain foreign help and overborne by force of numbers, they were obliged to submit in October 1864 to the terms of the treaty of Vienna, in accordance with which their King renounced all his rights in the duchies in favor of Austria and Prussia.

War of
1864 with
Denmark

The sequel to the Danish War of 1864 was, as Bismarck anticipated, a quarrel between Austria and Prussia over the disposition of the spoils. Austria at once proposed that the duchies be made a separate state under a German prince of their own, who would be, of course, a member of the loose German Confederation; and the Diet of the Confederation, by a small majority, endorsed the Austrian proposal. Bismarck's reply was to deny the right of the Diet to interfere in a matter which concerned Austria and Prussia alone. As neither of these Powers felt quite ready for war, diplomatic negotiations were undertaken between them, leading to the temporary convention of Gastein (August 1865), whereby, pending a final settlement, Schleswig would be occupied and administered by Prussia, and Holstein by Austria.

Quarrel
with
Austria

Before precipitating a civil war in Germany between Prussia

¹ See above, p. 96, note.

and Austria, Bismarck was anxious to ensure the former against the danger of foreign intervention in behalf of the latter. Austria, he knew, would be the champion of the German Confederation which had been erected in 1815 under the joint guaranty of the Great Powers of Europe. Might not one or another of the Great Powers join with Austria to prevent him from supplanting that Confederation with a closely knit national state under Prussian auspices? He gave thought to Great Britain, Russia, and France, and also to the newly founded kingdom of Italy. From Britain he expected no trouble. British opinion was unmistakably favorable to Prussia, partly by reason of the free-trade policy of the Prussian *Zollverein* in contrast with the protectionist policy of Austria, and partly by reason of the romantic antipathy of English liberals to any Continental Power, such as Russia or Austria, which opposed national freedom and union. Nor did Bismarck anticipate any trouble from Russia. He knew that the Tsar had been offended by Austria's refusal to aid Russia during the Crimean War; and he was sure, on the other hand, that the Tsar was grateful for Prussia's offer of assistance to Russia in suppressing the Polish revolt of 1863.¹

The attitude of France was more problematical. French opinion was much more anti-Prussian than anti-Austrian, and quite hostile to the establishment of a united, powerful Germany on the Rhine. Bismarck understood Napoleon III, however, and thought it safe to gamble on the French Emperor's natural timidity, on the difficulties which at the moment he was encountering in far-away Mexico, and on the obvious unpreparedness of the French army. Bismarck took the trouble, as we have seen, to visit Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865, to solicit his friendly benevolence, and vaguely to hint to him that, if Prussia were given a free hand in Germany, France might get some "compensation."²

From Italy Bismarck expected more than neutrality. This state had been formally erected in 1861, but it conspicuously lacked two provinces—Papal Rome, guarded by French troops, and Venetia, still held by Austria. There was no immediate prospect of acquiring Rome, but with Prussia's aid Italy might acquire Venetia. In the cir-

¹ On this revolt, see below, pp. 189-190.

² See above, pp. 143-144.

cumstances, the Italian government was receptive to Bismarck's overtures, and in April 1866 it concluded an alliance with him: if war broke out within three months, Italy would join Prussia and wrest Venetia from Austria.

It was now the business of Bismarck to provoke Austria to war. He fomented intrigues against the Austrian administration of Holstein; and when Austria, unable to obtain satisfaction from him, complained to the Frankfurt Diet of the German Confederation, he declared that

Provoking
Austria to
War

Austria had thereby violated the convention of Gastein. He at once despatched Prussian troops to occupy Holstein and oust the Austrian officials, and almost simultaneously he submitted to the Diet a scheme for reforming the Confederation and excluding Austria from it. By this time—in June 1866—the Austrian government at Vienna was thoroughly aroused against Bismarck and Prussia; it called upon the Diet to reject the "reform" and to authorize a general mobilization throughout Germany in order to restrain Prussia from interfering with Austrian rights in Holstein and in the Confederation. The Prussian representative in the Diet protested, but the representatives of most of the other states sided with Austria and voted accordingly. The pro-Austrian attitude of the lesser German states was taken in re-

Question
of Ger-
man Con-
federation

sponse to the personal wishes of their respective sovereigns, who foresaw a diminution of power and prestige if the loose German Confederation should be "reformed" into a close union under the hegemony of Prussia; but their attitude was applauded, in central and southern Germany, alike by liberals who feared Prussian conservatism and by Catholics whose cultural sympathies were Austrian.¹


The action of the Diet was interpreted by Bismarck as tantamount to a joint attack upon Prussia by the other German states. He recalled the Prussian representative from Frankfurt, announced Prussia's secession from the Confederation, and proclaimed to the world that against Austria and her German allies Prussia would fight a "defensive" war for the national union of Germany. Italy, of

Austria
Supported
by Lesser
German
States

¹ In central Germany the kingdoms of Saxony and Hanover, and in southern Germany the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg, the duchies of Hesse-Darmstadt and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfurt, were allied with Austria.

course, was soon found on the Prussian side. And so astutely had Bismarck managed the affair that public opinion in most foreign countries was preponderantly favorable to Prussia.

The actual war between Prussia and Italy, on one side, and Austria and lesser German states, on the other, was of such sur-




PRUSSIA IN THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1815-1866

prisingly brief duration as to earn for it the name of Seven Weeks' War (1866). Austria was not nearly as well prepared as Prussia. Moreover, she had to fight defensively and simultaneously on two widely separated fronts—in Bohemia against invading Prussians and in Venetia against invading Italians—and all the while she was not quite certain of the loyalty of her own Hungarians. In fact, the Hungarians were loyal, for reasons which we shall presently indicate. In fact, too, the Austrian army in Venetia repulsed the

Seven
Weeks'
War of
1866

Italians, and an Austrian fleet in the Adriatic defeated an Italian squadron. What really brought disaster to Austria was the Prussian military machine. It moved with vigor and speed. First it broke the feeble resistance of the lesser German states, one by one, before they had time to complete their mobilizations



PRUSSIA IN THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION, 1867

and join hands with Austria. Then it moved with its full force against the army which Austria had managed to assemble in Bohemia. The ensuing battle of Sadowa (Königgrätz), on July 3, 1866, was the decisive engagement of the war. It was an overwhelming victory for the Prussians, establishing their reputation for military preëminence in the world and having far-reaching effects.

**Results of
Prussian
Victory**

By the treaty of Prague (August 1866), Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy and Holstein to Prussia, to pay a

small war indemnity, and to consent to the dissolution of the German Confederation and the erection of a North German Confederation of which Prussia would be the head and from which she herself would be excluded. Thus while the new Italy was absorbing more Italians, a large number of Germans—the Austrian Germans—were being cut off from the new Germany.

Bismarck confirmed Prussian dominance by the arrangements which he made after the Seven Weeks' War with the lesser German states. Some of them he annexed outright in order to round out Prussia's misshapen territories, to increase her population and economic resources, and to strengthen her military position. Into Prussia, accordingly, he incorporated the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, the kingdom of Hanover,¹ the duchies of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt. These additions were important. For the first time, the Hohenzollern sovereign of Prussia was king of compact and continuous lands stretching from Russia and Denmark to the Main River and the French frontier; he gained more than 27,000 square miles of territory and almost five million subjects. Henceforth, excluding Austria, two-fifths of the area and two-thirds of the population of all Germany belonged to Prussia.

The lesser German states north of the Main River which were not annexed outright by Prussia—twenty in number—Bismarck joined with Prussia in 1867 in a new and closely knit North German Confederation. Each state retained a measure of local autonomy, but all were subordinated to a federal government, whose executive authority was vested in the King of Prussia as hereditary "president," assisted by a chancellor and ministers responsible to himself, and whose legislative powers were entrusted to a bicameral parliament comprising (1) a federal council (Bundesrat) of personal representatives of the sovereigns of the several states, and (2) an imperial diet (Reichstag) of elected representatives of the people in the

¹ Hanover had been joined in a personal union with Great Britain from 1714 to 1837, when Queen Victoria had succeeded to the throne of the latter. The law of succession in Hanover prescribed that its sovereign must be male, and hence in 1837 her uncle had become King Ernest of Hanover, and he had been succeeded in 1851 by his son, George V. In 1866 this George V was deposed and exiled, and Hanover was annexed by Prussia. See genealogical table at p. 350.

Confederation. The Prussian king as president of the North German Confederation would direct its foreign affairs and army and he might declare war.

Certain German states remained outside the North German Confederation. In addition to German Austria, there were the four states immediately south of the Main River: the kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg and the grand-duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt. In these states with the exception of Baden, whose grand-duke was pro-Prussian, both princes and people were hostile to any political union with Prussia, the princes fearing a diminution of their own importance and the people dreading the certain imposition of compulsory military service and the probable enactment of anti-Catholic or anti-liberal legislation. Toward these south German states, however, Bismarck adopted a conciliatory attitude, while missing no chance to alarm them with the possibility of French aggression at their expense. Indeed, he "protected" them by negotiating secret treaties of defensive alliance whereby if Prussia or one of them should be attacked by a foreign power, such as France, the others should come to the assistance of the party attacked. Bismarck trusted to the growth of anti-French feeling to bring the four states of southern Germany into eventual political union with Prussia.

4. Nominal Independence of South German States

And Their Alliance with Prussia

One factor of inestimable value in resigning the German people, south as well as north, to Prussian leadership was a remarkable change which the Seven Weeks' War produced in Bismarck's attitude toward liberalism and in the attitude of liberals toward him. In 1867 he restored the full operation of the Prussian constitution and asked a bill of indemnity from the Prussian parliament for the illegalities of which he had been wantonly guilty during the preceding four years; the liberal majority in the parliament met him halfway and passed the bill with unanimity and enthusiasm. In the same year, he sponsored the provision in the new constitution of the North German Confederation that its Reichstag should be elected by direct and universal manhood suffrage. To this there was objection from some Prussian conservatives, but he assured them that the German masses bade fair to be more conservative than the middle class and more

5. Concessions to Liberalism and Democracy

patriotically devoted to the maintenance of a strong central government. As a result of these popular concessions, a new political party soon took shape, known as the National Liberal Party and recruited largely from the bourgeoisie and in many instances from former Progressives. Its main object was to uphold Bismarck in his national endeavors and hence to subordinate, though not wholly to surrender, the earlier liberal demands for free constitutional government.

All the developments which we have just been describing—the rise of the National Liberal party, the expansion of Prussia, the formation of the North German Confederation, the defensive alliances between this Confederation and four independent states of South Germany—emerged from the Seven Weeks' War of 1866. They indicated quite clearly that the Germans would soon have a powerful national state under Prussian leadership.

Inside Austria the Seven Weeks' War also accentuated nationalism. The Austrian Germans, excluded from the larger Germany, were the more determined to maintain their traditional political and social ascendancy in the Habsburg Empire of which they constituted a numerical minority. On the other hand, the Slavic peoples in the Empire had been growing more and more nationalist since at least the revolutionary upheaval of 1848, and their leaders held a congress at Vienna on the morrow of the battle of Königgrätz (July 1866) and formally endorsed a scheme for the transformation of the Austrian Empire into a "pentarchy," or five-state confederation, comprising (1) German Austria, (2) Magyar Hungary, (3) Czech Bohemia, (4) Croat-Serb-Slovene Yugoslavia, and (5) Polish Galicia.

Against the Slavic scheme were arrayed the Magyar patriots of Hungary. These were devoted to the memory of the old Hungarian state; they were resolved to sacrifice none of its historic provinces, peopled though some of them were by Croats, Serbs, and Slovaks; and the Magyars, although hostile to German interference from Vienna in their own national affairs, were bitter against the Slavs for the decisive part which they had played in 1849 in enabling the Vienna government to put down the Hungarian revolt. Louis Kossuth, who had led that revolt, continued from exile to preach

Magyar rebellion against the Empire, but in the 1860's his influence declined at home, while that of Francis Deák rose. Deák believed that the Magyars could better satisfy their ambitions through partnership within the Empire than through rebellion against it. Mutual opposition to the Slavic peoples would cement an alliance of Magyars and Germans. He accordingly advocated the transformation of the centralized empire into a dual monarchy. And in the expectation that the Emperor Francis Joseph would see the problem of imperial reorganization as he saw it, Deák exerted his influence to assure the loyal coöperation of Hungary with Austria in the war of 1866.

Deák gambled successfully. Francis Joseph recognized, when military disaster of 1866 followed so closely upon military defeat in 1859, that the Habsburg Empire could not go on as it had been, that a drastic internal change must be made. He imagined, too, that his own position would be less imperilled by a dual arrangement, such as Deák and the Magyars urged, than by a pentarchy, such as the Slavs demanded. So, after due negotiations, a new political régime was instituted in east-central Europe by the "Ausgleich," or "Compromise," of 1867. By this settlement, the Habsburg dominions were divided into two parts: (1) Austria, embracing Austria proper, Bohemia, Galicia, Carniola, and the Tyrol; and (2) Hungary, including Hungary proper, together with its crown-lands of Croatia, the Banat, and Transylvania. Each part would have a constitution and parliament of its own, and each would be independent of the other in most respects. Yet the two would be united by a common sovereign—to be known henceforth by the dual title of "Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary"—and by a common army, common foreign relations, and certain common ministers. The Seven Weeks' War thus proved as advantageous to Hungary as to Prussia.

Not so well fared the Slavic peoples in the Habsburg dominions. Austria, it is true, made special concessions to her Polish subjects in Galicia, and Hungary partially appeased the Croats by according them a degree of local autonomy in 1868. Yet neither Poles nor Croats were satisfied; and the Czechs were thoroughly disgruntled.

After the defeat of Austria in 1866, France was the only European Power which seemed minded and able to stop the

Deák

7. "Ausgleich" of 1867: Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary

Slavic Opposition and Unrest

fruition of Cavour's plans for a completely unified Italy or Bismarck's plans for a German national state under Prussian leadership. French troops still garrisoned Rome, and in 1867 they repulsed an armed effort of Garibaldi to overthrow the temporal rule of Pope Pius IX and annex his state to Italy. Simultaneously, the Emperor of the French was warning Bismarck that the South German states must not be incorporated in the North German Confederation and that France would expect "compensations" for Prussian expansion. But the gains made by Prussia and Italy in the war of 1866 only whetted the appetite of their patriots.

Bismarck was desirous of a war with France. He was certain that the Prussian army was superior to the French, and that the South German states, in the patriotic enthusiasm engendered by war, would throw in their lot with Prussia and her North German Confederation. He must, of course, get France to declare the war, so as to show the world that she, and not Prussia, was the aggressor. But he knew that French patriots were irritated by the recent spectacular victories of Prussia and could be expected to egg on Napoleon III to make demands which Prussia would refuse.

How Napoleon made demands on Bismarck for territorial "compensation" in 1866-1867, and how they were rejected, we have already told. We have also told how, finally, Bismarck's published account of King William's refusal of a French demand in 1870 aroused such passions at Paris that Napoleon III and his Parliament declared war against Prussia.¹

The Franco-Prussian War began in July 1870. France was without allies, while Prussia was actively supported by the North German Confederation and the four states of South Germany. The first and decisive phase of the struggle, culminating in the French disaster at Sedan in September 1870, has been sketched in another place.² It remains to sketch the second and concluding phase and to indicate some of the war's immediate consequences.

With the surrender of Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon, and the main field army of the French at Sedan, German forces tightened their sieges of Strasbourg and Metz while large German armies advanced rapidly on Paris. Bismarck let it be known that

¹ See above, pp. 144-147.

² See above, pp. 147-149.

he would not make peace with France unless Germany should be "safeguarded" against future French interference by "regaining" Alsace and Lorraine and holding the Rhine as a really German river. On the other hand, the new republican government of France declared that it would "not cede an inch of French soil or a stone of French fortresses." So the war continued, after Sedan, from September 1870 to January 1871.

Léon Gambetta, the war minister of the French republic, escaping in a balloon from Paris just as the Germans were closing in about the French capital, did his utmost to arouse the countryside to continuing resistance. He improvised armies out of surviving remnants of regiments. He proclaimed a *levée en masse* of all men from twenty-one to forty years of age. He had the recruits hastily drilled and he despatched one force after another in frantic endeavors to relieve the beleaguered French armies at Paris, Metz, and Strasbourg. Such resolute endeavors astonished the invading Germans, but the outcome was never in doubt.

Strasbourg capitulated to the Germans late in September. In October, Marshal Bazaine, with shameful pusillanimity, surrendered to the Germans the great fortress of Metz, together with a French army of 150,000 men. Paris held out until January 28, 1871, and then surrendered only because its population was freezing and starving. Four days after the capitulation of Paris, an armistice was arranged in order to admit of the election of a French National Assembly which would possess authority to conclude peace. The preliminaries, Treaty of
Frankfurt agreed to at Versailles between Bismarck and Adolphe Thiers, were most reluctantly ratified by the Assembly in March; and the definitive treaty was signed at Frankfurt in May 1871. France ceded to Germany the whole of Alsace, excepting Belfort, and the eastern part of Lorraine, including the fortress of Metz, and agreed to pay an indemnity of five milliard francs (one billion dollars). German troops remained in occupation of northern France until the indemnity was fully paid (in 1873).

Of the numerous and far-reaching results of the Franco-Prussian War, the most striking was the fulfillment of Bismarck's plan for the unification of Germany and the establishment of a German Empire under Prussian and Hohenzollern leadership. Just as the Prussian statesman had anticipated, the fact that South Germans fought in

Outcome
of Franco-
Prussian
War

the war shoulder to shoulder with North Germans and that the triumph of German arms was achieved by Bavarians and Württembergers as well as by Prussians aroused all over Germany a popular patriotic ardor strong enough to overcome princely jealousies and liberal scruples. By November 1870, while the war was still in progress, treaties of union were negotiated by Bismarck on behalf of the North German Confederation with the governments of the several South German states.

1. German
Empire of
Prussian
Hohen-
zollerns,
1871

These treaties, duly ratified by the respective sovereigns and parliaments, simply extended the North German Confederation so as to include the southern states and changed its name to the "German Empire." The King of Prussia, instead of being "President of the Confederation," was henceforth to be styled "German Emperor."

By a curious irony of fate, the solemn ceremony of inaugurating the German Empire was held on January 18, 1871, exactly 170 years after the Prussian Hohenzollerns assumed the title of king;¹ and, as the Germans were still besieging Paris, the ceremony was held in the hall of mirrors in the palace of Louis XIV at Versailles, "in the ancient centre," the official report explained, "of a hostile power which for centuries had striven to divide and humiliate Germany." There, surrounded by sovereigns, generals, and soldiers, Bismarck read the imperial decree which sealed the first part of his life-work, and the grand-duke of Baden led the loud cheers for King William I of Prussia, now, by the grace of God and the will of his fellow princes, German Emperor.

The Franco-Prussian War thus hastened the creation of a Prussianized German Empire. It also served to remove every foreign danger of its early destruction. The war confirmed beyond the peradventure of a doubt the preëminence of the German military machine. Thereafter Austria must abandon every thought of avenging Sadowa, and France, for many a year to come, would be unequal to the task of avenging Sedan.

In one respect, Bismarck, as later events disclosed, overreached himself. That was in the taking of Alsace-Lorraine from France. He took the provinces for patriotic and military reasons. His military advisers pointed out that the new frontier of the Vosges Mountains would be easier for Germany to defend in another war with France

2. Ger-
many's
Seizure
of Alsace-
Lorraine

¹ See Vol. I, p. 333.

than the old frontier of the Rhine River and that the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz would provide additional security for Germany. Besides, Bismarck heeded the pleas of German patriots that the provinces had belonged to the medieval German Empire, that the majority of their population still spoke German, and that their "reannexation" to Germany would strengthen the new Empire. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the people of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, regardless of what language they might speak, showed themselves French and not German in national sentiment; their elected representatives protested against the compulsory cession of the provinces.

A consequent bitterness became chronic in Franco-German relations. In contrast to the relatively lenient treatment which Bismarck had accorded to Austria in 1866 were the harsh and humiliating terms which he imposed on France in 1871; and the results displayed a corresponding discrepancy. In the case of Austria, the soreness of defeat soon disappeared and within a short time the Emperor Francis Joseph was the sworn friend and ally of the Emperor William. On the other hand, the French remained painfully aware of their disgrace and eagerly anxious to recover Alsace-Lorraine.

More immediately, the Franco-Prussian War had an important bearing on Italian, as well as on German (and French), national union. On the eve of Sedan, Napoleon III, hard pressed for troops, withdrew the French garrison from Rome and left Pope Pius IX to defend his temporal rule as best he could with only the assistance of his personal guards and a small force of miscellaneous foreign volunteers. Then, when the collapse of the Second French Empire at Sedan made it clear that Napoleon III could not again intervene at Rome, the government of King Victor Emmanuel II, with Bismarck's approval, ordered an Italian army of 60,000 men to invade and occupy the Papal State. The Pope protested and made a show of armed resistance. At the first tidings of bloodshed, however, he directed his little army to cease firing, and on September 20, 1870—less than three weeks after Sedan—the troops of Victor Emmanuel entered Rome. Thus did the Rome of the popes, which had endured for more than twelve centuries, become the Rome of the Italian nation. A plebiscite ratified the appropriation of the Papal State

Embit-
tering
of
Franco-
German
Relations

3. Italy's
Seizure of
Rome

Papal
Discom-
fiture

by the kingdom of Italy, and in 1871 Rome became the capital of united Italy.

One other result of the Franco-Prussian War merits passing mention. The fall of Napoleon III permitted the undoing of another part of his work. In this instance, the Russian Tsar, also with Bismarck's benevolent approval, denounced in October 1870 the articles of the treaty of Paris of 1856 which limited Russian naval forces and armaments in the Black Sea; and a conference of the Powers in London, in March 1871, formally assented. It was an omen of the resumption of Russian activity in the Near East and a presage of another war against the Ottoman Empire.

4. Rus-
sia's
Treaty
Violation

4. NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, nationalism played a somewhat different rôle in eastern Europe from what it played in central Europe. In central Europe, where national aspirations were fostered by a rapidly growing middle class, by numerous scholars and publicists on the one hand, and by rising industrial capitalists on the other, nationalism inspired the political welding together of the fragmentary states among which a particular nationality had hitherto been distributed. It created national states, as we have seen, for Italians and for Germans. In eastern Europe, however, political and social conditions were not so favorable for the erection of strictly national states. Here, it was not a problem of unifying petty kindred states but rather of disrupting huge polyglot empires. For all the extensive lands and all the diverse nationalities of eastern Europe were comprised in three imperial sovereignties—the Russian of the Romanov tsars, the Turkish of the Ottoman sultans, and the Austrian of the Habsburg emperors.

In at least two of these empires, the Turkish and the Russian, the Industrial Revolution had as yet scarcely penetrated. There was a relatively small middle class, whether of intellectuals or of business men. There was a very wide social chasm between nobles and officials, on the one hand, and the vast mass of ignorant peasants, on the other. There was a natural tendency on the part of the sovereigns to disregard or minimize national differences among their subjects. The result was that frontiers of language

Relative
Back-
wardness
of Turkish
and Rus-
sian
Empires

(and nationality) were shadowy and uncertain; frequently in the same area the upper classes were of different nationality from the lower classes; and sometimes an area was so diversely peopled that it might be claimed with equal justice by several nationalities or by none.

The Habsburg Empire was intermediate, in a nationalist as well as in a geographical sense, between central and eastern Europe. Economically and intellectually, it was much more advanced than the Russian or the Ottoman Empire, and its various peoples shared in large degree the patriotic enthusiasm which possessed Italians and Germans. Under nationalist pressure, moreover, the Habsburg Empire was compelled between 1859 and 1866 to relinquish its provinces in Italy and its hegemony in Germany and, by the "Ausgleich" of 1867, to reorganize itself as the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This represented a compromise between the older imperial idea and the newer national conception. In Hungary, where the Magyar inhabitants were compactly patriotic, and in Austria proper where there was a solidly German population, separate and virtually national states were set up. Yet such national concessions were intended, not to disrupt, but to strengthen, the Empire of the Habsburgs.

One of the immediate consequences of the extrusion of the Habsburg Empire from Italy and Germany was the shifting of its interests and policies from central (and western) Europe to eastern Europe. It sought compensation in the East for what it had lost in the West. Its rivalry lessened with Prussia, France, and England, and increased with Turkey and especially with Russia. And the more Austria-Hungary competed with Russia for the imperial heritage of the Ottoman Turks, the more its national problems became interlocked with those of the Russian Empire and the Balkan peninsula.


Among the Christian population of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was clearly developing before 1848 and already producing disruptive effects. Among Greeks and Serbs there had always been some consciousness of nationality and some cherished recollections of bygone independence and greatness. To the Greeks, particularly, their Turkish masters had long accorded

Inter-
mediate
Status of
Austrian
Empire

Shift of
Austrian
Interests
Eastward

Rise of
National-
ism in
Ottoman
Empire

a privileged position in the trade of the Ottoman Empire and in the civil government of its Orthodox Christian subjects. But not until the first decades of the nineteenth century did political



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1810

nationalism seriously disturb the Ottoman Empire. This came out of the French Revolution and was carried from the West to the East during the Napoleonic wars. It was soon seized upon

by Greek and Serb chieftains and utilized by them to stir up popular revolts against the Turks and to elicit the sympathy and support of foreign countries. The Greek and Serbian revolts we have discussed in another place; we have noted how they were aided by France and Britain and by imperial Russia and how they were brought to partially successful issue in 1829-1832.¹ The greater part of the Greek peninsula and some of the Greek islands in the Ægean (though not by any means the whole Greek nationality) were incorporated in an independent Greek kingdom under the guaranty of Russia, France, and Great Britain and with a German prince—Otto of Bavaria—as constitutional sovereign. Almost simultaneously the Ottoman province of Belgrade was recognized as the autonomous principality of Serbia under a native “hereditary prince,” and the Rumanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were accorded a more limited autonomy.

After 1832, nationalism spread and was intensified in the Balkans, partly because of the successes of the Greeks and Serbs, partly because of the obviously growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire,² and partly because of interested promptings in foreign countries—at times from romantic patriots, especially in France and Britain, and more often from statesmen who grasped any opportunity to gain prestige for their own governments. Greece and Serbia aspired to become bigger and labored to infuse all Greeks and Serbs with an eager desire for complete national freedom and unity. Rumanians, also, commenced to be taught that they were a distinctive Latin nationality, with a glorious ancient history and with a rosy future. There were patriotic stirrings, likewise, among Bulgarians.

Only the Turks and their fellow-Moslem Albanians were still imperially minded and largely unaffected by nationalism. The Turks, it should be remembered, constituted a governing and land-holding minority in the European provinces of their Empire. They had hitherto been comparatively tolerant of their Christian subjects, but with the development of a subversive nationalism among

Greeks
and Serbs

Ruma-
nians and
Bulgari-
ans

Reaction
of Gov-
erning
Turks

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 705-708, 782-785.

² On the gradual weakening of the Ottoman Empire from the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 377-381, 704-705.

the latter, the Turks resorted to strenuous methods to hold them in check. Turkish "atrocities" and "massacres" were a concomitant of rising nationalism among the Balkan peoples, and Balkan nationalists not only repaid their Turkish "oppressors" in kind but also worked upon the sympathy of Christian Europe by dwelling upon their suffering and oppression. The story of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century is not a lovely one for Turks or for the Balkan peoples—or for Europe at large.

The huge Russian Empire resembled the Ottoman Empire in that it was fundamentally an autocratic and military state, the vast majority of whose subjects were poor and illiterate. It was unlike the Ottoman Empire, however, in that the majority of its European inhabitants belonged to a single nationality—the Slavic "Great Russian" nationality—occupying the central part of the country and stretching out from Moscow in all directions. In fact, the Russian Empire may be described as a

Nationalities in Russian Empire

"Great Russian" Majority

Finns and Poles

Great Russian national state which, under the ambitious direction of its autocratic sovereigns since the time of Peter the Great, had been surrounding itself with a wide fringe of dependent alien lands. In the far northwest of the Empire, Finland retained the rank of grand-duchy and the old-fashioned feudal constitution which it had had before its cession by Sweden in 1809;¹ and at the extreme west, the large portion of Poland which Russia had obtained from the peace settlement at Vienna in 1815 had been treated as a separate constitutional kingdom until its unsuccessful rebellion in 1831.² Other conquered territories—and Poland after 1831—were administered as integral parts of the Russian Empire. Such was the fate of the Ukraine, whose "Little Russian" peasant population dwelt in the southwest of the Empire and spoke a Slavic dialect akin to, but somewhat different from, "Great Russian." Such, too, was the lot of the former grand-duchy of Lithuania, embracing two principal nationalities: "White Russians" in the east, interspersed with Great Russian landlords; and Lithuanians in the west, interstrewn with Polish landlords. Such, also, was the position of Bessarabia, in the far southwest corner of the Empire,

¹ See Vol. I, p. 703.

² See Vol. I, pp. 792-793.

where Rumanian peasants were mingled with Great Russian colonists. Such, finally, was the case with the Baltic provinces: Estonia had a peasantry of Finnish stock; Livonia and Courland had a peasantry of Latvian nationality, akin to the Lithuanian; and all three provinces had landlords who were Germans partially Russianized.

Nationalism made slow and slight headway in the nineteenth century among Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, White Russians, or Little Russians. These peoples appeared to be definitely submerged in the Russian Empire. They seemingly entertained no desire for political freedom, and the only "national" demands which they voiced were for the Tsar's toleration of their linguistic and religious peculiarities. On the other hand, Finns and Poles alike felt the full nationalist fervor of western and central Europe. The former jealously defended their privileged position within the Russian Empire, and the latter were chronically rebellious.

Nationalism among the Great Russians took one of two forms—"Westernism" or "Slavophilism." The first was imitative of the contemporary liberal nationalism of Eng-
land, France, and Italy. Its Russian advocates wished to "westernize" Russia, to transform the existing autocracy into a liberal, constitutional government, and to industrialize the country. "Slavophilism," on the other hand, was an indigenous reaction against the "Westernizers." Its apostles lauded and sought to preserve whatever they thought was distinctive of Slavic civilization: the autocratic tsardom, half political and half religious; the traditional Orthodox Church; the social customs and institutions of the Russian masses—the agricultural peasants—centring particularly in their time-honored village communities, or "mirs."

Both "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" talked about the "Slavic" nationality and tended to regard Russian nationalism as an aspect of a higher Slavic nationalism. But whereas the "Westernizers" looked forward to a voluntary confederation of diversely liberal Slavic states—Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.—the "Slavophiles" emphasized the "sacred mission," incumbent on the Russian people as the purest and most powerful of all the Slavs, of safeguarding and promoting the common cause of traditional "Slavdom" at home and abroad.

The Russian tsars, from the very nature of their political

principles and traditions, were not disposed to countenance, in the abstract, the liberalism the Westernizers or even the extreme nationalism of the Slavophiles. Alexander I (1801-1825) had toyed for a time with the thought of granting a constitution to Russia, and in his dreamy way he had fancied himself in various nationalist rôles—in respect of Russia itself and in respect of Poles and Finns. But Alexander's chief hobbies, like his predecessors', were making a big military show (with size rather than efficiency) and intriguing for any territorial expansion which might enhance the prestige of the "Tsar and Autocrat of all the Russias." Alexander had appropriated Finland, Bessarabia, and the lion's share of Poland.

Nicholas I (1825-1855) was more hard-headed. There could be no misunderstanding about his attitude toward liberalism. He began with merciless suppression of a rebellious "liberal" outbreak among his troops at St. Petersburg—the so-called Decembrist revolt¹—and he continued to punctuate his reign with thoroughly reactionary measures. In 1848 he expostulated with the King of Prussia about the latter's "surrender" to "Western revolution," and next year he despatched an army to help the Austrian Emperor crush the national movement in Hungary.² Nicholas was no more a friend of abstract nationalism than of liberalism.

Nevertheless, a Russian Tsar could perceive in the rising nationalism of Europe, particularly in the nationalism of Russian Slavophiles, a practical means of widening the influence and perhaps the territory of the Russian Empire. The imperial ambition of the Romanovs might be served if they should champion the cause of Slavic or Orthodox peoples against the Ottoman Empire or perhaps even against the Habsburg Empire. There had long been pressure from the waxing Russian Empire against the waning Ottoman Empire. Of late there had been growing rivalry between the Russian and Habsburg Empires for the spoils of the Ottoman Empire. What now accentuated the pressure and the rivalry was the intensification of nationalism among the several peoples in all these empires and the encouragement which the Russian Tsar could afford to give to "oppressed" nationalities in the other empires.

¹ See Vol. I, p. 758.

² See above, p. 95.

This use of alien nationalism for Russian imperial purposes was first conspicuously demonstrated by Nicholas I in the war which he waged with the Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829.¹ Thereby, he not only assured independence to Greeks, autonomy to Serbs, and special privileges to Rumanians, but he obtained for the Russian Empire an extension of territory in the Caucasus and the reputation of being the mighty yet altruistic friend of all Orthodox and all Slavic peoples. This reputation he confirmed in 1849 by his military expedition against the Hungarians, who were dangerously "liberal" but who at the same time were "oppressing" Slavic Croats and Slovaks and Orthodox Rumanians. Shortly afterwards he was secretly proposing to Britain a partition of the Ottoman Empire and was ostentatiously claiming a virtual protectorate over all Orthodox Christians within it. Over this question, and doubtless for the fulfillment of far-reaching designs, he went again to war with the Turks in 1853. This time, Britain and France (and Sardinia) intervened to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russian "aggression." The resulting struggle—the Crimean War (1854-1856)—we have discussed elsewhere.² Here we may recall that the war halted Russian interference in the Ottoman Empire and temporarily lowered the prestige of the Tsar's army and government.

In
Turkey,
1828-1829

In Hun-
gary, 1849

Again in
Turkey,
1853-1856

The check to Russian imperialism did not signify any check to Balkan nationalism. The several peoples in southeastern Europe only clamored the louder after 1856 for cultural and political independence, and for the realization of their desires they now sought, and sometimes obtained, the assistance of France and Great Britain instead of Russia's. Rumanian demands for the union of Moldavia and Wallachia under a single prince and a single parliament were granted in 1862, mainly through the good offices of the French Emperor, Napoleon III.³ Greek ambitions were fed by Great Britain's coöperation in deposing the unpopular Bavarian King of Greece, Otto (1832-1862), in selecting a more acceptable sovereign in the person of a Danish prince who in 1863 took the title of George I, "King of the Hellenes," and at the same time in permitting the Greek national state to

French
and
British
Tutelage
in Bal-
kans,
1856-1870

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 784-785. ² See above, pp. 134-136. ³ See above, pp. 140-141.

annex the Ionian Islands which Britain had held since 1815. Moreover, Serbian security and pride were enhanced by Great Britain's prevailing upon the Ottoman Sultan in 1867 to withdraw the petty garrisons which until then he had maintained in certain fortresses in the autonomous principality of Serbia. It was thus obvious during the 1860's that not Russia, the imperial rival of the Turks, but Britain and France, the professed defenders of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, were actively abetting a nationalism which was endangering this Empire.

In the meantime, the check which the Crimean War administered to Russian imperialism in the Balkans had significant effects within the Russian Empire. Nicholas I had died in the midst of the war, and his son and successor, Alexander II (1855-1881), was soon faced with the necessity not only of negotiating an humiliating peace with Turkey, France, and Britain but also of allaying domestic unrest. Amid criticism of the conduct and outcome of the war, the "Westernizers" pressed upon the Tsar their demands for political and social reforms within Russia. To allay the unrest at home and to regain prestige abroad, Alexander II devoted his major attention, for some seven or eight years after the Crimean War, to establishing his reputation as a "reforming tsar." The first problem of internal reform which he tackled was social, having to do with the Russian peasants.

Russia, it must be remembered, was overwhelmingly an agricultural country, and when Alexander II came to the throne the majority of his subjects were still in a condition of serfdom, similar in kind to the serfdom which had prevailed in western Europe in the middle ages and worse in degree. It is true that northern Russia was inhabited by land-owning peasants, that the extreme south was studded with economically independent colonies of Cossacks,¹ and that serfdom had already been abolished in the Baltic provinces and in Poland.² Yet nine-tenths of the whole arable land of the Empire were still embraced in large estates, some belonging to the Tsar and the imperial

¹ The Cossacks were Russian colonists on the frontiers of the Empire, particularly in the South and in Siberia, who were endowed with special privileges and bound in return to give military service for specified periods under specified conditions.

² Serfdom had been abolished in the grand-duchy of Warsaw (the main part of what was later Russian Poland) in 1807, and in the Baltic provinces in 1816-1819. See Vol. I, p. 703.

family and the rest to some 100,000 noble families. Each such estate was divided into two parts, the produce of the one going directly to the landlord and that of the other being for the support of a community (mir) of peasants. Under the system of serfdom, as developed in Russia, the position of the peasants was sorry. They were "attached to the soil"; that is, without their lord's consent they could not leave the estate on which they were born, and the transfer of an estate from one lord to another automatically transferred the peasants' allegiance. To their lord the peasants paid dues, for him they performed manual labor, to him they rendered obedience as to a personal master. Sometimes lords detached their peasants from the land and sent them to work in the cities, requiring them to remit a fixed portion of their earnings and reserving the right to call them home at will. Sometimes lords employed peasants in household service virtually as slaves; of these there were about two million in 1855. Doubtless in many parts of Russia there were kindly and lenient landlords and considerate taskmasters, but too often the nobles and their overseers were cruel or capricious. They could make exorbitant demands upon their peasants' strength and funds and visit disobedience with corporal punishment. Under serfdom, furthermore, the mass of peasants remained almost wholly illiterate and quite unable to improve their minds or better their fortunes. And there can be no doubt that serfdom contributed greatly to the retention of primitive and wasteful methods of farming and hence to the general economical backwardness of Russia and to the chronic financial difficulties of its government.

To reform the Russian land system was an herculean task. Yet it was undertaken by Alexander II, with results, both fortunate and unfortunate, which we shall now indicate. Setting an example by freeing first the serfs on the estates belonging to members of the imperial family, and then with dogged pertinacity and cautious compromise overcoming the natural opposition of interested and selfish landlords, the Tsar at length promulgated a general emancipation decree, in March 1861, the sixth anniversary of his accession to the throne. The decree abolished all legal rights of noblemen over peasants. The serfs who were living detached from the soil, whether as domestic servants or as town laborers, obtained their personal liberty but no right to property. The serfs who were working on

Its Abolition, 1861

large estates secured their liberty and also an interest in a portion of the land which, bought from the nobles with money advanced by the government, was turned over to the village communities (*mir*s) to be parcelled out for use among the resident peasants. The benefits of even partial emancipation gradually appeared in an enlarged area of cultivation, increased value of land, greater yield of taxes, growth of export trade, and improved general condition of the peasantry.

There were also less happy results of Alexander II's abolition of serfdom. Many peasants found themselves in a worse economic plight than before. Lands allotted to them were too small to provide them with anything like a comfortable living, and for whatever land they got they were burdened with long-term installment payments of the money which the government advanced as compensation to nobles. Besides, while the peasants were freed from the jurisdiction of noblemen's courts, they were subjected to the regulations of their village communities and to the tax-gatherers and police officials of the central government. And the treatment of emancipated peasants by the state authorities was often harsh and corrupt. It has been remarked wisely, though perhaps a little strongly, that the decree of Alexander II liberated the peasants from the nobles only to make them "serfs of the State." Many ex-serfs, of course, received no land at all; and a large proportion of these, together with some of the others, tended to seek town work and to swell the proletariat and slums of the cities.

Alexander II did not confine his reforming activities to the emancipation of serfs. In 1864 he instituted a political reform—the creation of provincial assemblies—which optimistic "Westernizers" interpreted as preliminary to his establishment of a constitutional, parliamentary régime. The decree of 1864 provided that each district of the thirty-four administrative provinces, or "governments," into which Russia had been divided since the eighteenth century, was to have a local assembly, or "*zemstvo*," composed of landed nobles and of delegates indirectly elected by townsfolk and peasants, and that each *zemstvo* was to levy local taxes and exercise local authority over public works, churches, schools, and prisons, poor relief, and public health.

Judicial reform was also undertaken by Alexander II. In 1862

he decreed that the trial of civil and criminal cases should be transferred from administrative officials to a hierarchy of courts modelled after those in western Europe: justices of the peace, elected locally; district and circuit judges; and a senate, acting as court of final appeal. Accompanying the decree were instructions for the codification of the laws, for the appointment of prosecuting attorneys, for the use of jury trial in criminal cases, and for holding trials in public rather than in secret. From his decree, however, the Tsar significantly excepted one kind of judicial trial—that of political offenders, for whom the old secret and arbitrary administrative procedure was retained.

Judicial
Reform,
1862

Such were the main reforms of Alexander II: emancipation of the serfs in 1861, reorganization of the judiciary in 1862, and creation of the zemstvos in 1864. In addition to these, the Tsar during the same period encouraged the establishment of some elementary and technical schools, accorded a measure of liberty to the press, and advanced plans for railway construction and for developing the mineral resources of his empire.

By 1865, however—ten years after his accession—the reforming spirit of Alexander II was spent. He had never been at heart a liberal. What reforms he had instituted were an impulsive response to the protest of Russian Westernizers against a régime which had suffered humiliating foreign reverses in 1854–1856. By 1865 the Crimean War was a thing of the past, and a much more recent occurrence—the Polish Rebellion of 1863—was discrediting the Westernizers and throwing the Tsar into the arms of reactionary Slavophiles.

Cessation
of Alex-
ander's
Reforms

For some time before 1863 Polish patriots had been organizing secret societies and agitating for the restoration of their country's independence. In 1863 they precipitated open rebellion at Warsaw against the Russian government. The rebellion was not nearly so formidable as the revolt of 1831 had been. It was merely a struggle of groups of ill-armed patriots against regular troops, and it was marked by no real battle. From the nations of western Europe, the Polish leaders received only sympathy;¹ and they angered all Russian nationalists, liberal as well as conservative, by demanding the reunion of Lithuania with Poland. And Bismarck, for the sake of his

Polish
Revolt
of 1863

¹ On the French attitude, see above, pp. 141–142.

domestic and foreign policies, offered the armed assistance of Prussia to the Tsar.¹ The Tsar, however, had no need of Prussian assistance. His own army put a speedy end to the disorders in Poland, and his governors and police-agents inflicted dire penalties on surviving rebels and suspects.

Slavophiles and other Russian reactionaries were not slow to advise Alexander II that the troubles in Poland had been accentuated by his leniency and his concessions to liberalism and that further introduction of western novelties into "Holy Russia" would lead just as inevitably to dreadful commotions and bloodshed throughout the Empire. The advice was welcome to the Tsar. He willingly turned back on the political path which he had been following, and from 1865 Alexander II was as reactionary as any of the other Romanovs. Nothing more was heard of a parliament for Russia. The provincial zemstvos were forbidden to express political opinions, and their acts were made subject to veto by the imperial governors. Rigorous press censorship was restored. The government assumed the right to distinguish by administrative decree between political offenders and ordinary criminals: the former could be arbitrarily seized by the police and either kept indefinitely in prison on mere suspicion or bundled off to some place of detention in Siberia without any judicial formalities. Even the schools felt the force of reaction: everything was expurgated from the curricula which might be inimical to the existing régime. The only reform of Alexander II's later years—and that hardly a liberal reform—was the reorganization of the army in paper imitation of Germany's.

With the cessation of his zeal for reform within Russia, Alexander II applied himself anew to the expansion of the Russian Empire at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, almost as soon as he had curbed nationalism in his own Polish provinces, he was abetting nationalism among Slavic and other Orthodox peoples in southeastern Europe in the hope that thereby imperial Russia might profit. Then in 1871—in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War—he secured, with the aid of Bismarck, the right to refortify Sevastopol in the Crimea and to maintain a Russian fleet on the Black Sea.² He was preparing for another war with the Ottoman Empire.

¹ See above, p. 166.

² See above, p. 178.

It was easy for the Tsar to find justification for military intervention in the Ottoman Empire. Turkish suppression of popular uprisings in the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and likewise in the Bulgarian provinces was accomplished in 1875-1876 with such cruelty as to arouse general indignation throughout Europe as well as among the Christian peoples of the Balkans. English statesmen denounced the "Bulgarian atrocities" of the Moslem Turks; and the principality of Serbia in concert with the diminutive principality of Montenegro¹ went to war with the Ottoman Empire in behalf of their fellow Serbs in Bosnia. Simultaneously, the Ottoman government at Constantinople appeared to be drifting rapidly toward impotence and ruin. It seemed unable to maintain order in the Empire or to command the loyalty of its provincial governors and soldiery. Its treasury was bankrupt and its administration paralyzed. A palace revolution in 1876 brought Abdul Hamid II to the throne.

Serb and
Bulgarian
Revolts,
1875-1876

Abdul Hamid II was essentially a cruel and cunning despot, but, in order to curry favor with the Western Powers, he inaugurated his reign by promulgating (1876) a liberal constitution for the whole Ottoman Empire. In this, the Sultan was quite insincere, and the constitution remained a purely paper document. In his purpose of employing any means to restore order in his dominions and stave off foreign intervention, however, the Sultan was thoroughly sincere. And, by intrigue and butchery, he did restore a semblance of internal order, and thereby only hastened Russian intervention. In April 1877, the Tsar Alexander II, formally espousing the cause of "oppressed nationalities" within the Ottoman Empire, declared war against the Sultan. Another Russo-Turkish conflict began.

Sultan
Abdul
Hamid II

Russo-
Turkish
War,
1877-1878

A Russian army invaded the Ottoman Empire from the north, traversing Rumania and crossing the Danube in June 1877. To its surprise, it encountered fierce resistance from Turkish troops ensconced in the stronghold of Plevna, in Bulgaria, just south of the Danube. Twice in July, and again in September, the Rus-

¹ Montenegro, the "Black Mountain," was a practically independent little state, situated near the Adriatic and peopled by Serbs. It had a capable prince in the person of Nicholas I (1860-1918). On its history prior to 1860, see Vol. I, pp. 707-708, 806.

sian infantry was hurled back by Plevna's Turkish garrison. Presently, however, after the Russians settled down to besiege the fortress, its Turkish commander, Osman Pasha, seeing his men slowly starving to death, attempted a desperate sortie. The attempt failed and Osman surrendered with 40,000 men. In January 1878 the advancing Russians won a second victory and compelled the surrender of another Turkish army. By this time, Serbian and Montenegrin troops were clearing the Turks out of the western part of the Balkan peninsula; Bulgarians were volunteering for service in the Russian army; and Rumanian troops had already given invaluable aid to the Russians. The Turkish soldiers fought stubbornly, but they were outnumbered and outmanœuvred and apparently incapable of staying the triumphant advance of the Russians and their Balkan allies. Adrianople fell and a Russian army marched on Constantinople. In a panic of fear, the Sultan Abdul Hamid sued for peace.

The immediate outcome was the treaty of San Stefano, March 1878, between Tsar and Sultan. The Sultan was to recognize the sovereign independence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; he was to sanction the creation of a Bulgarian national state, which should embrace not only Bulgaria proper but most of Macedonia from the Ægean to Albania, and which, though still belonging nominally to the Ottoman Empire and paying annual tribute to it, should possess a prince of its own and enjoy complete autonomy; and he was to carry out sweeping reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides, he was to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the free commerce of all nations. These engagements of the Sultan were to the advantage of the Balkan nations as well as Russia, and the Tsar insisted upon them in the expectation that Bulgarians and Serbs and Rumanians would forever be the grateful debtors of their Russian "big brother." Directly for the Russian Empire, the Tsar was to receive part of Armenia, a large war indemnity (whose probable non-payment would give him an excuse for renewed interference in Turkey), and a strip of Dobruja (which he planned to exchange with Rumania for the portion of Bessarabia which he had lost in 1856).

The satisfaction with which the Tsar Alexander II and the Russian Slavophiles regarded the terms of San Stefano was equalled by the criticism and opposition which they evoked from

Great Britain and Austria-Hungary. At the head of the British government of the time was the Tory patriot, Benjamin Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield), who was sure that Britain's national and imperial interests were gravely menaced by such Russian hegemony in the Near East as the treaty of San Stefano implied. Quite as emphatic against the treaty was the Habsburg Emperor, Francis Joseph. He feared that an unchecked triumph of Slavic nationalism in both Russia and the Balkans would intensify the disruptive nationalism of Slavic peoples in his own dominions, and he knew that the entrenchment of Russia in southeastern Europe would prevent Austria-Hungary from obtaining in that direction any future compensation for its past losses in Italy and Germany.

Interven-
tion of
Austria
and
Britain

Wherefore Francis Joseph demanded that the treaty of San Stefano should be revised by a congress of the European Powers which had assumed responsibility for the Ottoman Empire at Paris in 1856—not only the Tsar and the Sultan, but also Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Lord Beaconsfield, on behalf of Britain, promptly seconded the demand; and Bismarck, assuring both Francis Joseph and Alexander II that Germany was disinterested and would be an “honest broker” between them, invited the Powers to hold the contemplated congress at Berlin. The Tsar was disappointed and angry, knowing full well that such a congress would be likely to deprive Russia of some of the spoils and prestige of its recent victory, and it required a threat of war from Britain and a demonstration by the British fleet in Turkish waters to bring Alexander II to reason and induce him to participate in the congress.

The Congress of Berlin met in the summer of 1878 and negotiated what was termed a “final” settlement of Near Eastern questions. The treaty of San Stefano was superseded by the treaty of Berlin (July 1878), to which all the European Great Powers (and the Ottoman Empire) were signatory, and in accordance with which less attention was given to satisfying the national aspirations of Balkan peoples and more to bolstering up the Ottoman Empire and effecting a compromise among rival ambitions of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain.

Congress
of Berlin,
1878

Russia was permitted to regain the strip of Bessarabia, north of the Danube delta and east of the Pruth, which she had lost in

1856, and to retain the Armenian districts at the eastern extremity of the Black Sea which the treaty of San Stefano had promised her.


Austria To offset Russia's gains, however, Austria-Hungary
Gets was accorded the right to occupy and administer
Bosnia the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to garrison the province of Novibazar (southwest of Serbia), and she obtained special commercial privileges in Serbia and Montenegro. Great Britain's "compensation" was
Britain provided for in a separate Anglo-Turkish Convention
Gets (June 1878), which practically formed a part of the
Cyprus Berlin agreement: in return for a pledge from Britain that she would defend the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan handed over to her the island of Cyprus and promised to collaborate with her in reforming his government.

The treaty of Berlin embodied the provision of the treaty of San Stefano recognizing Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro as independent principalities.¹ But it saddled them with
Disap- portions of the Sultan's debts, and outraged national
pointment feeling in them. Rumania lost all of Bessarabia
of Balkan (peopled largely by Rumanians) to Russia and re-
States ceived in return a part of Dobruja (peopled chiefly by Turks and Bulgarians). Serbia, which was already aspiring to play the rôle which Sardinia had recently played in Italy, and to unify the whole Serbian nationality under her ægis, found herself at the close of a victorious war restricted to almost the same narrow territories which she had had before the war, and hemmed in, north, west, and south, by the Habsburg Empire.

Even worse fared the national ambitions of the Bulgarians. The "big Bulgaria," for which the Tsar had stipulated in the negotiations at San Stefano, was divided by the Berlin
Partition treaty into three separate parts. The northern part
of Bul- alone was recognized as the autonomous principality of
garia Bulgaria, paying annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire. The southeastern part (exclusive of the province of Adrianople) was

¹ Rumania was transformed from a "principality" into a "kingdom" in 1881, and Prince Charles (member of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family and cousin of the Prussian King), who had been "Prince" of Rumania since 1866, now became King Charles I of Rumania with a royal crown wrought of steel from Turkish cannon captured at Plevna. In the following year, 1882, Serbia was similarly transformed from a "principality" into a "kingdom," and its Prince, Milan Obrenović (1868-1889), took the title of King.

formally dubbed "Eastern Rumelia" and left "under the direct military and political control of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan," with special provision that its governor should be a Chris-



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1878

tian and enjoy some "administrative autonomy." The third part, comprising most of Macedonia and the province of Adrianople, was allowed no degree of autonomy but was restored with-

out restriction to the direct rule of the Sultan and his agents. Such treatment of Bulgarian aspirations was dictated by Austrian and British belief that Bulgaria was only a stalking-horse for Russia and that the bigger Bulgaria was, the stronger would be the Russian Empire in southeastern Europe. The main result was an intense quickening of Bulgarian nationalism.

Greece alone of the Balkan nations profited by the revision of the treaty of San Stefano. By that treaty, Greece had been promised nothing, but as a result of the Congress of
Gain of Greece Berlin she obtained a considerable extension of territory on the mainland toward the north. The new boundary was not definitely fixed until 1881, when Thessaly was formally annexed to the Greek kingdom.

The Ottoman Empire, despite its losses, remained, under the treaty of Berlin, an extensive and important state in the Near
Extent of Surviving Ottoman Empire East. It still retained all its traditional territories in Asia (except a relatively small area in the Caucasus), and, in addition, a not inconsiderable portion of them in Europe: Constantinople, Thrace, Macedonia, Albania, and Crete in outright ownership, and Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, Novibazar, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as nominal dependencies.¹ And now its "integrity" was solemnly reaffirmed by all the Great Powers of Europe and newly guaranteed by a special pledge of Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and its immediate consequences exposed quite clearly a situation most menacing to the continuing integrity, nay to the very existence, of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was still, as it had always been, a hodgepodge of nationalities and in no sense a national state; but now, like a contagious fever, a nationalistic spirit was rapidly taking firm hold of its European peoples and promising thence to infect even its Asiatic provinces.

If the Ottoman Empire was obviously weakened by the events of 1877-1878, the Russian and Habsburg Empires seemed to be strengthened. The Russian Empire won a war, extended its territories, and earned the reputation of being the champion of all Slavic peoples. The foreign prestige of its sovereign was

¹ In Africa, Tripoli and Cyrenaica were still Ottoman possessions, and Egypt, though ruled by a practically independent prince (styled "Khedive" since 1867), was nominally a vassal state.

heightened and likewise the domestic patriotism of its Great Russian Slavophiles. The Russian Empire remained a Great Power. The Habsburg Empire likewise remained a Great Power. It intervened decisively in the peace negotiations of 1878 and obtained territorial compensation in southeastern Europe for what it had previously lost in central Europe, and it cemented the loyalty of its German and Hungarian subjects by restricting the pretensions of Serbia and Bulgaria and thus putting at arm's length the danger that its own Slavic peoples might be incited by Slavic successes in the Balkans to rebel against the Austro-Hungarian "Ausgleich" of 1867.

Russian
and
Austrian
Empires
Seemingly
Strengthened

Yet the strengthening of the Habsburg and Russian Empires was more apparent than real. In each of them, just as in the Ottoman Empire, subject peoples would become more self-conscious, more determined to utilize the first favorable opportunity to secure cultural and political autonomy. The more territories the Tsar annexed, the more numerous and widespread were the dissident groups within his Empire; and the lands which Francis Joseph took in 1878 soon involved him in the same sort of losing struggle with Yugoslavs as he had already been engaged in with Italians and Germans. Despite the fact that after 1878 both Russia and Austria-Hungary would continue to figure as Great Powers, their imperial sway would not outlast that of the Ottoman Turks. Nationalism, rampant by 1878 in eastern Europe, would eventually doom all three empires to practically simultaneous disruption.

But
Really
Imperilled

5. ADVENT OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1885

The spread of nationalism all over Europe—west, central, and east—synchronized, as we have pointed out, with a vogue of romanticism. It also led to an interesting shift in the political tenets of mid-nineteenth-century liberalism. Liberalism in the 1830's, it may be recalled, was chiefly a middle-class movement, and then and for some time afterwards its political aims were (1) to guaranty individual liberties, and (2) to establish constitutional parliamentary government under the guidance of persons of wealth and education. The latter aim involved a limitation of

Liberal
Governments
Originally
Not Democratic

traditional privileges of the upper classes, but it did not signify a recognition of political democracy. Indeed, the most typically "liberal" governments, such as that of the Victorian Compromise in Britain (from 1832 to 1867), or Louis Philippe's in France (from 1830 to 1848), or Belgium's after 1831, or Sardinia's after 1848 and united Italy's after 1861, were based on a franchise rigorously restricted to property owners, to a relatively small minority of the country's population.

Gradually, however, and in marked degree after 1865, professed liberals tended to acquiesce in, and sometimes to sponsor, a transition from middle-class control to thoroughgoing political democracy. Several factors conspired to this end. One was the logic in the situation, the perception that the individualist principle on which liberalism itself was founded could not logically justify a monopolizing of political life by any minority of individuals.

Another was the steady growth of political consciousness and ambition among the masses, particularly among urban proletarians, a consciousness quickened by the Industrial Revolution and an ambition fed by experience with trade unions and coöperative societies and by agitation for ameliorative social legislation. A third factor was the pressure of upper-class conservatives upon middle-class liberals; the former were accustomed to patronize the lower classes and may have thought that these, when entrusted with political responsibility, would serve as a counter-weight to middle-class liberal "excesses."

The only European countries which had employed universal manhood suffrage as early as 1848 were France and Switzerland.

France
and
Switzerland

The Third French Republic was assured of full democracy by its constitutional laws of 1874-1875, and a revision of the Swiss federal constitution in 1874 added the democratic referendum.

In Germany, more strangely, the nation-building Bismarck, aristocrat and ultra-conservative, outbid his liberal Progressive critics for popular support by instituting a democratically elected Reichstag for the North German Confederation in 1867 and for the entire German Empire in 1871.¹ The Reichstag had no such control of government as the French Chamber of Deputies possessed; universal manhood suf-

Germany,
1867

¹ See above, pp. 171-172.

frage, therefore, was more formal than real in Germany. Yet it is significant that even Bismarck, in the moment of personal and national triumph, was moved to concede at least the form of political democracy.

In Britain, the death of Lord Palmerston in 1865 removed the popular symbol and chief support of the "Victorian Compromise," and stimulated democratic agitation—by trade unionists, by Radicals, and by politicians, both Great Britain Liberal and Conservative, who hoped by forwarding it to draw new electors to the support of their respective parties. Gladstone promptly proposed an extension of the franchise. The proposal was not radical enough to please John Bright and his working-class supporters, but it was too radical to be acceptable to the Whig element in the Liberal party. The latter combined with the Conservatives to reject the proposal and overthrow the ministry (1866).

Little popular interest had been aroused by Gladstone's very moderate proposal for reform, but when it was rejected by Parliament and a Conservative ministry was formed, excitement was stimulated by fiery speeches of John Bright and other Radicals who claimed that the installation of the Conservative ministry was a declaration of war against democracy and the working classes. Trade unionists coöperated in organizing a (democratic) National Reform League, and when the cabinet sought to prevent the League from holding a big mass-meeting at London by locking the gates of Hyde Park, an immense mob defiantly threw down the railings. Alarmed by the prospect of further violence, Lord Derby, the Conservative prime minister, authorized his chief lieutenant, Disraeli, to introduce a reform bill in the House of Commons. Disraeli's bill as first presented was even less radical than Gladstone's, but Disraeli accepted radical amendments which his opponents presented in the hope of embarrassing him, and thus he came to sponsor the relatively democratic Reform Act of 1867. This was Parliamentary Reform of 1867 not thoroughly democratic; voting in Britain was still limited by property qualifications. Yet it was an important step toward democracy. It almost doubled the electorate and practically enfranchised the working classes in the industrial cities.

Other steps were soon taken. In 1872 the secret ballot—called the "Australian" ballot in reference to the place of its origin—

was prescribed for all municipal and parliamentary elections. In 1884 the suffrage qualifications in the counties were made identical with those in the boroughs, thereby enfranchising two million rural workers and increasing the electorate by 40 per cent. In 1885 the whole country was redistricted so that members of the House of Commons would be chosen by approximately equal constituencies.

Reform
Acts of
1884-1885

Thus it befell that between 1867 and 1885 Britain moved away from the oligarchical government which it had previously had and toward the political democracy which in the 1840's the Chartists had vainly demanded. Of the "six points" in the "People's Charter," four were substantially, though not perfectly, realized by 1885: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) equal electoral districts; (3) vote by ballot; and (4) removal of property qualifications for members of Parliament.¹

Italy, without sanctioning universal manhood suffrage, doubled the number of its electors in 1882. In Greece, a popular revolution in 1862 served to transfer the kingship from the conservative Otto to the liberal George I² and to secure the adoption, in 1864, of a democratic constitution, in accordance with which a single-chamber parliament was to be elected by universal manhood suffrage.

Italy,
Greece

In Spain, a liberal constitution had been promulgated in 1837 in the name of Queen Isabella II (1833-1868), but Isabella only used it to assure her of popular support in the struggle which she waged with her ultra-conservative uncle, Don Carlos, who disputed her claim to the throne.³

Spanish
Revolution of
1868

When Don Carlos was suppressed, Isabella flouted the constitution and conducted herself most scandalously. Finally, in 1868 an insurrection drove her into exile and inaugurated seven years of political turmoil in Spain.

A new Spanish constitution was adopted by a democratic national assembly in 1869. It guaranteed individual liberties, including complete religious toleration, and provided for a popularly elected parliament and for a king, strictly "limited" as in Britain.

¹ This last had been achieved by an act of 1858.

² See above, p. 185.

³ Don Carlos claimed that his brother, Ferdinand VII, had no power to set aside the Salic law, which restricted royal succession to the male line and which had always been respected by the Bourbon family, and that consequently he and not his niece Isabella should have succeeded Ferdinand. See genealogical table at p. 587. "Carlist Wars" were waged in Spain from 1833 to 1840 and in the 1870's.

But there was difficulty in obtaining such a king. At length, after several princes had declined the honor, including Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (whose temporary candidacy was the occasion for the Franco-Prussian War),¹ Prince Amadeo of Savoy, the second son of King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy, accepted the Spanish crown in 1870. It was a shaky throne which the new King mounted. Both the reactionary Carlists and the radical Republicans were hostile to him. The liberal royalists who were supposed to favor him were so split up into quarrelsome factions that their favor was not very helpful; and many Spanish patriots, regardless of political affiliation, eyed him askance as a foreigner and an intruder. In disgust Amadeo abdicated in February 1873, and returned to Italy; and a democratic republic was proclaimed.

Democratic
Monarchy
in Spain,
1869-1873

The First Spanish Republic proved even less stable than Amadeo's democratic monarchy. From the outset, its supporters disagreed as to whether the republic should be a federal or a centralized state, whether local autonomy should or should not be conferred on the several nationalities within Spain (Catalans and Basques, along with Castilians). Presently an army officer, Marshal Serrano, established a dictatorship and utilized it as a prelude to the destruction of the republic and the restoration of the Bourbons.

First
Spanish
Republic,
1873-1874

In January 1875, the youthful son of Isabella II entered Madrid as King Alphonso XII amid the plaudits of the Spanish nation. Within a year order was restored. The radical Republicans and the reactionary Carlists were alike suppressed. In 1876 a new constitution prescribed that the Spanish government should henceforth be conducted by the King, acting always on the advice of a ministry responsible to a bicameral parliament.

Restora-
tion of
Spanish
Mon-
archy,
1875

In Spain, and elsewhere, the formal steps taken in the direction of political democracy were impeded in practice sometimes by existing social traditions and sometimes by the dishonest or factional character of political action. Yet progress was clear. In addition to partial and qualified evidences of the new-democracy in Spain and Italy, must be stressed its definite

¹ See above, pp. 146-147.

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¹ See above, pp. 146-147.

advent in republican Switzerland and republican France, and the inspiration which it gave to the adoption of universal manhood suffrage in Germany in 1867-1871 and to the far-reaching extension of the franchise in Great Britain between 1867 and 1884.



• PART V

DEMOCRATIC AND REALIST EUROPE

1870-1910

XVIII. THE VOGUE OF REALISM, 1870-1910

XIX. ART AND RELIGION IN THE ERA OF REALISM

XX. BRITAIN, 1867-1914


XXI. LATIN EUROPE, 1870-1914

XXII. NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1871-1914



CHAPTER XVIII

THE VOGUE OF REALISM, 1870-1910



NOTABLY convenient is the division of the eighty years of European history from 1830 to 1910 into two eras of equal duration. The first, of forty years, the 1830's to the 1870's, was characterized by the Industrial Revolution, full-fledged in Britain and incipient on the Continent, by the rise of liberalism, political and economic, and by the ubiquitous vogue of romanticism, the widespread interest in nationalism, and the gradual advance of political democracy. Of these matters we have treated in the three preceding chapters.

The second era of forty years, from the 1870's to about 1910, appears superficially to be a mere continuation and development of the first. Democracy goes on making gains. Nationalism is more and more in evidence. A good deal of romanticism remains. Liberalism, at least as a verbal slogan, grows in popularity. The Industrial Revolution becomes a common phenomenon.

Fundamentally, however, a significant change occurs. The wider spread and faster speeding-up of machine industry is attended less by intense competition of individual industrialists, which in the previous era had nourished economic liberalism, than by acute rivalry of industrial nations, which leads to economic nationalism. There is consequently a weakening of liberalism and an intensification of nationalism, a special stimulus to overseas imperialism and to an unprecedented Europeanization of the whole world, and a confusing of the dream of universal peace with a nightmare of mounting national armaments.

There is, also, an absorption of intellectuals, and a great interest of the masses, in the pursuit of natural science, especially its "practical" and "applied" aspects. There is an accompanying shift of emphasis in philosophy from the spiritual and the free to the material and the fatalistic, in the social sciences from the historical to the statistical, and in popular movements from the

individualistic or the coöperative to the socialistic and combative. And in this era of machinery and materialism, traditional religion is extraordinarily troubled, while art and culture testify to the outmoding of romanticism and the rise of a new fashion, which is concerned with factual data, with social problems, and with psychology, and which is called "realism."

These features peculiar to the era from the 1870's to about 1910 are discussed, in order and in some detail, in this and the next chapter. Their relationship to the political and social history of particular parts of Europe during the era are then indicated in three chapters, dealing respectively with Britain, Latin Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe.

I. STRENGTHENING OF INDUSTRY AND WEAKENING OF LIBERALISM

Mechanized industry during the forty years just previous to 1870, had assumed such proportions in Britain and had begun to spread so widely in Europe and America that we have elsewhere identified those years with the "main phase" of the Industrial Revolution.¹ The Revolution, however, did not halt or slacken its pace in 1870. It continued to effect changes in an ever extending ambit of industries and areas.

Our first task, in the present section, is to indicate the chief features of mechanical industrialization during the forty years from 1870 to 1910, noting, as we proceed, the increasing output of industries already largely mechanized, the rapid evolution of novel industries, and the swift transformation of agricultural into industrial population, which is no longer specifically restricted to Britain (and Belgium) but becomes characteristic of Germany and the United States, and to a lesser degree of many other countries of the European world. Then, in the latter part of the section, we shall try to show the relationship of this intensifying and expanding industry to capitalism, and particularly to that politico-economic liberalism whose rise had attended the earlier industrialization.

All the industrial developments of the preceding period con-

¹ See above, pp. 17-46.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Mining," is from the Monument to Labor by the Belgian sculptor, Constantin Meunier (1831-1905). On Meunier, see below, p. 295.

tinued from 1870 to 1910 in an exaggerated degree and with more and more far-reaching effects. Engineers and scientists—physicists and chemists—became ever more numerous and allied themselves ever more helpfully to machine industry. The establishment of “polytechnical” schools and schools of “applied science” was now epidemic in all countries which aspired to be “civilized” and “progressive.” Tools of precision were multiplied and rendered ever more “precise” and useful. The production of coal and iron, the twin bases of the Industrial Revolution, was speeded up by mounting demand on the one hand, and by improving methods of supply on the other. The British production of coal increased from

Production of
Coal and
Iron

110 million tons in 1870 to 265 million tons in 1910, and of pig iron from six to nine million tons, but these figures tell only a part of the story. For whereas up to 1870 Britain produced more coal and iron than all the rest of the world, she produced in 1910 only 26 per cent of the coal and 14 per cent of the iron. In the meantime the output of coal increased in Germany from 37½ million tons to 222, in France from 16 to 40, and in the United States from 35 to 415; while the output of pig iron grew in Germany from 2 million tons to almost 15, in France from 1½ to 5, and in the United States from 1⅔ to 27⅓.

There was steady progress in perfecting and utilizing the Bessemer and Siemens processes¹ for the manufacture of steel. There was marked improvement of steam locomotives and of all accessories to railway transportation, and noteworthy extension of railway mileage. Not only was the network of rails in western and central Europe elaborated, but it was extended into eastern Europe, and railway construction went on apace outside Europe. In the United States the mileage increased from 30,000 in 1860 to 250,000 in 1910. In Canada and Australia, it increased proportionately. Long lines were built and more were projected in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. By 1905 the great trans-Siberian railway linked Moscow (and western Europe) with Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean. There was corresponding development of steamships, in numbers, size, and speed.

Extension of Rail-
ways

And
Steamship
Lines

¹ See above, pp. 19-20.

NOTE. The picture opposite, “Shipbuilding on the Clyde,” is from an engraving by a British artist, Muirhead Bone (born 1876).

Regular services were multiplied for passengers and goods from London and Liverpool, Hamburg and Bremen, Le Havre and Marseilles, Antwerp and Rotterdam, Genoa and Trieste, New York and Montreal, Yokohama and Shanghai, Bombay and Melbourne, Cape Town and Buenos Aires.

The cotton industry, whose mechanization had been an important aspect of the preliminary stage of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, kept on growing. In Britain itself, the number of spindles increased from 36,700,000 in 1870 to 53,500,000 in 1910 and the number of power looms from 475,000 to 700,000. But, while Britain possessed far more spindles and power looms than all the rest of the world put together in 1870, in 1910 she had only about 40 per cent of the spindles and 30 per cent of the power looms. By this time there were 37,200,000 spindles on the Continent of Europe, 27,800,000 in the United States, and 10,000,000 in other parts of the world (chiefly in India and Japan).

It was similar with the other textile industries of wool and linen. These, following the lead of cotton, had been pretty largely put on a machine- and factory-basis in Britain before 1870, and after 1870 the same basis was firmly established for them on the Continent of Europe and in the United States, with similar results. The silk industry of France and Italy was likewise mechanized and expanded, and gradually the search for an "artificial silk" led to the emergence of still another large-scale textile industry—that of "rayon" as it is called in the United States. This was originally invented by a French nobleman, Count Hilaire de Chardonnet, who studied under Pasteur at the Paris Polytechnic and who, after twenty years' experimentation, took out a patent in 1884 on a process for the conversion of a form of cellulose (wood-pulp) into a textile resembling silk. The big development was to come after 1910.

Another noteworthy addition to the mechanized textile industry during the period following 1870 was the steady progress in applying chemistry to the dyeing of fabrics. A profusion of chemical dyes were derived from coal-tar, and were used as cheap substitutes for natural dyes.

Comparable with the advance of the textiles was that of other significant industries whose production had already been speeded

up by machine and factory. With improving machines, enlarging factories, and increasing markets, there was a mounting output, in Britain, on the Continent of Europe, and in the United States, of cutlery, porcelain, tinware, boots and shoes, paper, furniture, tools, firearms and all manner of war implements.

In respect of the last category, special mention should be made of the machine-gun, the rifle, the submarine, and certain new explosives. The first machine-gun, as we know, was the Gatling gun, invented in America in 1862.¹ An- Firearms other, the so-called "mitrailleuse," was devised in France and employed in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Then, in 1889, Sir Hiram Maxim, an American who acquired a British title, designed a truly automatic machine-gun, which was widely adopted and, with subsequent improvements, became the principal weapon in the World War of 1914. Sir Hiram Maxim also invented, in 1908, the "Maxim silencer" for suppressing the noise of the discharge of firearms; and his brother, Hudson Maxim, perfected a smokeless powder. Rifles were much improved, and were produced in great quantities by the ever-expanding factories of the Vickers and the Armstrongs in Britain, the Krupps in Germany, the Schneiders (Creusot works) in France, the Du Ponts and the Remingtons in the United States. Of high explosives, an outstanding inventor was Alfred Nobel, a Swedish chemist and engineer, who introduced dynamite in 1867 and amassed an immense fortune from its manufacture.² As for "submarines," they had long been experimented with, but the first really practical one was the invention of an American, John Holland, in 1875.

The era from 1870 to 1910 was characterized not only by the expansion of previously mechanized industries, but also by the rather sudden appearance of essentially new industries.

The rayon industry, already mentioned, was one of New Industries these. Among the many others, even more important, special attention should be paid to: (1) those connected with the increasing knowledge and exploitation of *electricity*; (2) those having to do with a miscellany of mechanical aids to *individual comfort*, such as heaters and refrigerators, the sewing machine,

¹ See above, p. 22.

² The bulk of his fortune Nobel left in trust for the support of the "Nobel prizes," which have been awarded since 1901 for distinguished work in *physics, chemistry, medicine, literature, and international peace.*

the typewriter, the bicycle, wood-pulp paper, etc.; (3) those representing a revolutionary development of *photography*; and (4) those dependent on novel types of engine, especially on the *internal-combustion engine*.

From 1870, electricity and its applications came to occupy a central industrial position similar to that held previously by the steam-engine. This did not signify a lessening number or importance of steam-engines. It meant merely that, side by side with the omnipresent steam-engine, there appeared now a wide range and great variety of electrical devices. Nor was the development of "applied electricity" confined to one country as the early development of the steam-engine had been. It occurred simultaneously in Britain, in America, and all over the European Continent. It was closely associated everywhere with the general advance of physics and chemistry.

Electrical dynamos and motors were rapidly improved and multiplied. Moreover, the successful transmission of electrical power fostered the establishment of central power plants for ever-extending systems of electric lighting and traction.

Commercial electric lighting owed much to Thomas Edison (1847-1931), a native of Ohio, with almost no formal schooling but with a very real genius for mechanical invention and money-making. In 1879 he patented the greatest of his inventions, the incandescent lamp. Lighting by gas or kerosene lingered for some time, but eventually it was largely supplanted by electric lighting.¹

Almost simultaneous with the application of electricity to lighting was its application to the telephone. Here, the pre-eminent inventor was Alexander Graham Bell (1847-1922), a Scotsman who was educated at the universities of Edinburgh and London, and who, emigrating to America in 1870, opened at Boston a school for training teachers of the deaf and became professor of "vocal physiology" at Boston University. In 1876 he exhibited an apparatus embodying the results of his studies in the transmission of sound by electricity; this invention was the telephone. It was immediately successful, and with improvements and modifications it was quickly adopted throughout Europe and America.

¹ See above, p. 24.

Close upon the heels of the telephone came electric trams and street cars. The first regular line, a short one with a single motor-car, was opened in Germany in 1881. By the end of the 80's, most cities in Europe and America were being provided, or were taking steps to be provided, with systems of electrically powered street railways. Subsequently, electric railways began to parallel steam railways between populous centres, and certain steam railway companies "electrified" some of their lines.

Electric
Trams

Meanwhile, a theoretical foundation was being laid for wireless telegraphy and telephony by British and German physicists; and in 1895 a youthful Italian, Guglielmo Marconi, devised a practical system of wireless telegraphy. A year later Marconi patented his device in Britain and began the organization of a company for its commercial exploitation. In 1898 wireless telegraphic communication was established across the English Channel, and in 1901 across the Atlantic. Marconi was awarded the Nobel prize for physics in 1909.

Wireless
Tele-
graphy

As the nineteenth century ended and the twentieth advanced, the applications of electricity, especially for domestic purposes, became ever more numerous. There were electric lights and telephones, and small electric motors for vacuum cleaners, for sewing machines, and for washing machines. And, on a large scale, there was rapid progress in electroplating, in electrotyping, and in the use of electric furnaces for making steel. The "age of electricity" was even marked by New York's substitution in 1888 of "electrocution" for hanging as the legal death penalty for criminals.

Parallel with the rise of electrical industries was the development of special mechanical aids to the comfort of people at home and in shop or office. For example, artificial heating was provided by a variety of "furnaces"—coal-burning or (later) oil-burning—while higher standards of sanitation and better methods of plumbing contributed to a rapidly growing vogue of bathrooms, lavatories, and all manner of accessories.

Special
New Aids
to Work-
ing and
Living

For lightening the labor of housekeepers and ensuring to populous centres a copious and varied supply of foodstuffs, great "canning" industries arose and flourished. And to the earlier means of preserving food by heating or drying,¹ refrigeration was

¹ On the beginnings of large-scale food preservation, see above, p. 22.

now added. It depends, of course, on a plentiful supply of ice; and this was rendered possible and comparatively cheap by the ingenuity of chemists and engineers. **Refrigeration** Certain chemicals were found useful for making ice, as well as for preserving tinned or potted goods, and engineers eventually learned how to apply electricity to refrigeration.

A special aid to domestic economy was the sewing machine. The first practical design had been patented by an American, Elias Howe, in 1846, and the first commercial exploitation of it, with some modifications, had been undertaken by another American, Isaac Singer, in the 1850's. **Sewing Machine** It was not until 1863, however, that the "Singer Manufacturing Company" was solidly established and not until 1872 that it erected its first large factory (in New Jersey). Thereafter, the production and improvement of sewing machines went on apace. The "electric" sewing machine was patented in 1889.

A special aid to office economy was the typewriter. There had been several early experiments with mechanical writing devices in England, America, and France; but the first really successful typewriter was made jointly by three ingenious residents of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1867-1872, and its commercial manufacture was inaugurated by Remington and Sons, gunmakers of Ilion, New York, in 1874. **Type-writer** Thereafter other firms took to making typewriters, in America and in Europe, and there was steady improvement in the "Remington" and its competitors.

A special aid to individual locomotion (and a special stimulus to outdoor exercise and "sport") was the bicycle, whose manufacture developed steadily after 1870. For several **Bicycle** years, especially in Britain, the front wheel was made big and the rear wheel small. Gradually, however, a "standard" form was evolved. Ball bearings were introduced in 1877. Pneumatic rubber tires were added in 1889. By the 1890's the bicycle was widely used in Europe and America. It was helpful to workers going back and forth to the factory and to young people going back and forth to school; and it provided incentive and opportunity for all sorts of persons to escape periodically from home and town on outings into the open spaces.

Many ends were served by a remarkable contemporary utiliza-

tion of wood pulp or "cellulose." One form of it, "celluloid," was first made in the United States in 1869. Other forms came to be employed for the new "artificial silk," for explosives, for photographic films, and, most quantitatively from the 1880's, for print paper. Indeed, the extensive manufacture of cheap wood-pulp paper was of primary significance in the veritable revolution of journalism during the era from 1870 to 1910. Not only did the constantly improving printing machines, powered by electricity as well as steam, permit of much swifter printing of news. Not only did the telegraph, telephone, and wireless and the perfected means of transport greatly facilitate the collection of news and the distribution of newspapers. But also the substitution of cheap wood-pulp paper for the more expensive (and durable) cotton or linen paper enabled publishers to print more stuff in their newspapers and to sell them more widely. These developments, together with the marked increase of "advertising" which attended the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution, ushered in the distinctive popular and "sensational" journalism of the twentieth century.

Cellulose
and New
Journal-
ism

Photography had been discovered and developed before 1870.¹ After 1870, however, its progress was veritably revolutionary. In 1884 the film-roll system of photography was invented, and in the following year George Eastman laid the foundations of his great photographic industry at Rochester, New York, by patenting a machine for the manufacture of films. In 1888 the Eastman Company marketed the first "kodak," a small portable roll-film camera, which enabled amateurs, as well as professionals, to "take pictures." By 1900 photography was an important and widespread industry. Cameras and "kodaks" were used everywhere for artistic and scientific purposes, for individual diversion, for journalistic illustration.

Progress
in Pho-
tography

Kodak

The idea of "moving pictures" had been toyed with in France, Britain, and America since the 1860's, but it did not lead to practical results until after Eastman had begun the manufacture of roll-films in the 1880's. In 1891 Thomas Edison patented a peep-show device known as the "kinetoscope," which was put to commercial use for the first

Motion
Pictures

¹ See above, pp. 24-25.

time in New York City in 1894. Then, in 1895, two brothers by the name of Lumière, in Lyons, France, patented the "cinematograph," a mobile machine, combining a camera, a film-printing device, and a projector; and this marked the real beginning of the motion-picture industry. True, there was some delay in exploiting the "cinema," in part because of lawsuits over patent rights. But after 1900 the display of motion pictures became a regular feature of most vaudeville shows in the larger cities throughout the world, and in 1905 the first exclusively motion-picture theatre was opened at Pittsburgh. Though the enormous growth of the motion-picture industry was to come afterward, the preparation for it was made before 1910.

A characteristic feature of the era from 1870 to 1910 was the many-sided result of progress in engineering: the devising of

**Progress
in Engi-
neering**

the steam turbine and internal-combustion engines, the application of the latter to motor car, motor boat, and aviation, and the consequent prodigious rise of

**Turbine
Engine**

the petroleum, rubber, and cement industries. The turbine is a rotary motor in which the shaft is rotated steadily in its bearings, not by means of cranks, as in the earlier "reciprocating" engine, but directly by a current of water, air, or steam. The principle of the turbine had long been embodied in the windmill, but its utilization for a steam-engine was the master invention of a British engineer, Sir Charles Parsons, who patented his steam turbine in 1884 and labored on its perfecting for many years thereafter. In 1889 Parsons established at Newcastle a large factory for the manufacture of steam turbines, and by 1910 they were being extensively employed for the running of electrical dynamos and steamships.

The internal-combustion engine is a device for the direct translation of energy into mechanical power by means of gas explosion behind a piston; it "puts the furnace into the cylinder." There had been much experimentation with "gas" engines throughout the nineteenth century, but not until the last quarter of the cen-

**Diesel
Engine**

tury did it produce practical results in the oil-burning engine evolved by a German, Rudolf Diesel. The "Diesel engine" was patented in 1892 and publicly demonstrated for the first time in 1898. By 1910 it was being employed in electrical works, ocean liners, and locomotives.

Another German engineer, Gottlieb Daimler, devised in 1885-

1886 a small, portable internal-combustion engine, fuelled with light oil and capable of propelling vehicles and boats. This was the "gasoline engine," destined speedily to rival Watt's steam-engine in revolutionizing transportation and stimulating industry. Daimler applied the gasoline engine to a bicycle in 1886 and to a wagon in 1887, but, being much more interested personally in water travel, he sold his patents for motor cars to a French concern and devoted himself to the manufacture of motor launches.

Gasoline
Engine

In the meantime, in the late 80's and during the 90's, mechanics and "promoters" were producing varieties of motor cars in France, Germany, England, and the United States. At first, more cars were manufactured in France than elsewhere, but by 1910 three-fourths of the world's output were being produced in the United States. Here, the output of four cars in 1895 increased to 181,000 in 1910, and this figure was only a little augury of the monster production, twenty years later, of pleasure cars, business cars, trucks, buses, and tractors. Probably the most famous popularizer of the motor car was Henry Ford, an American mechanic, whose company, founded at Detroit in 1902, began a large-scale production of cheap "Ford" cars in 1909.

Automobile

Aviation also was rendered practicable by the gasoline engine. Man had long dreamed about flying, and in the 1780's Louis XVI of France had been edified, and his courtiers and countrymen elated, by several sensational balloons—one round and another egg-shaped, one filled with hot air and another with hydrogen, most of them pulling courageous human beings, in attached "cars," up toward heaven and then depositing them in earthly fields or trees. In the nineteenth century, balloon ascents—sometimes with parachute drops—became a sport in many countries, at local fairs and at international expositions; and balloons were occasionally used for military reconnaissance, as in the American Civil War and in the Franco-Prussian War. In 1870, it will be recalled, a balloon wafted Gambetta from Paris, over the heads of the Germans.¹

Pioneer
Efforts in
Aviation

In the 1890's Daimler's engine was utilized for "airships." The pioneers were an elderly German, Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, and a youthful Brazilian, Santos-Dumont. The latter,

¹ See above, p. 175.

coming to Paris, inaugurated the building of dirigible motor airships in 1898, and in 1901 won a prize for the first definite flight in a given time, from St. Cloud to the Eiffel Tower. Count Zeppelin, a retired army officer who devoted many years to the scientific study of aeronautics, designed dirigibles of larger size and with a framework of aluminum. The first "zeppelin" was constructed in 1900, and the first really successful flights with one were made in 1906.

**Motor
Airship**

While Zeppelin and Santos-Dumont were building motor airships (lighter than air), various mechanics and engineers were devising motor airplanes (heavier than air). Among

Airplane

the pioneers of the latter, the most successful were two American brothers by the name of Wright. They were associated in the business of repairing bicycles at Dayton, Ohio, and in the early 90's, as a recreation, they took up "gliding" with a winged contrivance. Gradually they learned how to adjust and control the wings, and in 1903, after intensive study and much manual labor, they installed a gasoline engine in a glider and made a successful short flight with it. In 1905 they made forty-five airplane flights, in the longest of which they kept their machine in the air half an hour and travelled twenty-five miles. These feats of the Wrights were soon excelled by others. Santos-Dumont at Paris turned from gas dirigibles to flying machines. In 1909 Bleriot, a French aviator, flew across the English Channel from Calais to Dover. The age of aviation was dawning.

From the invention of the internal-combustion engine and its rapidly extending utilization for motor cars, motor boats, and airplanes, and likewise, through the Diesel engine, for dynamos, ocean liners, and locomotives, arose a great, and essentially new, petroleum industry. The output of crude oil throughout the world, amounting to half a million barrels in 1860, reached a total of 325 million barrels in 1910. Almost all the output of petroleum, prior to 1880, was from the United States; after 1880, though at least two-thirds of it continued to be from the United States, sizable quotas were obtained from Russia, Rumania, Mexico, South America, Persia, and the Dutch East Indies. It was a large industrial undertaking to refine the crude oil and to transport it from industrially backward areas, where it was produced, to industrially advanced regions, where it was used.

Petroleum

There was a parallel development of the rubber industry, in general because of the steadily growing manufacture of miscellaneous rubber goods, and specifically because of a suddenly mounting demand for rubber tires for motor cars. The world's production of crude rubber rose from 10,000 tons in 1870 to 75,000 tons in 1910. The supply from wild rubber trees of Brazil proved insufficient and was supplemented and after 1900 surpassed by the supply from rubber plantations in the Dutch East Indies, Ceylon, Borneo, French Indo-China, and various regions of tropical Africa. Rubber

The motor car was an important factor in stimulating the rubber and petroleum industries and also the building of cement ("concrete") roads. Lime cements had been made back in the eighteenth century, and about 1825 a particularly good kind was invented in Great Britain and named "Portland cement" by reason of its resemblance in color to Portland limestone. The manufacture of this Portland cement was carried on in Britain and France in the 1850's. After 1870, the manufacture was notably improved, through a lessening of the water content, and was extended to many countries on a scale commensurate with the growing demand for "concrete construction," in which Portland cement was a principal ingredient. Cement

With all the strictly industrial progress of the era from 1870 to 1910 went hand-in-hand the steady mechanizing and industrialization of agriculture. Farm machinery, which had appeared in preceding decades, continued to be improved and multiplied. To bigger and better drills, seeders, cultivators, and harvesters, were now hitched gasoline engines; and to an ever greater knowledge and use of chemical fertilizers, which immensely increased the yield of crops, were now added novel means of marketing them, at a great distance as readily as near by. All of which meant that the countries of western and central Europe and the eastern part of the United States, as they became more intensely industrialized and urbanized, were becoming more dependent for foodstuffs and many raw materials on those regions of the world which undertook large-scale agriculture—Russia, Argentina, Canada, and the Middle-West and South of the United States. Of course, small-scale farming remained fairly important in France and Germany, in Italy and Scandinavia, in the eastern United Further
Industrial-
ization
of Agriculture

States, in Ireland and even in England, but it was relatively static, and at its best, as in France, it hardly sufficed to meet local demands.

From what has already been said, it must be evident that, to the preponderant industrialization of Britain and Belgium, which had occurred between 1830 and 1870, the era from 1870 to 1910 added a similar industrialization of other countries—Germany and the United States most strikingly; France, less so, but still to a large extent; and, in lesser and varying degree, Italy, Austria, Bohemia, the Dutch Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Russia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. In 1870, England and Belgium were the only countries in the world having more people engaged in manufacture and mining than in agriculture. In 1910 Germany and the United States could be ranked with England and Belgium in this respect, and in all the above-named countries there was a marked lowering of the percentage of farmers and raising of the percentage of day laborers.

Nor do these percentages tell the whole story. For, with the advancing industrialization went noteworthy scientific progress in the prevention and cure of disease,¹ and with this went an astounding growth of population. Between 1870 and 1910 the population of England rose from 22 to 36 million; of Germany, from 40 to 65 million; and of Europe as a whole, from 300 to 440 million.

It has been estimated that in 1910 a quarter of the human race dwelt in Europe, the smallest of the four major continents, and that there were then ten Europeans for every four a century previously. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the increase of population in Australia and in the American continents, particularly the increase in the United States from seven million in 1810 to 92 million in 1910, was largely of European stock.

A significant aspect of this growth of European population was the fact that it corresponded almost exactly to the contemporary growth of European cities. In Germany, for example, the percentage of urban population increased from 35 per cent in 1870 to 60 per cent in 1910—representing the same increase as that of Germany's total population during the era. Of course, the birth rate remained as high in

¹ On this important matter, see below, pp. 251-253.

rural as in urban areas, but in the country districts a stationary or even dwindling population, with the aid of agricultural machinery and foreign imports, sufficed to feed larger aggregations of people, and the excess of country-born persons naturally sought and usually found employment in factory towns or mining centres. There was much emigration from populous countries of Europe to more sparsely settled countries in America. There was much more migration, within the industrialized countries of Europe, from farms to cities.

Cities, thanks to the latest progress of the Industrial Revolution, were becoming attractive to the European (and American) masses. In cities, people could now live in rooms lighted by electricity and provided with sanitary plumbing. They could travel to and fro on bicycles or in electric trams. They could buy, relatively cheaply, a profusion of foods, raw or canned, produced near by or shipped in refrigeration from a distance. They could clothe themselves, likewise cheaply, in a bewildering variety of fabrics, including "artificial silk." They could provide themselves with innumerable little labor-saving devices and creature-comforts. They could find novel diversion in a dozen ways, looking at pictures or reading sensational stories in the newer type of journal, bicycling into the country, thrilling at the first sight of balloon ascent and parachute drop, of motor car, motor launch, zeppelin, or airplane. And all these newest achievements of the Industrial Revolution, added to those which had gone before, afforded to city dwellers unprecedented opportunity for employment—in new factories and foundries, in the new traction and transportation, in expanding offices and warehouses and retail shops, and in the multiplying repair-shops which the age of machinery brought in its wake.

With the spread of industrialization and the growth of cities, it was but natural that a "city spirit"—the bourgeois spirit—should become more and more prevalent. Besides, the more industrialized a country was and the more numerous were its cities, the greater was the prestige of its upper bourgeois class—its "captains of industry," its bankers and big manufacturers and exploiters of "natural resources."

For industrial capitalism, the economic framework in which industrialization had gone on prior to 1870,¹ was enormously

¹ On industrial capitalism, see above, pp. 29-34.

solidified and extended by the industrial progress of the ensuing era. The rise of great new industries, the prodigious expansion of old industries, the rapid extension of manufacturing and commerce, vastly enlarged the fields in which persons of wealth could make lucrative investments. At the same time it enabled many a pushing, ingenious, and sometimes unscrupulous individual to emerge from economic and social obscurity into monopolistic ownership of mines, petroleum wells, electrical works, motor-car factories, dynamite manufacture, or other key-business, and thence into front rank among the world's captains of industry. The opportunities for "self-made men," as well as for professional bankers (and corporation lawyers), were now golden.

According to estimates compiled by economists for the years 1870 and 1910, capital investments increased in Great Britain from 35 to 70 billion dollars, in France from 28 to 55, and in Germany from 17 to 70, while the foreign investments of Britishers grew from 5 to 20 billion dollars, of Frenchmen from 2½ to 8, and of Germans from none to five. Of this augmenting wealth, a growing proportion, especially in Germany and the United States, was owned or controlled by great industrial combinations—"cartels" as in Germany, or "trusts" as in the United States. They represented consolidations or federations of formerly competing businesses in a given industry, for the purpose of reducing "overhead" expenses, securing a practical monopoly, and thereby increasing profits for managers and stockholders. There were national "trusts" or "cartels," sometimes with international affiliates, of steel, of petroleum, of copper, of sugar, of electrical works, of chemical works, etc. And the directors and heavy stockholders of such combinations or pools were the great "barons"—in some cases, in public opinion, the "robber barons"—of the new industrial era.

The era gave promise not only of creating vast fortunes for a relatively small number of industrial and banking magnates but also of widening and deepening the well-being and prosperity of whole nations. There can be no doubt that, generally speaking, the misery—the veritable "reign of terror"—to which British proletarians had been subject during the first half of the nineteenth century (when the Indus-

Advance
of Indus-
trial Capi-
talism

Capital
Invest-
ment and
Export

Trusts
and
Cartels

"General
Pros-
perity"

trial Revolution was in its infancy)¹ was somewhat mitigated toward the close of the century (when the Revolution was reaching maturity). Unemployment was less and not quite so chronic. Wages, and the standard of living, tended to rise. Working and living conditions improved. Skilled artisans and clerical employees, together with shopkeepers and other retail merchants, and many farmers likewise, could now save a little money and put it in savings banks or invest it in government bonds or corporation stocks. Indeed, the development of savings banks (and insurance companies) and of small investments in government securities or in industrial enterprises was an outstanding feature of the era from 1870 to 1910, in Germany, France, and the United States, as well as in Britain, and a clear indication that in these industrialized countries the lower middle class and upper proletarian class were sharing, to a modest degree, in the prosperity of the upper bourgeoisie.

In the circumstances, the bourgeois capitalist spirit—the spirit ambitious for profits from banking, industry, and trade—possessed, in unwonted degree, all the traditional classes of European society. To emulate the great captains of industry became the eager desire of the whole citizenry of an industrialized nation—with obviously revolutionary social effects.

The era from 1870 to 1910 witnessed, then, along with a fascinating acceleration of industry and industrial capitalism, the seeming consummation of bourgeois ascendancy in western and central Europe. It remains to point out that this signal triumph of the industrial bourgeoisie was accompanied, curiously and somewhat paradoxically, by a weakening, or at any rate a blurring, of that doctrinaire liberalism which had previously been the special solicitude of the industrial and commercial middle class.²

Liberalism continued to be talked about. In fact, the word was in greater use than ever before, and so popular did it become that not only middle-class persons and romantic humanitarians but also political and religious conservatives took to describing themselves as "liberals." And, at least superficially, there were sufficient evidences of "liberal" achievement during the era to convey the general impression that the "triumph of liberalism" nicely par-

Bourgeois
Ascend-
ancy

Seeming
Triumph
of Liberal-
ism

¹ See above, pp. 34-39.

² On liberalism prior to 1870, see above, pp. 50-51.

alleled the "triumph of the bourgeoisie." There was a general vogue, throughout western and central Europe (and in America) of constitutional government, of religious toleration, of freedom of the press, and of other individual liberties.

If we look below the surface, however, we shall perceive that the word "liberalism" was used much more vaguely after 1870 than before and that a good many of the political and social developments of the new era were really a departure from liberal norms of the preceding age. Back in the 1830's and 1850's liberalism had been, politically as well as socially, a middle-class movement, and few liberals had sponsored a political democracy in which the mass of men without property or education might participate in voting and office-holding. A handful of "radicals," like John Bright in England and Mazzini in Italy, had represented, it is true, a democratic left-wing of the liberal movement, but for a long time they had been unable to prevail upon the majority of liberals to democratize the Victorian Compromise in Britain, the bourgeois monarchy in France, or the severely restricted suffrage in Belgium and Italy. Wherever liberalism was strongest, there was parliamentary government, but a parliamentary government of upper and middle classes.

Adoption of the form of democratic government, at least of universal manhood suffrage for parliamentary elections, occurred widely in western and central Europe, as we have seen,¹ between 1867 and 1885. Its occurrence at the beginning of the era which we are discussing in the present chapter is attributable less to the activity of convinced middle-class liberals than to the agitation of working-class leaders and to the opportunist tactics of professed conservatives like Disraeli in Britain and Bismarck in Germany. It was usually acquiesced in, and even applauded, by liberals—which was a sign that they were weakening in their devotion to a major political tenet of historic liberalism. Of course, they thought they could afford to acquiesce and applaud. For, now that the bourgeois spirit was permeating upper and lower classes, the whole citizenry of an industrialized nation might be expected to share the basic concern of the bourgeoisie for industry and commerce, for property rights and material prosperity.

¹ On the rise of political democracy, see above, pp. 197-202.

So political democracy, or important concessions to it, attended the advance of industrialization. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, this one departure from earlier liberalism was attended by other departures. One was in the field of popular education. Liberals had always been friendly to the idea that, while education should be "free," the secular state should broaden the opportunities for popular education by subsidizing private schools and supplementing them, if necessary, by a system of public schools, attendance at which, however, would be voluntary. Such had been the actuating motives of the school law which Guizot had sponsored in France in 1833,¹ of the financial grants which from the same year had been made by the British Parliament to church schools,² and of other liberal legislation in respect of schools in Belgium and Italy down to 1870. With the advent of political democracy, nevertheless, the movement for popular education took a new turn and became more insistent. Trade unionists and working-class people generally demanded a radical extension of public schools, and the upper and middle classes, intent upon preparing the masses for "enlightened" and patriotic exercise of their new political rights, heeded the demand.

Making
Education
National
and Com-
pulsory

Almost immediately, under democratic auspices, great systems of state-maintained and state-directed schools were inaugurated or strengthened. And eventually, still under democratic auspices, school attendance ceased to be voluntary and was made compulsory, while public secular schools were preferred to private religious schools. It might involve, theoretically, an abridgment of individual liberty. Practically, it was a response on the part of liberals themselves to the insistent demand of a machine age for the more intelligent popular use of the leisure which presumably would result from universal literacy.

Similar to the increase of state power in education was the parallel extension of state control over matters of public health and charity. The more industrialized a nation became, the more extensive and rigorous was its exercise of "police powers" over individual conduct, even over individual property rights, affecting the health and physical well-being of the community. Statute followed statute, regulating, in one country after another, the treatment of communica-

Assuring
Public
Health
and State
Charity

¹ See above, p. 74.

² See above, pp. 57-58.

ble disease, the disposal of sewage, the sanitation, ventilation, and lighting of factories and shops and private dwellings. Simultaneously, governmental appropriations multiplied for the establishment and maintenance of public hospitals and sanitariums, as well as of prisons and reformatories. In all these developments, professed liberals, full of humanitarian zeal, coöperated with conservatives and radicals and thereby helped to bring about a situation in which the old liberal ideal of the state as a "passive policeman" gradually receded before the new reality of the omnipotent state.

In the newer "liberal" attitude toward public health, popular education, and political democracy, nationalism played a significant part. Liberalism had always been identified with the principle of national self-determination, and liberals were generally elated by the apparent triumph of this principle in Italy and Germany (and in the Balkans) in the 1860's and 1870's. They were so elated, in fact, that, in many instances, their nationalism after 1870 rose superior to their liberalism and was scarcely distinguishable from that of conservatives. It followed that professed liberals supported the strengthening of central (at the expense of local) government in national states, and favored the adoption of governmental policies which eventually served to transform liberal nationalism into a nationalism more intensely political and imperialist and more intolerant of internal dissent. There were new restrictions on "foreigners." There were novel attempts to impose the language and culture of a major nationality upon ethnic minorities within its political borders, attempts at "nationalization" under such bizarre names as "Germanization," "Magyarization," and "Russification." In all of which illiberal attempts and restrictions, some "liberals" participated.

The weakening of historic liberalism was most evident, however, in the economic domain. The intense economic individualism which had characterized the preceding era was considerably abated by the increasing recognition of the desirability of national and social solidarity, and by the natural trend of the newer industry toward combinations of capital and of labor. In particular, a novel economic nationalism arose, which we shall discuss in the next section.

Here we may remark that, whereas liberalism was a very defi-

Subordi-
nating
Liberal-
ism to Na-
tionalism

Especially
Economic
National-
ism

nite doctrine prior to 1870, it became less and less so after 1870. Among the increasing number of persons who called themselves "liberals" were henceforth to be found liberals who favored tariffs as well as liberals who advocated free trade, liberals who were imperialist as well as liberals who were anti-imperialist, and liberals who accepted the new militarism as well as liberals who continued to preach pacifism.

2. NATIONAL ECONOMICS, IMPERIALISM, AND MILITARISM

It must be emphasized that the advancing industrialization of which we have spoken in the preceding section nicely synchronized with a marked access of nationalism. In the 1860's and 1870's, at the very time when "big business" was becoming deeply enrooted on the Continent of Europe (and in America), a series of wars was eventuating in the erection of national states for Italians, Germans, Magyars, and Balkan peoples (and the repression of sectionalism in the United States) and was promoting an intensification of national spirit and rivalry all over Europe (and America).

Big Business and Intensifying Nationalism

In the circumstances, it was but natural that this spirit and rivalry should find expression in the economic and industrial field as well as in strictly cultural and political domains. The fostering of a country's machine industries, the exploitation of its natural resources, the stimulation of its domestic and foreign trade, the increase of the security and purchasing power of its citizens, became central objects of concern to the statesmen (and the masses) of every nation and principal sources of an exaggerated competition among national states.

In other words, industrial progress was attended, after 1870, not so much by governmental policies of *laissez-faire*—giving free rein to individual competition, respecting the "laws" of supply and demand, and establishing the freedom of profession, trade, and "contract"—which had been especially advocated during the era from 1830 to 1870—as by a return of most national governments to the mercantilist, regulating policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before the advent of liberalism.¹

The new trend was a result, at least in part, of differences

¹ On early mercantilism, see Vol. I, pp. 92-94, 296, 473-475, 546. On the later, and opposing, *laissez-faire*, see Vol. I, pp. 547-548, and the present volume, above, pp. 50, 58-60.

among nations in degree of industrialization. So long as the Industrial Revolution was mainly confined to Great Britain, as was the case before 1870, this industrialized nation and likewise the other nations, predominantly agricultural, could readily perceive mutual advantages in international free trade. British manufactured goods could be freely exchanged for the rest of the world's raw materials and foodstuffs, to the profit of all concerned. But after 1870, with the extension of machine industry in one country after another—the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, etc.—the argument for free trade was not so convincing. If all these countries had remained agricultural, or if all of them had been industrialized equally with one another and with Britain, free trade might conceivably have continued as an ideal and a practical policy.

Britain, it is true, did cling to free trade during the era from 1870 to 1910. Her industrialization was so much more complete than that of any other nation, she had so much more capital, so much more experience in mechanical production, so many more customary markets, so much greater need for raw materials and food supplies, that her "national interests" did not appear to be seriously endangered by foreign developments.

Other nations, nevertheless, were in a different position. They were undergoing a novel industrialization. Their developing mechanical industries were "infant industries," varying greatly from country to country in lustiness and promise, and yet everywhere creating unusual strains for traditional agriculture. In these nations, consequently, tariff protectionism was sought for "infant industries" against more highly developed foreign industries, and likewise for agriculture against both rising domestic industry and mounting importation of foreign foodstuffs and raw materials. And intensified popular nationalism helped interested manufacturers and farmers to obtain what they sought.

The trend away from economic liberalism (or *laissez-faire*) and toward economic nationalism (or neo-mercantilism) was most marked in Germany. Here it was promoted by the agitation of a "national school" of economists, by the swift industrialization of the country, and by the patriotic fervor which accompanied the successful issue of the struggle for political unity. And here it found a

Industrial
Competition
among
Nations

Economic
Nationalism
in
Germany

twofold expression: in the inauguration, in 1879, of protective tariffs; and in the elaboration, during the 1880's, of a system of compulsory insurance for the nation's wage-earners.

Among the industrialized states of Europe (and America), Germany was only a pioneer in the pursuit of economic nationalism. Others quickly followed. In the three decades from 1880 to 1910 almost every such state enacted neo-mercantilist legislation. Some, such as France, the United States,¹ and Russia, specialized in tariff legislation in behalf of manufacturers and farmers and were relatively backward in labor legislation in behalf of workingmen. A few, such as Britain and the Dutch Netherlands, abstained wholly from tariff legislation but adopted a good deal of national labor legislation. The countries which imitated the example of Germany in stressing both major features of neo-mercantilism—tariff and labor legislation—were Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, and the Scandinavian kingdoms.

Else-
where

In later chapters, we shall see in specific detail how and in what varying circumstances the several countries of Europe applied the new economic nationalism. What we are doing in this place is to point out the general fact that the *laissez-faire* principle which had been regarded as a natural and ideal accompaniment of industrial progress in Europe during the era from 1830 to 1870 was replaced to a large extent during the era from 1870 to 1910 by neo-mercantilism, by governmental attempts to treat industry and agriculture, commerce and labor, as "national interests."

We would likewise indicate in this place another (and related) characteristic of the era from 1870 to 1910—a revival and intensification of national European expansion (and rivalry) overseas. During the preceding era, when *laissez-faire* had been most sincerely preached and had come nearest to being realized, and when liberals had talked most eloquently about the right of every people to national self-determination, there had been a notable loosening of colonial empires, an abatement of colonial wars, and a good deal of radical

Revival of
Competi-
tive Over-
seas Im-
perialism

¹ The United States actually preceded Germany in the adoption of tariff protectionism and, after 1879, greatly surpassed Germany in the height of national tariff walls. France, too, had never been a completely free-trade country, but her moderate protectionism of the 1860's and 1870's was considerably stiffened in the 1880's and thereafter.

criticism of overseas imperialism. France, it is true, had acquired Algeria, though in a hesitant manner and without any great popular enthusiasm, and then, under Napoleon III, had given several signs of renewed imperial pretensions in other parts of the world.¹ On the other hand, however, the British Empire had apparently been weakened by the grant of self-government to many of its overseas areas;² the Spanish colonial empire had obviously been all but destroyed;³ Dutchmen and Portuguese had had no thought of adding to their colonial possessions; and certainly it had not occurred to Germans or Italians or Belgians or Americans that they should subjugate distant alien peoples.

Now, particularly after 1880, there was a strong reaction. By this time, in industrialized countries, there was need of a greatly augmented supply of raw materials and food-stuffs from "backward" areas, and, under the developing system of economic nationalism, it began to be argued that such a supply could be obtained more cheaply and would be more stable if a "progressive" nation owned or controlled a large extent of "backward" lands.

Again, there was need of ever larger markets for surplus products of machine manufacture, and as "progressive" nations put up tariff barriers against each other their merchants sought compensatory markets in "backward" countries, and it was soon argued that sales could be speeded up if the "backward" countries were "colonies" or "protectorates." Unfavorable tariffs and other economic handicaps could then be gotten rid of in those areas. Through the "Europeanization" of such areas, the demand for European goods and the ability to pay for them could be enhanced. And requisite internal peace and trade prestige could be afforded by friendly officials of one's own nationality better than by natives.

Furthermore, and this was perhaps the most distinctive factor in the new imperialism, there was now a growing tendency to export surplus capital from "progressive" countries and to invest it in "backward" countries where rates of interest were usually higher than at home. Prior to 1870, the "progressive" country par excellence had been Great Britain, and the "backward" countries in which she had made

**Economic
Motives
for Impe-
rialist
Revival**

**Rôle of
Invest-
ments**

¹ See above, pp. 76, 133-134.

² See above, pp. 63-66, and below, p. 366.

³ See Vol. I, pp. 777-781.

her foreign investments (amounting in 1870 to about five billion dollars) were principally the United States and the Continental states of Europe. After 1870, however, as these states underwent rapid industrialization, they in turn became "progressive," ceasing to depend on British capital and beginning to export capital of their own. It thus transpired that, during the era which we are now considering, Germany and France and Belgium and the United States joined Great Britain as significant investors in "backward" countries, and that the "backward" countries in which foreign capital was invested were not so much in Europe and North America as in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Such investments were apt to involve considerable risk to capitalists, and these, in order to diminish the risk, found it convenient to appeal to their respective national governments for protection of their property abroad and sometimes for the political annexation of regions in which they had valuable "concessions."

Besides, "progressive" nations toward the close of the nineteenth century, thanks to the rapid perfecting of means of communication and instruments of warfare, were in a vastly better position than nations had been in any earlier period to appropriate far-off "backward" areas and to police and administer them. In other words, the advance of the Industrial Revolution made it relatively easy, as well as impelling, for industrialized states of Europe and America to found or extend overseas dominion, and simultaneously the intensification of nationalism among the masses in these states provided popular support for imperialist undertakings of their traders, investors, and governments.

Indeed, the advocates of national imperialism were inclined to buttress their undertakings less with strictly economic arguments than with broadly patriotic pleas. They talked about the defense of "national rights," the promotion of "national interests," and the avenging of "national honor." They talked about the signal genius which their own nationality had displayed in securing political unity and becoming an industrialized Great Power and which therefore warranted it as a "progressive" nation in controlling "backward" peoples. They talked, moreover, of the inevitability, the blind necessity, of imperialism; some of them labelled it "mani-

Industrialization
an Aid to
Imperialism

Nationalism
an
Incentive

fest destiny." They talked, too, about the problem of "surplus population," maintaining that part of the "surplus" could be supported at home if the industry of the mother-country were allowed freely to expand in colonial territory, and that the rest of the "surplus" could then emigrate, not to foreign countries, but to colonies wherein they would retain their national language and loyalty. They talked, also, about the "higher civilization," the solemn duty incumbent upon a great and civilized nation to instruct and prepare a less favored people for full participation eventually, perhaps remotely, in the blessings of the machine age, possibly to "Christianize" it, and certainly to endow it with mechanical devices, with sanitation and schools, with order and security. The duty was described in prose as "trusteeship" and in poetry as "the white man's burden."

To the pleas of patriots and the desires of investors and traders, the statesmen of the leading industrial countries responded. In Great Britain, Benjamin Disraeli did a good deal during his Conservative ministry from 1874 to 1880 to favor and foster the revival of imperial ambitions and to acquire new additions to the British colonial empire. In France, a similar development took place under the leadership of a conspicuous "liberal" republican, Jules Ferry, in the early 80's. In the late 80's, Germany, with the sanction of the conservative Bismarck, acquired a considerable overseas dominion, and Italy, under the "radical" statesman Crispi, started to acquire one. In the 1890's and early 1900's, the United States, guided officially by William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, launched an overseas empire. And by this time, Belgium and Japan were likewise becoming imperialist Powers, and Spain was endeavoring to recoup losses in America by gains in Africa.

Between 1870 and 1910, European imperialism overspread the globe and contributed more than in all previous ages to the real Europeanization of the whole world. Almost the entire African continent was partitioned among European Powers. The huge continent of Asia and the numerous islands of the Pacific were largely parcelled out into political dependencies, or economic "spheres of influence," of European Powers. Arctic and Antarctic regions were explored and much of their frozen expanse was claimed by Europeans.

Promotion
of the
New Na-
tional
Imperi-
alism

Its Ex-
tent: Eu-
ropeaniz-
ing the
World

The American continents were fastened ever more firmly to Europe, not by political bonds, but by economic and cultural links. The fullness of the earth seemed incontestably to be Europe's, and European shipping covered the seven seas. Everywhere, the customs and manners, the science and art, and, most of all, the mechanical contrivances of industrial Europe (and America) were becoming the central features of a novel and essentially material world civilization.

All this was being accomplished, let us remember, in the midst of intensified industrialization and nationalism—and intensified militarism—within Europe itself. Militarism, the idea that a state should ensure its security and fortify its domestic and foreign policies by maintaining large armaments, was especially popular after 1870. Of course, some degree of "militarism" had always been an earmark of the European state-system, and most European states of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had spent the main part of their public revenues on the upkeep of professional armies. Furthermore, certain states had attempted, on occasion, to make all their able-bodied men liable to military service: Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus; Prussia under Frederick the Great and again during the "War of Liberation" in 1813-1814;¹ and, most successfully, France under the First Republic and the First Napoleonic Empire.² It was not until the 1860's, however, that the principle of the volunteer professional army commenced to be supplanted effectively and permanently by that of the conscript popular army, and not until then that national governments were in a position greatly to increase their expenditure for military "preparedness."

Attend-
ant Na-
tional
Mili-
tarism

The intensified militarism was rendered practicable by industrial development. It was now practicable, as never before, to take a percentage of the total population of a country away from productive labor for a number of years, to feed and clothe and arm them, to transport and train them, and to pay the bills. In measure as a nation was industrialized, its machinery could relieve men from ordinary work,

Industri-
alization
an Aid

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 343, 348, 680.

² See Vol. I, pp. 632-634, 668-669. It may be remarked that Russia employed a form of conscription from the time of Peter the Great and that the Russian army throughout the nineteenth century was—on paper—the largest in Europe. See Vol. I, pp. 363-364, 758.

its factories could produce clothing and arms and military supplies of all sorts, its farm and foreign shipping and canning industries could yield surplus foodstuffs, its railways (and later its motor cars) could carry soldiers *en masse* quickly and widely, and its industrial wealth could be utilized to provide necessary funds for maintaining a whole military establishment—officers and men, fortresses and firearms, artillery and engineering works, transportation and supply—in greater size and efficiency.

As industrial development furnished new possibilities for militarism, so the rise of popular nationalism led to the actual exploitation of those possibilities. From the ending of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 down to the 1850's, while the Industrial Revolution was confined almost entirely to insular Britain and while liberals everywhere were imagining that their ideals could be realized with comparatively little bloodshed, there had been a good deal of "pacifist" sentiment and propaganda. But then had come, along with spreading industrialization, a series of sharp, explosive wars—the Crimean, the Franco-Austrian, the American Civil, the Austro-Prussian, the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Turkish—all occurring in the twenty-four years between 1854 and 1878. And out of them appeared to emerge a new world, with big industry and big ambitions, with multiplying wealth, and with new Great Powers in Italy, the United States, and Germany. The very suddenness of the wars, the speed with which most of them were conducted, and the decisiveness with which they seemed to effect radical changes, were amazing novelties to Europeans and had profound consequences.

The Crimean and Franco-Austrian wars of the 1850's were fought by fairly large, but still "professional," armies. In the 1860's, however, both the United States and Prussia swelled their volunteer armies by resorting to conscription. The United States was enabled thereby to crush the Southern Confederacy and solidify itself, and Prussia, in turn, to defeat Denmark, Austria, and France and to erect the German Empire. Whence the lesson was obvious that, for warfare between modern "civilized" states, general conscription was preferable to professional volunteering and quite as practicable. An even more consequential lesson was derived from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, namely, that

National-
ism an
Incentive

Influence
of Inter-
national
Wars,
1854-1870

a militarily "prepared" nation could make short shift of an "unprepared" nation and that therefore every nation, for its own security, should be in constant state of military "preparedness," in peace-time as well as in war-time. These lessons were taken to heart by European statesmen, and likewise by the most influential classes and a large part of the masses in Continental Europe.

Apparent
Need of
Military
Prepared-
ness

Here, indeed, was an especially marked difference between the militarism of the new industrial era and that of earlier times. Formerly, military establishments had been the usual concern of monarchs and a professional class, and whenever conscription had been resorted to by a Russian tsar or a Prussian king, it had been met by their subjects with sullenness and sometimes with open hostility. Now, in an age of popular enthusiasm for nationalism and democracy, the masses could be counted upon to second, or at any rate to accede to, the military policies of their several national governments. If a nation, such as Germany or Italy, had recently won its freedom and unity by force of arms, then all its patriotic citizens, regardless of class, felt a responsibility for continuing an armed "preparedness" which would preserve the nation's unity and freedom. If a nation, such as France, had recently lost territory and prestige through military defeat, then its patriotic citizens felt obliged to support a "preparedness" which would prevent further losses and eventually avenge defeat.

Popular
Support
and Par-
ticipation

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the majority of the Prussian parliament, who had bitterly opposed the extension of compulsory military training in their country in 1862, endorsed it with no little enthusiasm after it had proved its worth in the war against Austria in 1866.¹ Nor is it surprising that the Prussian military "reforms"—based upon the principle of "the nation in arms"—were speedily adopted by the other German states, becoming a permanent feature of the new German Empire, and were likewise imitated by Austria-Hungary in 1868, by France in 1872, by Russia in 1874, and by Italy in 1875. Even distant Japan organized a national army, on the new German model, in 1873. Almost every country aspiring to be a Great Power now armed itself as it had never been armed before, and the lesser Powers on the Con-

"Nations
in Arms"

¹ See above, pp. 163-170.

continent of Europe increased their armaments, made them more efficient, and spent larger sums of money on them. Great Britain, alone among the Great Powers of Europe, retained a relatively small, professional army,¹ but her expenditure on it rose steadily.

Big armies and big military budgets thus became the order of the day in Europe from 1870 onwards. They were represented by statesmen and publicists, and accepted by the majority of people, as making for peace—as assuring “national defense.” Actually, however, they fed the spirit of public nationalism and incidentally enriched the private manufacturers of steel and firearms and other military supplies. And they produced an ever larger number of professional militarists—army officers or ex-officers, promoters of dependent industries, and super-heated patriots—who, by dwelling upon the armed strength of their nation’s neighbors, heightened alarm and apprehension at home, or who, by bellicose utterances and boastful references to their own nation’s “might,” aroused distrust and hostility abroad. With the exception of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878,² the major Powers of Europe really kept peace among themselves from 1871 to 1910, but the peace was an “armed peace.” The new militarism was for Europe and for the world a sword of Damocles.

To mounting national armaments on land were soon added huge national armaments on sea. These constituted the “navalism” which was a special nationalist response, from the 1880’s, to the demands of neo-mercantilism and the new imperialism. To back up a merchant marine, to ensure the import of raw materials and foodstuffs and the export of manufactures, to “protect” traders and investors (and missionaries) in “backward” lands, to obtain and enlarge distant “spheres of influence,” to advertise the goods and promote the prestige of a “progressive” people, it seemed highly desirable to the governments of industrialized countries, and to influential and interested patriots among their citizens, that the latest technological developments should be utilized for warships. In

¹ The United States also, after the Civil War (1861–1865), reverted to the policy of maintaining a relatively small professional army. It should be borne in mind that, alike in the case of Great Britain and in that of the United States, geographical location was an important factor in lessening popular feeling of need for big land armaments.

² See above, pp. 190–192.

Effects of
the New
Militar-
ism

The New
Navalism

the 1880's France set out to "modernize" her navy, and at the end of the decade Great Britain, long the foremost maritime Power, acted upon the advice of a governmental commission of "experts" that "no time should be lost in placing the British navy beyond comparison with that of any two Powers." Germany, the United States, and Japan took to building large navies in the 1890's, and by the end of the century all the Great Powers had important fleets of warships.

The new land militarism was menacing to Europe, but its sea counterpart, the new navalism, was disturbing to the whole world. Powerful navies were a threat not only; they were actually employed, especially after 1890, as the chief instrument in a series of imperialist wars in Asia, in Africa, in America, in the islands of the Pacific. They were the forceful means of "Europeanizing" the earth, and incidentally of aggravating the rivalry among the Great Powers.

3. PURSUIT OF SCIENCE

During the era from 1870 to 1910, no word in any European language was more widely used or more highly esteemed than "science." Experimental science had been steadily developing since the so-called Intellectual Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At that time, fundamental work had been done in mathematics, physics, and astronomy, and in the latter part of the eighteenth century the painstaking study of "natural history" had begun to yield significant data for chemistry, geology, zoölogy, botany, and medicine.¹ "Applied science" had come to the fore more recently, as an accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution, but by the latter part of the nineteenth century, its record was imposing. Every industrial corporation was employing a staff of "experts" in engineering or chemistry. Every large-scale farmer was being advised by "authorities" on soils, crops, fertilizers, and stock breeding. Governments were calling for ever larger numbers of scientific practitioners in public works, public sanitation, and military and naval armaments. To meet the demand for scientists, new polytechnic schools were being established, while older universities were founding laboratories and faculties of applied science and institutes of industrial (and agricultural) research.

A Scientific Age

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 497-505.

No longer was science an avocation of the upper and middle classes. It was now a most honorable, and fairly profitable, vocation for any person of talent; and the masses, as well as the classes, were coming under its spell. Everybody hailed each new device, each additional creature-comfort, as still another triumph of "modern science." And, as the pursuit of natural science quickened, it not only enriched the content of physics and chemistry, geology and biology, but also stimulated a like development of "social" studies—sociology and anthropology, economics and statistics, geography and history—which were now formally labelled, imitatively and a little ostentatiously, "social sciences." Incidentally, it inspired some scientists and a goodly number of other persons to philosophize about "science" and to construct systems of thought which had even wider and more profound consequences than the metaphysics which had attended the advance of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹

Leaving "scientific philosophy"—and social science—to be treated of in the following sections, we shall devote the present section to a summary of the major developments of experimental natural science during the nineteenth century. These are basic to the applied science of which we have already treated in our accounts of European industrialization, and also to the newer currents of thought and action which flowed in upon Europe after 1870.

Physical theory remained quite "Newtonian" throughout the century. Experimental physics, however, underwent a specialized and utilitarian development, thanks largely to the concurrent Industrial Revolution from which it profited and to which it contributed. As the century proceeded, physicists devoted themselves more and more to practical problems in industrialization, to research in thermodynamics, in optics, in magnetism and electricity.

Thermodynamics, the physical science derived from the study of the motive power of heat, was essentially a nineteenth-century product, an accompaniment of the use of steam-engines. Most earlier physicists had entertained the idea that heat was a subtle imponderable fluid (called "caloric"), and it was not until the eve of the nineteenth century

¹ On the "metaphysics" of science in those centuries, see Vol. I, pp. 506-555.

that the idea of heat as a mode of motion, rather than as a substance, was given an experimental basis. This was done by an interesting American—Benjamin Thompson—who as a “loyalist”¹ had quitted his native land in 1776 and after serving the British government had held high office in Bavaria and there received the title of “Count Rumford,” by which he is commonly known. In 1798 Count Rumford presented to the Royal Society at London the findings of his *Enquiry concerning the Source of Heat which is excited by Friction*. Rumford’s contention was ably supported by Sir Humphry Davy,² and became the accepted premise of all thermodynamic theory.

Important researches in this field were made by two Britishers, James Joule and William Thomson, and by a German, Helmholtz. Joule (1818–1889), a wealthy brewer of Manchester and a master of experimentation, demonstrated the invariable equivalence of heat and of chemical, electrical, and electromagnetic energies as measured in terms of their specifically appropriate units. He gave his name—joule—to the practical unit of energy. Helmholtz (1821–1894), professor at various German universities, generalized Joule’s results and established the “law” of the “conservation of energy,” that the quantity of force which can be brought into action in the whole of nature is unchangeable, that it can be neither increased nor diminished. William Thomson (1824–1907), best known by his later title of Lord Kelvin, professor for many years at the University of Glasgow, generalized the “law” of the “dissipation of energy,” that, while the sum-total of energy is constant, the amount of available energy diminishes by a continual degeneration into non-available or “dissipated” heat.

As a further contribution to thermodynamics, Joule revived in 1857 the kinetic theory of gases, that they consist of minute particles which move in straight lines with high average velocity, constantly encountering one another, and hence continually changing their individual velocities and directions. This theory was substantiated by ingenious experiments conducted by James Maxwell (1831–1879).

Kinetic
Theory of
Gases

Contemporaneously, physicists were studying the phenomena of light and advancing the science of optics. The pioneer here had been a French engineer in the employ of Napoleon Bonaparte,

¹ See Vol. I, p. 481.

² See above, pp. 18, 19 n., 23, 24.

who undertook optical researches in 1814 and later practically established the wave-theory of light.¹ It was another
Optics Frenchman, Jean Foucault (1819-1868), who conclusively validated the theory by showing, in 1850, that light travels more slowly in water than in air and that its velocity in different media varies inversely as the refractive indices of the media.

The perfecting of lenses was an outstanding achievement of the 1840's and 1850's. To it, the development of photography contributed in no small measure. And from it came not only greatly improved cameras but telescopes and microscopes and other optical instruments of inestimable service to chemistry and biology, physics and astronomy.

Of all the developments of physical science in the nineteenth century, perhaps the most noteworthy, and certainly the most
Electricity original, had to do with electricity. Electrical science had begun in the second half of the eighteenth century with the work of Franklin, Galvani, and Volta. It was enormously forwarded in the first half of the nineteenth century by the researches, both theoretical and practical, of Ampère and Ohm and especially of Michael Faraday. Then, with the rapid exploitation of electricity for industrial purposes, there was correspondingly increased stimulus to scientific researches into its nature and properties. About 1855 James Maxwell turned from his fruitful study of the kinetic theory of gases to an equally fruitful study of electromagnetic phenomena. He conceived and gradually elucidated an epoch-making theory of electromagnetism, relating optics to electricity and holding that light-waves are the same in kind as those by which electromagnetic oscillations are propagated through the ether. Maxwell's great treatise on the subject appeared in 1873.

In the 1880's, Heinrich Hertz, a pupil of Helmholtz, finally established Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light on an experimental foundation and derived from it the principles which were utilized by Marconi in his invention of wireless telegraphy. In the 1890's, Joseph Thomson, in his celebrated research laboratory at the University of Cambridge, was investigating the conduction of electricity through gases and sharing with a Dutch physicist, Hendrik Lorentz, the fame of

¹ This theory had also been propounded by Huygens in the seventeenth century (see Vol. I, p. 499).

formulating the "electron theory." Concerning "electrons," and also concerning "atoms" and "molecules"—those basic concepts of nineteenth-century physics—we shall presently say more when we deal with chemistry.

Quite as significantly, certain curious forms of radiation were discovered toward the close of the nineteenth century. Wilhelm von Röntgen, director of the physical institute at Würzburg (in Germany) discovered the highly useful "X-rays" (or Röntgen rays) in 1895. In 1898 Pierre Curie, professor of physics at Paris, working in conjunction with his even more famous Polish wife, managed to extract radium from pitchblende, and thereafter both the Curies did much to make the world marvel at this newly found chemical element and at the essentially new science of radio-activity.

Radio-
Activity

In chemistry, significant work had been done by Robert Boyle in the second half of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth century by Cavendish, Priestley, and especially Lavoisier.¹ In the nineteenth century, however, chemical science, like electrical science, was powerfully stimulated by the Industrial Revolution and underwent a very great development.

2. Chem-
istry

Basic to nineteenth-century chemistry (and physics also) was the hypothesis, convincingly tested at the very beginning of the century, of the atomic and molecular constitution of matter. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, various philosophers and scientists had toyed with an idea of the "atom" as one of the minute indivisible particles of which the whole universe might be composed, but it was not until the first years of the nineteenth century that the idea was clearly defined and firmly fixed in scientific usage. At this time, John Dalton, an English Quaker schoolmaster of Manchester, argued conclusively from the facts of definite chemical composition that every bit of matter consists of "atoms" and that the atoms of one chemical element are distinguished from those of another by different relative weights. Almost simultaneously Count Amadeo Avogadro, an Italian nobleman and professor of physics at the University of Turin, demonstrated that gases consist of comparably minute particles, which he termed "molecules," and established the general fact, called "Avogadro's law," that "equal

Atomic
Theory

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 502-503.

volumes of all gases, under the same conditions of temperature and pressure, contain the same number of smallest molecules."

For a time there was confusion, in chemical nomenclature, between the "atoms" of Dalton and the "molecules" of Avogadro. Gradually, however, the confusion was dispelled by using the word "atom" to define the ultimate particles of simple elements, and the word "molecule" to denote gas particles and the ultimate particles of chemical compounds. Gradually, too, Dalton's conception of atomic weights was carried into effect. And with gradually increasing knowledge of these as fundamental constants of chemistry, attempts were naturally made to connect them with the chemical and physical properties of the corresponding elements. In 1869-1871 Mendelēyev, a Russian chemist and pro-

**Periodic
Law**

fessor in the University of St. Petersburg, succeeded in relating such data, and, on tabulating them, enunciated his "periodic law," in effect that there is a periodic sequence in the properties of elements arranged in the order of their atomic weights and that gaps in the sequence point to the existence of hitherto unknown elements. In accordance with this law, rare and hitherto unknown elements were soon discovered—for example, gallium in 1871 and scandium in 1879.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century, the advance of electrical science served to complicate and modify prevailing ideas about atoms and molecules. As far back as 1756 Benjamin Franklin had spoken casually of "electric particles," and in the 1830's Michael Faraday had based some interesting experiments on an "atomic" theory of electricity, but the significance of this

Electrons

was long unperceived. Only in the 1890's did the "electron" appear as the ultimate particle of electricity, and then, through the researches of Lorentz and Joseph Thomson, arose the "electron theory," that atoms are not simple indivisible entities, but that they contain electrons. And not until the twentieth century, after 1910, was the "electron theory" fully worked out with revolutionary consequences.¹

A major achievement of nineteenth-century chemistry was the discovery of ways of making organic substances synthetically. This involved, of course, a repudiation of the conventional distinctions which had long obtained between inorganic and organic bodies, between the "kingdom"

**Synthetic
Chemistry**

¹ See below, pp. 823-825.

of minerals on the one hand and those of animals and vegetables on the other. Such a repudiation was clearly implied in the remarkable achievement of Friedrich Wöhler, physician and professor of chemistry in the University of Göttingen, who in 1828 demonstrated that urea, a substance hitherto thought of as purely animal, could be artificially produced by synthesis from the chemical elements of which it was composed. Wöhler collaborated with Liebig in many of the investigations preparatory to the latter's celebrated contributions to the science of soils and fertilizers;¹ and their work was fundamental to the subsequent expanding production of synthetic dyes, synthetic drugs, synthetic rubber, and synthetic goods of all sorts. Moreover, the great chemical laboratory which Liebig founded at Giessen in 1826 was the prototype of a host of chemical laboratories which governments and universities, industrial corporations and private "foundations," soon put up all over Europe and America, and in which practical as well as theoretical chemistry was stressed.

Chemistry, let us emphasize, was intimately associated throughout the nineteenth century with manifold progress in the industrial arts. It contributed a vast deal to the efficiency of all forms of motive power, to the bleaching and dyeing of textiles, to the utilization of cellulose, to agriculture and food preservation, to the refining of petroleum and the production of rubber goods, to the instrumentalities for waging modern war; and all these arts, in turn, stimulated the growth of chemical science. "Chemical engineering" gradually became an important branch of general engineering, and along with "physical chemists" and "electro-chemists" emerged "bio-chemists." For chemistry in the nineteenth century was an ally, not alone of physics, but of biology, physiology, medicine, surgery, and sanitation.

Industrial
Chemistry

Back in the eighteenth century, it had been usual to lump together all such natural sciences as were not strictly mathematical and physical (or chemical) and to label them "natural history." In the second half of that century, there had been some specialization in botany and zoölogy, geology and mineralogy, but it was not apt to be the very detailed specialization which is nowadays common, and its exponents continued, well into the nineteenth century, to think of them-

3. "Natural
History"

¹ On Liebig and his contributions, see above, p. 28.

selves as dealing with "natural history." Such was certainly the case with certain famous scientists of the first part of the nineteenth century, who summarized and interpreted, and sometimes added to, the previously acquired knowledge of animals and plants and earth. Of these "naturalists," three are particularly noteworthy—Lamarck, Humboldt, and Agassiz.

Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829) was a French nobleman who studied medicine at Paris, became interested in meteorology and chemistry, and eventually devoted his great talents to botany and zoology. The researches and observations of a lifetime he embodied in his *Natural History of Invertebrate Animals* (1815-1822), a work celebrated for its detailed scientific information and for the general evolutionary theory underlying it, a theory of developmental relationship among all forms of life, a theory which was to exercise an ever greater fascination for nineteenth-century biological science and to distinguish it markedly from that of earlier times. The doctrine of evolution as set forth by Lamarck comprised four "laws": (1) Life by its very nature tends continually to increase the size of every body possessing it up to a limit which life itself sets; (2) A new need continually making itself felt in a body tends to produce a new organ in that body; (3) The development of organs is in constant ratio to their use; (4) Whatever has been acquired or changed in the organization of a living body is conserved by generation and thus transmitted to its descendants.¹

Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), Prussian nobleman and brother of the statesman Wilhelm von Humboldt,² was at once a product of eighteenth-century philosophical "enlightenment" and a forerunner of the nineteenth-century organizers and conductors of "scientific expeditions" in quest of "specimens" for botanical and zoological gardens. He made scientific trips to England and through Switzerland and Italy. He pursued scientific investigations for many years at Paris and for many other years at Berlin. He led a famous scientific

¹ It should be noted that these "laws" of Lamarck are much vaguer and more general than the later evolutionary doctrine of Darwin, and that the fourth—the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics—is extremely questionable.

² See Vol. I, pp. 681, 698, 723.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Alexander von Humboldt, from a painting by a German artist, Julius Schrader (1815-1890).

expedition in 1799-1804 all over South America, observing and collecting data about volcanoes, climate, manners and customs of the people, appearance and habits of birds, fishes, and reptiles, trees and shrubs. Humboldt was a father of the science of climatology, and the idea of "isothermal lines" in geography was his. But he was no narrow specialist, and the breadth of his knowledge, as well as the charm of his personality and the liberality of his purse, made him, next to Napoleon Bonaparte, the most famous European of his day. When he was an old man, between the ages of 76 and 90, he wrote and published a remarkable work, *Cosmos*, summarizing the scientific knowledge of the time and undertaking to demonstrate the existence of a supreme unity amid the complex details of natural phenomena. The *Cosmos* was at once a scientific encyclopedia and an imaginative conception of the universe; and its picturesque, almost poetical, style commended it to a romantic age.¹

Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) was born in Switzerland, the son of a Protestant pastor. Educated at various German universities in medicine, he became interested in the study of fish, writing scientific treatises on the fishes of Brazil and on those of central Europe, and then, turning to the study of fossil fishes, he wrote on them and presently on geology. In 1846 Agassiz removed to the United States, becoming an American citizen, professor at Harvard, and a recognized authority on the "natural history" of his adopted country. In the last year of his life, he obtained funds from a wealthy New Yorker for the establishment of the famous laboratory for research in marine zoölogy at Wood's Hole (in Massachusetts). This, of itself, was a sign that by the 1870's traditional "natural history" was being supplanted by systematic geology, botany, zoölogy, and physiology. Agassiz was among the last of the "naturalists" and the first of the "ichthyologists."

Geology was raised to the status of an independent science, and immensely forwarded, by Sir Charles Lyell (1797-1875), the son of a Scottish botanist and a Dante scholar. Lyell was trained as a lawyer, but showed a bent for nat-

Agassiz

4. Geology

¹ The first volume of Humboldt's *Cosmos*, it is interesting to note, inspired Edgar Allan Poe to write his "prose-poem" *Eureka*.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Arthur Schopenhauer, from the painting by Julius Hamel (1834-1899). On Schopenhauer, see below, pp. 261-262.

ural science while he was still a student at Oxford. He definitely abandoned law for geology in 1827, and three years later began the publication of his classic *Principles of Geology, an attempt to explain the former changes of the Earth's surface by reference to causes now in operation*. The central thesis of this work was not essentially different from that of James Hutton's book (published back in 1785),¹ but it was expressed more entertainingly and supported by a much greater wealth of convincing data.

Lyell Altogether, Lyell succeeded in persuading his scientific contemporaries that the continuous operation of observable geological processes—volcanoes pouring out vast masses of molten rock, rivers wearing away their banks and depositing strata which could naturally be transformed into sandstone, earthquake shocks producing faults in the rocks, vegetation preparing future coal-beds, land almost everywhere either rising or sinking—would suffice, over a very long period of time, to explain how the surface of the earth had assumed its present physical appearance. Lyell's *Principles* was extremely influential. Between 1830 and 1872 it went through eleven editions, each enriched with new material and with the results of riper thought.

To Lyell's basic contributions to geological science were added the work of Agassiz on fossils. And as more scientists devoted

Palæontology themselves to gathering information about fossil remains and their relationship to the rock or silt in which they were found, geology soon gave rise to the specialized branch of palæontology, and it became possible to reconstruct in rough outline the story of "prehistoric" geological ages in which now extinct species of animals and plants had flourished, or still extant species had occupied wider habitats.

Gradually, too, evidence came to light that man himself had existed in "prehistoric" geological ages. In 1846 a French customs officer, Boucher de Perthes, who devoted his leisure to somewhat amateurish geological investigations, announced that he had found, in the gravels of the Somme valley, along with fossil remains of elephant and rhinoceros, certain flints bearing marks of human handiwork. In 1857 the actual remains of a "prehistoric" man—what Boucher de Perthes termed "antediluvian man"—were unearthed in the Neander valley near Düsseldorf (in Germany).

Discovery
of Pre-
historic
Man

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 503-504.

In 1868, four skeletons of a different kind of "prehistoric" man—taller and with larger skulls—were discovered in a cave at Cro-magnon (in southwestern France). Subsequent research demonstrated that both "Neanderthal" and "Cromagnon" races had been fairly widely distributed at different early ages throughout Europe. It should be borne in mind that all these discoveries and all this research stimulated a remarkable development of anthropology and at the same time strengthened the credibility of current evolutionary teachings of biology.

The word "biology" was introduced into scientific nomenclature by Gottfried Treviranus, a German physician and naturalist, and for many years professor of mathematics in the gymnasium at Bremen, who published in 1802—5. Biology 1805 a work with the title *Biology, or Philosophy of Living Nature*. In this work the author maintained that simple forms, which he termed "zoöphytes," were "the primitive types from which all the organisms of the higher orders had arisen by gradual development," and he laid down as a fundamental principle "that all living forms are the result of physical influences which are still in operation, and vary only in degree and direction." In an effort to substantiate his theories, Treviranus assembled a mass of anatomical and physiological data and published them in 1831 as *Appearances and Laws of Organic Life*.

Succeeding biologists were greatly aided by the notable improvement which physicists effected in the 1830's in the compound microscope. Just as the earlier invention of the telescope had enabled astronomers to explore the "in-
Micro-
scopic
Work finitely great" in distant mysterious space, so the development of the microscope enabled biologists to behold the "infinitely little" in nearby commonplace things. And the more these were studied, the less commonplace did they appear.

One of the outstanding scientists whose use of the new microscopy proved epochal was Theodor Schwann (1810-1882), a native of Rhenish Prussia, and for many years professor of anatomy at the universities of Louvain and Liège (in Belgium). Schwann, with the aid of the microscope, discovered the organic nature of yeast
Schwann
and the
Cell
Theory in 1837 and formulated in 1839 the very important "cell theory," that all living things originate and grow in very small structural units, or "cells." Further investigation by other physiologists

confirmed the cell theory of Schwann, but added to it, in the 1840's and 1850's, the conception of "cells" as not being ultimate entities in themselves but as containing vital entities—to the matter of which the suggestive name of "protoplasm" was conventionally accorded.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, microscopy and its attendant quickening of biological research had extraordinary consequences, not only for physiological theory but also for the practice of medicine and surgery. Before taking up these matters, however, let us consider another kind of epochal contribution which mid-century biology (including zoölogy and botany) made to subsequent scientific thought—a contribution conveniently designated as "Darwinism," and originating in the independent labors of two eminent "naturalists"—Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882).

Darwin, born at Shrewsbury (in England) of middle-class stock¹ and sent to Edinburgh to study medicine and thence transferred to Cambridge for training as a clergyman of the Anglican Church, displayed in his youth but one ambition—to become a great scientist. In his twenty-third year, with the reluctant consent of his family, he abandoned the clerical calling and embarked as a "naturalist" on a surveying vessel, the *Beagle*. He was gone for five years (1831-1836) on a voyage through the South Sea islands and along the South American coasts, observing and gathering "specimens." His observations led him to ponder upon the possibility of attributing variations of species to differences of environment and of natural needs. For several years after his return to England, Darwin was engaged in detailed study along the numerous lines of scientific enquiry suggested by the expedition of the *Beagle*. He was particularly struck by Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, which was already spreading the idea that vast changes could be brought about by natural processes and was thus paving the way for a natural explanation of biological evolution. He was also struck by Malthus's *Essay on Population*, which had argued that the increase (or decrease) of population is related to a struggle for existence among mankind.

¹ His paternal grandfather was Dr. Erasmus Darwin, an eighteenth-century poet and botanist, and his maternal grandfather was Josiah Wedgwood, the well-known porcelain manufacturer.

Darwin
and His
Search for
Explana-
tion of
Variation
of Species

Why, thought Darwin, could not the principle of Malthus be extended to the whole organic creation and utilized to explain the variation of species?

Wallace, a considerably younger Englishman, had begun his career as a land surveyor and architect and then, becoming interested in plants and beetles, had served as "naturalist" on scientific expeditions to the Amazon (1848-1850) and through the East Indies (1854-1862). In 1858, while he was lying ill with fever in the Moluccas, he too began to think of Malthus's *Essay on Population* (which he had read several years previously); and the idea of the survival of the fittest flashed over him. In two hours he "thought out almost the whole of the theory," and in three evenings he embodied it in an essay, which he promptly mailed to Darwin as the best known naturalist of the day.

Wallace's
Similar
Search

Darwin, upon receiving the manuscript, presented it, together with an essay of his own, before a learned society in London, and the so-called Darwinian hypothesis of evolution was launched. Darwin's ideas were explained at length in his chief book, published in 1859, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life*, and were subsequently elaborated in certain particulars in his *Descent of Man* (1871).

Darwin's
Theory of
Evolution

The central idea of Darwin—his doctrine of "evolution"—was that animal and vegetable species, in their present very diverse forms and aspects, are not immutably fixed as results of separate special acts of creation but are different and changing natural outcomes of a common original source. Darwin's ideas as to how such change and differentiation took place were threefold: "natural selection," "sexual selection," and "inheritance of acquired characteristics."

Of these, the first—"natural selection"—was most stressed, and may briefly be summarized as follows. The pressure of the struggle for life favors those individuals in each species which possess particular variations from the normal type that are of direct advantage to them in their surroundings. Such individuals tend to survive at the expense of their fellows, and to produce offspring. The new generation shows variation also, and, once more, those individuals which depart from the ordinary in the most useful way have a better

"Natural
Selection"

chance of survival than the others. Thus, gradually, after the lapse of long periods of time, differences so far accumulate in the descendants of each one of the original type that really new types, or species, may be formed.

As for "sexual selection," Darwin explained the development of colors and structures peculiar to one sex as the result of its natural selection by the preferences of the other sex. And, to strengthen his whole argument for evolution, he took over from Lamarck the notion that "acquired characteristics" are transmitted hereditarily.

We must here notice certain limitations to the novelty or accuracy of "Darwinism." The general idea of "evolution" was not new. No one could fail to perceive that there were resemblances among all forms of life; and that these resemblances might be traced to some form of evolutionary development had been urged, before Darwin or Wallace, by Lamarck at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and, for the matter of that, had been suggested very much earlier, for example, by St. Augustine in the fourth century A.D., and by Anaximander in the sixth century B.C. Moreover, Darwin's doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, which he borrowed from Lamarck, has been seriously questioned by later biologists, and his theory of "sexual selection" has been dismissed as unimportant. Even his hypothesis of "natural selection" has had to be refined and modified in the light of more recent studies.

Yet we must point out that "Darwinism," unlike earlier concepts of evolution, was extraordinarily influential. It was put forth in a "scientific" and "materialist" age, just when the way to its reception had been prepared by a host of naturalists. It was sponsored by a most respected scientist and backed by his painstaking researches. It not only assumed an evolution in nature but offered a plausible explanation of how such evolution takes place.

Darwin's work was soon supplemented by publications of Wallace—*Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection* (1871), *Geographical Distribution of Animals* (1876), and *Darwinism* (1889)¹—and was reinforced by the researches and convictions of several contemporary scientists. Sir Charles Lyell, the geol-

¹ Against Darwin, Wallace contended that the origin of man, unlike that of other animals, cannot fully be explained by "natural selection."

ogist, accepted "Darwinism" in his *Antiquity of Man* (1863); and among particularly spirited apostles of "Darwinism" were two famous biologists: the Englishman Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) and the German Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919).

Huxley, after a training in medicine and surgery, earned a notable scientific reputation by accompanying an expedition of naturalists in 1846-1850 and making a careful study of the surface life of the tropical seas. Subsequently, he served as official naturalist to the English Geological Survey and carried on important original research in palæontology. With a good deal of sound knowledge about biology, Huxley combined an aggressive personality and a signal literary talent—all of which he utilized in defense of "Darwinism." He was "Darwin's bulldog," he said; and in *Man's Place in Nature* (1863) he emphasized, with square-jawed pugnacity, that aspect of the new evolutionary teaching which pointed to the purely natural development of man himself from lower forms of life.

Haeckel, trained also in medicine, and professor of zoölogy at the Prussian University of Jena, was the first outstanding scientist on the Continent of Europe to adhere fully to Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution. His *General Morphology* (1866) represented a suggestive attempt to work out and apply the doctrine in detail, and for many years afterwards his studies, his lectures, and his fast-flying pen alike contributed to the popularizing of "Darwinism." Haeckel presented to the international zoölogical congress at Cambridge in 1898 a "genealogical tree" of the relationship between the various orders of animals, tracing the descent of the human race in twenty-six stages from simple bits of protoplasm through the chimpanzees and the "pithecanthropus erectus"¹ to "primitive man." Haeckel was quite dogmatic about his "tree," but other scientists have been more dubious.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the best-known biologists, botanists, and zoölogists—and, indeed, the majority of all scientists—were proceeding on general Darwinian assumptions.

¹ "Pithecanthropus erectus" was the name given to a creature, then supposed to be the "missing link" between man and the anthropoid apes, which was imaginatively reconstructed in the 1890's from a thighbone, two teeth, and a skull-cap which were dug up in the East Indian island of Java by a medical officer in the Dutch army. No one knows whether the disinterred remains belonged to one and the same skeleton.

But already two lines of research were raising serious questions about certain of those assumptions. One line was that pursued by

Later
Amend-
ments to
Darwin-
ism

August Weismann (1834-1914), professor of zoölogy at Freiburg (in southern Germany), who reached the conclusion, set forth in his *Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems*, that heredity consists

Weis-
mann and
Acquired
Charac-
ters

of the transmission of pure germ plasm in germ cells which have nothing to do with acquired characteristics. Weismann's germ theory, with its attendant denial of the hereditary transmission of acquired characteristics, was hotly contested by Haeckel and other strict "Darwinians," but the more it was investigated, the more it was accepted, so that gradually, and especially after 1900, it brought about widespread scientific dissent from that part of Darwin's evolutionary doctrine which he had derived from Lamarck.

The other modifying line of research was inaugurated earlier, and only a little time after the appearance of "Darwinism," by

Mendel
and Inva-
riable
Elements
in Hered-
ity

Gregor Mendel (1822-1884), a native of Austrian Silesia, an Augustinian monk, and eventually abbot of the monastery at Brünn (in present-day Czechoslovakia). Mendel, not satisfied that Darwin's view of natural selection was sufficient to explain the formation of new species, undertook a series of experiments in the garden of his monastery on the cross-breeding of peas. He published his results in the volumes of a local scientific society, where they lay buried for more than thirty years. Their rediscovery in 1900 by a distinguished Dutch botanist and professor in the University of Amsterdam, Hugo de Vries, and their confirmation and extension by him and by other scientists, had revolutionary consequences. "Mendelianism" was established as a practical aid to scientific breeding of plants and animals and also as a very important amendment of evolutionary theory. For the essence of Mendelianism is that in heredity certain characters may be treated as indivisible and apparently unalterable units, thus introducing into biology what may perhaps be termed an atomic conception¹ and greatly complicating the problem as to how an organic evolution of different species actually occurs.

Second only to the development of the evolutionary aspects of biology, in nineteenth-century popular interest, was the par-

¹ Related to that of the "chromosomes," on which see below, pp. 820-821.

allel (and increasingly connected) progress of physiology and medical science. The founder of the newer scientific physiology was Johannes Müller, professor of anatomy and physiology at the University of Berlin and an inspiring teacher. His *Handbook* (1833-1840) was a classic: it treated of the whole field of human physiology in a highly scientific spirit and with due attention to the latest discoveries in related fields; and it broke fresh ground in its detailed tracing of the nervous system and the functioning of the senses. Another eminent physiologist was Claude Bernard, a Frenchman, who gave up the writing of dramas to study medicine and became professor at the Sorbonne and director of the laboratory at the Botanical Gardens in Paris. He discovered the vaso-motor system and also opened up the vast subject of glands and internal secretions.

6. Physiology and Medical Science

A prime service to medical and surgical science (and dentistry) was rendered by the development of anæsthetics. The anæsthetic qualities of nitrous oxide (so-called "laughing gas") were discovered by Sir Humphry Davy in 1800, and those of ether by Michael Faraday in 1818. These discoveries remained scientific curiosities, however, until 1842, when an American physician, by the name of Crawford Long, privately performed an operation under ether at a town in Georgia.¹ In 1847 a Scottish physician announced his discovery of the anæsthetic properties of chloroform. The use of all these anæsthetics spread speedily in Europe and America, and was later supplemented by the employment of cocaine for local anæsthesia. It may here be remarked that dentistry became a science, as well as an art, in the nineteenth century. The first institution for the systematic education of dentists was established in 1840 at Baltimore.

Anæsthetics

One of the greatest and most significant surgeons of the century was Joseph Lister (1827-1912), the founder of aseptic surgery. The son of an English scientist who improved the compound microscope, he studied physiology at the University of London and began the practice of surgery at Edinburgh in 1853. Then, becoming professor of surgery at Glasgow, he proceeded in 1865 to experiment with carbolic acid

Lister and Aseptic Surgery

¹ The state of Georgia has commemorated Long's achievement by placing a statue of him in the Capitol at Washington.

as a safeguard against the infections which had usually attended surgical operations. His experiments were strikingly successful, and in 1867 he published an account of them to the world in a paper *On a New Method of Treating Compound Fracture, Abscess, etc.* In addition to this fundamental contribution to modern aseptic surgery, Lister introduced the use of carbolized catgut for surgical sewings and conducted important researches in bacteriology. He occupied the chair of clinical surgery at Edinburgh from 1869 and at London from 1877; in 1891 he helped to establish the celebrated Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine. A grateful British government honored him with a baronetcy in 1883 and with a peerage in 1897.

At the very time when Lister was experimenting with carbolic acid and laying the foundations for aseptic surgery, the great

**Pasteur
and
Microbes**

French scientist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) was proving that the yeast plant is the agent of alcoholic fermentation and that other small organisms are the

agents of other familiar fermentations. Thence Pasteur was led to study abnormal and "diseased" fermentations, and thereby to discover microbes as the cause of disease and to inaugurate a veritable revolution in medical science. Pasteur's work in bacteriology was supplemented, in the field of preventive medicine, by the contemporaneous achievements of a distinguished German pathologist and politician, Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902).¹ Pro-

**Virchow
and Pre-
ventive
Medicine**

fessor of pathological anatomy and director of research in the Pathological Institute at Berlin, Virchow in his *Cellular Pathology* (1858) established what Lister described as the "true and fertile doctrine that every

morbid structure consists of cells which have been derived from preëxisting cells as a progeny." Subsequently, he contributed much to our knowledge of particular diseases and took an active part in assuring to Berlin an excellent drainage system, scientific sewage disposal, and a pure water supply.

Some of the most startling triumphs of modern medical science were secured through the researches of Robert Koch (1843-1910), a German physician, at first a medical army officer and afterwards a professor at Berlin. Koch found means of immu-

¹ Virchow was a vigorous proponent of liberalism and a leading spirit in the "Progressive" party formed in Prussia in 1862 to defend political liberalism against the King and Bismarck. See above, pp. 162, 163-164, and below, pp. 442-443.

nizing human beings against certain dread diseases. One brilliant step in this direction had already been taken by an English physician, Edward Jenner, who had discovered, at the close of the eighteenth century, that the scourge of smallpox could be gotten rid of by "vaccination," that is, by inoculating persons with the vaccine of cow-pox. On the sounder bacteriological basis provided by Pasteur, Koch was able to go much farther. In 1876 he obtained a pure culture of the bacillus of anthrax and in 1883 announced a method of preventive inoculation against it. In 1883 he isolated the bacillus of cholera.

Koch and
Inocula-
tions
against
Disease

The marvellous work of Koch stimulated widespread interest and much scientific practical progress in bacteriology. Within a comparatively short time, bacilli were detected of lockjaw, diphtheria, the bubonic plague, malaria, and sleeping-sickness, and methods were devised for inoculating persons against several such diseases. By the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to the development of bacteriology and aseptic surgery, medical science was concentrating upon the prevention even more than upon the cure of disease. Certain results were already obvious: a marked lessening of the scope and virulence of "plagues"; a sharp decline in infant mortality; and a considerable lengthening of the average span of human life.

All this advance in physiology and medical science, together with the rise of evolutionary conceptions in biology and the absorption of eminent naturalists in the behavior as well as in the structure of animals and plants, gave impetus to novel attempts to render human psychology a strictly physical science. The leading figure in these attempts was Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), a native of Baden, a trained physician and physiologist, and professor of philosophy successively at Heidelberg and at Leipzig. Wundt contended that the soul is not a separate entity or agent but a particular class of bodily actions of a mechanical sort; and in his chief work, *Foundations of Physiological Psychology* (1872), he expounded at length the physical basis of thought and behavior, the affinity of human minds to those of the lower animals, and the experimental laboratory methods which should be pursued. These methods he exemplified in the celebrated psychological laboratory which he opened at Leipzig in 1875, and before long

Physio-
logical
Psychol-
ogy

they were commonplaces of the "science" of psychology in Europe and America.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the pervasive supposition that man's mind is biological and evolutionary was being industriously applied to animal psychology, to child psychology, to social psychology, and especially to the testing of "intelligence" and the treatment of criminals and madmen. The pioneer of "intelligence tests" was Alfred Binet (1857-1911), who became director of the psychological laboratory of the Paris Sorbonne in 1894 and was called upon by the French government to devise tests for the investigation which it authorized in 1904 of the condition of mentally defective children in the public schools.

Among psychologists—or "psychiatrists"—who concerned themselves with criminology, the most conspicuous was Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909), an Italian of Jewish extraction, professor at the University of Turin. Lombroso referred all mental phenomena to biological causes, and held that the so-called "criminal" was not morally responsible for his acts, inasmuch as he was a special being whom processes of degeneration and atavism placed midway between the lunatic and the savage. Though Lombroso's work has since been discredited, it gave marked impetus at the time to the extensive development of "psychiatry" and its practical application to problems of crime and insanity.

4. MATERIALISM, POSITIVISM, AND MARXIAN SOCIALISM

The word "materialism" may conveniently be used to designate the general nature of the philosophic thought which proceeded from nineteenth-century science, industry, and international rivalry and which exercised a very great influence during the era from 1870 to 1910. Materialism means a denial or ignoring of any spiritual conception of the universe and an explanation of all phenomena by reference to the existence and character of matter. In this broad sense, many persons may be accounted "materialist" who were not at all philosophically minded and who ignored, rather than denied, the traditional dualism of "spirit" and "matter"—persons who were absorbed in "practical matters" of making money, directing banks, organizing industrial corporations, devising machinery, or otherwise "applying" science. Such persons had little time or inclination to think about the ultimates of human life and des-

Material-
ism,
1870-1910

tiny. Among them, as among most "scientific" philosophers, it was not so much a question of dogmatically rejecting the spiritual as of exalting the physical and the material and confessing a complete agnosticism about the supernatural.

Nineteenth-century progress in physics and chemistry seemed to confirm the eighteenth-century notion of the universe as a huge machine functioning in accordance with immutable "natural laws"—laws at once mathematical and physical. It now seemed apparent that earth, sun, moon, and stars not only, but animals, vegetables, and minerals, light, heat, and electricity—all the phenomena of nature—were material things, composed of simple "elements" organized in atoms, molecules, or other particles, and operating in a regular way. With telescope, microscope, and spectroscope, the "matter" of the whole universe might be observed and its mechanical constitution demonstrated.

Beyond all this went the philosophical implications of nineteenth-century "natural history." So long as "scientific" philosophy centred in Newtonian physics, as it had done during the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, its apostles and disciples could marvel at the Deity who had been the Creator and Supreme Lawgiver of the universe and at the peculiar mental endowment of man which enabled him, alone among all God's creatures, to apply his "reason" to discovery of universal natural law. They could be "deists" and "rationalists." But now, in the nineteenth century, evolutionary biology (and geology) shared with Newtonian physics the centre of the intellectual stage, and contributed to the rise of an even more radical philosophy, one more emphatically materialist, one which spurned deism and questioned rationalism.

It cannot be too emphatically stated that conceptions of historical growth and development, of "evolution," held a pre-eminent, and novel, position in nineteenth-century thought. This was exemplified by the historical writings with which the century teemed and of whose "developmental" and "scientific" character we have already spoken.¹ It was exemplified, yet more tellingly, by the formulation of a whole series of evolutionary hypotheses. Laplace in his

Mechanical
Universe

A Godless
and Irrational
Universe

An Evolving
Universe

¹ See above, pp. 122-123.

nebular hypothesis (1796) held that the solar system had been gradually evolved from a primeval hot nebula which, as it whirled in space, cast off parts that slowly cooled and shrank into the planets and moons, the sun remaining as a remnant of the original nebula. Lyell maintained (1830) that the physical features of the earth had been formed by natural evolutionary processes and presented convincing proofs of the great antiquity of these processes and of man's existence on earth. Lamarck set forth (1815) an evolutionary doctrine of the common origin and gradual differentiation of all living things on the earth, and Darwin proposed (1859) "natural selection" as the major explanation of how such evolution had actually taken place, including man's. As these and similar theories gained acceptance, the *tout ensemble* was highly favorable to materialist philosophizing about man and the universe.

The "social sciences" clearly revealed in the latter part of the nineteenth century a preoccupation with evolutionary investigations and a predilection for materialist explanations. We have already referred to the "scientific" psychology of the period, which posited man's "animal mind" and toppled "pure reason" from the throne which it had occupied in eighteenth-century philosophy.

Archæology and anthropology, like psychology, became "sciences" in the nineteenth century and contributed much to the knowledge of "prehistoric" times and peoples and also to the confirmation of contemporary evolutionary philosophy. The honor of having been the "father" of scientific archæology is usually ascribed to Winckelmann for his treatise (1762) on the excavations at Pompeii and Herculaneum;¹ and on the eve of the nineteenth century an army officer participating in Napoleon's Egyptian campaign had discovered at Rosetta the famous stone with parallel Greek and Egyptian inscriptions by means of which Jean Champollion (1790-1832) was enabled to decipher the latter and inaugurate the fruitful study of "Egyptology." As the nineteenth century advanced, archæological investigations were multiplied and greatly extended, accumulating a vast deal of information not only about classical Rome and Greece and ancient Egypt but also about early types of civilization in Mesopotamia and

**Evol-
utionary
and Mate-
rialist
"Social
Science"**

**Archæol-
ogy and
Man's
Antiquity**

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 534, 734.

Palestine, Crete and Carthage, India and China, Mexico and Peru, and carrying back the story of mankind to hitherto unsuspected dates. By the end of the century, too, it was possible, thanks to the discoveries of "Neanderthal" and "Cromagnon" remains, to fashion some idea of human life in a "neolithic age"—perhaps in a "palæolithic age"—anywhere from 20,000 to 100,000 years B.C. Archæology was a most helpful and fascinating handmaid to the geology of Lyell and the biology of Darwin.

It was similar with anthropology. In the eighteenth century there had been considerable interest in description and comparison of folk customs, and there had been some "scientific" attempts to differentiate the "races" of mankind and to connect their peculiarities with their physical environment.¹ In the nineteenth century, however, anthropology flourished as an important specialized branch of science, dealing with "primitive" races and cultures, with heredity and environment, and maintaining a close liaison with archæology and philology—and, of course, with evolutionary philosophy. Among professional anthropologists of the century, mention may here be made of three: Galton, Tylor, and Frazer.

Anthropology and Man's Primitive-ness

Francis Galton (1822-1911), a cousin of Charles Darwin, after study at the universities of London and Cambridge and extensive travel in Africa, was inspired by his cousin's *Origin of Species* to devote himself to anthropology, with special reference to heredity and the application of statistics to human attributes. Galton's researches provided a foundation for the subsidiary "science" of eugenics. By voice and pen he preached constantly the doctrine that heredity explains why some people are intelligent and "fit" while others are stupid and "unfit," and that therefore the "fit" should be encouraged to breed, while the multiplication of the "unfit" should be checked. He was a determined advocate of sterilization and birth-control—for the unfit and improvident. He believed that thereby man could direct his own evolution toward a higher plane and thus transform himself into a superman.

Galton and Eugenics

Edward Tylor (1832-1917) was the son of an English brass-founder and the brother of a distinguished geologist. His first book was a report on archæological and anthropological observations in Mexico. Gradually he widened the scope of his investiga-

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 549, 813.



tions; and the nature of his later interests is indicated by the title of his chief work, which he published in 1871 and which remained during the next forty years the standard textbook in anthropology, *Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Language, Art, and Custom*. Tylor was the first professor of anthropology at Oxford.

Tylor and
Primitive
Culture

In Tylor's footsteps followed James Frazer, a Scotsman, trained at Glasgow and Cambridge, a most persevering student and facile writer. Frazer specialized in primitive religion, collecting and presenting a prodigious number of bits of information about ancient ceremonies and beliefs and about popular superstitions (and suggesting an evolutionary relationship among them) in the comprehensive survey which he brought out under the title of *The Golden Bough* in 1890 and reissued subsequently in twelve volumes.

Frazer
and
Primitive
Religion

By anthropologists like Tylor and Frazer, much was done to stimulate an interest in comparative religion and especially to spread the idea that all religion rests on myths. This idea was applied not only by anthropologists to primitive cults but also by a considerable number of Biblical scholars to historic Christianity. A conspicuous pioneer among such "scientific" critics of the Bible was David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), a German, whose *Life of Jesus* assailed the inspiration of the New Testament and denied the miracles and other supernatural attributes of Christ. Strauss subsequently accepted Darwinism, and a group of his associates and disciples in the Protestant faculty of theology in the University of Tübingen (in Württemberg) became known as the "Tübingen school" of "higher critics."

Biblical
Criticism:
Strauss

Another outstanding critic of Christianity and student of comparative religion was Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a Frenchman from Brittany, who was trained for the Catholic priesthood but abandoned Christianity in 1845 and devoted himself to science. He was impressed with the "certitudes" of physics and biology, and eager to apply the ideals of natural science to the study of Oriental literature and comparative religion. He pursued researches in Palestine, a study of ancient languages, and drastic criticism of the Bible, gradually reaching the conclusion that the Scriptures and Christian creed were

Renan

but a development—an evolution—of primitive folk-lore and superstition. In 1862 he published his celebrated *Life of Jesus*, lucid in exposition and felicitous in phrase, portraying the Founder of Christianity as a pathetic self-deluded man. Renan displayed none of the bitterness of an eighteenth-century Voltaire. Rather, he heaved indulgent sighs for the beauty in what "science" must pronounce to be the "myth" of Christianity. Consequently, his attacks were more subtle and more influential. From his time, hundreds of scholars and thousands of students reckoned Christianity and other "revealed" religions as evolutionary products of physiological psychology or as curious survivals of anthropological nature worship. Of certain effects of this tendency we shall say more in the next chapter.

In the meantime, let us point out the elements which entered into a general materialist philosophy of the era. They were the seemingly scientific evidences of a mechanical and evolving universe, a lessening distinction between the organic and inorganic, an attribution of man's origin and of his mind, behavior, culture, and religion to physiological animal sources. The materialism, deduced from these hypotheses, reached its height during the era from 1870 to 1910 and was most zealously propagated by Huxley, Haeckel, and Spencer.

Huxley was a scientist of no slight ability or achievement, but he was also a literary artist and much inclined to philosophize on the general significance of the "Darwinism" which as a scientist he espoused. And he was particularly irked by what he deemed the "obscurantism" of theologians who opposed Darwin's idea of evolution. Huxley was a caustic critic of theism and theology. He did not absolutely deny the possibility of a divine "First Cause," but he insisted that "doubt is a beneficent demon" and declared that "there is no evidence of the existence of such a being as the God of the theologians." To Huxley, moreover, there was no freedom of the human will, only a kind of "scientific Calvinism" according to which everyone must behave as one's physiological processes and the laws of evolution direct.

Haeckel was more uncompromising in his materialism. He spent many years in expounding the philosophical implications of an extreme and dogmatic "Darwinism," and when he was sixty-five he summarized his convictions in a famous book, *The*

**Material-
ism of
Huxley**

Riddle of the Universe (1899). According to him, what purports to be spiritual is really physical. Organic nature is essentially one with inorganic nature, and "life" has sprung naturally from an arrangement of chemical elements. Man's mind as well as his body, together with all animal and vegetable species, has been evolved from protoplasm which arises from nitrogenous carbon compounds by spontaneous generation.

The most comprehensive philosophy of evolutionary materialism was set forth by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), an Englishman and one of the most typical figures of the nineteenth century. Spencer was neither an experimental scientist nor a university man. Born of a family of school-teaching Quakers and Methodists, he was largely self-educated and "self-made." In the early days of English railroad-building, he was an engineer on the London and Birmingham railway; and for several years after 1848, when economic liberalism was in the ascendant, he was an editor of the London *Economist* and an energetic advocate of individualism. Gradually he turned his attention to theorizing; and in 1857 he maintained, in *Progress, Its Law and Cause*, that all development—of the individual as well as of the solar system—proceeds "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." Spencer applauded Darwin's *Origin of Species* and enriched its doctrine with the phrase, "survival of the fittest." And in 1860—the year following the appearance of Darwin's book—Spencer issued the prospectus of his *Synthetic Philosophy*, an enormous work in ten volumes, upon which he was engaged for the next thirty-six years.

The central feature of Spencer's philosophy was that everything organic and inorganic had been naturally evolved, through a "struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest," "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." Back of this evolution, Spencer reasoned, must be a Power or Cause, but it should be defined as the Unknowable and quite neglected in speculations about matter and motion which alone are "knowable." In his *Principles of Psychology*, Spencer explained the phenomena of adult human mind by reference to its infant and animal ancestry. In his *Principles of Sociology*, he treated of society as an evolving organism, and utilized "Darwinism" to support the industrial competition and capitalism of the age and, indeed, to buttress

the whole creed of political and economic liberalism. In his *Principles of Ethics*, he relied upon evolutionary conceptions and concluded most optimistically that, as evolution proceeds, the moral sense must increase and lead on to a state of social harmony so complete as to wipe out the antagonism between altruism and egoism and render duty a pleasure.

The evolutionary materialism of Spencer, Haeckel, and Huxley might, and did, conduce to a very optimistic view of human progress, especially when its disciples thought mainly of the continuity of evolution. If matter had evolved so inevitably from protoplasm to present-day man, then man's future evolution into a superman was bound to be quite as inevitable and (it was imagined) even more rapid.

Optimistic
Material-
ism

But when thought was concentrated on man's animal and cave-man ancestry and on the earthy nature of his "reason" and "intelligence," pessimism might result. Man had so much of the beast in him and was misled by his imaginings into such gross superstition and such insane "idealism" that there was little chance of improving him—at least within a calculable period or by usual means. It should not surprise us, therefore, that during the years from 1870 to 1910, a pessimistic, as well as an optimistic, philosophy found favor with a considerable number of persons who were excited by the reputed lessons of science. Nor should it surprise us that, whereas the optimists relied upon the fated "progress" of the human race for the realization of a kind of utopia in the not too distant future, pessimists invoked the arbitrary individual "will" of exceptionally gifted persons as the only possible escape from the prison of matter and unreason.

Pessimis-
tic Mate-
rialism

The philosophy of the "will" and of pessimism had been expounded before the rise of "Darwinism" by a German, Arthur Schopenhauer,¹ in *The World as Will and Idea*, a work originally published in 1818 and subsequently revised and issued in two volumes in 1844. It was a protest at once against the rationalism of the eighteenth century and against the romantic idealism of the first part of the nineteenth century. It maintained that there is no intelligence save what is exhibited by animals. What sways animals (including man) is sheer vital "will" of each individual, acting not from

Schopen-
hauer

¹ See portrait of Schopenhauer facing p. 243, above.

any idealism but from a "realism" based on appetite and passion.

This kind of "realism" was developed further by another German, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Nietzsche came of a Saxon family of Protestant pastors and was expected to become a clergyman himself, but the reading of Schopenhauer and a special delight in the music of Wagner actuated him to abandon the pursuit of theological studies and the profession of Christianity. After obtaining a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Bonn, Nietzsche taught at Basel from 1869 to 1879, when he resigned on account of ill health and took up his residence in northern Italy and on the French Riviera. In 1889 he broke down completely, mentally as well as physically, and during his last mad years he was tended by members of his family at Weimar.

Nietzsche wrote much during the 70's and 80's. At first, he essayed the rôle of classical scholar and critic. Then, passing from mild criticism of democracy to furious criticism of romanticism in general, he penned several polemics against contemporary "illusions" of art, religion, and philosophy. At the last, in 1888, he brought out a series of savage attacks on Christianity and its Founder and on "Judæo-Christian morality." In the meantime, in 1883-1885, he published his philosophical masterpiece, in the form of apothegms put in the mouth of a Persian sage, *Thus Spake Zarathustra, a Book for All and None*. Life, according to the author, has been retarded for thousands of years by an illusory worship of "the good, the true, and the beautiful." There are no such instincts as these in man, nor is there any foundation in nature for ideals of sacrifice, generosity, or gentleness. What does exist is another instinct, another basis for human excellence—the will to power, the will to a stronger and hence a higher life. If this instinct is obeyed, if the weak are ruthlessly trampled upon by the strong, an aristocracy of supermen will arise and possess the earth.

The gospel of pessimistic realism had no such popular support as that which optimistic materialism obtained. Schopenhauer had almost no following during his lifetime, and Nietzsche's doctrine made its chief appeal to a coterie of young intellectuals who wanted to be "revolutionary" or were enamored by the literary form of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* as much as by its philosophical

content. Yet we must not underestimate the significance of the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche development. Being compatible with a particular view of "science," and becoming full-fledged in an age of mounting militarism and expanding imperialism, it could be utilized to explain, even to excuse and extol, the behavior of "supermen" among nationalist statesmen and industrial capitalists, and to justify specific assaults on supernatural religion and conventional morality. And it was so utilized by an increasing number of persons, especially after 1890. It became a factor in the "realism" which helped to pave the way to the World War and to post-war dictatorships.

Of far greater importance to the immediate thought of the era from 1870 to 1910 than the "willfulness" of Nietzsche or even the "pure materialism" of Haeckel, was the "positivism" of Auguste Comte. Comte (1798-1857), the son of a French tax official, received a scientific training at the Polytechnic in Paris and earned a precarious living by teaching mathematics, but his chief interest was in the field of social philosophy. Here his innate abilities and methodical habits enabled him, between 1830 and his death in 1857, to produce a large number of heavy, yet meaty, tomes which have won him the titles of "father of sociology" and "founder of positivism." The "system" of Comte, as set forth in his *Positive Philosophy*, represented an attempt to treat "social science" as a "natural science."

Comte
and the
Philosophy
of
Positiv-
ism

An evolutionary conception was basic to Comte's sociology. According to him, man has passed successively through three historical phases: (1) the theological, or fictitious; (2) the metaphysical, or abstract; and (3) the scientific, or positive. In the first phase, man believed that all phenomena are the result of supernatural powers. In the second—a transitional phase—man turned from capricious "spirits" to abstract forces and tried to find the causes of phenomena in "nature" and "reason." In the third phase, the dawning positivism of the nineteenth century, man no longer seeks for causes, whether natural or supernatural, but is content with facts. In other words, fact-finding was to be the pursuit and the goal of the future, the assembling and counting of facts, with only contempt for external explanation of facts.

Positivist
Sociology

In freeing the "facts" of human relationships from abstrac-

tions, Comte insisted that he was erecting a new "social science,"—that is, sociology, or, as he styled it, "social physics." Its goal would be the reorganization of the moral, religious, and political systems of mankind in accordance with the dictates of positivism, that is, of "fact."

Comte associated with his positivist philosophy certain ideas of considerable influence. One was his criticism of the eighteenth-century principle of "natural rights": he deemed it "metaphysical," and prophesied that positivists would presently discover a scientific substitute for it. Another was his distrust of the masses, whom he thought too credulous, and his belief that society and government should be directed by an aristocracy of landowners, industrialists, and engineers, in accordance with the advice of "scientific experts." Still another idea of Comte's was the glorification of force as the "scientific" cornerstone of the modern state. Force, he held, answers in sociology to tissue in biology; it is the cement of the social organism.

Finally, Comte sought to invest his positivism with religious garb. In place of a supernatural deity he would raise up humanity not only to be studied scientifically but also to be worshipped. The positivist "church" of Comte did not materialize as its founder hoped. True, it was duly inaugurated at Paris, and branches were established in England and Germany. It secured, however, no really popular following, and the number of "intellectuals" who constituted its membership and aspired to be "Catholic without being Christian" was very slight in comparison with the number of scientists who, on the one hand, remained Christian, or, on the other hand, deemed any formal religion quite superfluous.

Positivism, nevertheless, was influential. Many scientists, and likewise many engineers and industrialists, including some who did not read Comte or know much about the refinements of his doctrine, were essentially positivist in that they concentrated on fact-finding and confined their philosophizing about science to an optimistic faith in its all-sufficient utility for human progress.

Besides, a goodly number of liberal intellectuals discovered in Comte's gospel a logical and up-to-date supplement to the earlier gospel of Jeremy Bentham.¹ They perceived that Comte

¹ On Bentham, see Vol. I, pp. 544-545.

had emphasized Bentham's humanitarianism, and the more they studied Comte, the more they found his "scientific spirit" and his "idealistic" materialism in harmony with their own mental attitude and of service to that gradual modification of liberalism which they wrought during the era after 1870.¹

One of the foremost "liberal" positivists was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). He began as a devoted disciple of Bentham and a brilliant exponent of economic liberalism, but gradually his interests broadened into the fields of natural science, psychology, and sociology, and he developed a marked sympathy for certain aspects of Comte's teaching. He was too independent a thinker to become a mere follower of Comte, but it was in line with Comte's positivism that Mill in his later life changed the basis of his liberal philosophy (and ethics) from *a priori* reasoning to scientific observation and embodied in his practical program not only an earnest plea for individual liberty but also sweeping demands for sociological, even "socialist," reforms—the emancipation of women, the nationalization of land, the amelioration of the conditions of the working classes. John Stuart Mill was the herald of the "new liberalism"—the positivist liberalism—which after 1870 was intimately associated with "science," with industrial and material "progress," and with a gradual evolution toward "state socialism."

Liberal
Positiv-
ism: John
Stuart
Mill

At the opposite extreme, some conservative intellectuals discovered in Comte's positivism an arsenal of arguments against liberalism and in favor of what they were pleased to term "realism." They liked Comte's criticism of the French Revolution. They sympathized with his defense of aristocracy. They agreed with him that force is requisite for social order and security. Positivists of this sort were not so much in the public eye, between 1870 and 1910, as were those of the liberal type, but behind the scenes they were fostering an intellectual movement highly favorable to contemporary militarism and imperialism and to the later emergence of Fascism and similar manifestations of illiberal nationalism.

Illiberal
Positiv-
ism: Root
of Fas-
cism

The rise of positivism gave special impetus to sociological studies, and these took two chief forms. One was the synthesizing

¹ On pre-positivist liberalism, see above, pp. 50-51; and on the later modification of liberalism, see above, pp. 221-225.

of data of history, economics, and politics with data of natural science and of the new social sciences of psychology and anthropology into generalized statements of the "laws" and "trends" which presumably govern the behavior and evolution of human society. This was the form of sociology initiated by Comte and immensely forwarded by Herbert Spencer.

The other was the analysis, through detailed "field" investigation, of the life and labor of particular social classes or groups. This second form of sociology was suggested by Comte, but its principal exponent was another Frenchman, Frédéric Le Play, a graduate (like Comte) of the Paris Polytechnic and long an official of the department of mines of the French government, who spent five or six months every year for a score of years in first-hand study of "typical" families, their income and expenditure, their mode of life, the problems confronting them and how they met them. The results of his investigations Le Play published in a series of monographs, *European Workers*, the first edition of which appeared in 1855. Among the numerous "social surveys" inspired by Le Play's example, special mention should be made of the monumental inquest into the "life and labor of the people of London," directed and financed by Charles Booth, a British capitalist and philanthropist, and reported by his staff of "experts" in ten huge volumes (1889-1903).

Sociological studies multiplied after 1870 and exerted an ever greater influence on the thought and action of the period. Not only did sociology become a recognized subject of research and instruction in many universities, but its aims and methods were increasingly adopted by disciplines of the other and older "social sciences." Historians, for example, concerned themselves less with strictly individual biography and purely political narrative, and more with general social movements, with the "evolution" of social forces and social institutions. Political scientists, likewise, were moved to stress the practical, rather than the theoretical, aspects of government and to deal not so much with its structure

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Charles Booth, the patron of the sociological fact-finding survey of London in the 1890's, and is from the painting by Sir William Rothenstein (born 1872).

and its relationship to the individual as with its actual functioning in and on society at large.

Economists, too, betrayed a sympathy for current sociology. Such a distinguished economist as John Stuart Mill was led by sociological interests, as we have seen, to supply "classical" economy (and economic liberalism) with a new social orientation. Moreover, the emergence of a new "statistical" or "value" school of political economy nicely synchronized with the spread of the Le Play type of sociology and was affected by it. Of this "school" of economics, William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) was one of the leaders. He was professor of logic and political economy at London and wrote extensively in both fields. In the latter, he defended the distinguishing theory of "value," that value depends entirely upon utility, and that the degree of utility of a commodity is some continuous mathematical function of the quantity of the commodity available. This theory he applied, with the aid of elaborate statistical calculations, to special studies of particular industrial and financial phenomena. Jevons thought he could demonstrate mathematically a connection between commercial crises and sun-spots.

Statistics, both as a "science" in itself and as a method for all the social sciences, assumed a new importance after 1870. Beginning with sociologists (particularly of the Le Play type), and following speedily with economists (especially of the Jevons persuasion), presently with political scientists, and eventually with social historians, the statistical method was exalted as the "exact" method of "social science," and as such it partially eclipsed the "genetic" or "historical" method which had been most prominent in the earlier part of the nineteenth century.

Sociological and statistical studies were no mere academic exercises. They were patronized by municipalities and national governments as well as by universities and research foundations, and were utilized increasingly after 1870 by legislators and a great variety of social reformers. They helped to shift popular and political interest from the individual to society. For if the

Sociological
Economics

Statistics
and Fact-
Finding

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Hand of God," is an example of the "natural" art of the Age of Realism (and Positivism) by the distinguished French sculptor, Auguste Rodin (1840-1917). On Rodin, see below, p. 295.

first part of the nineteenth century was characterized by a trend toward individualism and *laissez-faire*, the latter part of the century was distinguished, indeed, by a socializing tendency.

The same tendency was forwarded by a specific "scientific socialism," equally characteristic of the era from 1870 to 1910.

"Scientific Socialism" It developed just when nineteenth-century natural science was reaching full fruition, when the "scientific" philosophies of materialism and positivism were flourishing, and when governments and governed were alike concerned with industrial progress and social betterment.

The father of this "scientific socialism" was Karl Marx (1818-1883). He was a native of Rhenish Prussia and the son of an ambitious Jewish lawyer who, when Karl was six years old, had the family baptized in the Protestant Church and the family name changed from "Mordecai" to "Marx." Karl was sent in due course to the universities of Bonn and Berlin to study law, but to his father's disgust he preferred philosophy and history and eventually took a doctorate at Jena. Unable to obtain an academic position, he embarked upon a journalistic career—of many vicissitudes. From 1849 to his death in 1883 he resided in England, eking out a meagre living for himself and his devoted family by translating books and serving as special correspondent for the *New York Tribune*. Marx's career was not externally brilliant, and, though he proclaimed the essential doctrine of "scientific socialism" in the revolutionary year of 1848, it was not until twenty or thirty years afterwards that any great fame attached to his ideas.

Career of Karl Marx Marx derived his ideas from several sources. For his logical method and for a great vision of historical evolution, he was indebted to Hegel, the master of "idealist" philosophy.¹ Under the influence of the "Younger Hegelians," with whom he studied at Berlin, he developed a strong sympathy for liberal and democratic political ideals. Presently his interest was aroused in economics; and at Paris this interest was intensified and made fruitful by Marx's personal observations of the new factory system and industrial proletariat about him, by his discussions and debates with Louis Blanc, the "state-socialist," and with Proudhon, the "anarchist-socialist," by his own critical reading of the works of the "utopian socialists"

¹ On Hegel, see Vol. I, pp. 739-740.

and of the "classical" economists and, most significantly of all, by his close contact with Friedrich Engels.

Engels (1820-1895) was a German from Rhenish Prussia (like Marx himself), who, after coming under the spell of Hegelian philosophy, had been sent by his father, a wealthy cotton-spinner, to England to take charge of a branch factory near Manchester and had there been so shocked by what he saw of the condition of the working class that he joined the radical "socialist" element in the Chartist movement. In 1844, on a brief visit to Paris, Engels met Marx, and from this meeting dated the intimate friendship and uninterrupted collaboration which lasted during their lives. It should be emphasized that both Engels and Marx were much influenced by contemporary industrialism and also by the growing materialism, positivism, and "scientific spirit" of the age in which they formulated their economic doctrines.

His Association
with
Engels

In 1848 Marx and Engels jointly issued a little pamphlet, the *Communist Manifesto*. It opened with caustic criticism alike of "bourgeois liberalism" and of "utopian socialism," and went on to expound a "scientific socialism" (or "communism," as the authors preferred to call it) of the following general tenor. The current economic conflict between capitalists and proletarians is but a phase of the age-long economic struggle between social classes.

Communist Manifesto of
1848,
Epitome
of
Marxism

History is simply the record of how one class has gained wealth and then secured political power only to be overthrown and succeeded in wealth and power by another class. Recently the class struggle has been between aristocratic landlords and middle-class capitalists. Now, the factory system is magnifying the wealth and political power of the capitalists at the expense of the landlords, but simultaneously it is creating a proletarian class by whom the capitalist class are to be fought and eventually destroyed. For, through factory exploitation of labor, capitalism will become concentrated, as time goes on, in fewer hands, while the proletariat will absorb the masses of the population and grow more "class-conscious." The day must come when the many will be able to dispossess the few and usher in a solidly proletarian society and government under which the economic means of production and exchange will be owned and operated not privately but socially. On that day will disappear the es-

entially "bourgeois" institutions and mentality which dominate present society. In the meantime, it is the business of "scientific communists" to prepare the proletarians for their inevitable victory: to inculcate "class consciousness" in them, and to urge them to the "class struggle" which they must wage with capitalists. The *Manifesto* concluded with a revolutionary and international flourish: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!"

The *Communist Manifesto* attracted little attention in 1848, and awoke no immediate response even on the part of proletarians. Nevertheless, Marx continued to devote his major energies (usually in collaboration with Engels) to fortifying the doctrines of the *Manifesto* and trying to induce workingmen to organize themselves in support of its philosophy and program. For many years he toiled at a monumental study of economics with a view to showing just how the industrial worker was "exploited" by the industrial capitalist; the results were embodied in a bulky treatise, *Capital*, of which the first volume was published by Marx in 1867 and others by Engels after Marx's death.

Fundamental to Marx's mature work and to the movement which he inaugurated, was a philosophy of "economic determinism." This may be stated in three postulates: (1) that the distinctive civilization—culture, religion, morality, and art—of each age is determined by its material and economic conditions; (2) that the course of history is determined by a succession of class struggles for material supremacy; and (3) that present-day bourgeois capitalistic society will inevitably be transformed into another society, proletarian and collectivist.

Such a philosophical approach to socialism proved "timely." It was advertised as "scientific." It was frankly materialist. It enshrined concepts of evolution and struggle. It appealed in a "realistic" age to a growing number of persons who perceived an affinity of "Marxism" in sociology to "Darwinism" in biology. All of which helps to explain why Marxian doctrines, unheeded in 1848, secured a large following after 1870.

The particular organization which Marx himself founded and directed was not very strong or influential. Formally established

Later Ac-
tivity of
Marx

Marxian
Philoso-
phy of
Economic
Determin-
ism

in 1864 as the "International Workingmen's Association," and usually referred to as the "First International," it comprised groups of workers in various countries of Europe (and in the United States) and held several international congresses. It did spread a knowledge of "Marxism" and it did alarm the governments of the time. Its membership, however, was small and poor; and, despite the strenuous efforts of Marx and Engels, it suffered from the passions attendant upon the Franco-Prussian War, from the disillusionment following the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871,¹ and from internal dissensions arising from the expulsion of anarchist members who criticized Marx. The last real congress of the Association was held at Geneva in 1873, and its dissolution was decreed by a few of the faithful assembled at Philadelphia in 1876.

Organiza-
tion of
Marxians:
First In-
terna-
tional,
1864-1876

Nevertheless, the failure of the "First International" meant by no means the failure of Marxian Socialism. Some of the national groups of which the International had been composed continued to function. In particular, the German group forged ahead, partly because the industrial and intellectual circumstances were favorable and partly because it annexed in 1875 a rival socialist organization which had been founded in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle. Lassalle (1825-1864), a well-educated, well-to-do bourgeois, famed both as a man of fashion and as a "messiah of the poor," was less doctrinaire and more "practical" than Marx. His organizing genius was a legacy, along with the gospel of Marx, to the united "Social Democratic" party which emerged in 1875. Thenceforth, until 1914, this party, committed to political democracy and Marxian socialism, grew in Germany by leaps and bounds.

German
Party of
1875

The Social Democratic party of Germany became the model for similar political organizations of Marxian socialists in other countries. By the end of the 1880's there were such parties in almost every country of Europe (and in the United States), commanding the loyalty of many workingmen and a considerable number of intellectuals, and supported by affiliated trade unions and newspapers. In 1889 delegates of the several "national" parties met at Paris and formed an international federation—the so-called "Second International"—which maintained a central office

¹ See below, p. 390.

and held a series of congresses until the World War of 1914. So impressive was the growth of Marxism during the era from 1870 to 1910 that it dwarfed all other types of socialism, and the word "communism" which Marx and Engels had employed to differentiate their "scientific socialism" from "utopian" or "Christian" socialism fell into disuse. In popular parlance and in the usage of Marxians themselves, "socialism" now connoted the economic and political movement associated with the teachings of Karl Marx.

Marxian socialism was an important factor in European history throughout the "era of realism." It represented a significant intellectual tendency of the era, and, though it was denounced and combated by the majority of the upper, middle, and agricultural classes, by leading statesmen and zealous patriots as well as by capitalists and ecclesiastics, though its disciples remained a minority in every country, it made no mean contribution to the era's "socializing" achievements. It elicited from its adversaries both enmity and emulation. To wean the industrial proletarians from it, and to inoculate the masses against it, governments enacted socialistic legislation—nationalizing railways and other public utilities, protecting trade unions and coöperative societies, and ameliorating the conditions of labor.

In the 1890's, a decade after the death of Karl Marx, the movement which he had inaugurated was obviously advancing, but within it were appearing divergent factions. Marxian socialists were always prone to quarrel with one another over tactics and doctrinal details, but the quarrels assumed a larger significance in the 1890's when several "higher critics" of the gospel of Marx cast doubt upon the accuracy of the master's prophecies. He had foretold that, through the inevitable evolution of capitalism, the bulk of the middle classes would fall into the category of proletarians and that the class-conscious proletariat, thus becoming a numerical majority, would be enabled by sheer weight of numbers to abolish private property and erect the new collectivist state and society. But it was now pointed out, with array of statistics, that while the management of capital was being concentrated in fewer hands, its ownership was being extended, that accompanying the descent of middle-class persons

Second
International,
1889-1914

Influence
of Marx-
ian
Socialism

Diver-
gencies
within
Marxism

into the proletariat was a disconcerting ascent of proletarians into the middle class, and that there was no immediate prospect of a class-conscious proletariat's having the numerical strength of itself to capture any existing government.

If the critics were right, some revision or amendment of Marxian doctrines and tactics appeared necessary. But in what direction? Eduard Bernstein, a prominent figure in the Social Democratic party of Germany and a most trenchant critic of orthodox Marxism, argued that Socialists should move toward the right. Instead of pursuing tactics in strict keeping with the philosophy of economic determinism, they should collaborate with democratically minded persons, even bourgeois political parties, in any action which would strengthen popular government and advance the socialization of industry. The right-wing Socialists who followed Bernstein were known as "revisionists" or "reformists." They were fairly numerous in trade unions (the "aristocracy" of labor) and among middle-class converts to socialism. Some of them formed "independent" socialist groups, as in France and England, but most of them remained within the regular socialist parties, as in Germany, and exerted a gradually growing influence upon them.

Bernstein
and
"Revisionism"

Other critics of orthodox Marxism urged a movement in the opposite direction—toward the left. According to them, Socialists, lacking a numerical majority, should intensify the class struggle, precipitate a revolution, and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. Such counsels appealed particularly to unskilled workers in southern Europe, who had a deep-seated distaste for parliamentary government, and to radical extremists in an absolutist and industrially backward country like Russia. In this way, a "syndicalist" or "direct-action" movement emerged in France, Italy, and various other countries in the late 1890's. It eschewed politics, and devoted itself to "economic" and "moral" preparation of the proletariat for a "general strike" and a social revolution, preparation involving the development of "industrial unions" of unskilled as well as skilled workers and frequent resort to strikes and sabotage.

Left-Wing
Syndicalism
and
"Direct Action"

The chief philosopher of "syndicalism" was George Sorel, a French engineer and *littérateur* and a curious compound of

positivist and mystic. Sorel called himself a "Neo-Marxist." In numerous writings, including his famous *Reflexions on Violence* (1906), he accepted Marx's ideas of the class conflict and the destiny of the proletariat, but he tinged them with pessimism and criticized Marx's concessions to political democracy and his faith in merely material progress.

In subsequent chapters on Britain, Latin Europe, northern and eastern Europe, we shall have occasion to illustrate what we have said here in general concerning the growth and influence of Marxian Socialism, with its "revisionist" and "syndicalist" wings, during the era from 1870 to 1910. Meanwhile, in order to complete our broad survey of this era of realism—this era of machinery, science, materialism, positivism, and Marxism—we must sketch its artistic and religious aspects.



CHAPTER XIX

ART AND RELIGION IN THE ERA OF REALISM



OW the first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by a rapid development of machine industry and by the vogue of romanticism in thought and art, we have elsewhere indicated.¹ Romanticism, no more than classicism, could be expected to cease in the latter part of the century. Both were too solidly established. Both were too intimately associated with historic movements of continuing vitality. Both were too impressively exemplified in enduring monuments. Hence, as industrialization proceeded, as nationalism flourished and liberalism was transformed, the culture of Europe continued to be in part romantic, in part classicist.

In part, however, it was now something else. It was what certain leading artists and philosophers of the era described as "realist." A special mark of the period from 1870 to 1910, a cultural accompaniment of developments in natural science, in sociology, and in psychology, it was defined by its champions as the basing of art, as well as of practical "progress," not on ancient models or "reason," as "classicists" had done, not on "emotion" and an idyllic state of nature, as romantics had tried to do, but on a veritably photographic representation of observable "facts" of the contemporary world. There would be in it no idealization of man, of his past, of his mind or "soul," of his aspirations or philosophizings. Indeed, it would tend in an opposite direction toward emphasizing the very gradualness of man's ascent from his savage animal origins and the atavistic, pathological, and irrational features of his present existence.

I. LITERATURE

In literature, much of the earlier romanticism of both subject and style survived, and was exemplified, especially in English

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 734-751, and Vol. II, above, pp. 106-124.

literature, by several "popular" writers. Thus, romantic adventure was the central concern of that engaging Scottish writer, Robert Louis Stevenson, in the series of delightful volumes which he published in the 1880's. Then, too, a romantic idealism characterized the whole outlook and output of that other engaging Scottish author, James Barrie, the touching humor and pathos of his novels and the fairy-like whimsicality of his plays. Romantic also was Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), not only in his jungle tales and his stirring sea stories but likewise in his poetical praise of the new imperialism, the "white man's burden."

Indeed, the contemporary interest in imperialism as well as the ever-heightening interest in nationalism was reflected in a good deal of romantic literature of the era from 1870 to 1910, in French and German, Russian and Italian, as well as in English. It was quite obvious that such writers as Maurice Barrès in France and Gabriele D'Annunzio in Italy were literary heirs of the romanticism which had reveled in folk-manners and folk-lore, in national scenery and national "souls."

But in literature, while romanticism still flourished, "realism" cropped up fresh and more abundant. The new realist literature treated usually of one or both of two general subjects: (1) psychological analysis of the individual, with special reference to his "fated" response to his domestic and social milieu and to traditional institutions and ethics; and (2) sociological study of family, class, or social problems, with particular implications of the need for radical social reform—uplifting the laboring classes, emancipating women, ending war, and redistributing wealth. It treated of its subjects preferably in prose and with a wealth of petty detail, "factual" and ostensibly precise and "scientific."

In "atmosphere" and "style," realist literature displayed divergent tendencies. If it was "social," it was apt to be optimistic and journalistic. If, on the other hand, it was "psychological," it was likely to be pessimistic and to be most meticulously expressed. Some of the foremost "psychological realists," especially those in France, were quite "classicist" in the painstaking care they took to find just the right phrase, just the right "proportion," to convey their meaning.

Of such realists, one of the most famous was Gustave Flaubert

(1821-1880). An extremely neurotic son of a French physician, he refused to practice law in which he was trained and sought escape from chronic melancholy by applying himself most assiduously to literary labor. His first and greatest novel, on which he toiled constantly for five years, was *Madame Bovary* (1857), a coolly analytical story of the marital infidelity of a country physician's wife; and his last work, in the 1870's, was a half-finished literary assault on optimism. Flaubert's fame was much greater after his death than during his lifetime. *Madame Bovary*, when it first appeared, was generally regarded as salacious and scandalous, and its author was prosecuted for immorality. After 1880, in the age of realism, it was hailed as the highest art.

The witty impressionistic narration of "realistic" love-affairs was a specialty of Alphonse Daudet (1840-1897), who, in quite another vein, could specialize in romantic adventures of his *Tartarin of Tarascon*. On occasion, indeed, Daudet was as romantic as Dickens; on other occasions he was as realistic as Flaubert. Somewhat similar to Daudet in style, though always realist in subject-matter and in the sardonic quality of his humor, was Guy de Maupassant (1850-1893), an acute observer and a very great artist. Maupassant, by his writing during the 80's, proved himself a supreme master of the short story.

Far less of an artist but far more serious in his realism was Émile Zola (1840-1902). The son of an engineer, he was intensely interested in the newer developments of natural science and quite obsessed with the "laws" of heredity; and, brought up in poverty, he was an ardent agitator for social reform. He was a "social" realist, half novelist and half journalist. In the years following 1871 he turned out some twenty sombre volumes on various situations and problems confronting several generations of an imaginary family, and other novels he wrote about population, about work, about alcoholism. Zola was a radical republican, and towards the end of his life he played no slight rôle in French politics.¹

Surpassing all these French writers in contemporary vogue was Jacques Thibault (1844-1924), best known by his pen-name of Anatole France. For thirty years, from 1885 to 1915, French

¹ See below, pp. 412, 413.

literature (and indeed European literature) was dominated by his fame. No reputation since Voltaire's was comparable with his. He

was the son of a Parisian bookseller and began his literary career by writing verse for self-amusement.

His first novel, *The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard* (1881), was a brilliant success, and thenceforth for forty years he poured out a series of witty, mocking, and captivating works of most varied content: pungent and mischievous short stories; philosophical and critical books; novels like *The Rotisserie of Queen Pedaugue*, *Thaïs*, and *The Gods Thirst*; a sceptical biography of Joan of Arc; a number of satires on politics and religion, including *Penguin Island* (1908) and *The Revolt of the Angels* (1914).

Anatole France was essentially what Voltaire would have been if he had lived at the end of the nineteenth century instead of in the eighteenth. He had all of Voltaire's cleverness and lucidity and all his pitiless scepticism about the stupidity and silliness of mankind, but the philosophy which he derived from the natural science of his day was more disillusioning and pessimistic. Whereas Voltaire had believed in Deism and in rational human progress, Anatole France until at least 1900 gave no evidence of a belief in anything, either better or worse. He was the perfect sceptic and ostentatiously indifferent to everything except "art." After 1900 he did take some interest in political and social matters, allying himself at first with radicals and then with social revolutionaries.¹

Among English novelists who were esteemed as realists toward the close of the nineteenth century were Meredith and Hardy.

George Meredith (1828-1909) inaugurated his series of psychological novels as early as 1859 with the *Ordeal of Richard Feverel*, but it was not until much later, with the publication of *The Egoist* (1879) and *Diana of the Crossways* (1885), that he became famous for his realistic analysis of character and for his clipped epigrammatic style. Thomas Hardy (1840-1928) devoted his talents mainly to studies of the fateful workings of the "struggle for existence" in village and peasant life in the English countryside. His principal novels, such as *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886) and *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (1891), are concerned not with civilization or manners but

¹ A likeness of Anatole France, by T. A. Steinlen, appears as the tail-piece to this chapter. p. 325, below.

with animal aspects of human life; and his poetry, which is now esteemed more highly than his prose, shows the same concern.

English drama, like the English novel, responded to the scientific realism of the age, less emphatically perhaps along the lines of individual psychology than in the domain of sociology. The outstanding dramatist of the age, with an international vogue and influence scarcely inferior to Anatole France's, was George Bernard Shaw. Shaw was born (1856) at Shaw

Dublin of an Anglo-Irish Protestant family and was schooled at a non-conformist college in his native city. His chief early interests were in music and painting, and in 1876 he betook himself to London and earned a meagre living there by journalistic art-criticism. In the early 80's a special interest in economic radicalism was awakened in him by Henry George,¹ and presently he became a Socialist. With an enthusiasm for Marxism, he combined a faith in the beneficent rôle of science, mechanical progress, and materialist philosophy, and a caustic witty manner of viewing the obstacles in the way and preaching their removal. He wrote clever novels, brilliant essays, shrewd letters; but his forte was as a playwright. To the "realistic" drama he was impelled by his admiration for the Norwegian dramatist, Ibsen, and beginning in 1893 he produced an amazing number of plays, treating of a variety of social problems—prostitution, militarism, imperialism, socialism, the Nietzschean superman, the Salvation Army, etc.—all very didactic and entertaining. Shaw had a genius for self-advertisement, and a multitude who were not always sure whether he was making fun of them or not, swarmed to his plays and applauded his sallies. He was the bludgeoning British counterpart to the more rapier-like Anatole France.

A similar vogue attended the literary efforts of H. G. Wells (born 1866)—for rather different reasons. Wells came from the lower middle class, the son of a professional cricketer, and from the beginning he was devoted to "science." Wells

He obtained a scientific degree from London University and for several years as schoolmaster and private coach he taught science. Then, at a time when everybody was talking about the marvels of science, he took the world by storm with a series of "scientific romances"—*The Time Machine*, *The Stolen Bacillus*, *The War of the Worlds*—making the most romantic improbabilities seem

¹ See below, p. 343.

real and assured. In the meantime he became a convert to socialism, and soon he was fusing his mechanical, "scientific" utopias with social utopias in which machines would work and men would play and from which would be eternally banished religious superstition and everything else inimical to the evolution and reign of superman. This "utopian realism" Wells set forth in a swift succession of vivid writings from *A Modern Utopia* (1905) to *The Research Magnificent* (1915).

Norwegian literature was notably influential in the age of realism, thanks largely to the international repute of Ibsen.

Ibsen Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) was an unhappy person, and his early dramas, intensely patriotic and quite romantic, were not well received. Forsaking Norway in the 1860's, first for Italy and then for Germany, he became "realist" and internationally famous. His *Brand* and *Peer Gynt* (1867) were poetical satires on Norwegian life and religion; and in a series of grim dramas during the 70's and 80's—*A Doll's House*, *Ghosts*, *An Enemy of the People*, etc.—he mercilessly diagnosed various diseases of modern society, especially the disease of hypocrisy. Then, in the 90's his dramas grew increasingly symbolic and mystical until no clear content but only an esoteric "art" remained.

Ibsen exerted no little influence on younger men throughout Europe. We have already noted his influence on Shaw. It was also apparent in German literature of the era, particularly in the social novels and dramas of Hermann Sudermann and in the peasant-life plays of Gerhart Hauptmann. We may add that Hauptmann in his later years turned from "realism" to "dream poems" and dramatic fairy tales.

Outside the main stream of the new "realism," yet paralleling it, was the important work of an eminent Russian reformer and

Tolstoi novelist, Count Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910). Tolstoi belonged to the Russian aristocracy, and during the Crimean War he served in the Tsar's army. Suddenly, however, he evinced a great interest in the peasants and in their betterment. He freed the serfs on his own estate before the Tsar Alexander II issued the general edict of emancipation. He conducted several educational experiments among the lower classes. In the 1860's he began his literary career by publishing *War and Peace*, a powerful pacifist novel. Thereafter he grew ever more philosophical and revolutionary, renouncing all private property and

extolling a kind of communist and anarchist Christianity. His later novels, such as *The Kreutzer Sonata* (1890) and *Resurrection* (1900), curiously combined a "realism" in presenting current problems of life with a profound mysticism in suggesting solutions.

Two other Russian writers acquired European fame during the period—Chekhov and Gorky. Anton Chekhov (1860–1904), the grandson of a serf, was trained as a physician at the University of Moscow but deserted the profession of Chekhov medicine for that of letters. His early tales, very popular in Russia, were humorous sketches of peasant life. Subsequently he adopted a pessimistic, psychological "realism" in plays, such as *The Seagull* (1896) and *The Cherry Orchard* (1904), and in a series of extraordinary stories. Chekhov had a genius for portraying moods and states of mind and a deep-seated aversion for the strong and the efficient. He usually ended on a minor key "not with a bang but a whimper."

Maxim Gorky was the pen-name of Alexis Peshkov (1868–1936), a self-educated product of the urban working class, who became a provincial journalist. In the 1890's he wrote Gorky the short stories about tramps and social outcasts which made him famous. After 1900 he wrote longer and more ambitious novels and plays, dealing with Russian life in general and with social problems in particular, discursive and increasingly revolutionary. Gorky took an active part in the uprising of 1905 against the Tsar's autocracy.¹ In 1914 he was a pacifist, and in 1917 a Communist.

It is noteworthy that the majority of the writers whom we have been mentioning, especially those devoted to psychological analysis, associated with their "realism" a peculiar æstheticism. This took the form, perhaps most typically, as with Flaubert, Daudet, Anatole France, Meredith, and Chekhov, of a meticulous use of words and the studied creation of an "impressionistic" atmosphere, frequently tinged with irony. Occasionally, as with Shaw, the style, though exceedingly direct, was startlingly paradoxical. Sometimes there was a marked straining for unusual expression, and an achievement of mysterious vagueness. In several cases, as with Ibsen particularly, realism was supplemented, especially from the 1890's onward, by mysticism in content and a kind of "symbolism" in

Impres-
sionism
and Sym-
bolism

¹ See below, pp. 481–482.

form. "Not sharp colors, but pastel shades, not a literal exactness but a suggestive use of words," was the way in which one symbolist indicated the ideal of the new æsthetics. "Art for art's sake" was the popular interpretation.

Such "symbolism" went naturally enough with mysticism, but the relevance of mysticism and symbolism to the age of machinery, big business, and scientific realism is not so clear. The mysticism was vague and varied, it is true, and not at all orthodox, and the symbolism which attended it was no simple phenomenon. Perhaps the new literary movement owed more to previous romanticism than its devotees would confess. Perhaps it was a reaction against the certitudes of science. Perhaps, on the other hand, it was a logical corollary to the latest propositions of science, a formulation of the notion that the only thing left for man to do, now that he was demonstrably a very minor cog in a universal machine of physics and chemistry, was to seek sensations and to express himself in an art which would have no other object than "art" itself. At any rate, by the 1890's, the most significant poetry in an essentially prosaic age was characterized, along with a growing amount of the prose, by "symbolism" and similar esoteric qualities, implying that form is more than content, sound is more than sense, and that the highest goal of human endeavor is "pure æsthetics."

In France, "symbolism" was established as a theory and applied to poetry by Stephane Mallarmé (1842-1898), a mild-mannered professor of English literature in a Parisian college. Mallarmé taught that beauty is sensuous and can best be felt through words mysteriously suggestive of color, sound, taste, and touch. He was very fond of Edgar Allan Poe's poetry, which he translated into French, and he held that the most perfect phrase in all literature was Poe's line about "the viol, the violet, and the vine." His own poetry, beginning with the celebrated *Après-midi d'un faune* (1876), he invested with a strangely jewelled magnificence and a vaguely haunting impressionism. As he grew older he grew more obscure and eventually abandoned punctuation.

Mallarmé for years presided every Tuesday evening over a salon to which young writers flocked and at which he held forth on æsthetic feeling and appreciation. It was very effective in forming a generation of "symbolists." By the late 80's and

throughout the 90's a swarm of young men were vowed to "pure æsthetics," and the extremists among them, in the name of "art," were assuming "stained-glass attitudes," caressing Japanese prints and medieval tapestries, carrying lilies and sunflowers, indulging in absinthe and hashish and in the most singular amours. These were the "æsthetes" of the "fin de siècle"; the "decadents" they were called by their critics.

Of all the French "decadents," the outstanding literary genius was Paul Verlaine (1844-1896). Born at Metz, the son of a Napoleonic army officer, he was initiated into "impressionism" while he was a student and clerk at Paris. Then, in the early 70's, he travelled around with a precocious youth, Arthur Rimbaud, quarrelled with him, and for firing a pistol at him was imprisoned for two years in Belgium.¹ While he was in gaol, Verlaine was converted from a pagan into a Catholic, and some of his finest poetry, published after his release, was sincerely religious in subject-matter. But whether the attitude was pagan or Christian, the form was "symbolist" and the effect was mystical. And Verlaine's later life of poverty and disease, of alternating fits of drunkenness and repentance, rendered him, despite his chronic courage and cheerfulness, the typical "decadent."

In England, a parallel trend toward "pure æstheticism" was fostered by Walter Pater (1839-1894), whose position as an Oxford don enabled him to exert an influence on young English writers comparable with that which Mallarmé was contemporaneously exercising on young French writers. Pater was both "pagan" and "modern" in his admiration for the culture of ancient Greece and Rome and in his cult of sensuous enjoyment as opposed to asceticism. He had a fondness for beauty of word and phrase, and to select circles he communicated it in his *Marius the Epicurean* (1885).

Pater expressed the new æstheticism in sonorous prose rather than in poetry. The Englishman who contributed to its vogue in

¹ Rimbaud (1854-1891), a vagabond from childhood, wrote in his teens some amazing "symbolist" verse. After his break with Verlaine he disappeared from view, and it was not generally known until after his death that, following the most varied adventures throughout Europe and the Dutch East Indies, he had settled in Ethiopia and become a wealthy merchant and powerful chieftain. Verlaine's publication in 1886 of the verse of Rimbaud (whom he thought dead) did much to forward the "symbolist" movement.

poetry was Algernon Swinburne (1837-1909), an aristocrat and neurotic, whose *Poems and Ballads* marked a revolution in the form of English verse. Their strange witchery of words and sound, their lilting impressionism, suggested Poe rather than Tennyson or Wordsworth or earlier English poets. In form, Swinburne was "symbolist," even "decadent." Yet in subject-matter he showed, as time went on, an ever closer adherence to the tradition of Byron and Shelley, the tradition of intellectual revolt against the conventions and restraints of politics, religion, and morality. This tradition he reënforced by his acceptance of an extreme "Darwinism" and especially by his sympathy with Nietzsche's virulence against Christianity. In his *Songs before Sunrise* (1871), in his second series of *Poems and Ballads* (1878), and in his later poetical dramas, he put a bitter hatred of priests and kings and traditional morality into a framework of alliterative rhetoric, peculiarly alluring to youth.

In Britain æstheticism of the "decadence" reached its zenith in Oscar Wilde (1856-1900), with his extreme affectation of "art for art's sake," with his sparkling plays and coruscating essays and fairy tales, with his bohemianism and fateful imprisonment and what he described as "dying beyond his means." Wilde was only one devotee, albeit the most notorious, of a literary fashion of the fag-end of the nineteenth century—the "fin de siècle." It seemed then as though Europe specialized in minor poets and that these were all symbolist.

Related to the æstheticism of the symbolist and "decadent" movements, and largely inspired by it, was a new concern with finding (or inventing) symbolic and mysterious features in folk literature. Ibsen ransacked collections of Norse sagas to find symbols of basic Norwegian character, and the mysticism of his last period echoed an æsthetic appreciation of pre-Christian mythology. Lesser literary artists in other countries adopted similar methods and moods, evoking as beautiful and aboriginal (and always shadowy) the "soul" of Slav or Celt. A twilight of mystical nationalism seemed to descend upon Europe. Upon Ireland, for example, a peculiarly "Celtic" afterglow was shed in the 1890's by a group of youthful æsthetes, in-

NOTE. The picture opposite, a caricature of Oscar Wilde's lecturing to American farmers on æstheticism, is by Max Beerbohm (born 1872).

cluding Lady Gregory, William Butler Yeats, and George Russell (writing under the initials "AE"), who accompanied their mystic poems and plays with erudite footnotes on the symbolism of legendary Gaelic beasts and gods.

Stylistic "symbolism" was employed not only by a new generation of nationalists and by so-called "decadents," but also by such a "psychological" artist as Maurice Maeterlinck.

Maeterlinck was a Belgian of Flemish extraction, who, after graduating from the University of Ghent, lived several years in Paris, becoming acquainted with Mallarmé and other members of the "symbolist" group, and, under their influence, beginning to write poetical plays in French. In 1892 appeared his *Pelléas and Mélisande*, and his reputation was made. During the next twenty years he sustained it with a succession of dramas and lyrics, treating of the "souls" of orphan princesses, blind persons, or pale Arthurian knights, who, in shadowy bodies out of time and space, mysteriously stir about and vaguely sigh according to the dictates of some inscrutable but thwarting fate.

Mysticism
of Maeterlinck

2. PAINTING, MUSIC, ARCHITECTURE, AND SCULPTURE

There was a quantitative increase of pictorial art during the "age of realism." Ever so many rising industrialists (at least their wives), with more money than taste, acquired a reputation for "culture" by collecting pictures, usually through "art dealers," who flourished as never before, and who, if there were not enough first-rate pictures to go around, could profitably dispose of second-rate pictures if their "style" was in fashion or their authors had "name." The private demand for portraits, landscapes, still-life scenes, human-interest episodes, was unparalleled. Besides, in an era of mounting national resources and intensifying national spirit, all the new public buildings—government offices, town halls, libraries, universities—had to be adorned with historical or allegorical murals.¹

i. Painting

At Paris, which was the recognized capital of European art throughout the nineteenth century, a type of painting known as "impressionism" was evolved in the second half of the century. It was certainly not "classicist," and, though indebted for its dreamy

¹ On romantic and classicist painting from 1830 to 1870, see above, pp. 117-119.

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of George Moore, the Irish literary "realist," by the French "impressionist" painter, Edouard Manet (1832-1883).

poetical tendency to preceding romanticists (notably Corot), it was not so concerned with pure naturalism, and not so forceful or vivid, as most romantic painting had been. Its sources were partly in romanticism but more specifically in the revived appreciation of Spanish painting of early modern times, particularly the subtle composition and coloring of Velasquez's canvases and the queer effect of distortion in El Greco's,¹ and also in a sudden new enthusiasm for the suggestiveness, the decorum, and the decorativeness of Japanese art. Japan, it should be borne in mind, was opened up anew to Europeans in the late 1850's, and very shortly afterwards its art was influencing European art even more than the Chinese had influenced it back in the eighteenth century.²

"Impressionism" in painting was akin to symbolism in literature, and each reacted on the other. As Mallarmé and Pater were apostles of the novel movement in poetry and prose, so Manet was its pioneer in the pictorial arts. Edouard Manet (1832-1883), after completing his academic course in Paris, spent three years in South America and was so enamored by the old Spanish masters whose works he saw there that on his return he made a careful study of the examples of Spanish art in the Louvre and then proceeded to paint, in "impressionistic" style, a number of engaging pictures, including *A Spaniard Playing the Guitar*, *Olympia*, and *The Music Lesson*. Like Mallarmé, Manet was attracted to Edgar Allan Poe, and in his illustrations of Poe's *Raven* some Japanese influence was manifest.³

Manet's "impressionism" soon inspired a notable group of French artists. Camille Pissaro began as a student of Corot but presently threw in his lot with Manet. Curious effects of sunlight became almost an obsession with him, and his chief pictures—of boulevards and bridges of Paris and Rouen—he invested with a peculiar "atmosphere." Edgar Degas painted dancers and ballets, workwomen and jockeys, portraits of criminals, and several likenesses of Manet, all in wistful and vaguely haunting moods. Claude Monet in his paintings subtly suggested, rather than definitely depicted,

¹ On El Greco and Velasquez, see Vol. I, pp. 116, 143 n., 266, 267 n., 561.

² On the influence of Chinese art at that time, see Vol. I, pp. 565-566. On the "closing" and "reopening" of Japan to Europeans, see below pp. 521-523.

³ For an example of Manet's art, see his portrait of George Moore, facing p. 285.

cathedral towers in varying lights, and rocky cliffs along the sea-coast, and architectural piles in Paris and London.¹

With these French "impressionists" must be classed the son of an American army officer, James McNeill Whistler (1834-1903), who studied with Manet at Paris in the 1850's and thereafter resided in England, with frequent trips to France. Whistler was fascinated by Japanese prints; and his own etchings and lithographs, as well as his "nocturnes" and "tone paintings," were eloquent alike of a sense of harmonious beauty original with him and of a considerable borrowing from Japanese sources.² Whistler was a good deal of a poseur and dandy, and a faulty draftsman, but he was as influential as he was provocative, and in his *Gentle Art of Making Enemies* (1890) he proved that he was a master of prose.

One of the noteworthy painters of the age was Paul Cézanne (1839-1906). Cézanne was a schoolmate and lifelong friend of Zola; and, coming to Paris in 1863 to study art, he joined the group about Manet and for a time painted in a thoroughly impressionistic manner. Under the guidance of Pissaro, the best draftsman of the group, he gradually improved his technique; and then, gradually, he outgrew "impressionism." He wished to emphasize the "realistic" aspects of his art, and he felt that, to produce the needful psychological effects, he must give more solidity to pictures than the impressionists gave. Secluded in his native Aix (in southern France), he did his most distinctive work in the 1890's; with thick layers of paint he made simple, vivid, and slightly distorted portraits, landscapes, and pictures of card-games. At the very end of his career, we may remark, he reverted to a kind of extreme romanticism. Cézanne's painting was not particularly popular in his own day, but it was subsequently recognized as the starting-point of "post-impressionism."³

A strange extremity of "impressionism" was exemplified by two "revolutionary" painters—Gauguin and Van Gogh. Paul Gauguin (1848-1903), half French and half Peruvian, learned the impressionist technique from Pissaro,

Whistler

Toward
Post-
Impres-
sionism:
Cézanne

Gauguin

¹ For an example of Monet's art, see the picture facing p. 399, below.

² A typical etching by Whistler is reproduced below, facing p. 330.

³ See below, pp. 836-839. For an example of Cézanne's art, see the picture facing p. 297, below.

but exaggerated and transformed it by adopting an extraordinary subjectivity and by employing a "decadent" symbolism and the most startling colors. As one of his disciples said, "Gauguin freed us from all restraints which the idea of copying placed on our painter's instinct. . . . Henceforth we aspired to express our own personality. . . . If at any moment a tree looked reddish to us, we might paint it in vermillion; if a girl's shoulder struck us just right, we might stress its curve even to the point of deformation." Gauguin escaped not only from the canons of conventional art but from the haunts of traditional civilization. The last decade of his life he passed in squalor and semi-insanity on South Sea islands.¹

Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890), a Netherlander and the son of a Calvinist pastor, left the business of selling art objects at The Hague, Paris, and London to study theology; he left the seminary at Amsterdam to preach Christian communism and anarchism to Dutch workingmen; and he left Protestant radicalism to become a radical painter. He intermittently studied art at Brussels, Antwerp, and Paris, and for a short time collaborated with Gauguin—until he scared the latter off by trying to kill him and by mutilating himself. At the last, he was quite mad and he died by his own hand. Van Gogh painted blossoming fruit trees, sunlit fields, sunflowers, his own portrait,² his simple room, his rustic chair; and whatever he painted he marked with Japanese-like decoration, with the most intense emotion, and with the wildest color.

Both as man and painter Van Gogh was deemed bizarre and of no account by his contemporaries. By them, too, Gauguin was adjudged a "wild man," though they grudgingly admitted that he was contributing something worth while to the art of colored posters. It remained for a later generation to extol Gauguin and Van Gogh as founders of "modern art."

"Impressionism" flourished and "post-impressionism" arose in France. Indeed, the most significant painting of all "schools" of the era from 1870 to 1910, whether "radical" or "conservative," was done by Frenchmen or by persons who studied in France. Among the latter, the most memorable, in addition to Whistler, were two

Predom-
inant
French
Influence

¹ One of Gauguin's South Sea paintings is reproduced below, facing p. 548.

² See the picture facing p. 296, below.

Spaniards (Sorolla and Zuloaga) and an Anglo-American (Sargent).

Joaquin Sorolla, a native of Valencia, was half romantic and half impressionistic. His first striking success was *Another Margaret* and one of his best-known pictures is *The Fishermen's Return*. He was popular as a portrait painter and a mural decorator. Ignacio Zuloaga, a native of the Basque region, was considerably affected, while a youthful student at Paris, by Gauguin, and much more, on his return to Spain, by El Greco and Goya.¹

Sorolla
and
Zuloaga

Portrait painting, which had been exemplified in England by a distinguished line of artists, was best represented there in the "age of realism" by John Sargent (1856-1925), who was born in Italy of American parents and made his headquarters at Paris until 1885 and thereafter at London. Sargent displayed, in the spirit of the age, a remarkable control of light and shade and a tendency to accentuate the less pleasing qualities of his sitters. "I chronicle, I do not judge," he said. His portraits are "psychological" and at the same time decorative. Between 1890 and 1916 Sargent executed a series of huge murals on the *History of Religion* for the Boston Public Library.

Sargent

More pronouncedly than in painting, the new "realism" was set forth in the art of caricature, which was highly developed and especially popular during the era. A large number of caricaturists found outlet for their work in the multiplying comic journals of the time; and, on the whole, their pictures were apt to be better drawn and to deal more directly with the "realities" of social and political life than the pictures of contemporary painters. Of the caricaturists (and illustrators) of the era, four may here be mentioned.

Caricature

Perhaps the greatest of the caricaturists was a Frenchman, Jean Louis Forain (1852-1931), who in his drawings for various Parisian journals (usually of a conservative trend) mercilessly exposed the weaknesses of republican politicians and the capitalistic bourgeoisie. He derived the scathing bitterness of his satire from Daumier,² and his pictorial style from Manet and Degas (though his draftsmanship was superior to any of the "impressionists"). A close second to Forain was an

Forain

¹ See, as an example of Zuloaga's art, the picture facing p. 427, below.

² On Daumier, see above, pp. 118-119. For examples of Forain's art, see the tailpieces on pp. 622, 667.

Englishman, John Tenniel (1820-1914), associated with the London *Punch* for over fifty years. Tenniel's work was characterized by an accuracy of drawing almost equal to Forain's, and by a greater geniality of satire; some of his political cartoons are classics.¹

The designing of "posters" was done with distinction by Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, an admirer of Degas and of Japanese woodcuts, who, as something of a "symbolist" and "decadent," provided illustrations of Parisian night-life, specializing in types of Montmartre and in circus-scenes. Another kind of illustrating—the drawing of fantastic decorative figures in black and white—was done to perfection by a short-lived English "decadent," Aubrey Beardsley.²

In music, such outstanding composers of the preceding era as Gounod, Wagner, and Verdi³ lived considerably beyond the year 1870 and exerted a strongly romantic influence on the succeeding generation. The tradition of a national French opera, firmly established by Gounod, was continued by Camille Saint-Saëns, with his *Samson and Dalila*, first produced in 1877, and by Jules Massenet, with his *Manon*, *Thaïs*, and *Jongleur de Notre Dame*. The tradition of distinctively German music, fathered by Wagner, was continued by Richard Strauss. Strauss composed songs in the romantic manner of Liszt and Mendelssohn and some early operas and orchestral pieces in that of Wagner. Then, aspiring to be "modern" and "realist" (and coming under the double influence of Nietzsche and the "symbolists"), he produced the magnificent but somewhat bizarre *Hero's Life* and the sensational operas of *Salome* (1905) and *Elektra* (1910). In Italy, the romantic Verdi was supplemented and succeeded by Puccini, whose *La Bohème* (1896), *Tosca* (1900), and *Madame Butterfly* (1904, with its "Japanese" flavor) enjoyed an immense popularity.

Indeed, the prevailing inspiration and mood of musical art, unlike literature and painting, continued, throughout the whole "era of realism," to be national and romantic. Such was the case with Johannes Brahms (1833-1897), an eminent German musician, long resident in Vienna, who wrote a

¹ Drawings by Tenniel are reproduced on p. 274, above, and facing p. 365, below.

² See his self-portrait on p. 384, and the tailpiece by him on p. 848.

³ See above, pp. 120-122.

Song of Triumph in celebration of German military victories in 1870-1871 and who in his later *Hungarian Dances* and his many other compositions displayed a lively appreciation of Hungarian and German nationalism. Such, too, was the case with a group of notable composers who, by utilizing and elaborating folk-melodies, sought to create a distinguished national music for several lesser peoples in Europe: for example, Anton Dvorák for the Czechs, and Edvard Grieg for the Norwegians. Such, also, was the case both with Johann Strauss "the Younger" whose sparkling waltzes, such as the *Blue Danube*, and popular operettas, such as *Die Fledermaus*, were peculiarly "Viennese" and quite romantic, and with Arthur Sullivan, whose songs were finely sentimental and whose well-known light operas were as "English" and as genially satirical as the drawings of Tenniel.

Folk-Music

Light Opera

Such, finally, was the case with the more sober "school" of music which arose in Russia. Peter Tschaikovsky based his opera of *Eugen Onegin* on a folk story by Pushkin, and composed his famous descriptive *1812 Overture* in commemoration of his country's successful conflict with Napoleon; while his "symphonic poems," and particularly his celebrated "sixth symphony"—the *Pathétique*—betrayed the sentimental and mystical leanings of his romantic heart. Modeste Moussorgsky inaugurated the peculiarly "Russian opera" with his forceful, fateful *Boris Godunov* in 1874, and Nicholas Rimsky-Korsakov (1844-1908) not only continued and developed it in *Sadko* and *Coq d'Or* but displayed a genius for enshrining Russian folk-music in orchestral suites of strangely modernist conception and effect.

Russian Music

Some reaction against romanticism, some response to newer tendencies in literature and painting, was evidenced by a few first-rate musical composers between 1870 and 1910. At least in form, if not always in subject, both Rimsky-Korsakov and Richard Strauss were increasingly "modern" and "realist."

"Modern Music"

The outstanding innovator in musical art, however, was Claude Debussy (1862-1918), a Frenchman who studied under Massenet and began in the 80's to experiment with unusual scales and "mystical" dissonances calculated to appeal to the sophisticated imagination rather than to the

Debussy

simpler emotions. The new style seemed quite in keeping with the "impressionism" of contemporary painting and with the "symbolism" of current literature, and Debussy employed it in musical settings for poems of Verlaine, for the *Après-midi d'un faune* of Mallarmé, and most fully, for the *Pelléas and Mélisande* of Maeterlinck. Debussy's work was significant and influential in the transition from the music of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth.

In architecture, both "classical" and "romantic" styles which had been employed from 1830 to 1870¹ continued to be utilized and adapted from 1870 to 1910. In this later period, the romantic "Gothic revival" slackened; few of the newer public buildings or private dwellings were dominated by it.² Yet it by no means went entirely out of fashion. It was evidenced in a number of ecclesiastical and collegiate edifices, especially in Britain and the United States.

"Classicism" was, indeed, the prevailing mode in architecture after 1870, but it was an "eclectic classicism"—a decorative baroque classicism, varying from country to country in accordance with historic and national circumstance, and not disdaining to make use of novel materials, such as steel and concrete, and curious bits of embellishment suggestive less of purely Greek and Roman models than of Egyptian or Hindu or Japanese or even Gothic. This eclecticism was symptomatic of the rapidly broadening interests with which the rampant imperialism of the time was endowing Europe. Some of its best-known examples are: the grandiose court theatre in Vienna (1871-1889); the heavy Reichstag building (1882-1894) at Berlin; the colossal national memorial at Rome to King Victor Emmanuel II (1884-1911); and the lighter and more graceful "Little Palace of the Fine Arts" put up at Paris in connection with the international exposition of 1900. The "Little Palace" was the perfect flower of "official" French architecture and, by reason of the commanding position of French art in general, it was extremely influential at the beginning of the twentieth century as an inspiration for the de-

3. Architecture

Prevalence of Eclectic Classicism

¹ See above, pp. 111-114.

² Notable among the exceptional public buildings which were erected in the Gothic style were the parliament buildings at Budapest in Hungary and at Ottawa in Canada.

signing, all over Europe and America, of art galleries and libraries and of mansions for industrial capitalists.

Two variants of "classicism" during the period should be mentioned. One was the revival of a Byzantine style, illustrated most monumentally in the Church of the Sacred Heart, reared atop Montmartre in Paris as "an act of national Byzantine expiation" following the Franco-Prussian War, and in the great Catholic cathedral of Westminster (in London).

The other variant was a new type of domestic architecture, based on classical models but aiming at "picturesqueness" in appearance and "livableness" in interior appointments. In France and Germany it was exemplified by suburban dwellings which betrayed the influence of the "Châlet" and "Queen Anne" *châlets* of Switzerland, and in England (and the United States) by the "Queen Anne" house, representing an essentially modern combination of a variety of materials suggested by the "Gothic revival" with forms recalling the "Dutch" fashions which had flourished in England during the reigns of William III and Anne.

Thus, in greater or less degree, traditional classicism (and romanticism) entered into the prevailing "eclectic" architecture of the age of realism. But the age witnessed the beginning of quite a different movement in architecture—one which was not "eclectic" and which spurned tradition whether romantic or classical. This movement, to which the name of The New "Functionalism" "functionalism" is sometimes given, was associated in spirit as well as in time with the spread and intensification of industry, with the vogue of machinery and science and materialist philosophy, and with the rise of "impressionist" painting and "realist" literature. Especially from Darwinian biology it took its cardinal principle that form must be rigorously adapted to environment and function. Its exponents, chief among whom was a German, Otto Wagner (1841-1918), contended that the new age required a brand-new architecture which would conform the appearance of buildings to their actual use and purpose and at the same time give direct or "symbolic" expression to contemporary culture.

Before the emergence of full-fledged "functionalism," there had been a good deal of experimentation with new building materials: with iron, as in the reading-room of the National

Library at Paris (1855-1861); with glass and iron, as in the Crystal Palace in England (1851) and in the buildings of the Paris Exposition of 1878; and with "reënforced concrete," as popularized in France in the 1870's. Then, when "functionalism" did appear as a definite movement in the late 80's and in the 90's, it took over the new materials and utilized them as integral parts of its schemes for "modern" architecture.

"Functionalism" bore fruit in the Eiffel Tower at Paris (1889), and, most significantly, in a variety of structures in Germany and Austria, such as the stations of the urban railway in Vienna (designed by Otto Wagner) and the Wertheim department-store in Berlin (1896-1904). It also exercised an ever widening influence on the construction of bridges, factories, and shops. Eventually, after 1910, it would reach gargantuan proportions.¹

Sculpture was plentiful during the "age of realism," and the best examples of it reflected either the "eclectic" tendencies in architecture or the naturalist trends in literature and painting. An outstanding representative of the French "eclectic" was Jules Dalou, a pupil of Carpeaux,² and such an ardent radical republican that he participated in the Paris Commune of 1871 and had to live in exile in England during the next eight years while royalists were dominant in his own country.³ Dalou consciously patterned his sculpture after the paintings of Rubens,⁴ striving for a similar richness of content, vivacity of effect, and "realism" of anatomy and flesh. His first and most renowned achievement of this kind was the monument called *The Triumph of the Republic* in the Place de la Nation at Paris. Subsequently he executed a number of memorials, to Delacroix for example, in which the effigy was surrounded, usually at a lower level, by large related figures allegorical or historical—a type of memorial which became very common. In his last days Dalou forsook the pompousness of "classical" allegory, and, under the influence of Marxian socialism, projected a great "naturalist" monument to Labor.

Some elaborate and frequently "pretty" form of baroque was utilized by numerous sculptors for a multitude of patriotic memorials which were erected after 1870 in Italy, England, and

4. Sculpture

Dalou

¹ See below, pp. 839-841.

² See below, pp. 389-395.

³ On Carpeaux, see above, p. 115. ⁴ On Rubens, see Vol. I, pp. 261, 560-561.

Germany as well as in France. They fitted in with the grandiose "eclectic" architecture of new public buildings. In Germany, particularly, there was a very pronounced revival of baroque sculpture, not so much "pretty" as exuberant and forceful, whose loud strains were evoked to celebrate Teutonic pride in recent triumph of German arms and creation of the German Empire. The "official" German sculptor of the new era was Reinhold Begas; his monument to the Emperor William I at Berlin was a baroque outburst;¹ and the female figures with which he decorated many of his other monuments surpassed in sensuousness anything which the French school had done.

Patriotic
Memorials

Begas

Of all the sculptors of the era, the most influential were undoubtedly the Frenchman Rodin and the Belgian Meunier. Auguste Rodin (1840-1917) showed a revolutionary repugnance to classical form. He was essentially "modern," interested in psychological analysis, animal passion, and the Nietzschean "will to power," and expressing his interests, somewhat mystically and symbolically, in the blurred outlines of impressionistic painting but with a greater ruggedness and strength. His *Man with a Broken Nose* is dreadfully realistic. His *Thinker* suggests the evolution of man from the lower animals. His uncompleted masterpiece, *The Gate of Hell*, inspired by Dante's *Inferno*, is an impressionistic, heavily tragic setting-forth of "modern" sufferings, doubts, and discontents.²

Rodin

Constantin Meunier (1831-1905), after acquiring some fame as a painter of religious themes, turned his attention in 1880 to the sculptural representation of the Industrial Revolution, especially the rôle of labor in it. He discerned better than any other sculptor the æsthetic values of the workingman's body as moulded, muscularized, made lithe, and hardened by toil, and by his own masterful genius he did much to emphasize the dignity and idealism of labor. Among his distinguished figures were *The Puddler*, *The Hammerer*, *The Sower*, *The Mower*, *The Smith*, *The Miner*.³

Meunier

¹ See the reproduction facing p. 440, below.

² For examples of Rodin's sculpture, see the pictures facing pp. 267 and 601.

³ For examples of Meunier's sculpture, see the frontispiece and the picture facing p. 206, above.

3. BASIC QUESTIONINGS OF SUPERNATURAL RELIGION

The large majority of Europeans continued throughout the nineteenth century to profess some form of Christianity, Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant. Christianity was still, as it had been for centuries, a distinguishing mark of European, or "Western," civilization.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Christian leaders and believers were confronted with a wave—or a swift succession of waves—of criticism and opposition more varied and with deeper swell than any wave which had previously troubled Christianity. The question now was not whether Protestantism was preferable to Catholicism or whether Pietism was more appealing than Deism. Rather it was whether, in the face of contemporary political, social, and intellectual developments, any sizable group of Europeans would long retain a loyalty to any religious tradition of the past. To a rapidly growing number of persons, certainly—among the masses as among the classes—religion appeared to be an anachronism in an age of progress and science.

The developments which stressed the contrast and broadened the conflict between "modern civilization" and traditional Christianity were the major developments which we have already indicated as especially characteristic of the "era of realism" from 1870 to 1910. (1) Intensifying *industrialism* promoted indifference if not hostility to the claims of religion. It held out the prospect of a mechanized Europe (and world) in which human comfort and happiness would be assured without recourse to creed or prayer. Likewise, in stimulating extensive migration, from field to factory, from one town to another, from one country to another, it tended to loosen the hold of the masses upon any ancestral tradition (including the practice of religion).

(2) *Liberalism* in general minimized religion and fostered "anti-clericalism." It insisted that religion is not at all a public concern, but a purely private matter. No governmental favors should be accorded to any particular religion or church, and the state should be strictly

NOTE. The picture opposite is the self-portrait of the unhappy and "revolutionary" painter, Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890), which he dedicated to Gauguin.

New
Problems
for His-
toric
Christi-
anity

1. Indus-
trialism

2. Liber-
alism

"neutral" and progressively "lay." Religious instruction should have no place in public education; and clergymen should be restrained from exercising over the lives of the laity or on the politics of the state any influence which might forward "clericalism" at the expense of "liberalism."

(3) Nationalism in the abstract was not necessarily inimical to historic Christianity. Indeed, the Protestant and Orthodox churches had always been markedly national, and the Catholic Church had recognized the principle of nationality and had frequently made concessions to it; and many nineteenth-century patriots were devout Christians. Nevertheless, the *rampant nationalism* of the latest age was subversive of Christian teaching and tradition. It was becoming a religion itself, a kind of natural tribal religion in actual (if not theoretical) competition with supernatural, universal Christianity. Its chief concern was not with Christendom but with the nation, not with Christian ideals and civilization but with national ideals and culture. It was specially jealous of any ecclesiastical organization which was "international" or "supranational," or which might divide with the national state the loyalty of citizens, and hence it tended to join with liberalism in the furtherance of "anti-clericalism."

(4) If liberalism and nationalism were "un-Christian" in their general tendencies, *Marxian Socialism* was definitely anti-Christian. Its philosophy was dogmatically materialist and determinist; it repudiated the freedom of the individual will and denied the efficacy if not the existence of any "spiritual" powers. Its goal was a strictly earthly paradise; and its declared method of reaching its goal was not through social coöperation but through class conflict. Moreover, militant Marxists were prone to assail traditional society and the traditional family, as well as the institution of private property, and actively to abet "anti-clericalism."

(5) *Science* was invoked against Christianity. Of course, little or none of the applied science with which the nineteenth century teemed had any real bearing on Christian faith or dogma. At most it only indirectly lessened Christian devotion by concen-

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Man with Straw Hat," is by the French "post-impressionist," Paul Cézanne (1839-1906). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York. On Cézanne, see above, p. 287.

trating popular attention upon the "marvels" of human achievement, by exalting engineers over preachers or priests, and by stimulating a greater ambition for creature-comforts than for personal holiness. Nor, as a matter of fact, did the experimental science of the century necessarily involve any conflict with Christian theology. The physicist or chemist might be enlarging human knowledge about a material, finite world without subtracting anything from the beliefs of man about a spiritual, infinite universe. In fact, of the outstanding scientists whom we have elsewhere mentioned by name, about as many were Christian as non-Christian.

It was when certain philosophizing about natural science was indulged in, and when it was carried over into the so-called social sciences, that conflict was joined between "modern science" and "historic religion." Such a "conflict" was the theme of many books and pamphlets written between 1870 and 1910, and its reality was affirmed not only by proponents of science who took "pot shots" at the churches, the theologians, and religion in general, but also by defenders of religion who knew more about theology than about science or who knew little about either. The "conflict" was not very edifying, and, at least temporarily, it was more damaging to "religion" than to "science." It served to confirm and extend the alienation of many Europeans (and Americans) from Christianity, and from any "revealed" or dogmatic religion.

To many professed Christians the new evolutionary conceptions of Lyell and Darwin, as explained by Haeckel, Huxley, and Spencer, and seemingly reinforced by scores of detailed discoveries and observations, were particularly shocking. They clearly implied that the Biblical account of creation was erroneous, that man had not been created by special act of God a few thousand years ago but had been evolved from lower forms of life by entirely natural processes over a very long period of time. Parallel interpretations of research in psychology and anthropology carried the even more devastating implications that man had no soul or moral responsibility, that his "sins" were attributable to physical disease or biological atavism, and that all his religions were so many evolutionary expressions of primitive myths and fears. And by way of confirming this last implication,

5. Materialist
Philosophy and
Science

"Conflict
between
Science
and The-
ology"

Origin of
Man?

Existence
of Soul
and Sin?

a large number of students of "comparative religion" and "higher criticism" argued that Christianity was a mere bundle of superstitions borrowed from various older religions and philosophies, that the New Testament as we have it had been written (like the Hebrew Scriptures) long after the events it purported to relate and was hopelessly corrupt, and that Jesus had been an obscure mystic or deluded fanatic.

Higher
Criticism?

By the last decades of the nineteenth century, moreover, all these evolutionary conceptions and implications were associated with some form of philosophy quite anti-Christian or un-Christian: the optimistic materialism of Haeckel; the pessimistic will-to-power of Nietzsche; the positivism of the followers of Comte; and the struggle-for-existence and survival-of-the-fittest philosophy of Spencer. To one or another of these philosophies numerous European (and American) intellectuals (scientists, professors, engineers, physicians, lawyers, publicists, etc.) were drawn; and, as we have also seen, the same philosophies actuated, in greater or less degree, the majority of outstanding European men of letters during the period—Anatole France and Zola, Hardy and Swinburne, Shaw and Wells.

In face of all these new and strange developments, many Europeans (and Americans) repudiated or profoundly modified their traditional Christian beliefs and practices. An extreme group—chiefly of intellectuals and proletarians—broke away altogether from the churches and rejected Christianity entirely. These went to swell the minority of agnostics and "infidels" (or "pagans") who had been continuously in evidence in Europe (and America) since the "Enlightenment" and French Revolution of the eighteenth century and who, now becoming numerous in many countries, put new energy into "anti-clerical" campaigns.

Increase
of Ag-
nostics

Another and less extreme group, particularly of the bourgeoisie, while endorsing with only minor qualifications the general trends of "modern civilization" and the special teachings of "modern science," remained nominally within the churches and continued to profess Christianity, though seeking to supplant its traditionally fixed "deposit" of faith and morals with up-to-date evolutionary conceptions which would bring the historic churches abreast of "modern progress" and preserve them as carriers of the modern "scientific spirit."

Rise of
"Mod-
ernism"

Such persons, advocates of a "progressive" Christianity without definite dogmas and with morals derived from experience rather than from revelation, came to be known as "modernists."

On the other hand, a sizable number of persons who remained within the churches, resisted "modernism" and clung to historic Christianity. The most extreme defenders of traditional religion, including many clergymen and members of the lower middle and agricultural classes, especially of "evangelical" antecedents, assumed a rigidly uncompromising position, affirming that the Bible was the literally inspired "Word of God," denouncing the "higher critics" of it, insisting that men could not be "descended from apes," and denying the whole doctrine of evolution. The designation most appropriate to these extremists is the term originally applied to them in the United States—"fundamentalists."

Less extreme in opposition to "science," but no less desirous of preserving historic dogmatic Christianity, were numerous clergymen and laymen who viewed the newer intellectual difficulties somewhat like this: That current discoveries about the material universe did not and could not disprove the existence of a greater and more enduring spiritual universe; that "Darwinism" was only an hypothesis which was being confessedly weakened in certain details, and which, if true, could explain only the evolution of man's material body, not the creation and life of immortal spirits; that there could be no "conflict" between science rightly understood and theology divinely inspired; that current "higher criticism" of the Bible and the church was "destructive" and displayed too much bias, but that, if pursued "constructively" in a scholarly fashion, it would but confirm the essential uniqueness and truth of Christianity; and that the Bible, anyway, was not a textbook in science, and that parts of it, as foremost fathers of the church had recognized, were susceptible of allegorical, as well as literal, interpretation.

It should be borne in mind that active defenders of dogmatic Christianity and direct assailants of it constituted minority groups, and that the majority of Europeans (and Americans) went their usual way, evincing more and more interest in science, in nationalism, and in liberalism or socialism, but continuing to adhere formally to the religion of their ancestors. In the latter

part of the nineteenth century, church attendance, especially on the part of men, gradually lessened in certain countries (for example, in Britain, France, Italy, and Scandinavia). The urban proletariat became increasingly unchurched, and the universities more "godless." Yet Christianity was so vital a part of European tradition and experience—it was so intertwined with the history, institutions, and culture of every "Western" nation—that it could not suddenly be shorn of a widespread popular following, even in an age of "realism." At least in the crises of life, the masses still went to church, to be baptized, to be married, to attend funerals. Sundays and church holidays were still almost universally observed, and no little social prestige still attached to churchmembers and churchgoers. Moreover, the number of "practicing" Christians was still relatively large all over Europe (and America), and there was a noteworthy growth of Christian missionary enterprise overseas and of Christian "social work."

Decline of
Church
Attendance
and
Influence

So far, we have spoken in general terms of Christianity in the nineteenth century—its continuing vitality, and its accumulating difficulties. Christianity, however, was no unit. It was represented, in the nineteenth century as in the sixteenth, by the Catholic Church, by the Orthodox Church, and by a variety of Protestant Churches and sects. Each of the major divisions of Christianity had distinctive traditions of its own, and therefore felt the effect of contemporary social, political, and intellectual movements in peculiar ways and responded to them somewhat differently. It accordingly behooves us, if we would understand the religious situation in developing industrial society, to pass from general discussion of "abstract" Christianity to specific consideration of its churches and then to say something of non-Christian minority groups (Moslem and Jewish) which survived in traditionally Christian lands.

Different
Churches
Various
Affected

4. THE CHURCHES—CATHOLIC, PROTESTANT, AND ORTHODOX; MOSLEMS AND JEWS

The Catholic Church covered the widest territory and embraced the largest membership of any religious organization. It held to its claims of being the one and only true Church of Christ, the custodian and interpreter of the original deposit of faith

transmitted by the Man-God to the apostles. It maintained its historic organization headed by the pope, bishop of Rome, successor of Saint Peter, and vicar of Jesus Christ.¹

Catholic Church in Age of Realism Against the Catholic Church, as the largest body of Christians and the one most intransigent in its devotion to tradition and most authoritarian in its manner of speaking, all the anti-religious and irreligious tendencies of the nineteenth century seemed to converge. Nor was opposition lessened by any obvious sign that the church was changing front. On the contrary, the official words and actions of the three popes of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth—Pius IX (1846-1878), Leo XIII (1878-1903), and Pius X (1903-1914)—tended, on the whole, to emphasize the contrast and intensify the conflict between historic Catholicism and the most characteristic new “isms” of the period. These popes differed considerably from one another in manner and outlook and in the seeming success of their policies, but they were at one in directing a vigorous counter-offensive against “the errors of modern society and thought.”

Popes of Era

Pius IX began his pontificate with a reputation for friendliness to liberalism and nationalism, but the reputation was short-lived. The behavior of liberals, such as Mazzini, in the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 and the steadily growing threat of Italian nationalism against the independence of the Papal State of Rome shocked him and filled him with forebodings about the ultimate consequences of the whole modern complex of “liberalism” and “individualism.” From 1849 he combined a zealous churchmanship with an uncompromising conservatism. While negotiating friendly agreements (concordats) with the reactionary governments of Spain (1851) and Austria (1855), he relied upon French troops to preserve his temporal régime at Rome; and while reestablishing Catholic hierarchies in the predominantly Protestant and “liberal” countries of England (1850) and the Dutch Netherlands (1853), he issued a series of documents against liberalism. This series culminated in a famous encyclical, *Quanta Cura*, and an accompanying *Syllabus of Errors* (1864).

Pius IX, 1846-1878

In the encyclical, Pius IX condemned the modern liberal ideas

¹ On the organization and doctrine of the Catholic Church, see Vol. I, pp. 136-144, 184-197.

of extreme individualism and of the supremacy of the secular state over the church, and lauded the earlier ideal of the "Christian State" in which the church, though independent of secular authority, would be supported by it. The *Syllabus* "of the principal errors of our time" reproduced in abbreviated form all the specific doctrines, political as well as strictly philosophical and religious, which had latterly received papal condemnation. The listed "errors" were of several different groups: "freethinkers" and "agnostics," who denied or doubted the divine origin and mission of the church; "materialists" and "naturalists," who repudiated the spiritual or subordinated it to the physical or the temporal; "anti-clericals" and "nationalists," who aimed at restricting the freedom of the church, exalting the secular lay state, and overthrowing the temporal dominion (and hence weakening the spiritual independence) of the papacy; "liberals" and Freemasons and "indifferent" persons, who imagined that one religion was as good (or as bad) as another, who sought to reduce the church to the condition of a private association, or who thought that the pope should reconcile himself with "modern society" and "modern civilization."

*Syllabus
of Errors,
1864*

The *Syllabus* was not issued as dogma, and several leading Catholics, including Newman, took pains to explain that it was in the nature of counsel against peculiar developments of the time in Italy and against the "abuses" of modern liberalism. Nevertheless it strengthened the impression in many minds that the papacy was conducting a crusade against modern civilization, and it evoked storms of criticism from liberals and protests from prominent statesmen.

In 1869, while discussion of the *Syllabus* was still heated, Pius IX convened at the Vatican a general council of the Catholic Church, the first such council since that of Trent three centuries previously. The Vatican Council, attended by nearly eight hundred prelates from all over the world, elaborated the traditional teaching of the church on the relationship between faith and reason, but its most sensational achievement was the definition, despite earnest preliminary opposition from a minority of its members, of the dogma of papal infallibility. It solemnly proclaimed as "a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of the

*Vatican
Council,
1869-1870*

*Dogma of
Papal
Infalli-
bility*

when he speaks *ex cathedra*—that is, when in discharge of the

office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, he defines, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal church—is possessed, by the divine assistance promised him in Blessed Peter, of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining faith or morals.”

While the Vatican Council was still in session, the Franco-Prussian War broke out. The French garrison which had been

Loss of
Papal
State,
1870

protecting the temporal sovereignty of the pope was withdrawn from Rome, and in September 1870 Italian troops of King Victor Emmanuel II seized the city by main force and transformed it from the age-long supranational city-state of the popes to the new national capital of united Italy.¹ Pius IX protested, immured himself as a “prisoner” in the Vatican, and in October 1870 prorogued the general council on the plea that it could no longer deliberate in requisite freedom.

Critics of the Catholic Church were elated by the overthrow of the pope’s temporal power but pained by the simultaneous definition of papal infallibility which, they feared, would give him a dangerous new weapon in his warfare against liberalism and nationalism. Over the doctrine of papal infallibility, therefore, the storm which had been brewing since the *Syllabus of Errors* raged with unusual violence. The majority of Catholic intellectuals, to be sure, defended the doctrine and the mass of Catholics adhered to it. All the bishops accepted it, and only a small minority of professors and other laymen, chiefly in Germany and Switzerland, actually left the church and formed a dissident “Old Catholic” sect. On the other hand, the doctrine was widely assailed by Protestants and agnostics, liberals and patriots, and likewise by leading statesmen. In Prussia, and eventually throughout Germany, Bismarck waged a *Kulturkampf*—a “struggle for civilization”—with the Catholic Church. In England, Gladstone indited a fiery pamphlet in support of the thesis that Catholics could not be “good citizens.” In France, Gambetta arrayed the republican party under the banner of “anti-clericalism.” In Spain, the revolutionary government of the day nullified the existing agreement with the papacy. In Italy, the liberal régime of Victor Emmanuel II

Intellectual and
Political
Conflict

¹ See above, pp. 177-178, and below, pp. 420-422.

took "defensive" measures against the church. In Austria, a liberal ministry of the time prevailed upon the Emperor Francis Joseph to repudiate his concordat with Pius IX.¹

When Pius IX died in 1878, after the longest and one of the most remarkable pontificates in history, the Catholic Church appeared to be at losing feud with almost every European government. And the succeeding pontificate, Leo XIII,
1878-1903 almost as long, of Leo XIII (1878-1903) was the very period in which the rising philosophies of materialism and the widening researches in anthropology and comparative religion bade fair to undermine historic Christianity.

Yet the period proved not so disastrous for the Catholic Church as was anticipated. Leo XIII himself was able and gifted. He was a first-rate diplomatist, a sincere sympathizer with democratic and social-reform movements, and a scholar of considerable erudition. Moreover, he was not content to denounce the "errors" of the time. He perceived "good" as well as "evil" in modern civilization, and he had a genius for fostering a constructive program of Catholic action.

In the intellectual domain, Leo XIII stood by the historic dogmas of Catholic Christianity, and not only renewed his predecessor's condemnations of the "vagaries" of modern philosophy, but also revived, as a special corrective, the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. At the same time he encouraged the study of church history and opened to scholars the valuable archives of the Vatican. He procured an eminent scientific staff and the best scientific instruments for the astronomical observatory at the Vatican.

Of the political principles of Pius IX, Leo XIII professed not to change a jot or a tittle. He expressed in a series of encyclicals the same ideal of the "Christian state" and similar condemnations of certain features of liberalism and "anti-clericalism." Again and again, he insisted that the church was a "perfect society" in itself, whose authority in its own spiritual realm was, by divine institution, independent of, and superior to, the authority of any temporal state or sovereignty. Again and again,

¹ More detailed accounts of these "anti-clerical" developments are given in succeeding chapters. Especially, see below, pp. 443-445, on the German *Kulturkampf*, and pp. 394-395, on Gambetta's activities. The most interesting—and important—reply to Gladstone's pamphlet was Newman's *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*.

he asserted the "right" of the church to a privileged position in the state, and especially its right to maintain schools and carry on its "mission" without let or hindrance from the state. Yet Leo XIII was no partisan of any particular form of government. He was not a "reactionary" in the earlier sense, and he was as willing to negotiate with governments nominally "liberal" as with those nominally "conservative." He was inclined, indeed, to sympathize with the democratic trend of the time. He thought it quite as compatible with Christian philosophy and tradition as absolutism or oligarchy, and imagined that it might be more effectual in enlisting popular support in defense of the church. He looked with favor upon the development of Catholic political parties, popular and democratic, in Germany, in Austria, and in Belgium. He counselled French Catholics to accept and co-operate with the republican government of their country. He expressed admiration for the constitution of the United States.

Leo XIII was fully aware of the social problems attending the Industrial Revolution. He commended the efforts of clergy-
men and laymen to build up a Catholic "social" move-
ment which, combating economic liberalism on the
Catholic Social Move-
ment one hand and Marxian socialism on the other, would
aim at the "Christianizing" of modern industrial so-
ciety. Such a movement gathered headway in the 1870's and
1880's, and in 1891 Leo XIII gave it a guiding charter in his
famous encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*. Against Marxian socialism,
this document defended private property as a natural right, em-
phasized the importance of the family, protested against the
exalting of the state, condemned the doctrine of economic de-
terminism, and declared that "class is not naturally hostile to
class." On the other hand, against economic liberalism, it held
that "labor is not a commodity," that "it is shameful to treat
men like chattels to make money by," that the state should
prevent the exploitation of labor, encourage collective bargain-
ing, and enact social legislation. The encyclical specifically urged
a wider distribution of private property, a fostering of industrial
trade unions and agricultural coöperative undertakings, a restric-
tion of the hours of employment, especially of women and chil-
dren, and the assurance of a "living family wage."

The encyclical *Rerum Novarum* inspired the formation of
Christian trade unions, which in certain countries, for example

in Germany, Belgium, and France, soon counted a following second only to that of the Socialist trade unions. It likewise stimulated in several countries the extension of Catholic co-operative societies among the peasants and the creation of Catholic "guilds" of professional men. In Germany, Austria, and Belgium, all these "social" agencies proved valuable allies to Catholic political parties; and elsewhere they exerted influence upon national legislation and public policy.

Altogether, it may be said, that during the pontificate of Leo XIII, Catholic Christianity at least held its own. In several traditionally Catholic countries, it is true, the church seemed weaker in 1903 than in 1878. In Italy, there was no settlement of the "Roman question" between king and pope, and only increasingly embittered relations between state and church. In France, where the most ardent Catholics were apt to be anti-republican, there was a marked growth of "anti-clerical" agitation and legislation. In Spain and Portugal, and in countries of Latin America, there were sporadic, and sometimes very tempestuous, attacks on ecclesiastical property, schools, and monasteries. On the other hand, Catholics put a stop to the *Kulturkampf* in Germany, regained an ascendancy in Austria, and obtained control of the Belgian government. Moreover they notably increased their numbers and influence in Switzerland, in the Dutch Netherlands, and, most strikingly, in English-speaking countries.

Losses in
Traditionally
Catholic
Countries

Gains
Elsewhere

Here the increase was attributable in some part to conversion but in chief part to nineteenth-century migration of European Catholics, particularly of the Irish, to England, Scotland, the United States, Canada, Australia, etc. In all these countries, by the end of the nineteenth century, Catholicism was represented by firmly established hierarchies, by fairly large numbers of both "secular" and "regular" clergy, by schools, and by an augmenting minority of the lay population.

During the pontificate of Pius X (1903-1914) the Catholic Church was troubled by several acute conflicts with national governments and also by the rise of "modernism" within its own ranks. In Italy, to be sure, there was a slight easing of the strain between church and state.

Pius X,
1903-1914

Pius X, though continuing (like Leo XIII and Pius IX) to regard himself as a "prisoner of the Vatican" and to demand the res-

toration of the temporal sovereignty of the papacy at Rome, withdrew the prohibition which his predecessors had put on the participation of Italian Catholics in the politics of the Italian kingdom and encouraged the formation of a Catholic "popular party" to safeguard their economic, as well as ecclesiastical, interests. In France, however, a bitter conflict led to the abrogation of the concordat which had regulated the relations of church and state since the time of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the enactment of especially drastic "anti-clerical" legislation.¹ Almost simultaneously, legislation hardly less drastic was enacted in Portugal, Spain, and Mexico.²

Complicating the political difficulties, moreover, was the persuasive contention on the part of a considerable number of Catholic priests and laymen—themselves obviously influenced by "Darwinism" and by the "higher criticism" of the Bible—that the church must "modernize" its teachings and discipline if it would recover its popular prestige and stop the leakage of intellectuals. Although these so-called "modernists" differed among themselves about many details, they generally held that dogma is not immutable but evolutionary, that the basic apology for the church is less its divine origin than its human utility, that ecclesiastical authority should be reformed and restrained, and that "science" should be independent of the church and the findings of the former superior to the dictates of the latter.

Against the "modernists," Pius X was adamant. He had the Inquisition (or "Holy Office") publish a *Syllabus* of their errors (1907), and concurrently he issued an encyclical, *Pasce* (1907), denouncing "modernism" as a "summation of heresies." He excommunicated several leading "modernists" and put their writings on the Index; and he obliged all Catholic priests throughout the world to take a special oath against "modernism." The Catholic Church was thus purged, and its traditional beliefs and papal authority reasserted. There was some loss to the church of individual priests and laymen, but there was no mass secession in any country.³ "Modernism"

¹ See below, pp. 413-416.

² See below, pp. 434, 431, 517.

³ In Bohemia and Austria, a so-called "Los von Rom" ("Away from Rome") movement reached large proportions early in the twentieth century, but it was motivated by nationalism more than by modernism.

ceased to be an important movement within Catholic Christianity, at the very time when it was becoming an ever more influential movement within Protestant Christianity.

Protestantism displayed throughout the nineteenth century—and increasingly in the first decade of the twentieth—two divergent tendencies. The one involved a marked decline of dogmatic teaching about faith and morals (a tendency diametrically opposed to that of contemporary Catholicism). The other involved a notable development of “good works” and “ritualism” and, in extreme instances, of what was described as “neo-Catholicism.”

Protestantism in Age of Realism

In certain respects, Protestantism seemed more adaptable than Catholicism to “modern civilization.” The Industrial Revolution began in overwhelmingly Protestant Britain, and spread most spectacularly in predominantly Protestant Germany and America. Protestant apologists delighted in identifying the ideal of material “progress” and “capitalistic prosperity” with the “rugged individualism” and “sober thrift” of traditional Protestant ethics. The individualism of Protestantism, especially of its more radical forms, appeared to be peculiarly compatible with the individualism of modern economic liberalism and likewise of modern political democracy. Then, too, the major Protestant churches had always been national churches—the Anglican in England, the Presbyterian in Scotland, the Dutch Reformed in Holland, the Lutheran in Scandinavia, etc.—subservient to secular governments and responsive to patriotic emotions. They could accept and forward the nationalism of the nineteenth century more naturally and more unquestioningly than could the international, supranational Catholic Church. Besides, Protestants could invoke the “right of private judgment” to justify themselves in putting their own interpretations on the relationship between religion and science and in still remaining “Christian” while rejecting the creed of any church.

Protestant Adaptability

Wherefore, Protestantism was not seriously disturbed by conflicts between state and church; and “anti-clericalism,” common in traditionally Catholic countries, was exceptional in countries traditionally Protestant. What did disturb Protestantism very seriously—far more so than Catholicism—was the questioning of its distinctive historic principle of religious authority. For Prot-

estantism, in rejecting the papacy as the divinely inspired custodian of religious tradition, interpreter of the Bible, and supreme ecclesiastical authority, had insisted that the Bible itself was the sole rule of faith for Christians and their sole guide of conduct. And now, in the nineteenth century, doubts about the divine origin of church or papacy were eclipsed by the doubts which "Darwinism" and "higher criticism" cast upon the authenticity of the Bible. These doubts, troublesome enough to "modernist" Catholics, were bound to shake Protestantism to its foundations.

**Acute
Problem
of Biblical
Authority**

The first reaction of most Protestants to "Darwinism" and "higher criticism" was, generally speaking, one of hostility and abuse. But shortly, as the "new science" was popularized, it produced more complex reactions, so that, by the end of the nineteenth century, three distinct movements were obvious in nearly all Protestant churches.

**Kinds of
Protes-
tant
Reaction**

(1) A minority of nominal Protestants, including a relatively large proportion of "intellectuals," were moving toward an *agnostic* position. Unable to square the Bible with "science," they threw over the former, and, unable to accept Catholicism, they repudiated historic Christianity altogether. Some of them sought refuge in positivism (the "religion of humanity") or in "ethical culture."

**1. Agnos-
tic**

(2) At the opposite extreme, considerable numbers of Protestants—relatively more numerous among the masses than among the classes—were impelled to take a *fundamentalist* position, holding to the Bible as the literally inspired "Word of God" and denouncing any "scientific" explanation which contradicted or questioned their own traditional interpretation of the Bible. "Fundamentalists" were to be found among Lutherans and Calvinists and in the so-called "low" or "evangelical" section of the Anglican Church, but they were especially influential in English-speaking countries and in such sects as the Methodist and Baptist.¹

**2. Funda-
mental-
ist**

¹ The Christian Science Church, which was founded by Mary Baker Eddy (1821-1910) at Boston in 1879, and which subsequently secured a considerable following in America and Europe, was nearer to "fundamentalism" than to "modernism." Though "scientific" in name and "modern" in its practical solicitude for physical health, it was quite "evangelical" in origin and, in its faith healing and in its central doctrine of the reality of mind and the unreality of matter, quite antithetical to "Darwinism" and all other materialist science.

(3) While some Protestants became frankly agnostic and left their respective churches, and while others fortified their abiding faith with "fundamentalism," a gradually growing number became modernist. That is, they remained "Protestant Christians" in name and in actual church membership but they subordinated church creeds and the Bible itself to the latest fashions in scientific speculation and "higher criticism." They tended to stress the "beauty" rather than the "truth" of the Bible and the Christian religion, to prize the Holy Scriptures not as the inspired "Word of God" but as "great literature," and the Founder of Christianity not as God but as a moral teacher or poetical idealist or social reformer. Indeed, they were disposed to admit that the Bible was a collection of human and hence fallible stories and sermons and that historic Christianity, representing a syncretism of folk-myths and pagan cults, was but one, though probably the best, of evolving, uplifting world religions. "Modernists" of this sort had their most natural home in a Protestant sect like the Unitarian, but they gradually made fruitful homes for themselves in leading theological schools, whether Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, or "Evangelical." And as there was no central authority in any of the Protestant churches capable of combating "modernism"—as the papacy combated it in the Catholic Church—it was fairly rapidly communicated from Protestant professors to the rising generation of Protestant clergymen and thence to Protestant laymen. By the twentieth century, a "modernist" change was being wrought in Protestantism far more revolutionary than that religious upheaval of the sixteenth century in which Protestantism had originated.

3. Modernist

Innumerable, of course, were the gradations and shades of "modernism" within the Protestant churches. What distinguished it as a whole was its evolutionary attitude toward religion in general and Christianity in particular. It involved a sharp reversal of the Protestant habit of seeking "pure religion" in an old volume and identifying "ecclesiastical reform" with a return to primitive Christianity.

Modernist Revolution

It also involved a curious shift of emphasis from "faith" to "good works." Originally, as we know, Protestants had repudiated the Catholic doctrine of "good works" and had insisted

that "salvation" is by "faith alone";¹ and for a long time all the various Protestant churches had been insistently dogmatic.

Decline of Faith and Dogma This stressing of dogma had been somewhat lessened in the eighteenth century,² and now in the latter part of the nineteenth century, contemporaneously with the growth of "modernism," it fell into notable disrepute. To a rapidly growing number of Protestants, "dogmatic" and "theological" became words of reproach, connoting ideas as repulsive as the word "superstitious." But these same Protestants, as they ceased to dwell upon particular dogmas, evinced a special regard for "good works," not of course the theological "good works" of Catholicism, but the "good life" of modern humanitarianism: social "uplift," popular education, public health, organized recreation, and special campaigns against alcoholism and juvenile delinquency.

Substitution of Good Works Altogether, "modernism" was providing a lowest common denominator for numerous Europeans (and Americans) who were Protestant in background and name, who still "felt" religious, and yet who were hostile or indifferent to the theology in which they had been reared. No matter to what denomination they belonged, they could stand together against "outworn dogmas" and, a little more vaguely, in support of "the good life." Standing together—coöperation—became indeed a characteristic (and essentially novel) ideal of Protestantism in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Growing Coöperation To the realization of such an ideal the "modernist" movement certainly contributed; and to it contributed also the synchronous development of several comprehensive organizations half religious and half social. One of these was the "Young Men's Christian Association," founded in England in 1844 for the union of youthful "evangelical Christians" in social and religious comradeship. Another was the "Salvation Army," established in England in 1880 by William Booth for "saving" slum-dwellers.

Mention should here be made, too, of Freemasonry. It had taken root, as we know, in the eighteenth century,³ but in the latter part of the nineteenth century it flourished as never before. Its lodges were more wide spread, and its membership more numerous. It was primarily a

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 153-155, 193-195.

² See Vol. I, pp. 525-527.

³ See Vol. I, pp. 512-519.

social and benevolent organization, though it had no slight religious significance. Inasmuch as it had been condemned by a succession of popes, its membership was now practically restricted to non-Catholics; and among these—Protestants, Jews, and agnostics—it was peculiarly influential. On the continent of Europe, particularly in traditionally Catholic countries, Freemasonry provided a common platform and program for various critics of Catholic Christianity. Here it was markedly "anti-clerical," very potent in "radical" politics, and strongly inclined toward materialistic atheism. In English-speaking countries, on the other hand, it was more conservative, less directly political, not professedly anti-religious or anti-Christian, and hence remarkably effective as a solvent of sectarianism. In these countries, moreover, Freemasonry was imitated by a host of "secret societies," which shared, surely if unconsciously, in popularizing the idea that Christians should be vague in what they believe and progressive in what they do.

It must not be gathered from what we have said that there was any marked decline in activity or membership of the several Protestant churches. On the contrary, just as many persons in Europe (and America) were affiliated with Protestantism in 1910 as in 1870 or at any earlier date; and most of the Protestant churches were far more active in social work and missionary enterprise than ever before. What we have been pointing out is that within these Protestant churches a revolution was taking place. Their creeds were being blurred or cast aside, and, despite the resistance of "fundamentalists," an increasing proportion of their members were adopting a "modernism" at variance with historic Protestant ideas of the Bible and of dogmatic and moral theology.

The outstanding development in nineteenth-century Protestantism was undoubtedly the "modernist" revolution. But there was another subversive development, less extensive though almost as sensational—a "Catholic" counter-revolution. For in the nineteenth century some Protestants took to "protesting" against Protestantism and trying to "re-Catholicize" it. The impetus to such a counter-revolution was furnished in first instance by romanticism—particularly the emotional sympathy it engendered for the middle ages and the resulting appreciation of the

Continuing Protestantism

"Catholic" Counter-Movement in Protestantism

historic character and services of the Catholic Church—and eventually by the intellectual conviction that Protestantism, by departing too far from Catholic tradition and authority, was ceasing to be a bulwark against agnosticism.

The “Catholic” counter-revolution especially flourished within the Anglican Church. Here it was inaugurated by the so-called “Oxford movement,” an agitation by a group of brilliant young clergymen, graduates or tutors of the University of Oxford, including John Henry Newman (1801–1890) and Edward Pusey (1802–1882). These men, beginning as “evangelicals,” were disturbed by the progress of rationalism and the rise of liberalism, perceiving in the one a threat against religion in general, in the other a menace to the privileged position of the Church of England. The more they thought about the danger of “national apostasy,” the more certain they became that it was but a natural outcome of the Protestant principle of “private judgment” and the Protestant practice of ecclesiastical subserviency to the lay state, and that the only remedy was for the church to recover its independence and reassert its authority. But what was “authority”? In a series of famous tracts in the 1830’s, the leaders of the “Oxford movement” set forth the thesis that “authority” was not alone in the individual or the Bible but preëminently in the church itself, and not in any particular Protestant body but in the “undivided Catholic Church” of the early centuries of the Christian era. Any modern ecclesiastical body which enjoyed unbroken “apostolic succession” from that church was a branch of the Catholic Church, and as such was under an obligation to be Catholic in fact as well as in name. It followed that the Anglican Church was not only Protestant but also Catholic. It should pursue a *via media*, a happy mean between the extremes of “Rome” and “reform.”

For some of the Oxford leaders (or “Tractarians,” as they were also styled), the *via media* was hard to find and keep. Newman, for example, the most conspicuous and gifted among them, could not rest content with individual interpretation of Christian tradition any more than with individual interpretation of the Bible. He felt the need of a continuing authoritative voice, and his studies convinced him that the pope’s had been just such a voice in the

Especially
in Angli-
can
Church

Newman
and Con-
versions
to Rome

early church and was the same today. In 1845 Newman formally left the Anglican Church and joined the Roman Catholic Church. His example was followed, then and afterwards, by a considerable number of Anglicans in Britain, in the United States, and elsewhere. Indirectly at least, the "Oxford movement" was an important factor in revivifying and extending the Catholic Church in English-speaking countries.

The majority of the "Tractarians," however—including such a leader as Pusey—remained within the Anglican Church; and, despite the unsympathetic attitude of bishops and the fanatical opposition of spokesmen of the "evangelical" masses, they succeeded in implanting in many Anglican clergymen and a considerable number of Anglican laymen an admiration for Catholic principles and practices.

Pusey and
the Anglo-
Catholics

This "Catholicizing" trend within modern Protestantism was evidenced most clearly and fully in the Anglican Church. But it was evidenced to some extent also by contemporary high-church developments in the Lutheran churches of Scandinavia and Germany, and, more strangely perhaps, by a new vogue of ritualism among many Protestants who were not at all "high church" in belief. "Evangelical" Protestants evinced a gradually lessening repugnance to the ceremonial aspects of historic Christianity, and "modernist" clergymen discovered that religious rites could provide a strong attraction for persons whose religious dogmas were nebulous or non-existent. There was a widening observance of ecclesiastical holy days and seasons such as Christmas, Good Friday, and Lent. There was a marked tendency to adorn church edifices with crosses, stained glass, and statues of saints, to elevate the "communion table" into an "altar" and embellish it with flowers and candles, and to enrich church services with vested choirs and set forms of prayer and praise.

Ritualism
among
Protes-
tants

To what we have been saying about Protestantism and Catholicism a few words should be added concerning the other great historic division of Christianity—the Orthodox communion of eastern Europe. This was not a single ecclesiastical organization (like the Catholic Church), nor was it a merely nominal bond (like Protestantism) for discordant beliefs and practices. Rather it was a federation of churches in close communion one with another. Originally, of

Orthodox
Church in
Age of
Realism

course, it had been a single ecclesiastical organization headed by the Greek patriarch of Constantinople, but the nationalizing of the part of it in Russia ¹ served as a model during the nineteenth century for the nationalizing of other parts of it in countries which now became politically independent of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, so-called "autocephalous" Orthodox churches

**"Auto-
cephalous"
Churches
in Eastern
Europe** were established, usually with the reluctant consent of the patriarch of Constantinople, for Greece in 1850, and in the 1870's for Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. One distinguishing feature of Orthodox Christianity, then, was its organization on strictly national lines

and in frank subserviency to secular governments. Another distinguishing feature was its doctrinal unity and conservatism. All the several national "churches" which composed it vied with one another in the ardor with which they clung to the historic creeds, ritual, and observances of the mother-church at Constantinople. They frowned on the Catholic Church, but they held aloof from the Protestant churches.

Orthodox Christianity was less obviously troubled by nineteenth-century developments than Catholicism or Protestantism.

**Their
"Back-
ward-
ness"** The countries in which it was the prevailing religion were relatively "backward." The great mass of its adherents were still agricultural and illiterate, accustomed not to question but to conserve their ancestral

cult. Nor was there any serious conflict in these countries between church and state, between Christianity and nationalism. Practically, each Orthodox Church was a national institution and an agency of a particular state, controlled by it and helping to forward its ends and to protect it against revolution. Naturally, the sovereigns and leading patriots of the state were especially intent upon maintaining and fostering the church.

Beneath the surface, however, lurked dangers for Orthodox Christianity. There was danger in the steady indigenous growth of dissenting sects in the Russian Empire,² and much graver danger in the gradual importation, from the West, of machine industry and its novel intellectual attendants—liberalism, materialism, "higher criticism," Marxian socialism. These novelties did not immediately affect the mass of peasantry, but they did contribute to the spread of religious

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 190-194.

² See Vol. I, pp. 364, 517.

indifferentism among the middle classes and to more or less open hostility to the Orthodox Church on the part of "intellectuals" and urban workingmen.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Europe still harbored, as in previous centuries, two religious minorities of considerable importance—the Jewish and the Moslem. The Moslem minority was concentrated in southeastern Europe and comprised the governing classes (and a portion of the masses) in what remained of the Ottoman Empire and smaller and less influential groups in adjacent (and predominantly Christian) countries which had latterly been freed from Turkish dominion. The Moslem minority had dwindled as the military fortunes of the Ottoman Turks ebbed, but it was still an important minority, and was backed up by the much larger, and still expanding and aggressive, Islam outside Europe—in Asia, Africa, and the East Indies. Moreover, all Islam was treated with increasing tenderness and circumspection by so-called Christian Powers of Europe (notably Great Britain, France, and Russia) as these, in pursuit of the "new imperialism," enlarged their extra-European territories and acquired more and more Moslem subjects. Not until after 1910 did the impact of "modern civilization" on the Moslem world produce revolutionary consequences.

Moslem
Minority
in Europe

Islam in
Age of
Realism

The Jewish minority was dispersed all over Europe, and in America, northern Africa, and western Asia. In eastern Europe, where the Jews were most numerous, they maintained a community life of their own—social and cultural as well as religious—sharply differentiated from the life of the Christian peoples among whom they resided; and here they continued to suffer (especially in Russia and Rumania) from galling restrictions on their personal freedom of occupation and education, from spasmodic persecution, and from occasional mob violence. On the other hand, the Jews of central and western Europe had undergone, since the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century and in harmony with the liberalism of the nineteenth century, a gradual "emancipation" from restrictive legislation and had adapted themselves to "modern civilization."¹ Particularly in western and southern Europe (in Great Britain, the

Jewish
Minority
in Europe

¹ On the beginnings of Jewish emancipation in the era of the "Enlightenment," see Vol. I, pp. 529-532.

Netherlands, France, Italy, etc.), and only a little less so in Germany and Austria, they had come by 1870 to enjoy full rights of citizenship and to be hardly distinguishable from their fellow citizens except that they were still called "Jews" and were still attached, at least sentimentally, to the Jewish religion. These Jews exerted an influence from 1870 to 1910 out of all proportion to their actual numbers. Many of them were conspicuous in business—in capitalistic industry, trade, and banking; others, in science, in the arts, in journalism, or in patriotic or humanitarian undertakings; others, in Freemasonry and "liberal" politics. Some among them took an active part in "radical" movements, notably in Marxian socialism.

In the novel circumstances of the nineteenth century, the traditional Jewish religion was greatly troubled—even more so, on the whole, than Christianity. Historically, Judaism was a tribal religion, based not only on the ancient Hebrew Bible with its story of God's marvellous dealings with His "chosen people" and its prophecy of a national "messiah," but also on the progressive elaboration, written and oral, of an essentially tribal way of life—social, ceremonial, and dietary. For centuries, Jews had been regarded, alike by themselves and by others, as belonging both to a peculiar religion and to a separate nationality. Now, Judaism was confronted with two distinct, yet related, problems: that of preserving its "tribal" character in the face of mounting nationalism throughout Europe; and that of preserving its "religious" faith against the rising flood of materialist philosophy, Biblical criticism, and "modernism." On these problems, Jews divided into three camps.

(1) Some, chiefly in eastern Europe, remained rigidly "orthodox," resisting "higher criticism" and holding to all the "tribal" Jewish laws and observances. (2) Some, including the majority in central and western Europe (and in America), became "reformed" (which was another name for "modernist"). In various ways, these rationalized and universalized their religion, lessening its ceremonial observances, softening or neglecting its special laws, and approximating it to the contemporary Unitarian and "Ethical Culture" movements in Protestant Christianity. (3) A small but perceptibly growing number in almost every country, while

Jewish
Emanci-
pation
Since 18th
Century

New Na-
tional and
Religious
Problems
for Jews

Religious
Divisions
among
Jews

still thinking of themselves as Jews in "race," drifted away from the Jewish religion whether orthodox or reformed, severed any connection with the synagogue, and became frankly agnostic or enthusiastically Marxian.

Complicating the Jewish situation still more was the external development, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, of nationalistic anti-Semitism. We have indicated that European "liberalism" had been favorable to Jewish "emancipation" and "absorption"; and so long as European nationalism was preponderantly "liberal," fairly rapid progress was made (at least in central and western Europe) in breaking down political and cultural barriers between Jews and non-Jews and in accustoming both to submerge religious and "racial" differences in a common patriotism. But gradually, as we have also indicated, nationalism was intensified and liberalism waned or was modified. By the 1880's an extreme and essentially illiberal nationalism was directing the public policies of European states toward neo-mercantilism, imperialism, and militarism, and also inspiring popular agitation within each state against any minority of its citizens who were presumed, by reason of racial or social peculiarities or international affiliations, to be lacking in perfect devotion to the national institutions and ideals of the majority. In the circumstances, it was but natural, for example, that German nationalists who waged a *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church and campaigned against Marxian socialism, should also react against Jews. Such reaction was by no means confined to Germany. It was amply evident, simultaneously, in Russia, in Rumania, in Austria, in France, and it was echoed elsewhere.

Of particular phases of anti-Semitism in the several countries, we shall speak in later chapters.¹ Here we may remark its general character and some of its general effects. It did not profess to oppose the Jewish religion as such. Rather, its concern was with the Jewish "race." With much parading of "scientific" theory about biology and eugenics, it preached the doctrine that the "Semitic" inheritance of Jews endows them with physical and mental traits different from, and repugnant to, the traits inherent in Aryans or "true Europeans," and hence renders them a permanently "alien" and potentially cor-

Rise of
Anti-Semitism

Racialism

¹ See below, pp. 410-412, 447, 466-467, 473-474, 475, 495.

rupting body in the several European nations. To this basic "racial" doctrine were related certain charges against the Jews: that they were "international" and cowardly, and disposed to sacrifice national interests and national honor to their own ambitions; that in their eagerness to make money they were thoroughly unscrupulous and largely responsible for the exploitation of workingmen, the impoverishment of peasants, and the high cost of living; and, somewhat paradoxically, that in their hatred for European civilization they were active in such a revolutionary movement as Marxian socialism. However preposterous these charges were when levelled at the whole Jewish people, they were accepted, in an age of mounting nationalism and of much loose talk about "race," as substantially true not only by unbalanced agitators but by some "intellectuals" and by sizable groups among the masses; and the attendant propaganda quickened anti-Jewish prejudice in the minds of many persons who were not expressly "anti-Semitic."

The rise of anti-Semitism in the 1880's did not actually lead to any legal discrimination against Jews, except in Russia and Rumania. Yet it complicated the domestic politics of other (and more democratic) countries, and it widely fostered a social discrimination against Jews. Its most significant consequences, however, were for the Jews themselves. Suffering from social ostracism and from imputations against their "racial" character, they became acutely "race-conscious" and thereby were attached to an idea of ethnic unity transcending religious and cultural differences. Suffering, too, from actual governmental oppression in eastern Europe, numerous Jews emigrated thence to regions where at least there were no legal handicaps, to Germany for example, and, in largest numbers, to the United States. Suffering, moreover, from nationalist taunts that Jews everywhere were "aliens," some of them—the so-called Zionists—formulated a nationalism of their own.

The leading apostle of Zionism was Theodore Herzl (1860-1904), who maintained that the Jews were a distinct nationality and that an independent national state should speedily be erected for them in Palestine. Zionism was political and cultural rather than religious; by seeking to draw together Orthodox and Reformed Jews and Jews who were such only by "race," it clearly subordinated religion to nationalism. And it

proved to be still another source of dissension to Judaism. For most Jews had no thought of settling in Palestine, and many of them were hostile to Zionism elsewhere, either on principle or on the tactical ground that espousal of it might compromise their existing citizenship. On the whole, nevertheless, if nineteenth-century developments were emphasizing Jewish differences in religion, politics, and economics, they were bringing Jews into new prominence and were reuniting them in sentimental bonds of race and nationality.

5. MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE

To the foregoing account of religious groups in nineteenth-century Europe, must be added a few words about the religious significance of the contacts which the Industrial Revolution and capitalistic imperialism were multiplying in the nineteenth century between Europe and the other Continents. This significance was twofold: first, outside Europe, a remarkable extension of Christian missions; and second, within Europe, a less obvious but by no means negligible response to Asiatic religions.

Christianity had always been a conspicuously missionary religion, and ever since its beginning successive waves of proselyting zeal had expanded its professed following ever more widely: throughout the Mediterranean world in the first five centuries, into England in the sixth century, into central Europe in the seventh and eighth centuries, into northern Europe in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, throughout the American continents and into the Philippines and India (and temporarily into China and Japan) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The nineteenth century, however much or little it may have weakened Christianity in Europe, witnessed a new wave of Christian expansion outside Europe—in Asia, Africa, and Australasia.

The Catholic Church, under whose auspices and in whose behalf the greater part of earlier missionary work had been done, played an important part in nineteenth-century missions. Under the continuing direction of the papal "Congregation of the Propaganda," which had been established at Rome by Gregory XV back in 1622, and with more liberal financial aids from the laity, an increasing number of Catholic missionaries went out from Europe to convert

Christianity, a Missionary Religion

Especially in 19th Century

Catholic Missionary Enterprise

the "heathen." By 1910 Catholic missionaries in Africa, Asia, and Oceania numbered about 41,000, comprising (in round figures) 8,000 European priests, 6,000 native priests, and 27,000 sisters and lay brothers.

This new wave of Catholic missionary endeavor produced results. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Philippine Islands were the only part of the world outside Europe and America where the Catholic Church was established firmly and with as large a native following as it had ever had. Japan and China had been closed to it. The number of Catholics in India had shrunk to barely 350,000. There were no Catholics in Indo-China or Oceania and hardly any in Africa. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, a remarkable change occurred. Catholic missionaries reentered China in 1842 and Japan in 1861; they settled in Korea, Indo-China, Oceania, and Africa; and they redoubled their efforts in India. Catholic hierarchies were newly created for China in 1875, for India in 1886, and for Japan in 1891. When the century closed, Catholics numbered about two and a quarter million in India, slightly over a million in China, some sixty thousand in Japan, close to sixty thousand in Korea, and two and a half million in Africa.

Protestant Christians had evinced, prior to the nineteenth century, comparatively little interest in foreign missions. Just on the eve of this century, however, an awakening of interest was indicated and stimulated among English-speaking Protestants by the organization of Baptist, Presbyterian, and Anglican missionary societies. Other Protestant churches and sects, in Britain and the United States and also on the continent of Europe, soon caught the contagion, and by the middle of the century dozens of Protestant societies were competing with one another and with Catholic missionaries in efforts to Christianize the peoples of the non-European world. By 1910 the number of active Protestant missionaries totalled over 18,000, comprising 13,000 Europeans and Americans (5,700 clergymen, 2,800 laymen, and 4,500 unmarried women) and 5,000 native clergymen. And by this time Protestantism in one form or another was the religion of one and a half million persons in India, a quarter of a million in China, eighty thousand in Japan, and two and a half million in Africa.

Since the sixteenth century the Orthodox Church of Russia

had been steadily expanding over northern Asia, in measure as Russian emigrants settled in Siberia and Russian Tsars extended their political sway and ecclesiastical patronage. In the nineteenth century, it became more zealously proselyting. It sponsored missions among the natives of eastern Siberia and Alaska, and also in China and in Japan. By 1910, Orthodox Christianity had fifteen million followers in Asia.

Orthodox
Missions

Altogether, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Christianity was professed outside the traditionally "European" or "Western" world by some forty-one million persons, of whom the majority were the fruit of nineteenth-century missionary activity. But there were other, and more incalculable, fruits of such activity. For, while the number of actual converts to Christianity constituted a very small proportion of the populations of India, China, Japan, and even Africa, it should be remembered that Christian missionaries were a most effective agency (along with traders and industrial capitalists) for spreading at least the externals of "Western" civilization among a large part of those populations and thus contributing to the "Europeanization" of the whole world. Especially through the numerous schools and hospitals which missionaries established, many natives who did not become Christian acquired at any rate a taste for the education, the science, the machinery, the clothing, and the sports of contemporary Europe.

Christian-
ity a Fac-
tor in
European-
izing the
World

Besides, many natives who retained an attachment to the religion of their ancestors—to Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, or Shintoism, as the case might be—tended more and more, under the influence of Christian teaching and example, to interpret their own religion in "modern" terms and to invest it with ethical principles borrowed

Influence
on "East-
ern"
Religions

more or less consciously from Christianity. It would be going too far to assert that Hinduism or Buddhism was transformed; these great historic religions remained for the mass of their disciples what they had previously been. But for "intellectuals," the impact of Christianity and "Western" civilization on the "East" gradually wrought a veritable revolution. A few accepted Christianity; a larger number became agnostic; and some turned to "reform movements," seeking to reconcile their traditional faith with modern developments.

The multiplying contacts of "West" and "East," through nineteenth-century Christian missions (and the Industrial Revolution), had results for the East, and for the West also. Undoubtedly the most important, of which we shall speak later in considerable detail, was the resurgence of economic and political imperialism among the Great Powers of Europe (and America). Noteworthy here, however, was the heightening interest of "intellectuals" of the "West" in the civilizations of the "East."

Counter-
Influence
on the
"West"

This was evidenced by European artists—by painters like the French impressionists and Whistler who tried to be "Japanese," or by a "modernist" painter like Gauguin who preferred "primitive" Tahiti to sophisticated Paris. It was evidenced, too, by European scholars who produced learned tomes, ever bigger and more abundant, about the languages and customs, religions and antiquities of the Orient, and who, through extensive translation, made available to western readers the "classics" of India and China and the Moslem world. It was evidenced likewise by a novel vogue in "Christian" Europe (and America) of oriental philosophies and religions.

In the "West," there was little or no organized propaganda by Moslems, Buddhists, or Hindus, such as Christians were conducting in the "East." Yet many "Westerners," as they grew sceptical or "modernist" about Christianity, developed a high appreciation, perhaps more romantic than realist, of the "spirituality" and "profundity" of traditional oriental thought and an enthusiasm for the "beauty" and "nobility" of the ancient sacred books and cults of the East. By the beginning of the twentieth century, most metropolitan centres of Europe and America had groups of intellectuals or would-be intellectuals who curiously combined with a devotion to science and material ease and "social uplift" a penchant for religious novelties—for Theosophy or Bahá'ism, for spiritualistic séances with mediums, for personal attachment to mysterious mahatmas and yogis, or for more nebulous worship of what was termed "New Thought." Simultaneously, in ethical-culture societies which were arising and in "radical" Protestant churches which were becoming ultra-modernist, respect was being inculcated for all the great "prophets" of the human race—for Confucius, Gautama Buddha, Laotse, and Mohammed, no less than for Jesus—and their collective moral teachings, divorced from their several "dogmas,"

were being drawn upon to provide a spiritual and ethical setting for contemporary material progress. "Progressive" people were apt to perceive in these urban religious novelties, as well as in the advance of science and machine-industry, sure signs of the passing of narrowly Christian European civilization into a broadly humanitarian world civilization.



CHAPTER XX

BRITAIN, 1867-1914

I. THE WORKSHOP AND BANKER OF THE WORLD



PROGRESS in machine industry was more marked in Great Britain than in any other country.¹ The Industrial Revolution had begun in Britain and had there produced significant effects a generation or two before it spread to other countries. The lead which Britain thus obtained in manufacturing, commerce, and banking, she kept at least to 1914.

Other countries, to be sure, underwent progressive industrialization after 1870: Germany and the United States, most notably; France and Austria and Italy, considerably; and, in varying degrees, all the countries of western and central Europe—and Russia and Japan, Canada and Australia, and even India. But while Britain no longer had a monopoly of industrial machinery, while she felt the increasing competition of industrial rivals, while her commerce and capital constituted a gradually lessening proportion of the world's commerce and capital, the loss to Britain was relative and not absolute. Despite new competition, she continued to be, *par excellence*, the workshop and the banker of the modern world.

Britain's population grew and shifted proportionately with her industrialization. In the island of Great Britain (embracing England, Wales, and Scotland), where the bulk of big industry was carried on, the population increased by giant strides, from ten and a half million in 1801, to sixteen and a quarter million in 1831, to twenty-six million in 1871, and on to almost forty-one million in 1911. And the increment was concentrated in urban centres, such as London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham, etc.

In the other island of "Little" Britain (that is, Ireland), only

¹ Except Belgium, which was very much smaller.

industrialized Belfast greatly increased in population. The population of Ireland as a whole, largely agricultural and once almost as numerous as that of Great Britain, declined from eight million in 1841 to five and a quarter in 1871 and to four and a quarter in 1911. All this decline is accounted for by the stream of emigration which flowed from agricultural Ireland to industrial centres in America, Scotland, and England.

One British industry suffered serious loss. That was agriculture. For three decades previously, the tide of British agricultural prosperity had been rising,¹ but after 1874 it turned and rapidly ebbed. At first, the ebb was viewed as a temporary phenomenon, a natural but passing effect of a widespread economic "depression" of 1873-1874, which adversely affected manufacturing as much as agriculture. But while British manufacturing soon recovered and again forged ahead, the ebb of British agriculture became chronic. From the 70's British farmers were staggered by an astounding rise of grain-growing in the United States and Argentina, Canada and Australia, and by still more astounding expansion of overseas shipping whereby the plentiful cheap grain of those hitherto distant countries came flooding into British cities and underselling British-grown grain. In the circumstances, the grain area of England and Wales shrank from eight and a quarter million acres in 1871 to five and three-quarters in 1901; and the financial profits from what remained tended to disappear.

British farmers simply could not meet the newer foreign competition. Besides, they were handicapped by an aristocratic landholding system under which most of them were mere tenants rather than real owners² and hence were expected to make enough money from farming to support themselves and to pay rents to noble landlords. And the one advantage which they had possessed of proximity to their markets was now being overcome by the speed and cheapness of oceanic transportation.

The decline of British agriculture was platonically lamented,

¹ See above, pp. 27-29.

² The number of persons in England and Wales owning more than one acre of land was about 150,000, or less than $\frac{1}{170}$ of the total population, and of this number 2,250 were landed aristocrats who owned almost a half of all the cultivated land. It is noteworthy that at the same time France, with a population only a third larger, had some 5,600,000 landed proprietors, and Belgium, with a population of but 7,000,000, had as many as 1,000,000 landowners.

Agricultural
Decline

but little or nothing was actually done to arrest it. Already when it began, the agricultural population was too small a fraction of the total population of Great Britain—about a sixth—to be able to exert any great or decisive influence, as a class, upon governmental policy or legislation. The landholding aristocracy, though still very influential in government, was now as much identified with banking, trade, or manufacturing as with agriculture. Landlords complained that they could not make their ancestral estates “pay,” but the persons who suffered most were usually their tenants and farm laborers. These persons might better their lot only by migrating to industrial centres or foreign fields. Landlords, on the other hand, could continue to derive pleasure, if not profit, from their country estates; they could transform them into parks and hunting grounds with the profits which they reaped from urban business. British noblemen and gentlemen—and social pretenders among the middle class—might play on country estates, but their work was more and more in urban offices, in the management of factories, collieries, foundries, railways, steamship lines, public utility corporations, insurance companies, banks and brokerage houses, in the maintenance of Britain’s premier position in industry and trade.

**Industrial
Concen-
tration**

For Great Britain was the leading commercial as well as industrial country; and the value of her foreign commerce steadily rose. Already in 1865 it was 418 million pounds sterling, much in excess of any other country’s. In 1890 it was 600 million, and in 1910 it amounted to 1,085 million. London was the greatest commercial port in the world, and Liverpool did the greatest exporting business. Moreover, the bulk of the shipping to and from Great Britain, together with the largest part of the whole world’s carrying trade, was in British hands, and it showed a similar gain. The net tonnage of the British merchant marine went up from five and a half million in 1870 to eleven and a half million in 1910; and whereas sailing vessels constituted over four-fifths of the tonnage in 1870, steam ships accounted for over nine-tenths of it in 1910.

**Commer-
cial Su-
premacy**

Great Britain was the wealthiest country in the world, with the largest accumulations of capital at home and the largest investments abroad. Her domestic wealth was roughly estimated at 6,000 million pounds sterling in 1865, and at 14,000 million

in 1910,¹ representing a rate of increase considerably in excess of the rate of population increase. And she was the chief lending country in the world, the foremost exporter of capital. By 1913 her external investments aggregated at least 3,760 million pounds sterling, comprising 1,825 million in the British overseas empire, 755 million in the United States and a like amount in Latin America, 110 million in Russia, 65 million in Japan, 25 million in the Ottoman Empire, and 225 million elsewhere. Wherefore from all parts of the world and from a variety of public and private undertakings flowed to Britain a stream of annual tribute in the form of interest on stocks and bonds. London was the unquestioned financial capital of the world, the pivot of the world's money and banking and stock exchange.

**Increasing
Domestic
Wealth
and For-
eign In-
vestments**

As the national wealth increased, the British government could and did increase its revenues and expenditures. The central government more than doubled its expenditure from 71 million pounds in 1867 to about 150 million in 1910, while local authorities multiplied their expenditure almost fivefold from 36 million in 1867 to about 168 million in 1910. The expense of past wars and of preparedness for future wars was still the principal item in Britain's public budget, but it was not increasing quite as fast as the expense of the civil service. The state was obviously being called upon to do more for its citizens than to protect them against armed aggression of foreigners. In fact, by the twentieth century, many inmates of the "workshop of the world" were becoming "socialistic." How this came about, we shall presently see.

**Increasing
State Ex-
penditure**

Meanwhile, let us note briefly but with emphasis certain peculiar, almost paradoxical, facts about Britain—facts intimately associated with her position as workshop and banker of the world and fundamental to any detailed account of her political and social development from 1867 to 1914.

**Paradoxical
Britain**

One was the striking contrast between the waxing industrial wealth of the country as a whole and the continuing poverty of the majority of its inhabitants. It is true that the dire misery prevalent among the masses during the earlier stage of industrialization was somewhat mitigated. But it is also true that there was no general diffusion of wealth at all comparable with its quantitative

¹ For corresponding estimates at earlier dates, see above, p. 34.

increase. The economic condition of farm tenants and agricultural laborers grew steadily worse; and, if the lot of urban working-men as a class showed some improvement, most of them still owned no property, had no permanent homes, and were expected to work long hours for mere subsistence wages, while some of them remained chronically idle and on the verge of starvation. The profits of British industry, we must remember, went on accruing primarily to a minority of Britishers rather than to the majority.

A second curious fact about Britain was the evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, character of her politics and society.

**1. Na-
tional
Wealth
and Indi-
vidual
Poverty**

**2. Con-
servative
Political
Evolution**

She had had no "French Revolution." Side by side with her impressive and very modern machine industry, she retained a form of government and a class society which dated from the middle ages and which a series of compromises had adapted, slowly and imperfectly, to changing conditions. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, "compromise" was a specially sacred word in the English language, and "muddling through" a favorite way of describing the process by which compromises were practically effected. There was a monarch who reigned "by grace of God," but did not rule. There was a privileged national church whose communicants constituted only a fraction of the nation. There was a small privileged nobility which prided itself on landholding but profited mainly from bondholding. There was a powerful House of Commons, elected by the masses but actually dominated by the classes. And, despite a persistent tradition of individualism and personal liberty, despite an extraordinary frankness of discussion and criticism, the great majority of Englishmen were wont to respect their social "betters" and to obey their political rulers. On the whole, they were intensely patriotic, and, however poor or romantic they might be individually, they were prone to glorify the "wealth of Britain" and British "common sense." They might demand "reform," but they were not likely to participate in "revolution." All of which gave internal solidity and external fame to the "workshop of the world" and to its political and social institutions.

A third remarkable fact was that Great Britain, as workshop

NOTE. The picture opposite is from an etching of a scene on the River Thames by James McNeill Whistler (1834-1903). On Whistler, see above, p. 287.

and banker of the world, seemed to be so small a part of the world. We say, "seemed to be." In a literal sense, "Great Britain" was one of two relatively small islands lying off the coast of the smallest of the five continents, and its population, even when reaching the figure of forty million, was dwarfed by the sixty-five million in Germany, the ninety-three million in the United States, the hundred and forty million in Russia, the three hundred million in India. In a metaphorical and truer sense, however, "Great Britain" was not a mere island with a puny population; it was a huge imperial domain. And this domain was not confined to the political British Empire where the British flag waved over a fourth of the earth's habitable area and a fourth of the human race. It embraced an economic empire of all lands and seas and of all peoples wherever British shipping and trade or British investment extended.

3. Small-
ness and
Bigness of
Britain

2. OPERATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AND GROWING DEMAND FOR SOCIAL REFORM

The year 1867—the year of the second great parliamentary reform¹—marked the close of the earlier Victorian compromise between noble landlords and bourgeois capitalists and the beginning of a new compromise between aristocracy and democracy. On the one hand, the upper and wealthier classes retained their prime position in public life. They monopolized the House of Lords. They occupied most of the seats in the House of Commons and nearly all cabinet offices. They supplied the heads and much of the staff for the governmental services, military, naval, and civil. They provided the leadership for both Liberal and Conservative parties. On the other hand, all this abiding political ascendancy of the classes was newly and radically conditioned by the enfranchisement of the masses. Aristocratic government had to function within a democratic framework, with the result that while it remained predominantly aristocratic in personnel it became increasingly democratic in method and policy.

New
Political
Compromise,
1867

Despite the fact that the Reform Act of 1867 had been spon-

¹ See above, p. 199.

NOTE. The picture opposite is of the Palace at Westminster—the seat of the British Parliament—and is reproduced from an etching by a popular French artist who spent much time in England, Felix Buhot (1847-1898).

sored by the Conservative party, the majority of workingmen whom it enfranchised gave their first suffrages, in 1868, to the Liberal party. They distrusted Disraeli, the Conservative leader,¹

Gladstone's
First
Liberal
Ministry,
1868-1874

and they were less sympathetic with a party traditionally identified with the landed aristocracy and the Anglican Church than with the party of Gladstone² and Bright, the party especially favorable to industrial progress, to freedom of trade, and to non-conformity in religion. In 1868, therefore, the Liberal party returned to power, with a cabinet under the premiership of Gladstone and with a parliamentary majority comprising a group of "Whig" aristocrats, a larger number of strictly "liberal" industrialists, and some "radicals" like John Bright.

This first Gladstone ministry—this first "democratic" ministry—lasted from 1868 to 1874. It stuck to the Liberal tradition of "peace and retrenchment," economizing on expenditures and

"Peace
and Re-
trench-
ment"

obtaining necessary revenues from free-trade budgets, and pursuing a pacific policy in foreign and colonial affairs. It preserved a strict neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. It submitted to

arbitration the claims for damages of the United States growing out of the depredations of British-built Confederate vessels during the American Civil War.³ It fostered local self-government in several regions of the overseas British Empire. It disestablished the Anglican Church in Ireland and attempted some land reform there.⁴ Its most significant legislation was in response to demands of the recently enfranchised workingmen of Great Britain for popular education and for full legalization of trade unions.

One of these demands was met by the Education Act of 1870. Since 1833 the state had been subsidizing elementary schools

Education
Act of
1870

maintained by the church (chiefly by the Anglican Church), and the subsidies had gradually heightened.

Until 1870, nevertheless, there had been no real state schools in Britain, and almost half the children of Britain still

¹ On the earlier career of Disraeli, see above, pp. 70-71.

² On Gladstone, see above, pp. 69-70.

³ The most famous of these vessels of the Southern Confederacy was the *Alabama*. The arbitration of the so-called "Alabama claims" resulted in the payment (in 1872) of damages of \$15,500,000 by Great Britain to the United States.

⁴ For a fuller account of Irish unrest and disaffection, with a general survey of remedial legislation, see below, pp. 358-361.

had no regular schooling. Now, provision was made for larger public subsidies to private schools, and also for the establishment of a supplementary system of state schools ("board schools," as they were called) which would be financed entirely by public taxation and managed by public "boards of education" and in which no denominational religion would be taught. Under the operation of these new "board schools" and of the continuing church schools, and with the added requirement (in 1880) that every child must attend some school, the percentage of illiteracy in England rapidly decreased from 24 in 1871 to 1 in 1911. By 1911 more than 5,500,000 English children were attending school (3,000,000 in "board schools" and 2,500,000 in "church schools"), and governmental authorities (central and local) were expending £25,000,000 on elementary education.

The other major demand of British workingmen was partially met by the Trade Union Act of 1871. This formally and finally legalized trade unions, by empowering them to hold property and to maintain and defend actions at law, but it contained drastic provisions against "picketing" and every form of "violence" in connection with strikes and other labor disputes. Trade unionism grew rapidly in Britain after 1871, but its rank and file were by no means satisfied with the Liberal Act of that year.¹

Dissatisfaction of British workingmen with the Trade Union Act of 1871 and opposition of Anglican churchmen and British landlords to the ecclesiastical and educational legislation of Gladstone were capitalized by the Conservative party and associated by its adroit leader, Benjamin Disraeli, with the "higher patriotism" which he sedulously preached in lieu of the "inglorious" foreign and colonial policy of the Liberal government. By 1874 Disraeli was in a position to profit politically from an intensified nationalism—and imperialism—which was taking possession of Britishers. There was popular reaction against the government which had stood aside while Germany and Italy became unified

Trade
Union Act
of 1871

Surge of
New Na-
tionalism
and Impe-
rialism

¹ Gladstone catered to his democratic working-class constituents with the Education Act of 1870 and the Trade Union Act of 1871 with the enactment of the secret ballot for electing members of Parliament (1872) and with a regulatory code for labor in mines. On previous labor legislation, see above, pp. 61-63, and on the secret ballot, see above, p. 200.

sored by the Conservative party, the majority of workingmen whom it enfranchised gave their first suffrages, in 1868, to the Liberal party. They distrusted Disraeli, the Conservative leader,¹

Gladstone's First Liberal Ministry, 1868-1874 and they were less sympathetic with a party traditionally identified with the landed aristocracy and the Anglican Church than with the party of Gladstone² and Bright, the party especially favorable to industrial progress, to freedom of trade, and to non-conformity in religion. In 1868, therefore, the Liberal party returned to power, with a cabinet under the premiership of Gladstone and with a parliamentary majority comprising a group of "Whig" aristocrats, a larger number of strictly "liberal" industrialists, and some "radicals" like John Bright.

This first Gladstone ministry—this first "democratic" ministry—lasted from 1868 to 1874. It stuck to the Liberal tradition of "peace and retrenchment," economizing on expenditures and obtaining necessary revenues from free-trade budgets, and pursuing a pacific policy in foreign and colonial affairs. It preserved a strict neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. It submitted to

arbitration the claims for damages of the United States growing out of the depredations of British-built Confederate vessels during the American Civil War.³ It fostered local self-government in several regions of the overseas British Empire. It disestablished the Anglican Church in Ireland and attempted some land reform there.⁴ Its most significant legislation was in response to demands of the recently enfranchised workingmen of Great Britain for popular education and for full legalization of trade unions.

One of these demands was met by the Education Act of 1870. Since 1833 the state had been subsidizing elementary schools maintained by the church (chiefly by the Anglican Church), and the subsidies had gradually heightened. Until 1870, nevertheless, there had been no real state schools in Britain, and almost half the children of Britain still

¹ On the earlier career of Disraeli, see above, pp. 70-71.

² On Gladstone, see above, pp. 69-70.

³ The most famous of these vessels of the Southern Confederacy was the *Alabama*. The arbitration of the so-called "Alabama claims" resulted in the payment (in 1872) of damages of \$15,500,000 by Great Britain to the United States.

⁴ For a fuller account of Irish unrest and disaffection, with a general survey of remedial legislation, see below, pp. 358-361.

had no regular schooling. Now, provision was made for larger public subsidies to private schools, and also for the establishment of a supplementary system of state schools ("board schools," as they were called) which would be financed entirely by public taxation and managed by public "boards of education" and in which no denominational religion would be taught. Under the operation of these new "board schools" and of the continuing church schools, and with the added requirement (in 1880) that every child must attend some school, the percentage of illiteracy in England rapidly decreased from 24 in 1871 to 1 in 1911. By 1911 more than 5,500,000 English children were attending school (3,000,000 in "board schools" and 2,500,000 in "church schools"), and governmental authorities (central and local) were expending £25,000,000 on elementary education.

The other major demand of British workingmen was partially met by the Trade Union Act of 1871. This formally and finally legalized trade unions, by empowering them to hold property and to maintain and defend actions at law, but it contained drastic provisions against "picketing" and every form of "violence" in connection with strikes and other labor disputes. Trade unionism grew rapidly in Britain after 1871, but its rank and file were by no means satisfied with the Liberal Act of that year.¹

Dissatisfaction of British workingmen with the Trade Union Act of 1871 and opposition of Anglican churchmen and British landlords to the ecclesiastical and educational legislation of Gladstone were capitalized by the Conservative party and associated by its adroit leader, Benjamin Disraeli, with the "higher patriotism" which he sedulously preached in lieu of the "inglorious" foreign and colonial policy of the Liberal government. By 1874 Disraeli was in a position to profit politically from an intensified nationalism—and imperialism—which was taking possession of Britishers. There was popular reaction against the government which had stood aside while Germany and Italy became unified

Trade
Union Act
of 1871

Surge of
New Nationalism
and Imperialism

¹ Gladstone catered to his democratic working-class constituents with the Education Act of 1870 and the Trade Union Act of 1871 with the enactment of the secret ballot for electing members of Parliament (1872) and with a regulatory code for labor in mines. On previous labor legislation, see above, pp. 61-63, and on the secret ballot, see above, p. 200.

Great Powers, while Russia repudiated the results of the Crimean War,¹ while the United States collected "damages," while the British Empire continued to "disintegrate." A feeling spread that Britain, if she would retain her international prestige, must play a bigger and more active part in world politics and imperial sway, and that "patriots" could expect more from Disraeli and the Conservative party than from Gladstone and the other Liberals. A general election had to be held in 1874, and when the votes were counted they showed that Gladstone must go out of office and Disraeli come in.

The Conservative ministry of Disraeli lasted from 1874 to 1880. It had Parliament repeal in 1875 the restriction which the Trade Union Act of 1871 had imposed on "peaceful picketing" and in 1878 enact a comprehensive code of factory laws. But while it thus catered to British workmen, its chief interest—and significance—was in the nationalist domain. It was extremely patriotic, even jingoistic, and it displayed a tender regard for the unity, the dignity, and the greatness of the British Empire. Disraeli knew how, by flattery and cajolery, to manage his somewhat difficult sovereign, Queen Victoria, and he did much to render the crown the outstanding symbol and object of British patriotism. He did much, too, to reassert and revivify Britain's imperial traditions.² He emphasized the union of Ireland with Great Britain and refused to make any concessions to what he termed the "rebellious elements" in that island. He stressed the importance of India to Great Britain by adding to the titles of his sovereign that of "Empress of India." He obtained for Britain the financial control of the Suez Canal.³ He intervened decisively in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, helped to dictate the terms of peace at Berlin,⁴ and, as a kind of brokerage-fee, secured for his own country the island of Cyprus.

Disraeli's government was turned out of office by the general election of 1880, and he himself died the following year. But Gladstone—whose second Liberal ministry extended from 1880 to 1885—was unable to breast the current of nationalism and

¹ See above, p. 178.

² For a fuller account of the nineteenth-century development of the British Empire, see below, pp. 365-384.

³ See below, p. 368, and the cartoon facing p. 365, below.

⁴ See above, pp. 193-194.

Disraeli's
Conservative
Ministry,
1874-1880

imperialism which Disraeli had set in motion and which the Conservative party now exploited to the full. Though the Liberal prime minister was a shrewd politician and a resonant orator, his principles and prejudices were more consonant with mid-century liberalism than with late-century nationalism. He was still a "little Englander," dubious about foreign entanglements and distant undertakings and sure that the noble ends of peace and material prosperity could best be attained through a continuous proliferation of such domestic "reforms" as had been effected by Liberal governments in the 1830's and 40's.¹ Gladstone talked so much and so eloquently about "reform," that he acquired the reputation of being more radical than he really was. He alarmed many conservatively minded persons, and Queen Victoria disliked him on personal grounds (she said he talked to her as if she were a mass-meeting) and deemed his "principles" highly dangerous. Yet it was the irony of fate that the only memorable domestic "reform" which Gladstone actually accomplished during his second ministry was the extension of the parliamentary suffrage to farm tenants and agricultural laborers (1884)—and this he accomplished through an understanding with the Conservative party that there should be a new and equitable rearrangement of electoral districts (1885).² He permitted, it is true, an armed intervention in Egypt, but he insisted that it would be only temporary and he so weakened it that it came perilously near to disaster. For Ireland he contented himself with another Land Act (1881) and a renewal of coercive measures.

Gladstone's
Second
Ministry,
1880-1885

Reform
Acts of
1884-1885

All these policies were distasteful to an increasing part of the British electorate. Workingmen complained that the Liberal government did nothing to improve their lot. Patriots denounced its concessions abroad as weak and undignified, if not traitorous. Men of means were alarmed by the restrictions which its Irish Land Act placed upon the rights of private property. The Irish were not satisfied; they wanted a more radical land reform, they opposed coercion with redoubled violence, and they intensified their agitation for "home rule." In 1885 Gladstone, outvoted in the House of Commons, resigned; and until a new general elec-

¹ See above, pp. 56-61.

² On the parliamentary reform of 1884-1885, see above, p. 200.

tion could be held, a Conservative ministry under the Marquess of Salisbury took office.¹

The first general election in which the agricultural as well as the industrial masses participated was held in 1885. It returned a slightly greater number of Liberals than of Conservatives but a sufficiently large number of Irish Nationalists to give them the balance of power between the two major parties. Gladstone at once perceived the advantage of "home rule" to Ireland and to his own political fortunes. In alliance with the Irish Nationalists, he voted Salisbury out of office and in 1886 formed his third ministry, pledged to set up a separate Irish parliament at Dublin.

Gladstone's third ministry was brief. Its one proposal was a home-rule bill for Ireland, and the bill was defeated in the House of Commons. Though the Irish Nationalists and a majority of the Liberals voted for it, a minority of Liberals who called themselves "Liberal Unionists," and who proved themselves more nationalist than liberal, joined the Conservatives in rejecting the bill. Gladstone immediately resigned, and Salisbury, with Liberal Unionist backing, formed his second and more lasting Conservative ministry.

The year 1886 thus registered a schism within the Liberal party as significant for British politics and as symptomatic of a social and intellectual shift as the schism of 1846 within the Conservative party had been. Back in 1846 economic and political liberalism had been so much in the ascendant that a considerable number of Tory Conservatives (including their leader, Sir Robert Peel) had repudiated the traditional agrarian policies of their party and joined the Liberals in repealing the corn laws and instituting the régime of free trade. And during the forty years from 1846 to 1886, the Liberal party, reinforced by the "Peelites" (of whom, we may recall, Gladstone himself was one), was usually the major political party in the realm and was in power most of the time. Now, in 1886, nationalism and imperialism were so much in the ascend-

¹ Robert Cecil, third Marquess of Salisbury (1830-1903), was an aristocrat of the aristocrats. He had been a bitter opponent of the Reform Act of 1867 but had subsequently accepted it as "irrevocable" and had been one of Disraeli's chief colleagues in the Conservative ministry from 1874 to 1880. His principal interest was in foreign affairs, and he succeeded to the leadership of the Conservative party on the death of Disraeli in 1881.

ant that a considerable number of professed Liberals coöperated with the Conservatives to prevent Gladstone from tampering with the Union between Britain and Ireland. And during the ensuing twenty years, the Conservative party, supported by Liberal Unionists, controlled the government almost continuously. For only three years (1892-1895) out of the twenty were the Gladstonian Liberals in office, and then with a most precarious majority in the House of Commons.

Nationalistic imperialism was not the only factor in the disintegration of the Liberal party. A goodly number of professed Liberals, especially among the younger generation, were impatient with Gladstone's "old-fashioned" leadership and ideas, and desirous of a "new liberalism" which should be less doctrinaire and which should realistically face the practical social and economic problems of the day. The most conspicuous of such Liberals, and the leader of the "Liberal Unionists," was Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), a highly successful manufacturer of Birmingham and a "radical" in religion and in the cause of social reform. Chamberlain made a reputation for himself as a "socialistic" mayor of Birmingham in the 70's: he cleaned up the city slums and established municipal ownership of gas and water supply. Gradually, as he became more active in national politics, he evinced an interest not only in social legislation but in imperialism and tariff protectionism; in other words, in the neo-mercantilism which was spreading out from Germany and which was obviously at variance with the economic liberalism that had long been the guiding principle of British public policy. The question of "liberating" Ireland and loosening its ties with the British Empire was the occasion, rather than the basic reason, for the secession of Chamberlain and his followers from the Liberal party of Gladstone.

Joseph
Chamberlain
and the Lib-
eral
Unionists

The Conservative ministry of Salisbury from 1886 to 1892 conducted the British government along the nationalist and imperialist paths already pointed out by Disraeli. It celebrated in 1887, with befitting pomp, the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's accession to the throne and utilized the occasion to inaugurate a series of semi-ceremonial, semi-advisory "colonial conferences," in which the chief ministers of the overseas self-governing colonies discussed

Salis-
bury's
Second
Ministry,
1886-1892

with representatives of the home government matters of general concern to the British Empire as a whole. It sponsored in 1889 a sensational strengthening of the British navy, ostensibly for the protection of the Empire,¹ and it greatly enlarged the territorial extent of the Empire by securing, through treaties of 1890-1891 with Germany, France, and Portugal, the principal share in the pending general partition of Africa.² In respect of Ireland, it consistently opposed all "home-rule" and "separatist" agitation, but in an effort to reconcile the Irish peasants to political union it sponsored a type of land reform more fundamental in character and eventually more beneficent in operation than the Gladstonian land reforms of 1870 and 1881. Whereas Gladstone had undertaken merely to restrain landlords from oppressing their tenants, the Salisbury government enabled peasants, by advancing money to them on easy terms, to buy out their landlords and transform themselves from tenants into small landed proprietors. By a series of such "land purchase acts," the number of peasant proprietors in Ireland was materially increased.³

Salisbury was scarcely more interested than Gladstone in social reform within Great Britain. The Conservative party was still more agrarian than the Liberal, though by the 1880's—thanks to the striding industrialization of the country—many Conservative landlords were as much identified as any Liberal with manufacturing, commerce, and banking, and quite as reluctant to endanger capitalistic profits by legislation in behalf of workingmen. Nevertheless, the Conservative party, unlike the Liberal, had a tradition of *noblesse oblige*, a memory of the stand which some of its most honored members, such as Shaftesbury and Disraeli, had previously taken in behalf of factory legislation. This tradition, this memory, was kept alive by the agitation of a special group of young Conservatives—the so-called "Tory Democrats"—under the leadership of the brilliant Lord Randolph Churchill,⁴ and was reënforced by the pressure of Joseph Chamberlain and his Liberal Unionists.

¹ See above, pp. 234-235.

² See below, p. 539.

³ The first important measure of the kind had been enacted in 1885. Another followed in 1891, and still others in 1896 and 1903. See below, p. 361.

Churchill was a younger son of the seventh Duke of Marlborough and a strenuous advocate of the doctrine that the Conservatives ought to adopt, rather than oppose, reforms of a popular character and to challenge the claims of the Liberals to pose as the champions of the masses.

In the circumstances, the Salisbury ministry was induced to grant some working-class demands. It put through a mines act in 1887, forbidding the employment of children under twelve years of age. In 1891 it practically abolished tuition fees in elementary schools.

The general election of 1892 gave the Liberals, in combination with the Irish Nationalists, a slight majority in the House of Commons. Gladstone, now a very old man, formed his fourth ministry and tried again to realize the one and only "reform" which filled his mind: home rule for Ireland. This time he got a home-rule bill through the House of Commons, but it was thrown out by the House of Lords, and in 1894 the "Grand Old Man" of nineteenth-century British liberalism turned over the premiership to a younger and more imperialist colleague, the Earl of Rosebery, and withdrew, at the age of eighty-four, to his country estate. Here he lingered on, charming visitors with his conversation and edifying them with his piety, and bursting into the public limelight once more, and for the last time, with a clarion call to Britain to aid Armenians against the Turks. He died in 1898.

Gladstone's
Fourth
Ministry,
1892-1894

In the general election of 1895, the coalition of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists won an overwhelming victory. Salisbury resumed the premiership and Joseph Chamberlain entered the cabinet as colonial secretary. In 1900 another election prolonged the coalition's sway, and, though Salisbury's age and infirmity caused him in 1902 to surrender the headship of the cabinet to his kinsman, Arthur J. Balfour, a placid academic person and former disciple of Lord Randolph Churchill, the régime endured until 1905. These ten years of Salisbury and Balfour government witnessed some social legislation, inspired mainly by Chamberlain and including, most notably, a "Workmen's Compensation Act," the insurance of workmen against accidents in certain specified trades. They also witnessed an important Education Act (1902), increasing the facilities for popular schooling and especially strengthening the church schools.

Decade of
Conservative Rule,
1895-1905

But what the decade preëminently witnessed was an extraordinary advance of nationalism and imperialism and a startling agitation for tariff protectionism. It was the time when economic—and imperial—rivalry was fast developing among the Great Powers, when Great Britain

Imperial-
ist
Activity

was feeling acutely the industrial competition of Germany and the United States and was becoming alarmed by the ambitious projects of Russia in Asia, France in Africa, and Germany in the Near East and in the Pacific. It was the time, too, when Cecil Rhodes¹ was dreaming about an Africa which would be solidly British, when Rudyard Kipling was composing poems about "the white man's burden" and "the manifest destiny" of imperial Britain, when Joseph Chamberlain was zealously enlisting popular and governmental support in furtherance of just such dreams and just such a destiny.

The Boer War (1899-1902), with its culminating incorporation of the two Dutch republics of South Africa into the British Empire,² was the outstanding monument of the imperialist régime of Chamberlain and Salisbury. There were other similar monuments, however, in the forceful expansion of British political dominion or economic supremacy in India, in China, in Persia, in Egypt, as well as in the diplomatic—and imperialistically advantageous—*entente* with France (1904).³ And the government which busily concerned itself with imperial projects abroad neglected no opportunity to enhance patriotic pride at home. It celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's reign in 1897 as a magnificent national fête; and with emotional intensity, colorful processions, and a grandeur reminiscent of antique Rome, it buried the Queen in 1901 and crowned her son and successor, Edward VII (1901-1910). Edward, it is interesting to note, added to the sovereign's titles of "King of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, and Emperor of India," the new and appropriate title of "King of the British Dominions beyond the Seas."

In 1903 the restless Joseph Chamberlain began a campaign for "tariff reform." Alike as an imperialist and as a manufacturer, he felt that the circumstances of the twentieth century necessitated a departure from those "liberal" policies of the nineteenth century which had involved free trade, a comparatively slight expenditure on national armaments, and a progressive loosening of ties, economic and political, between the mother-country and her colonies. Instead, he would have Great Britain reestablish import duties on food-stuffs and manufactures, according preferential treatment to

¹ See below, p. 538.

² See below, pp. 372-374.

³ See below, p. 560.

Chamber-
lain's
Tariff
Agitation

foodstuffs coming from other parts of the Empire as these lowered their tariffs on her manufactures. He prophesied that such all-around "imperial preference" would cement the Empire and profit both British industry and colonial agriculture. Simultaneously he called upon the colonies to share with the mother-country in the maintenance of armaments sufficient to assure the unity and integrity of the Empire as a whole. "Imperial preference," "imperial defense," and "imperial conference" were convenient slogans for ideas which were closely intertwined in Chamberlain's mind, and among these, the substitution by Great Britain of tariff protectionism for free trade was central.

Joseph Chamberlain had disrupted the Liberal party in 1886. In 1903-1905 he weakened, if he did not disrupt, the Conservative party. For, while most of the Liberal Unionists and a considerable number of their Conservative allies endorsed his tariff proposals, a somewhat larger number of Conservatives were so accustomed to free trade or were so fearful of the effect of protectionism in raising the cost of living, and hence the wages of industrial and agricultural laborers, that they denounced his proposals as unsound and "radical" and practically forced him out of the cabinet. In vain, Balfour, the prime minister, tried to keep peace within the coalition and prevent party warfare. There was a growing enmity between "free traders" and "tariff reformers"; and at length, late in 1905, Balfour resigned, and King Edward VII invited the Liberal leader, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, to form a ministry. The ensuing general election, early in 1906, was a "landslide" for the Liberal party, the acknowledged party of free trade. Campbell-Bannerman had the biggest backing in the country and in Parliament

Liberal
Landslide
of 1906

that any British minister had ever had. Chamberlain was rebuked, tariff reform was shelved, and the Conservative party was discredited. It was a peaceful kind of democratic revolution.

The triumph of the Liberal party was not attributable solely to the factional fight within the Conservative party over Chamberlain's "tariff reform," nor did it betoken a complete popular endorsement of the older liberalism. Free trade was still a guiding principle with the masses, as it was with the Liberal party, but what the masses were now chiefly interested in was social and democratic legislation, state action looking toward limitation of the privileges of landlords

The New
Liberal-
ism

and Anglican Church, positive improvement of living and working conditions of the common people, regulation and broader distribution of industrial wealth, and removal of political checks upon the exercise of the popular will. For such a program, the masses obviously expected more sympathy and support from the Liberal party than from the Conservative.

The expectation of the masses was not mistaken. For the Liberal party represented in 1906 a different kind of "liberalism" from that which Palmerston had personified in the middle of the nineteenth century or Gladstone in the latter part of the century. The retirement and death of Gladstone had brought new and younger leaders to the fore; and these, while the Conservative governments of Salisbury and Balfour were fostering imperialism abroad, were being impressed and influenced by the development of varied but widespread agitation for social—even "socialistic"—reform at home. Three varieties of such agitation, which had been emerging since 1870 and which proved influential with the younger generation of Liberals, merit special mention.

First, there was the activity of prominent intellectuals who in one way or another helped to undermine the older faith in "classical" economics, in individual competition and governmental *laissez-faire*, and to substitute for it an interest in sociology, in collective undertakings and democratic control. John Stuart Mill gave a new slant to "liberal" political economy by distinguishing between the production of wealth, governed by "natural laws," and the distribution of wealth, susceptible of regulation by state law.¹ John Ruskin stimulated an æsthetic reaction against purely mechanical "progress" and a special regard for the human element in industry.² Still other intellectuals familiarized the British public with what foreign or colonial governments—such as Germany or Australia—were doing to ameliorate the condition of workingmen and dwelt upon the "backwardness" of Britain in this respect. Some rising literary lights, including Shaw and Wells, were zealous and clever propagandists of "socialism."

Second, there was mounting discussion (and criticism) of "landlordism" in Britain—the monopoly of agricultural land by titled nobles and country gentlemen, and the ownership of

¹ On J. S. Mill, see above, pp. 265, 267.

² On Ruskin, see above, pp. 112, 116.

urban land and congested urban tenements by a relatively small number of wealthy aristocrats. Discussion of the problem, with denunciation of the evil effects of landlordism on the working classes in town and countryside, was stimulated by lectures of an American reformer, Henry George, and by his cogent and eloquent book, *Progress and Poverty*. A young Welsh Liberal, David Lloyd George, was especially impressed by Henry George.

For Land
Reform

Third, and most effective, there was extraordinary agitation, political as well as economic, on the part of urban workingmen. Among these, particularly among skilled factory operatives and miners, trade unions had been steadily developing since the 1850's;¹ and they had already been influential, as we know, in securing the extension of the parliamentary franchise to workingmen in 1867² and the legalization of labor organizations in 1871 and of "peaceful picketing" in 1875. The holding of annual trade-union congresses began in 1868, and in 1872 there were eighty-three major trade unions in England, with a membership of 203,000 and an annual income of £125,000. For some time, the leaders and the rank-and-file were under the spell of Liberals like John Bright; "liberal" in philosophy and mainly so in political affiliation, they sought amelioration of their lot less through state action than through direct bargaining with employers. At the end of the 80's and at the beginning of the 90's, however, British trade unionism was influenced by two novel movements. One was an unprecedented activity among "unskilled" workers—dock laborers, etc.—who, under young "radical" leaders, participated in a series of "great strikes" involving much violence against employers, repeated defiance of the government, and no little criticism of the "conservative" tactics of earlier trade unionism. The other was an advance of Marxian Socialism in Britain.

Political
Activity of
Urban
Workmen

In 1881 a group of intellectuals, including William Morris, the artist, and Henry Hyndman, a scholar and man of fashion, formed the "Social Democratic Federation" for the propagation of revolutionary Marxian socialism among the masses.³ In 1883 the "Fabian Society"

Socialism
in Eng-
land

¹ On earlier trade unionism in Britain, see above, p. 62.

² See above, p. 199.

³ On William Morris, see above, p. 117. The "Social Democratic Federation"

came into being, and presently, enlisting the talents of such persons as George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb (a government employee and the historian of British trade unionism), and without adhering strictly to "Marxism," it conducted a brilliant literary campaign in behalf of the socialization of industry, land, and government. In 1893, Keir Hardie, a Scottish miner, founded the "Independent Labor party," which adopted a program in harmony with "revisionist" Marxism and put up candidates of its own for election to Parliament in opposition to those of the Liberal and Conservative parties.

Professed Socialists were only a minority among British trade unionists, but they were very active and increasingly influential with the majority. And trade unionists, as they became more "radical" and more politically minded, grew in numbers and resources. The number of major English unions mounted in 1890 to 490, with a membership of 650,000 and an annual income of £1,000,000; and in 1906 to 675, with a membership of 1,720,000 and an annual income of £2,700,000. In the meantime, an event of first-rate importance brought the whole trade-union movement into active politics. For, in 1901 the House of Lords, in its capacity as the supreme law court of the realm, decided that a trade union was legally liable for damages resulting from any strike conducted by its members. This judicial decision—the so-called **Taff Vale Decision and the Labor Party**—imperilled not only the "right to strike" but the whole trade-union organization and its financial resources. Almost immediately, trade-union leaders effected a political coalition with the Independent Labor party, the Social Democratic Federation, and the Fabian Society. The coalition became known as the "Labor Party." It was semi-Socialist and semi-trade-unionist. While declaring its willingness to coöperate with any other political party which would forward labor legislation, it strove to be a distinct working-class party. In the general election of 1906, it elected twenty-nine workingmen to seats in Parliament.¹

The rise of the Labor party was important in itself, and also was supported for a time by John Burns, and, though it obtained only a small following among the working classes, it was particularly active—and indirectly influential—in the "great strikes" of 1888-1889.

¹ In addition, eleven workingmen were elected by the Miners' Federation (which was not formally affiliated with the Labor party until 1908), and thirteen workingmen were elected as candidates of the Liberal party.

for its effects on the other parties. It gave the final impetus to the conversion of the Liberal party from *laissez-faire* to the championship of social legislation, and it contributed to the débâcle of the Conservative party in the election of 1906. The Conservative leaders were too divided over tariff protectionism and too compromised by the Taff Vale decision to keep their hold on the British masses. On the other hand, the Liberal leaders could now win a broad popular following. A "radical" group among them, including David Lloyd George¹ and Winston Churchill,² vied with Laborites in espousing social reform and attacking "landlordism," while an "imperialist" group, embracing Herbert Asquith³ and Sir Edward Grey,⁴ promised that in the pursuit of domestic reform a Liberal régime would not neglect British interests abroad. And binding the two groups together was the common advocacy

New Liberalism
both
Radical
and Imperialist

¹ David Lloyd George (born 1863), a Welsh lawyer of the lower middle class, Baptist in religion, had come into prominence in the 90's as a flaming antagonist of the landed aristocracy, the Anglican Church, and the imperialism of Joseph Chamberlain. A zealous Welsh nationalist, he was ardently pacifist during the Boer War; and coming from the "common people," he thought of himself as their special spokesman. By reason of his popular following and his gifts as a debater in the House of Commons, he was given a place in the Liberal government in 1905. Before long, he was its most influential member.

² Winston Churchill (born 1874), son of Lord Randolph Churchill and his American wife, was a natural heir to "Tory democracy"; and with great intellectual talents he combined a forceful impetuosity. After experiences in the army and in journalism (he was a press correspondent during the Boer War), he entered Parliament in 1900 as a Conservative, but his enthusiasm for free trade and social reform soon caused him to break with his party and join the Liberals.

³ Herbert Asquith (1852-1928), the son of a manufacturer, liberal and non-conformist, had entered Parliament in 1886 and, following the lead of Lord Rosebery, had become an apologist for the "new imperialism." At the same time, however, he clung to the traditional free-trade tenets of the Liberal party, and bore the brunt of the fight against Chamberlain's tariff proposals. In 1905, as first lieutenant to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, he became Chancellor of the Exchequer; and in 1908 he succeeded his chief as prime minister. Much later he was raised to the peerage as Earl of Oxford and Asquith, by which title he is now known.

⁴ Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933) belonged to a famous family of Whig aristocrats, one of whose members had sponsored the Reform Act of 1832 (see above, pp. 52-54). He was a country gentleman with a taste for sport, and his very respectability gave him a position in Liberal politics which his actual achievements in Parliament from 1885 to 1905 hardly warranted. He was recognized as an "imperialist" disciple of Lord Rosebery, sympathetic with the Boer War and with the foreign policies of the Conservative government; and as such he was named foreign minister in Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal cabinet of 1905. This post he continued to occupy during the momentous years from 1905 to 1916, when he was honorably retired and elevated to the peerage as Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

of free trade. This still remained a vital tradition of British Liberals—and the British public—at the very time when nationalism and imperialism and “socialism” were transforming all the other tenets of historic liberalism.

For ten years, from 1905 to 1915, the Liberals were in office. At first the “radical” Campbell-Bannerman was prime minister, with the “imperialist” Asquith as Chancellor of the Exchequer and chief assistant. Then, in 1908, when Campbell-Bannerman fell sick and died, Asquith became prime minister, with the “radical” Lloyd George as Chancellor of the Exchequer and chief assistant. Free trade was sedulously maintained throughout the period. Much social legislation was enacted, with the coöperation of the Laborites and, usually until 1909, with that of the Conservatives. An important constitutional change was effected in 1911, with the partisan backing of Laborites and Irish Nationalists. Moreover, to the satisfaction of Tories and of patriots in general, there was no radical departure from foreign or colonial policies already established and no sacrifice of “national honor.” Indeed, it was this same Liberal régime which carried Britain into the World War. Let us briefly review the major political accomplishments from 1905 to 1915, beginning with the social legislation.

Favors were accorded to trade-union activity, both economic and political. A “trade disputes act” in 1906 practically reversed the Taff Vale decision by protecting the funds of trade unions against suits for damages and expressly allowed trade-union “pickets” to employ “peaceful persuasion” in strikes. In 1911, in order that trade unionists might better afford to sit in the House of Commons, Parliament authorized the payment of regular salaries to its members. In 1913 it went still farther and legalized the use of trade-union funds for electoral and other political purposes.

A series of enactments extended the scope of state intervention in industry and of state help to workingmen. A “workmen’s compensation act” of 1906 applied the principle of employers’ liability on a much larger scale than the act which Joseph Chamberlain had sponsored in 1897. It required almost every employer to ensure his workingmen against accidents and against certain industrial diseases. A “labor exchange act” of 1909 set up a system of free public

employment bureaus to inform unemployed workmen where work might be had and, if necessary, to pay for their transportation thither. A "trade boards act" of 1909 established special boards (composed of representatives of employers and employees in equal numbers) to fix a "minimum wage" which should be paid to workers in "sweated industries." In 1912 minimum-wage legislation was enacted for the benefit of coal miners.

In the meantime, the government was assuming special responsibility for children, for old people, and for the employment and health of the whole nation. A comprehensive "children's act" of 1908 sought to regulate in considerable detail many phases of child life, providing free medical attendance at child-birth and free medical examination and care of infants and young children, prescribing exceptional treatment of juvenile offenders, facilitating the removal of children from homes where they were abused to public institutions where they would be cared for, and enlarging the opportunities of young persons for recreation and for part-time schooling. At the other extreme of human life, an "old-age pensions act" of the same year obligated the state to pay a subsidy to every needy old person; by 1913 a million elderly Britishers were receiving old-age pensions from the public treasury. To improve the living conditions of the urban masses, a "housing and town planning act" of 1909 authorized public authorities to condemn and tear down insanitary tenements and replace them with parks and "model dwellings." And capping the whole series of social enactments was the "national insurance act" of 1912. This compelled employers and employees to contribute to funds, to which the state made a special contribution, for the insurance of almost all industrial workers "against loss of health and for the prevention and cure of sickness" and, simultaneously, for the insurance of certain specified categories of workingmen against unemployment.

To most of this social legislation, there was (surprisingly, perhaps) comparatively little opposition in Parliament or in the country at large. The Laborites complained that it did not go far enough, and a handful of individualistic Liberals (survivors of an earlier day) denounced it as going much too far. The Conservative minority in the House of Commons was apt to be critical in debate—

Children's
Act of
1908

Old-Age
Pensions

Conservative
Co-
operation
in Labor
Legisla-
tion

not so much of the measures themselves as of the Liberal ministers who sponsored them—and then to concur in voting them, though in a few instances the Conservative majority in the House of Lords imposed amendments which weakened the measures and rendered them less “radical.” In general, however, strenuous partisanship was not manifest until David Lloyd George brought forward, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, his budget proposals of 1909 for meeting the greatly increased public expenditure necessitated in part by the new social legislation and in part by the costs of military and naval “preparedness.”

Lloyd George was faced with the problem not only of getting more money but of getting it by direct taxation, for the free-trade principles of himself and of the whole Liberal party (and the whole Labor party) precluded him from resorting to indirect taxes in the form of tariff duties (as Joseph Chamberlain and a section of the Conservative party urged). The solution which Lloyd George offered was sensational; and to aristocrats and the well-to-do, to the leading lights of the Conservative party, it was shocking in the extreme. He frankly proposed, in his budget of 1909, to put the financial burden of social reform on the shoulders of the rich and to make the taxation of landlords a means of effecting still more radical social reform. Specifically, he asked Parliament to levy, in addition to customary stamp taxes and excise taxes, a steeply graduated income tax (with a seemingly confiscatory “super-tax” on very large fortunes), a heavy inheritance tax, and special taxes on motor cars, on undeveloped land, and on the “unearned increment” of land values. He would force the landlords, he said, to disgorge their “ill-gotten gains,” and he would expedite a more equitable distribution of national wealth. The Laborites and “radical” Liberals acclaimed the budget and the motives in back of it, and most of the other Liberals acquiesced in it for the sake of party unity, though without enthusiasm. On the other hand, the Conservatives, almost to a man, denounced it as unjust and revolutionary.

The famous Lloyd George budget passed the House of Commons by a strict party vote in 1909, and then by a strict party vote it was defeated in the House of Lords. This action of the Lords was almost as startling as the budget itself, inasmuch as it had long been customary for the upper house of the British

Lloyd
George
Budget of
1909

Conserva-
tive Oppo-
sition

Parliament to give perfunctory assent to finance bills adopted by the House of Commons. The Conservatives defended the Lords on the ground that the budget of 1909 was not an ordinary finance bill, but an extraordinary "socialist" measure on which the whole nation should be consulted through a general election. The Liberal government responded with the declaration that the Lords had "violated the British Constitution," and with an appeal to the country to rebuke the Lords.

New elections were held in January 1910 amid great excitement and floods of passionate oratory. The Liberals lost a considerable number of seats, so that in the new House of Commons they were almost exactly balanced with the Conservatives. Nevertheless, the Liberal ministry of Asquith was enabled by Labor and Irish Nationalist support to remain in office, and to put the Lloyd George budget anew through the House of Commons.

Election of
Jan. 1910
and En-
actment
of Lloyd
George
Budget

This time the Lords confined their opposition to speech-making, and the budget became law. It did yield the promised revenue, but it exacerbated the feelings between political parties and between social classes. From 1910 to 1914, along with multiplying social legislation, went a rising tide of partisanship. Some there were who saw Britain headed straight toward civil war.

Close on the heels of the fight over the budget, followed a constitutional conflict over the House of Lords. Liberals were annoyed by the fact that however strong they might be in the House of Commons, all their legislation had to be reviewed and could be amended or emasculated by an upper house where, thanks to its hereditary character, the Conservative party was always dominant, and they were particularly nettled by the latest action of the Lords in throwing out a finance bill and precipitating a general election. Moreover, "radical" Liberals and all the Laborites regarded the House of Lords as an aristocratic anachronism in an age of democracy,¹ while Irish Nationalists knew very well that however difficult it

Conflict
over
House of
Lords

¹ The membership of the House of Lords in 1910 totalled more than 600, and comprised: (1) hereditary English peers (dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons), (2) 16 elected representatives of the Scottish nobility, (3) 28 elected representatives of the Irish nobility, (4) 26 prelates of the Anglican Church, (5) 4 "law lords," ranking as barons and appointed for life to exercise the judicial functions of the House of Lords. Ordinarily, only a small percentage of the Lords attended the meetings of their House.

might be to pass a home-rule bill through the House of Commons, it would be impossible to get one through the House of Lords. The entire coalition of Liberals, Laborites, and Irish Nationalists pressed Asquith's government to rebuke the House of Lords and to deprive it of its power.

In 1910, therefore, the Liberal government submitted a "parliament bill," with three main provisions: (1) finance bills passed by the Commons would automatically become law whether the Lords approved them or not; (2) other public bills might become law, despite repeated rejection by the Lords, if they were passed by the House of Commons in three successive sessions and if at least two years elapsed between the first and third passage; (3) a general election of members of the House of Commons would have to be held at least every fifth year, instead of every seventh year as had previously been the rule. The Conservatives could not prevent the "parliament bill" from passing the House of Commons, but in the House of Lords they could—and did—reject it. Whereupon, the Liberal government had the King dissolve Parliament and call for a second general election in the year 1910, this time on the constitutional fate of the House of Lords.

The election of December 1910 produced about the same political results as that of the previous January. Again, the Liberals and the Conservatives obtained about the same number of seats in the House of Commons; and again, the balance of power was held by Laborites and Irish Nationalists, both intent upon enacting the "parliament bill" into law. As soon as the new Parliament met, in 1911, Asquith, the prime minister, put the bill again through the Commons and then announced that unless the Lords accepted it without further ado the King would name a sufficient number of Liberal peers to outvote the existing membership of the aristocratic House. A great hubbub ensued. Conservatives protested against the prime minister's "threat" and tried to arouse popular feeling against the Liberal government by accusing it of "dragging the crown in the mire." They declared that the "parliament bill" had hastened the death, in 1910, of King Edward VII and that his inexperienced son and successor, George V, had been forced to begin his reign by taking sides in a constitutional conflict against his true friends and his best judg-

Parlia-
ment Bill
of 1910

Election
of Dec.
1910 and
Enact-
ment of
Parlia-
ment Bill

GE III
(1820),
1, Elector of Hanover

WILLIAM IV
(1765-1837),
King of Great Britain
King of Hanover
1830-1837

ERNEST
(1771-1851),
King of
Hanover
1837-1851

LE
(18
1
I
18

GEORGE V
(1819-1878),
King of
Hanover
1851-1866

A
(18
1
11

Leopold
(1853-1884),
Duke of
Albany

Beatrice
(1857-),
m. Henry of
Battenburg

Ernest
(1845-1923),
Duke of
Cumberland

LE
(18
1
11

CHARLES EDWARD
(1884-),
Duke of
Saxe-Coburg
1900-1918

Victoria
(1887-),
m. ALPHONSO XIII
King of Spain

ERNEST
(1887-),
Duke of
Brunswick
1913-1918

(1
Cr
o

John Sybil
Leopold (1908-),
(1906- *m.* Gustavus,
) Crown Prince
of Sweden

John
(1913-),
Prince of
Asturias

ment. A large number of Conservative peers—the so-called “die-hards”—insisted that, come what might, they would oppose the bill to the bitter end. The Liberal government, however, was adamant, and the country at large was more amused than alarmed by the attitude of noble “die-hards.” Eventually, the Conservative leaders decided that acceptance of the Liberal bill by the existing House of Lords would be a lesser evil than flooding the House with hundreds of new peers. Consequently, in April 1911, enough Conservative nobles absented themselves from the House of Lords to enable the Liberal peers to outvote the remaining “die-hards” and thus finally to assure the enactment of the “parliament bill.” The Parliament Act of 1911 was almost, if not quite, as epochal in British constitutional history as the Reform Act of 1832.

Political acrimony which had attended the controversies over the Lloyd George budget and the Parliament Act was intensified by the attempts which the Liberal government of Asquith and Lloyd George made immediately after 1911 to pay off its debt to Laborites and Irish Nationalists and other “radicals” for the support which these were giving it in the House of Commons. (1) To please the Laborites, and advanced democrats generally, the government introduced into the Commons in 1912 a bill to abolish “plural voting,” that is, the right which Britishers still enjoyed of exercising the parliamentary franchise wherever they could satisfy certain property qualifications and which permitted a landlord or other person of wealth to cast several ballots in a general election while a workingman could cast only one. (2) To satisfy the demands of religious non-conformists (who constituted a large and influential section of the Liberal party), and particularly to humor David Lloyd George, the government also introduced into the Commons in 1912 a bill to disestablish and disendow the Anglican Church in Wales.¹ (3) Simultaneously to reward the Irish Nationalists, the government prepared and presented to Parliament a new “home-rule bill” for Ireland.

Intensification of
Political
Strife

These three bills—for Irish home rule, for Welsh disestablishment, and for strictly democratic voting—were strenuously opposed by the Conservatives, and, though passed by the Com-

¹ Only a relatively small minority of Welshmen were Anglicans. The great majority were non-conformists (Methodists, Baptists, or Congregationalists).

mons, were rejected by the Lords. The Liberal government was resolute, however. Taking advantage of the Parliament Act, the government reintroduced all three bills in 1914; again they were passed by the Commons, and again they were rejected by the Lords. One more passing of them by the Commons would automatically make them laws, without further consultation of the House of Lords. And in 1913—in the midst of extremely angry debates over these measures—David Lloyd George and Winston

Question of Land Reform Churchill launched a peculiarly provocative campaign against “landlordism.” The whole land system of the realm must be reformed, they said; the state must actively intervene between the owners and the users of the land, protecting the latter and gradually dispossessing the former. Lloyd George’s land campaign (on top of his famous budget) added fuel to the fire of Conservative indignation.

The indignation was at fever heat by 1914. While landlords were being warned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that “the chariots of retribution are drawing nigh,” Con-
Conflict over Irish Home Rule servative leaders were ready to seize any opportunity which promised embarrassment for the Chancellor and a distancing of his “chariots.” Such an opportunity seemed to present itself in connection with Irish “home rule.” The Protestant majority in northeastern Ireland (that is, in Ulster) were definitely hostile to home rule, and their leaders, Conservative (or “Unionist”) in politics, proceeded to enlist and arm a force of “Ulster volunteers” with the avowed purpose of fighting for the maintenance of the “union” between Ireland and Great Britain, and with the active encouragement of leading Conservatives in Britain. In the spring of 1914 it was obvious to everyone that the Liberal government, if it persisted in enacting the home-rule bill, would have to face an armed rebellion in “loyal” Ireland, and that most Englishmen would be impelled by their patriotism and their religious sympathies to side with the “rebels” against the government.

The prospect of civil war was suddenly and dramatically dispelled, in the midsummer of 1914, by the opening of a vast foreign war—the World War—in which
World War, and Political Truce in Britain Britain was speedily engulfed. In the face of foreign danger, patriotism rose superior to political partisanship and class consciousness. Conservatives and Unionists im-

mediately pledged their support to Asquith and his Liberal cabinet in waging the war, and in return Asquith's government agreed, with the consent of Laborites and Irish Nationalists, to postpone "debatable" legislation until after the war. Lloyd George and Winston Churchill turned from denouncing landlords to assailing Germans, and transferred their abounding energies from social reform to military endeavors. The "chariots of retribution" were truly nigh, but they proved to be quite different "chariots" from what Lloyd George had foreseen, and the "retribution" which they wrought was not primarily on landlords or Conservatives.

We must bear in mind that the furtherance of British nationalism and imperialism was no monopoly of Conservatives. Indeed, from 1905 to 1914, during the very years when "radical" Liberals and Laborites were seemingly engrossed in social legislation and democratic reform, "imperialist" Liberals were manning important offices in the government and pursuing foreign, colonial, and military policies hardly distinguishable from those which a Disraeli or a Salisbury might have pursued and yet which now evoked very little criticism from "radicals." The foreign minister throughout the period was Sir Edward Grey, and he was no "little Englander." He strengthened the entente which his Conservative predecessor had made with France in 1904, and he supplemented it in 1907 with an entente with Russia. He promoted British imperial interests in the Far East, in Persia, in the Near East, and in Africa.

Liberal
Foreign
Policy,
1905-1914

Sir
Edward
Grey

The foreign policies of Sir Edward Grey were backed, moreover, by a rapidly growing "preparedness" of British armaments, for which Liberal colleagues of his were directly responsible. The war minister, Richard Haldane, effected a noteworthy reorganization of the British army. While keeping it on a professional rather than a popular basis, he rendered it more efficient by creating a general staff and more expansive by establishing "officers' training corps" in connection with schools and universities and by building up a trained "reserve." He also did much to relate, in practical ways, the latest advances in science to the art of warfare, and to forward plans for military coöperation, in the event of war, between Britain and her overseas Empire, and between Britain

Haldane's
Military
Reforms

and her "friends" on the Continent of Europe—France and Russia.

Even more significant than the army reforms of Haldane was the contemporaneous strengthening of the British navy. This was motivated, in general, by a popular conviction, in which Liberals fully shared, that naval supremacy was essential to the protection of the far-flung British Empire and to the assurance of vital trade between industrial Britain and the rest of the world on which she depended for raw materials, foodstuffs, and markets. And it was specifically motivated by the obvious fact that Germany was becoming a great naval Power and a potential rival of Britain for naval supremacy. In the circumstances, the Liberal government of Asquith showed itself quite as anxious as any Conservative government could have been to maintain Britain's lead in the race of naval armaments with Germany. British expenditure for social reform rose fast between 1905 and 1914, but expenditure on the British navy rose faster.

The World War closed a decade of reforming Liberal government in Britain and opened a new era of very different character. Of the period from 1867 to 1914, it remains for us to outline two special developments: one, the rise of Irish nationalism; and the other, the growth of the British Empire.

3. IRISH NATIONALISM

For more than a century after the "Act of Union" of 1801, the British Isles constituted a political unit—the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,"—with a common sovereign and with a single Parliament at Westminster. Within this centralized state were several nationalities—notably English, Scottish, Welsh, and Irish—each of whom cherished special cultural traditions and the memory of an erstwhile political independence. Only in the case of the Irish did such traditions and memory become associated with an active movement to break the unity of the state.

Wales had been incorporated in England since the sixteenth century, and Scotland since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Besides, both Wales and Scotland had undergone religious and industrial changes similar to England's. All three were largely Protestant, and latterly all three had been profoundly affected by

Ireland
and the
Union of
1801

the Industrial Revolution. The traditional differences which survived among them were preëminently sentimental; and real differences between capital and labor, city and countryside, liberalism and conservatism, were equally characteristic of Wales and Scotland. The three formerly distinct nationalities were being ever more obviously merged into a "British" nationality.

It was otherwise with Ireland—or, at any rate, with three-fourths of Ireland. Geographically, Ireland was somewhat more isolated. Politically, too, it had had, as late as the eighteenth century, a parliament of its own, which, though legally subordinate to the Parliament at Westminster, had actually been autonomous in local legislation. Moreover, the mass of its population, instead of becoming Protestant, had remained Catholic, and instead of becoming industrialized, had remained agricultural. Alike in economics and in religion, Ireland was set off from the rest of the "United Kingdom."

Cleavage
between
Great
Britain
and
Ireland

The situation was complicated by chronic friction not only between Ireland and Great Britain but also within Ireland. Ever since the sixteenth century, English (and British) governments had regarded the native Irish as an inferior race, superstitious, unprogressive, happy-go-lucky, and lacking in thrift, and had therefore pursued policies calculated to Anglicize them or, failing in this, to penalize them. On the one hand, every effort had been made to establish and spread Protestantism in Ireland and to encourage the settlement of English and Scottish colonists in the country. A Protestant "Church of Ireland," similar to the Anglican Church, had been erected and richly endowed as the official state church, and toward its further financial support all Irishmen, whether they participated in its worship or not, were obliged to contribute. Likewise, special favors had been accorded to such Irish landlords as turned Protestant and to the Anglican and Presbyterian "colonists" who were transplanted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in fairly large numbers from Scotland to Ireland, particularly to the northeastern province of Ulster. On the other hand, drastic measures had been taken to overcome recalcitrance and subdue insurrection on the part of the native Irish. The Catholic Church was deprived of its historic edifices and any legal status, and its adherents suffered serious abridgment of rights of citizenship, property,

Protracted
Attempts
at Angli-
cizing
Ireland

education, and even life. Simultaneously, a series of equally drastic economic statutes of the British Parliament had destroyed the bulk of Ireland's historic industry and shipping¹ and consigned the mass of Irishmen to a precarious existence as agricultural tenants or laborers on the estates of Anglo-Irish noblemen who spent most of their time in England.

It thus transpired that Ireland had been governed from the sixteenth century primarily according to the religious predilection and in the economic interest of Englishmen and Scotsmen and secondarily for the well-being of such inhabitants of Ireland as shared that predilection or profited from that interest. These inhabitants were chiefly "Anglo-Irish" and "Scotch-Irish." By the opening of the nineteenth century the latter constituted almost a majority of the population of Ulster (the northeastern quarter of Ireland), and the former comprised the social élite of Dublin and the well-to-do and governing class throughout the country. Together they composed hardly a fourth of the total population of Ireland, and yet they long monopolized political and economic power in Ireland. They manned the established church, the learned professions, the schools, the army offices, the courts and civil administration; they owned most of the land; and, until the enactment of Catholic emancipation in 1829,² they alone were eligible to represent Ireland in the Parliament of the United Kingdom at Westminster. They were truly a "British garrison," the basic link between Great Britain and Ireland.

Nevertheless, the mass of the native Irish proved remarkably obdurate. They did not become British or Protestant. They interpreted the well-meant attempts to convert them as persecution and the thrifty or punitive economic legislation as exploitation. They had a habit of sympathizing with the foes of Britain—with Spaniards in the six-

Irish Op-
position

¹ This economic legislation was part and parcel of the general "mercantilist" policy which the English government pursued during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ireland, as a "colony," was not allowed to compete with the mother-country, and the commercial preëminence of Liverpool, for example, was assured by the commercial ruin of Cork and Limerick. Such Irish industry as supplemented rather than competed with British industry was encouraged. Its most important elements in the nineteenth century were the brewing and distilling industries, centring in Dublin and directed by "Anglo-Irish" companies, and the linen and shipbuilding industries, centring in Belfast and operated chiefly by "Scotch-Irish."

² See Vol. I, p. 764, and above, p. 52.

teenth century, with Frenchmen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the American and French revolutionaries at the close of the eighteenth century. Occasionally they offered armed resistance to régimes which were especially popular with Englishmen—for example, to those of Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell—and the horrible penalties meted out to them on such occasions seemed to teach them no improving lesson.

In respect of language, some progress was made in Anglicizing Ireland. The Gaelic language of the natives was gradually supplanted by English, and by the nineteenth century the former was fast disappearing and the latter was becoming the usual speech throughout the country. Yet the decline of the distinctively national language did not betoken a lessening of national spirit. For the nineteenth century was too replete with nationalism in all other parts of Europe not to be characterized by noteworthy nationalist developments in Ireland.

The leading Irish patriot in the first half of the nineteenth century was Daniel O'Connell, a gifted lawyer, who formed the bold design of combining the Irish Catholic millions into a vast league which by orderly means would induce the Parliament at Westminster to right the wrongs of Ireland, religious, social, and economic. The "Catholic Association," which he accordingly created, grew rapidly and proved most effective in securing parliamentary enactment of Catholic Emancipation (1829).¹ Catholics were relieved of many civil disabilities and were admitted to seats in the British Parliament. This meant that the masses of Irishmen could henceforth elect persons of their own kind to represent them.

O'Connell
and Cath-
olic Eman-
cipation,
1829

O'Connell, now styled the "Liberator," entered the British House of Commons in 1829, and for several years thereafter he was the leader of the expanding "Catholic Association" in Ireland and also of an Irish nationalist group at Westminster. He prevailed upon the British government to relieve Irish Catholics of the necessity of paying direct tithes for the support of the Anglican "Church of Ireland" (1838), and to appoint Catholics to important public offices. At the same time, with characteristic energy and oratory, he demanded that the Act of Union be repealed and an autonomous parliament be reestablished at Dublin. In this demand, he

O'Connell
and Home
Rule

¹ See above, p. 52.

was unsuccessful. Although O'Connell was a sincere foe of revolution and violence and as conservative as any English Whig in economic matters, the British governing classes took fright at the prospect of the social changes which a democratic Irish parliament might make. In 1843 the British government dissolved the "Catholic Association" and imprisoned O'Connell.

With the failure of O'Connell's program of peaceful repeal of the Act of Union, a group of more radical and violent Irish nationalists formed a "Young Ireland" society, akin to Mazzini's "Young Italy" and pledged to work for an independent Irish republic. In 1848 they attempted a revolution in imitation of the revolutions of that year on the Continent. They lacked the popular support which O'Connell had had. The uprising was speedily put down, and its leaders were executed or exiled.

One of the participants in the revolt of 1848 who managed to escape was John O'Mahony, who organized in the United States about 1858 another society of Irish nationalists, the "Fenian Brotherhood." It was a secret society, whose members took an oath of allegiance to the "Irish Republic" and a vow of strict obedience to their officers, and it adopted a national "republican" flag—a tricolor of green, white, and orange. It never gained much hold on the Irish peasantry and was denounced by the Catholic clergy. It secured, however, a fairly large following among Irish emigrants in urban centres of the United States, Canada, and Australia, and in British cities such as Manchester, Glasgow, and London. Irish-American "Fenians" made an alarming but unsuccessful military raid on Canada in 1866, and in the following year the English government had to employ troops to suppress Fenian riots in Lancashire, while in Ireland itself Fenian agitators, returning from America and England, committed a series of depredations which caused panic among Irish landlords and anxiety in the British government.

In the midst of the Fenian troubles, Gladstone and his fellow Liberals took charge of the British government in 1868 and adopted a twofold policy in respect of Ireland. On the one hand, they would repress disorder and destroy "Fenianism." On the other hand, they would seek to restore quiet and contentment among the "native

"Young
Ireland"
and
Rebellion
of 1848

Fenian
Move-
ment of
60's for
Irish
Republic

Gladstone
and
Ireland,
1868-1874

Irish" by redressing two of their major grievances, the one religious and the other economic. Accordingly, Gladstone carried through the British Parliament in 1869 the measure for disestablishing and disendowing the Anglican "Church of Ireland" and putting it on an unprivileged legal equality with the Catholic and Presbyterian churches in Ireland. Then in 1870 followed the first of his "land acts," which forbade landlords to raise agricultural rents at will or arbitrarily to evict a peasant without compensating him for whatever improvements he had made. The religious reform was effectual, but the agrarian reform was not. The Land Act of 1870 merely sanctioned a principle of agrarian reform and gave currency to the slogan of the "three F's"—fair rent, fixity of tenure, and free sale. It did not adequately apply the principle, and it aroused the hostility of landlords and the hope of peasants without disarming the one or satisfying the other.

The decade of the 1870's brought to the fore two new apostles of Irish nationalism. One was Charles Stewart Parnell, an "Anglo-Irish" landowner, aristocratic and Protestant, who imbibed from his mother, an American woman, an almost fanatical hatred of England, and who, elected to Parliament in 1875, organized among his Irish colleagues in the House of Commons a political party—the Irish Nationalist party—with the avowed purpose of insisting upon the reestablishment of "home rule" as prerequisite to any real cure of Irish ills. The other was Michael Davitt, a lowly untutored Catholic peasant, who, after his father's eviction from the land, had worked in cotton mills in Lancashire, joined the Fenian Brotherhood, participated in the disturbances which it encouraged, and been jailed for seven years. Released in 1877, Davitt went to the United States, where, in concert with other exiles, he worked out a plan for organizing the Irish peasants into a "Land League" to agitate for radical agrarian reform. Then, returning to Britain, he prevailed upon Parnell to accept his ideas, and in 1879 he formally launched his Land League.

Parnell's
National-
ist Party

Davitt's
Land
League

At once the Irish nationalist movement assumed new vigor and prominence. In the British Parliament of 1880, nearly eighty of the hundred Irish Commoners belonged to Parnell's "home-rule" party and strictly obeyed his orders to render themselves such nuisances at Westminster, in obstructing debates, that their British colleagues would be glad to get rid of them by granting

their demand. At the same time, in Ireland, the peasant masses were being organized through Davitt's Land League as well as through Parnell's Nationalist party, not only to support the latter's political aims but also to forward the former's economic purposes. And from Irish-Americans across the Atlantic was coming invaluable financial aid for the interconnected causes of home rule and land reform.

In 1881 Gladstone sought to halt the movement by putting through Parliament the second of his Land Acts. It practically conceded the "three F's": fair rents were to be determined by a special land court, definite provision was made against unjust evictions and in behalf of free sale of land. But, though the land court actually reduced the average rents in Ireland by a fourth, Davitt and the Land League were by no means satisfied. They were now insisting that the peasants should own, rather than rent, the land. The Act of 1881, they said, was only a sop, and it did not touch the central problem of home rule. So both the Land Leaguers and the Nationalist party redoubled their protests, and in Ireland peaceful agitation was succeeded by systematic "boycotting"¹ and an epidemic of acts of violence. Gladstone's only response for the next five years was coercion. Ireland was put under martial law. Parnell was arrested and temporarily jailed. Davitt spent two years in prison.

In 1886, by a strange balancing of political forces in Great Britain, Gladstone had to choose whether he would retire from office or try to remain in office by conciliating the Irish Nationalists. He chose the latter alternative, and submitted to Parliament a home-rule bill acceptable to Parnell. It was a very modest measure, which would transfer Irish administration to an Irish ministry appointed by a separate local parliament at Dublin, but which would leave all "imperial" matters and most of the taxing power to the central Parliament at Westminster. Nevertheless it aroused furious opposition both in England and in Ulster. A large group of Liberals—the Liberal Unionists—deserted Gladstone, and

¹ The word "boycott" was first employed in 1880, when a certain Captain Boycott, an agent for an Irish landlord, was made to suffer for refusing demands of the landlord's tenants. His life was threatened, his servants were compelled to leave him, his fences torn down, his letters intercepted, and his food supplies interfered with. In a word, he was "boycotted."

Gladstone's Policy, 1880-1885

Home-Rule Bill of 1886 and Its Defeat

Ulster threatened violent resistance. The bill was rejected in the House of Commons. Gladstone was compelled to retire from office. The Conservative party, foes of "home rule," dominated the British government during the next six years. And, as a seemingly final blow to the cause of "home rule," a domestic scandal clouded the career of Parnell and split his Nationalist followers into two quarreling factions.

In 1893 Gladstone, again in office, introduced into the Parliament at Westminster a second "home-rule" bill, which passed the Commons by a close vote but was rejected by the Lords. It was the last serious effort of England's veteran Liberal statesman. His colleagues advised him that it would be suicidal to their party to appeal to the country at large on the question, and he withdrew from public life. The extended sway of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists from 1895 to 1905 appeared to seal the doom of Irish hopes.

Home-
Rule Bill
of 1893
and Its
Defeat

In fact, however, these very years of Unionist domination proved a fertile seed-time for a luxuriant new crop of Irish nationalism. Something of an agricultural revolution occurred in Ireland, attributable in part to the series of land acts which transformed numerous tenant-farmers into peasant proprietors,¹ and in part to the tireless activities of Sir Horace Plunkett and the Irish Agricultural Organization Society which he founded in 1894 for the development of coöperative enterprises among Irish farmers. Peasant proprietorship and the coöperative movement combined to improve the condition and to promote the solidarity of the rural masses.

Agricul-
tural Rev-
olution

Simultaneously, a literary renaissance began. In 1893 Douglas Hyde inaugurated the Gaelic League for the preservation and extension of the native Irish language, and around it soon clustered a galaxy of poets, essayists, and dramatists.² They wrote mainly in English, but they dealt largely with Irish themes, and, in conjunction with the Gaelic League, they were intent upon reviving among the masses of the Irish people a knowledge of the national language and an appreciation of traditional Irish character, customs, and culture. Gradually it became fashionable for the younger generation to receive some instruction in Gaelic.

Literary
Renaissance

¹ On these land-purchase acts of the Unionist government, see above, p. 338.

² On these Irish writers, see above, pp. 284-285.

Neither Plunkett's agricultural society nor Hyde's Gaelic League was political in character or purpose. Both sought to weld together the whole Irish people, regardless of their religious affiliation or "racial" stock, and regardless of their attitude toward "home rule." The one organization was economic; the other was cultural. Both Plunkett and Hyde were Protestants, and Plunkett in politics was a Unionist rather than a Nationalist. Unwittingly, nevertheless, the fruitful labors of these men in the fields of economics and literature served to stimulate a new kind of political nationalism in Ireland.

Stimulating a New Irish Nationalism

The man with the fullest vision of the new Irish nationalism and with the greatest resourcefulness in advocating it was Arthur Griffith. A native of Dublin and a printer by trade, he began his political career as a fervent disciple of Parnell, but the factional quarrels among Irish Nationalist members of Parliament following Parnell's downfall led Griffith to despair of achieving "home rule" or any other radical reform for Ireland by parliamentary means. His goal was a united Irish nation, with a constitution of its own making, and with a government entirely independent of Great Britain's except for a "personal union" (like Austria and Hungary after the Ausgleich of 1867) under a common sovereign. The means which he urged of realizing the goal should be neither parliamentary pressure on Britain nor forceful insurrection in Ireland but rather such "passive resistance" on the part of Irishmen as Hungarians had successfully employed in 1866-1867. The Irish people should not participate in the British government; they should refuse to serve in its army or pay taxes to it; and their elected members of Parliament should absent themselves from Westminster and constitute a governing council at Dublin. In a word, national self-reliance should be the means and the end of Irish politics.

Griffith and "Passive Resistance"

In 1906 was formally launched a new political party in accordance with Griffith's doctrine and under his leadership. It took the name of "Sinn Féin"—Gaelic for "we ourselves." At first it was small, and, although it attracted a number of youthful intellectuals and secured allies in the radical element of the urban working class, its electoral successes prior to the World War were limited to placing some of its members on the local governing bodies of Dublin and a few other

Beginning of Sinn Féin, 1906

towns. The golden opportunity for Sinn Fein—and the fame of Arthur Griffith—came with the World War and afterwards.

Meanwhile the overwhelming majority of the Irish people outside Ulster continued in the tradition of Parnell to vote for Nationalist candidates and to expect them to obtain from the British Parliament a measure of home rule for Ireland. Indeed, by 1900 the position of the Nationalist party seemed to be improving again. In that year the factions which for almost a decade had been bitterly quarreling among themselves over a successor to Parnell finally united on John Redmond, an able lawyer and an experienced parliamentarian. Redmond's Nationalists claimed credit for prevailing upon the Conservative majority in the British Parliament to enact in 1898 a significant law entrusting town and county government in Ireland to popularly elected officials, and to sponsor the even more significant land-purchase acts of 1896 and 1903. Apparently, important reforms could be gotten from the British Parliament by Irish Nationalists even when the unfriendly Conservatives were in power. Then, in 1906, when the more friendly Liberals took office, great expectations possessed Redmond and his followers. The expectations were slow of realization, for the Liberals, so long as they did not need the votes of Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, were deaf to Redmond's pleas for "home rule."

Redmond
and the
Older Na-
tionalist
Party

Redmond was patient, however, and awaited the time when the Liberals would need the support of his party. The time came in 1910-1911 with the balancing of electoral strength between Liberals and Conservatives over the Lloyd George budget and the parliament bill. Both these measures were enacted into law by aid of Redmond and his Irish Nationalists, and in return for such decisive aid the Liberal ministry of Asquith introduced in the House of Commons in 1912 a "Government of Ireland Bill"—the third of the definite "home-rule" proposals—providing for the establishment of a special Irish parliament at Dublin, which, however, would be subordinate to the British Parliament at Westminster in military, financial, and certain other matters. The bill did not go as far as Redmond and his followers desired, but they decided to accept it as a step in the right direction. It passed the House of Commons but was rejected by the House of Lords. Reintroduced in 1913, it again

Home-
Rule Bill
of 1912

passed the House of Commons and was again rejected by the House of Lords. One more passage by the House of Commons, in 1914, would operate, under the provisions of the Parliament Act, to make it the law of the realm.

While Redmond and the Irish Nationalist party were coöperating with British Liberals in behalf of the home-rule bill of 1912, opposition to it developed in Ireland from two opposite camps. On the one hand, Griffith's Sinn Fein party criticized it as a sorry compromise of the principle of Irish freedom. On the other hand, the Unionist party in Ireland, especially strong among Ulster Protestants and now finding a militant leader in Edward Carson, denounced the bill as a treasonable attempt to destroy the unity of the British Empire and put "progressive" Protestant Ulster under the yoke of "backward" Catholic Ireland. Griffith's followers as yet were not numerous enough to make serious trouble, but it was otherwise with the Ulster Unionists. These, aroused by the organizing genius and fiery eloquence of Carson and backed by the moral support of British Conservatives, held imposing mass-meetings, bound themselves by a "solemn covenant" never to submit to an Irish parliament, and raised a volunteer army of some 100,000 men.

Faced with the threat of armed revolt in Ulster, the Liberal government at Westminster wavered and vainly tried to find some generally acceptable compromise, while Irish Nationalists and Sinn Feiners joined in raising a force of "Irish volunteers" to resist the "Ulster volunteers." Civil war clearly threatened, but just then the World War broke out. Whereupon, Redmond, still most conciliatory and optimistic, evoked applause from the whole British House of Commons by declaring that "armed Nationalist Catholics will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen."

Such unexpected unanimity brought rewards to all concerned. Redmond and the Irish Nationalist party had the satisfaction of seeing the home-rule bill enacted into law in September 1914. Carson and the Unionists had the satisfaction of seeing the simultaneous enactment of a "suspensory bill," whereby the execution

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of Parnell from a painting by Frederick Hall (born 1860).

Enact-
ment and
Suspend-
ion of
Home
Rule, 1914

of the home-rule law would be suspended for the duration of the World War, and of hearing the Liberal prime minister assure Parliament that any coercion of Ulster was "absolutely unthinkable."

Carson had the better of the immediate bargain. Redmond's was but a paper victory, and the only way by which he could hope to make it real was to trust to the good intentions of the British government at the close of the war and in the meantime to give convincing proof to Ulstermen and the British people at large that nationalist Ireland was not separatist and would wholeheartedly support Great Britain in a foreign war. Such proof, however, Redmond could not give. Personally, he did his best to encourage Irish enlistment in the British army, but his outspoken critics in Ireland were no longer confined to Unionists. The mass of Irish Nationalists were bitterly disappointed and disillusioned about obtaining any measure of home rule from the British Parliament. They came to feel that Redmond had been duped by Carson and the British politicians, and they evinced little enthusiasm for fighting Britain's battles. In the circumstances, the more radical nationalist agitation of Griffith and Sinn Fein gathered headway in Ireland. The more Redmond strengthened his position at Westminster, the more he weakened it at Dublin. The future of Irish nationalism was to be, not with Redmond and the parliamentary party of Parnell, but with Griffith and the revolutionary movement of Sinn Fein.

Red-
mond's
Dilemma

Sinn
Fein's Op-
portunity

4. THE EMPIRE

The "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" was the core of the hugest imperial domain which the world has ever known. In 1914, on the eve of the World War, the British Empire embraced approximately a quarter of the earth's land surface and a quarter of its entire population. Within this Empire, subject to Great Britain, were territories in every continent and every ocean of the globe, in the most diverse climates from frigid to tropical, and inhabitants of every race and of every phase of culture from cannibalism to Cambridge.

NOTE. The caricature opposite was drawn by Sir John Tenniel for *Punch*, just after Disraeli's purchase of the majority stock in the Suez Canal Company (1875). On Tenniel, see above, pp. 289-290.

The Empire was a creation of modern times, almost wholly since the seventeenth century; and its greatest expansion and development occurred in the nineteenth century. At the beginning of this century, the Napoleonic Wars markedly enlarged it. In the middle of the century, though English Liberals seemingly weakened its bonds by according self-government to important parts of it and by adopting a censorious attitude toward imperialism in general, it actually suffered no diminution in size, and at least in the case of India was expanded by conquests and solidified by the transference of control from commercial company to crown. After 1874, when the government of the mother-country passed from the liberal Gladstone to the imperialistic Disraeli and when the advance of industrial capitalism was revitalizing overseas ambition, the British Empire grew by leaps and bounds.

The growth of the British Empire from 1874 to 1914 was partially a growth of such colonies as were peopled mainly by persons of European stock—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. Much more, however, it was a growth of British political and economic sway over non-European peoples in Asia and Africa, a growth by military conquest or by diplomatic negotiation.

British India was designated an "empire," and Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of it, in 1877; in the 1870's Baluchistan, to the west of it, was finally conquered and annexed, and in the 1880's Burma, to the east. The Malay states adjoining Singapore were obtained in 1874. From China were taken Hongkong in 1842 and Wei-hai-wei in 1898, and presently Tibet was treated as a British "sphere of influence." In 1907, by agreement with Russia, the British also delimited a "sphere of influence" in southeastern Persia. In the Pacific Ocean, the Fiji Islands were appropriated in 1874, southeastern New Guinea (Papua) in 1884, northern Borneo (Sarawak) in 1888, Tonga (or the Friendly Islands) in 1900. Nearer home, in the Mediterranean, Cyprus was occupied in 1878. And with amazing rapidity the British Empire expanded in Africa. Here, prior to 1880, it comprised only Cape Colony and Natal in the extreme south and a few trading posts on the west coast. After 1880, a large part of the continent came under British rule. Egypt was occupied in 1882, and protectorates were established in Bechuanaland in 1885, in

Somaliland in 1887, in Zanzibar in 1890, in Uganda in 1896. Chartered commercial companies acquired Nigeria in 1886, British East Africa (Kenya) in 1888, and Rhodesia in 1889. Conquest was made of Zululand in 1887, of Ashanti in 1896, of the Egyptian Sudan in 1897, and of the Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1902.

It was but natural that an empire so large and heterogeneous should not be administered according to any one pattern. Indeed, the British Empire, as it expanded, displayed a growing differentiation in government, so that in the latter part of the nineteenth century at least three distinct types of dependency were generally recognized: (1) the self-governing colonies, or "dominions"; (2) a miscellany of crown colonies, naval stations, and "protectorates"; and (3) the so-called "empire" of India. We shall treat of these three types in turn, pointing out, as we proceed, significant developments in the respective dependencies.

Its Heterogeneous Character

The self-governing colonies, or "dominions," included by 1914 a trifle more than half of the territory in the British Empire. It would be most misleading, however, to infer that half of the British Empire possessed the right of self-government; for in respect of population the "dominions" constituted only a twentieth part of the empire. Self-government was a special privilege conferred by Great Britain upon a small minority of her colonial subjects, not a natural right granted freely to all. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the privileged minority was almost exclusively of European stock, that the colonies enjoying home rule were precisely the colonies in which relatively large numbers of Britishers had settled—Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Outside these colonies, there were but a few thousand white men in all the colonial domain of Britain. Self-government, in short, was exercised by almost all the "white" colonies, and by none other.

1. Self-Governing Dominions

The "White" Colonies

How the principle of self-government was set forth in the "report" of Lord Durham in 1839, and how, with the sanction of the British government, it was progressively applied to the several colonies in Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, we have elsewhere related.¹ When Queen Victoria ascended the

¹ See above, pp. 64-65.

throne in 1837, there was no self-governing colony in the British Empire. When her son, Edward VII, died in 1910, there were twenty-one.

As Canada had been the first colony to obtain self-government, so also it was the pioneer in another important movement, the formation of confederations among self-governing colonies. In 1867 the colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick joined with Quebec and Ontario to form a confederation styled the "Dominion of Canada." The Dominion was technically created by enactment of the British Parliament at Westminster—the British North America Act of 1867—but the plan had originated in Canada and been formulated by a convention at Quebec in 1864. The government of the Dominion was modelled after that of the mother-country, with a governor-general acting for the monarch, a Senate in place of the House of Lords, and a democratically elected House of Commons, to which the cabinet of ministers was rendered responsible. Although each of the four provinces preserved its separate legislature, there was little question of "states' rights" in Canada. With the terrible example close at hand of the United States in civil war over "states' rights," the framers of the Canadian constitution restricted the powers of the several provinces.

For a long time the dominant political party in Canada was the Conservative, strongly British in sympathy, though resolved to promote an economic nationalism within the Dominion; and its leader, Sir John Macdonald, was prime minister from 1867 to his death in 1891 (excepting the five years 1873–1878). The Dominion organized its own militia and police, civil service, and systems of banking, currency, and posts. It established a protective tariff for the fostering of Canadian industries. It promoted agricultural settlement in the great Northwest.

The growth of the Dominion was remarkably swift. First, from the Hudson's Bay Company were purchased extensive lands from which the new province of Manitoba was carved (1870). Then British Columbia (1871) and Prince Edward Island (1873) were brought into the confederation. Finally a decree of 1878 proclaimed that the Dominion of Canada should have jurisdiction over all British territory north of the United States—with the exception of Newfoundland (and its dependency of Labrador), which remains to this day a separate colony. The fertile prairies

and rich mines of western Canada attracted a steady stream of settlers, particularly after the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway (1886), some from Great Britain and others from the United States, and the ensuing economic development of the West received political recognition by the creation (1905) of two new prairie provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan.

Meanwhile, following the death of Sir John Macdonald, the Conservative party declined and was supplanted in power by the Liberal party, whose gifted leader, Sir Wilfred Laurier, held the premiership continuously from 1896 to 1910. Laurier was a native of Quebec, French in nationality and Catholic in religion, and he proved that a French Canadian could be as loyal both to the British Empire and to the Dominion of Canada as anyone of British extraction. While he lowered the protective tariff and sought to promote closer commercial relations with the United States, he was a staunch supporter of British imperial interests. He sympathized with Joseph Chamberlain's proposals for "imperial preference," and he despatched a Canadian army to South Africa to help the English in the Boer War.

Notwithstanding the evident success of the confederating movement in Canada, the Australian colonies hesitated three decades before they finally decided to form a similar union. There were five of these (Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania), beside the original colony of New South Wales, which had been founded as a penal station back in 1788 and had since developed into a free, prosperous community. In the early part of the nineteenth century the introduction of sheep-raising, and in the middle of the century the discovery of gold, had attracted British emigrants to the Australian colonies and enabled them to mature rapidly.

Common-
wealth of
Australia,
1900

They would doubtless have been federated as early as 1885, had they not been divided on the tariff question. While New South Wales clung stubbornly to free trade, the younger colonies were reluctant to surrender the revenues which they obtained from their customs duties. But the advantages to be gained from confederation—especially the advantage of concerted action in excluding Chinese immigrants and maintaining British supremacy in the South Pacific against French and German intruders—finally outweighed the disadvantages. After long discussion, the

colonists agreed upon a plan which was enacted by the British Parliament as the Commonwealth of Australia Act, 1900. New Zealand, physically separated from Australia by 1,200 miles of water, refused to join the Commonwealth, just as the island of Newfoundland had held aloof from the Dominion of Canada.

The six Australian colonies became states in the Commonwealth.¹ The federal or Commonwealth legislature, like the American Congress, was composed of a Senate, in which each state had the same number of seats, and a House of Representatives, in which the seats were distributed according to population. The High Court of the Commonwealth, like the American Supreme Court, was the guardian and interpreter of the constitution. Besides, in delegating only specified powers to their federal government and reserving all others to the respective states, the Australians imitated the political structure of the United States rather than the more centralized system of Canada. In two important respects, however, the Australian Commonwealth was essentially British. First, its highest magistrate was a governor-general, who, like the monarch whom he represented, reigned but did not rule. Secondly, its cabinet of ministers was responsible to the parliament rather than to the chief magistrate. Australia preceded both Great Britain and the United States in the enfranchisement of women.

An outstanding feature of Australian development was the rapidity and extent of its industrialization and urbanization. Sheep-farming and agriculture in general, which, along with mining, had originally been the basis of the continent's economic and social life, were eclipsed after 1871 by manufacturing and commercial enterprise. One result was that, while the population tripled between 1871 and 1914, the country as a whole remained sparsely settled and urban centres absorbed the entire increment. Another result was that the governments of the several states, and the government of the Commonwealth after its creation in 1900, had to cope with a serious land problem and with even more serious labor problems.

The latter were made acute by increasingly radical demands from the masses of urban workingmen. After a furious but futile fight for the principle of the "closed shop" (in a great widespread

¹ Subsequently the Commonwealth took over the government of two "territories"—Papua or British New Guinea (1905) and Northern Australia (1911).

strike of 1890), workingmen became convinced that they must use the ballot box as well as the trade union to better their lot. Labor parties sprang up, therefore, in the several states and demanded socialistic legislation. Between 1890 and 1910 the state of Victoria, coming under the control of the Labor party, enacted a series of laws providing, among other things, for the creation of trade boards to regulate the wages and hours of industrial labor. Labor influence and legislation soon spread to Queensland, South Australia, and New South Wales.

The Commonwealth government followed the lead of the states, establishing in 1904 a federal arbitration court for the settlement of interstate industrial disputes, and in 1908 a system of old-age pensions. In the general election of 1910 the Labor party swept the country, and their leader, Andrew Fisher, a former Scottish coal miner, formed a ministry which, with a brief interruption and some changes in personnel, endured for the next seven years. It failed to induce the people to pass constitutional amendments which would have enabled it to forward its socialistic program, but it succeeded in introducing, in 1911, compulsory military training for all young Australian men—a significant innovation in the army traditions of the British Empire—and it was the same Labor government which with enthusiasm and energy carried Australia into the World War in active support of the mother-country.

New Zealand, the Australasian colony which remained apart from the Commonwealth, had been self-governing since 1856, and in 1907 was styled a "Dominion" and accorded equal rank with the confederations of Canada and Australia. Its internal development was strikingly similar to neighboring Australia's. There was a similar increase of population, with the majority settled in cities. There was similar legislation of a democratic and socialistic sort. In respect of this legislation, New Zealand was even more radical than Australia. Not only were women enfranchised; not only were old-age pensions provided, workingmen ensured against accident, and special courts set up to arbitrate disputes between employers and employees; but the government, in the spirit of "state socialism," undertook to own and operate railways, life- and fire-insurance, and coal mines. Nor was New Zealand much if any behind Australia in adopting the principle of compulsory

Dominion
of New
Zealand,
1907

military training, in giving effective aid to the mother-country in the World War, and in evidencing otherwise both a proud nationalism of its own and an intense loyalty to the Empire.

The union of four British colonies in South Africa followed nine years after the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth. In another place we have mentioned how Cape Colony, the oldest of the South African settlements, was wrested by Great Britain from the Dutch Netherlands.¹ The Dutch inhabitants—farmers, who were called “Boers”—resented the transfer of sovereignty, particularly when the British government obliged them in 1833 to free their Negro slaves,² and a large number of them quit Cape Colony, “trekking” (emigrating) to Natal, and thence northward to lands along the Orange River (where they founded the Orange River Territory in 1836) and on to the region across the Vaal River. The British tried to extend their sway wherever the Boers “trekked.” They annexed Natal in 1843, and in 1848 they claimed the settlements on the Orange and Vaal rivers. There were enough British soldiers and settlers in Natal to make the annexation of this territory effective, but the Boers were sufficiently numerous and resolute in the more northern lands to withstand the British. In 1852, by the “Sand River Convention,” Great Britain acknowledged the independence of the Boer republic of Transvaal, and in 1854, by the “Convention of Bloemfontein,” the freedom of the other Boer republic, the Orange River Free State. Thus came into existence in South Africa two British colonies—Cape Colony and Natal—and two Dutch republics—Transvaal and Orange River Free State. To Cape Colony the British granted self-government in 1872, and to Natal in 1893.

In all four South African states was a numerous and troublesome native population, and in each the “native problem” bulked large, involving recurrent insurrections and repressions. For a long time, however, the “native problem” was dwarfed, in white men’s eyes, by the rivalry between the two European stocks—the British and the Dutch—for supremacy in South Africa. In 1877 the British reasserted their claim to sovereignty over the Transvaal. The Dutch Boers again resisted, and, following a defeat which they administered to

**Friction
with Boer
Republics**

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 713, 725.

² See above, pp. 57, 65 n.

a small British force at Majuba Hill (1881), Gladstone recognized anew the virtual independence of their country. Elated by this success, the Boers increased their truculence toward the British, and some of their leaders dreamed of uniting the Dutch-speaking minorities in Cape Colony and Natal with the forces of the two republics in a war to make all South Africa Dutch.

On the other hand, British imperial ambitions were simultaneously stimulated by the activities of Joseph Chamberlain in England, and by the sensational projects and achievements of Cecil Rhodes in Africa. Relations of the Boers with the British were not improved when thousands of British fortune hunters and adventurers flocked into Transvaal following the discovery there (in the Rand region, 1886) of the world's richest gold mines, or when the British shut off Transvaal from all access to the sea by annexing Zululand and the territory just south of Delagoa Bay (which was Portuguese), or when Dr. Jameson, an associate of Rhodes and a fanatical imperialist, led a filibustering expedition into Transvaal (1895) with the avowed intention of overthrowing its Boer government and incorporating it in the British Empire. The "Jameson raid" failed of its immediate purpose, and its leader, captured by the Boers and turned over to the British government, underwent a brief imprisonment at London. But the raid greatly embittered the situation in South Africa. Jameson was lauded by Britishers in measure as he was reprobated by Boers. From 1895 to 1899 the Transvaal government, headed by Paul Kruger, a hardened old Dutch pioneer, assumed an ever more implacable attitude toward the British and especially toward the "Uitlanders," the British immigrant miners within Transvaal. These immigrants were very vocal in criticism of the oligarchical character of the Transvaal government and stentorian in demands for recognition of their own political rights under it. The refusal of the Boers to enfranchise the "Uitlanders" (except after seven years' residence) was the grievance which these most fully exploited.

In 1899, the republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State, feeling that peaceful measures had failed to check British pressure and aggression, formed an alliance and went to war with Great Britain. At the outset, the Boers took the offensive, invading Natal and striking at the Kimberley diamond fields in Cape Colony, and they won several brilliant

Boer War,
1899-1902

victories. Their armed forces were not large, probably fewer than 40,000 men, but they had resourceful commanders in such men as Louis Botha and Christian De Wet, and the rank and file knew how to get about the country and to shoot straight. In time, however, they were borne down by weight of numbers. The regular British army was reinforced by volunteers from England and Scotland and by detachments from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, until the British had some 350,000 men in the field under the command of Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener. In a year the Boers seemed to have lost the war: they were compelled to retire from Natal and Cape Colony; Pretoria, the capital of Transvaal, fell; President Kruger fled to Europe; and the British annexation of both Transvaal and Orange River Free State was proclaimed. Nevertheless, Boer resistance was not yet broken, and two years of fierce and trying guerilla warfare ensued. Not until May 1902, by the treaty of Vereeniging, did the Boer generals agree to lay down their arms and then on condition that the British government should respect the Dutch language in South Africa and grant self-government to the former Dutch republics. That was done in 1906-1907.

The way was at last prepared for the union of South Africa. An intercolonial convention for the discussion of tariff questions was speedily followed by agreement upon a plan of political confederation, which was ratified by the British Parliament in 1909. Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State became provinces in the Union of South Africa, a union modelled after the Dominion of Canada. In a sense, the creation of the Union of South Africa was a triumph for the Boers. They outnumbered the British in the Union as a whole, and inasmuch as they enjoyed equal political rights with the British they elected a majority of the members of the Union parliament, and one of their number, General Louis Botha, who had fought valiantly against Great Britain during the Boer War, became the first premier of the Union. Botha loyally accepted the new order. While safeguarding Boer interests in respect of language, education, agriculture, and the subject native races, and maintaining that South Africa was a "nation," he was conciliatory toward the British inhabitants of the Union and fully determined to keep it within the British Empire. He had some difficulty with extremists on both sides,

Union of
South
Africa,
1909

but the masses acquiesced in his policy of moderation; and this statesman who had been in arms against the British Empire during the Boer War lived to bear arms in behalf of the Empire during the World War.

Great Britain by 1910 was thus mistress—or ally—of five “colonial nations”—the Union of South Africa, the Commonwealth of Australia, and the Dominions of Canada, Newfoundland, and New Zealand—whose vast territorial extent and rich natural resources promised them a great future. Politically, the ties between them and the mother-country were rapidly loosening. They managed their own internal affairs as they saw fit through parliaments and ministries of their own choosing, and the governors-general whom the British government at Westminster sent out to reside in their midst were symbols, rather than directors, of imperial rule. The mother-country still claimed certain rights over the dominions: to pass upon their constitutions; to veto acts of their parliaments; to control their foreign relations; and to decide in its own Privy Council at London judicial cases which might be appealed from their law courts. In practice, however, the British government interfered less and less with the legislative freedom of the dominions and even permitted them on occasion to negotiate treaties with foreign countries.

Dominion
Relations
with
Great
Britain

Economically, too, the self-governing dominions went their own way, sometimes against the interests and policies of the mother-country. To forward their own industrial development, they levied tariffs on imports from foreign countries and likewise from Great Britain. To raise the standard of living of their own citizens, as well as to ensure that they would remain “white” countries, they imposed restrictions on immigration, particularly of Orientals, even where the immigrants might be from British dependencies such as India and Hongkong.

Despite the growing political and economic cleavage between mother-country and her self-governing colonies—or, as some persons said, *because* of the lessening sources of friction—there was a marked increase of sentimental devotion on the part of these colonies to the British Empire. Significant of the new spirit of voluntary, but very real, coöperation was the fact that Canada could have a French prime minister in Laurier, Australia a socialistic premier in Fisher, and South Africa a Dutch

premier in Botha, and yet all be proud to own themselves "British."

Before the World War many projects were adumbrated, especially in England, for establishing some "system" of inter-
Imperial dominion relationship. One of the most celebrated was
Confer- Joseph Chamberlain's triple scheme of "imperial con-
ence, ference, imperial preference, and imperial defense."
Prefer- Formal imperial conferences were actually inaugurated
ence, De- in London in 1887, and henceforth, at more or less regu-
fense lar intervals, the prime ministers of the several dominions met personally with the prime minister of the United Kingdom and discussed matters of mutual concern. "Imperial preference" was recognized by some of the dominions in lowering their tariffs on commodities imported from Great Britain, though the rigid adherence of the mother-country to free trade prevented her from favoring colonial imports and hence militated against the full fruition of "imperial preference." "Imperial defense" remained a matter of voluntary action on the part of the several self-governing sections of the British Empire; in peace times it was sluggish, but at critical moments, as in the Boer War or in the World War, it was remarkably coöperative and prompt.

In addition to the self-governing dominions which we have just
2. Crown been discussing, the British Empire embraced a mis-
Colonies cellany of crown colonies, naval stations, and protec-
and Pro- torates, which were as far-flung and considerably more
tectorates numerous but which were inhabited chiefly by non-European stocks and were ruled more or less despotically by agents of the British government.

The "crown colonies" represented a continuation of the type of colonial administration which had flourished in the earlier days of the British Empire, before the revolt of the United States and the grant of self-government to Canada. They were presided over by governors who were named by, and responsible to, the colonial ministry in London and who might be "advised," but could hardly be dictated to, by assemblies or councils elected or appointed from British residents in the several colonies.

The oldest group of crown colonies comprised the remaining British possessions in tropical America—British Honduras, British Guiana, and West Indian islands—the large majority of whose inhabitants were descendants of Negro slaves, and the

West African coastal lands (almost wholly Negro) which Britain had held since the eighteenth century—Gold Coast, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. As crown colonies were administered, also, the series of naval stations which Britain had gradually acquired in the Mediterranean—Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus. Of these, the native population was respectively Spanish, Italian, and Greek, and at least in the cases of Malta and Cyprus there was such a lively local nationalism that the British government thought it unsafe to entrust them with self-government. Among still other crown colonies were Ceylon, Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, the Falkland Islands, and British East Africa (or Kenya).

The "protectorates" represented, as a rule, larger areas, more recently acquired and less civilized, in which native princes were allowed to retain the trappings of power but were obliged to exercise it in harmony with instructions or "advice" of a resident British agent. In some instances, a crown colony acquired a protectorate over its hinterland; such was the case with the crown colonies in West Africa. In other instances, a commercial company, specially chartered by the British government, gained and exercised a protectorate. Such was the case with Cecil Rhodes's "British South African Company" (chartered in 1898), which, by virtue of wars and treaties with native chieftains, opened up and actually governed the huge territory of Rhodesia until after the World War. Such, too, was the case with the "Royal Niger Company" (chartered in 1886) whose activities added the equally huge tract of Nigeria to the British Empire. In still other instances, protectorates were established directly and exercised from the outset by the British government. Such was the case with the Federated Malay States, with Sarawak (whose rajah was an Englishman), with Tonga, with Zanzibar and Uganda and British Central Africa (renamed Nyasaland in 1907).

A kind of informal protectorate Great Britain established in Egypt. This country, in theory, was still a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, but in the first half of the nineteenth century an ambitious and bellicose Turkish governor ^{Egypt} (or pasha), the famous Mehemet Ali, had wrung from the government at Constantinople the recognition of a privileged position for Egypt and for himself and his family.¹

For a time, under Mehemet Ali's grandson, Ismail (1863-

¹ On Mehemet Ali, see above, pp. 75-76.

1879), Egypt appeared to be advancing toward full independence and national well-being. Ismail, with the consent of the Ottoman Sultan, assumed the title of "Khedive" (1867); and, full of admiration for European material civilization, he labored to "modernize" his country. He remodelled the administrative system. He promoted cotton culture. He employed European engineers to build railways, telegraph lines, a breakwater at Alexandria, and harbor works at Suez. He subsidized the researches of European scholars in Egyptian antiquities and founded a great museum at his capital city of Cairo. In 1869 he celebrated with gala fêtes the opening of the Suez Canal, which had been financed by a French company (with liberal aids from the Khedive) and constructed by a distinguished French engineer, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Unfortunately, all these undertakings were expensive. Ismail was notoriously prodigal, while Egypt was notoriously poor. The result was a rapid accumulation of indebtedness to foreign bankers, especially French and British; a crushing burden of taxation on the Egyptian peasants in order to meet the interest-charges to foreigners; and, eventually, national bankruptcy and foreign intervention.

In 1875 Ismail sought relief by selling to the British government for about twenty million dollars the block of stock which he owned in the Suez Canal Company. The canal thus came permanently under British control,¹ but the financial relief to Egypt was transitory. In 1876 Ismail submitted Egyptian finances to a "dual control" of British and French agents, and when, three years later, he tried to get rid of the foreigners, he was deposed. His successor had to submit anew to the "dual control," but some of his subjects resented it and in 1882, under the leadership of Ahmed Arabi, they revolted. The French declined to use force against the rebels, but a British fleet bombarded Alexandria and a British army occupied the country.

From 1882 to the World War, Egypt was virtually a British dependency. It continued to have a native khedive, but a British army remained and British will was law. There can be no doubt that under the guidance of British "advisers," notably Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener, many helpful reforms were instituted. Finances were gradually put on a solid footing. The administration of justice was bettered. The Egyptian Sudan,

¹ See the cartoon by Tenniel facing p. 365, above.

long a seat of disorder, brigandage, and religious fanaticism, was reconquered and policed. Important irrigation works were undertaken, culminating in the construction of the magnificent Assuan dam. Moreover, an advisory assembly was created in 1883, and in 1913 it was entrusted with limited legislative powers. Notwithstanding all these benefits, and the promise of greater benefits to come, many Egyptians, particularly young men who had studied in Europe and learned lessons in nationalism, were discontented. Arabi's insurrection of 1882 had been crushed, but the echoes of his slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," resounded.

India, the greatest of all British imperial possessions, remains to be considered. Within this one Asiatic dependency were included (in 1914) four-fifths of the population of the whole British Empire. For every square mile of territory in the United Kingdom, India could show fifteen; and as the British Isles had only 45 million inhabitants as against India's 315 million, every man, woman, and child in the former might be thought of as having seven subjects in the latter. And no other country in the world purchased so large an amount of British merchandise as did India.

3. Empire
of India

The foundation of British supremacy in India had been laid, and much of its superstructure reared, by a succession of merchant-adventurers and empire-builders of the English East India Company during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.¹ Not until the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the resulting passage of the "Better Government of India Act" by the British Parliament in 1858² did the East India Company cease to function and the British government assume direct and full responsibility for India. Eighteen years later—in 1876—Parliament enacted that British India should be designated an "Empire" and the British sovereign should be styled "Empress (or Emperor) of India."

British India was extraordinarily heterogeneous in geography, race, language, religion, and culture. It was truly an "empire" and not a "national state." Geographically it comprised four fairly distinctive areas: the triangular peninsula-plateau of southern India (usually called the Deccan);

Its Diver-
sities

¹ On the history of the British in India during these centuries, see Vol. I, pp. 389, 398-399, 410-418, 491, 713, 760.

² See above, pp. 66-67.

the broad belt of lowlands forming the Ganges and Indus river valleys to the north of the Deccan; the mountainous region still farther north reaching into the Himalayas and extending westward past the frontiers of Afghanistan into Baluchistan; and the northeastern area of Burma.

Racial divisions corresponded roughly with the geographical, the so-called Dravidians dwelling in the Deccan, the Hindu Aryans in the lowland belt, the descendants of Moslem invaders (Arab, Afghan, and Persian) in the northern hill region, and Mongoloid peoples in Burma. In many localities, however, different races lived side by side in neighborly hostility, and everywhere was plentiful evidence of racial intermixture.

Religious differences and antagonisms accentuated the racial and cultural contrasts. About two-thirds of the entire population adhered to the Brahmanic or Hindu religion, with its polytheism, its sacred laws, its distinctive ceremonies and pilgrimages, and its rigid caste system. Three sizable religious groups derived originally from Hinduism but had long been quite separate: Buddhists, numbering about eleven million, chiefly in Burma; Jains, a million and a quarter, recruited principally from the commercial class in cities on the Malabar coast; and Sikhs, some three million, compactly settled in that part of the Indus valley known as the Punjab. Over against these was a fairly large number of militant Moslems—some seventy million—whose stronghold was in northern India, though influential Moslem princes were to be found elsewhere in the country. Among Moslems, and even more among Hindus, were innumerable sects; while the religious hodge-podge was increased by the activity of Christian missionaries, Catholic and Protestant, whose converts by 1914 totalled about five million.

To the confusion of religion was added the confusion of language. Over two hundred languages were spoken in British India, and while three-fourths of the whole population employed Aryan languages derived from ancient Sanskrit (akin to Latin, German, and Slavic), there were wide dialect differences among them, and, in addition, certain languages of basically different derivation, such as the Dravidian (spoken by sixty million persons in the Deccan) and the Tibeto-Chinese (in Burma).

It was but natural, in the circumstances of divergent languages, religions, races, and geographical features, and in the face of a

widespread and deeply rooted caste system, that cultural contrasts should be strikingly sharp. Some natives were highly cultured. Others were extremely primitive. Some, among the Moslem aristocracy and the Hindu upper classes, were inordinately wealthy and lived a life of luxury. Others, the vast majority of the native population, worked hard in field or shop for bare subsistence and had first-hand experience with direst poverty.

In other words, "India" was a mere geographical and political expression. In the realm of politics, even after the British had created their "Empire of India," governmental uniformity was notably lacking. There were two major parts of British India—two major methods by which the British government dealt with the heterogeneous country. On the one hand was the "Empire of India" in its technical sense, the portion ruled directly by British officials. It embraced three-fifths of the area and seven-ninths of the population of British India, and was divided into nine provinces, comparable in

Part
Ruled Directly by
Britain

size with countries in Europe, each presided over by a governor and all subject to central direction by the "Viceroy of India" named by the government at Westminster and responsible in turn to the "Secretary of State for India" in the British ministry. The Viceroy was practically a dictator, and through the governors in the several provinces and also through a vast staff of civil and military officials he ruled the "Empire." On the other hand were some 600 "native states," including several fairly large ones¹ and many very small ones, each governed directly and usually quite despotically by a Hindu or Moslem prince (with some such title as "rajah" or "gækwar"), though all these princes were obliged to acknowledge British suzerainty, to live on friendly terms with the "Empire of India," and to submit to "supervision" by the Viceroy.

Part
Allied with
Britain

As a part of the British Empire, India experienced an internal peace and an economic development which it had not known for centuries. The British civil service was generally of a high order of intelligence and integrity, and British officials displayed no little resourcefulness in coping with the traditional animosities and conflicting interests of the vast and heterogeneous native

¹ Such as Hyderabad, Mysore, Kashmir, Gwalior, and Baroda. The Himalayan native states of Nepal and Bhutan, also fairly large, were recognized by the British as fully independent though they were in practical alliance with British India.

people. Roads and railways were built, agricultural production was stimulated, industrial machinery was introduced, harbor works were undertaken, and throughout the huge territory sanitation and public health were promoted and some educational opportunities provided. An Indian army was organized with British officers, and utilized to protect as well as to extend India.

Nevertheless it seemed as though the more the British tried to do for the well-being of India, the more the natives found fault. To be sure, most of the princes, favored by British rule, were undoubtedly devoted to it, and the vast masses of the ignorant peasantry were as indifferent to it as they had been to the less benevolent despotism of native potentates. But many of the younger generation of Indian intellectuals, especially those who were educated at European schools in their own country or at universities in England, gradually adopted and propagated a kind of nationalism. Why not India for the Indians? Why not a welding together, through their own efforts, of Hindus and Moslems, of Aryans and Dravidians, of high-born and low-born castes, of rich and poor, of the cultured and the untutored, to fashion a real and free Indian nation? Why not a fairly rapid transition to self-government? In 1885 ardent nationalists formed an "All-India Congress" whose subsequent sessions were ever more largely attended and ever more vociferous in demanding self-government.

Rise of
Indian
Nation-
alism

Eventually in 1909, in an attempt to reconcile the nationalist Indian desire for self-government with the British determination to rule, the British Parliament enacted the Indian Councils Act of 1909, providing for native election (by a very restricted suffrage) of a minority of members of the advisory councils which were set up in six of the nine provinces and of the "legislative council" which would advise the Viceroy. This act did not satisfy the Indian nationalists. They termed it a sham and redoubled their agitation for radical constitutional reform. In order to stifle the rancorous criticism, the government curtailed the freedom of the press, censored the mails, and forbade "seditious" meetings. Extremists replied with attempts at rioting and terrorism. Opposition was undoubtedly intensifying, though it had not reached such proportions in 1914-1918 as to disturb the existing régime in India or to hamper the coöperation of Indian troops with Britain during the World War.

Councils
Act of
1909

We must not forget that important economic considerations incalculably strengthened the determination of Great Britain to retain India and exercise real authority over it. India was predominantly an agricultural country, a cheap producer of foodstuffs and raw materials for export to Britain and a big consumer of manufactured goods imported from Britain. Of the country's rapidly growing trade, which increased fivefold from the Mutiny in 1857 to the World War in 1914, Great Britain had almost a monopoly. On the eve of the war, the United Kingdom exported to India ten times as much merchandise as did the rival industrial nation of Germany; and three-fourths of India's seaborne commerce was carried under the British flag. British shipping interests were naturally eager to maintain British rule.


Economic
Advantages of
India to
Britain

So, too, were many industrialists in Great Britain, particularly in the cotton and iron industries, who derived profits from the Indian market. There was also a large number of Britishers who drew their livelihood from civil or military service in India; they were likely to be apologists and propagandists for the British régime. There was an even larger number of Britishers who invested savings, much or little, in Indian government securities (of which some 600 million dollars' worth were held in England), or in private enterprises in India.

These investors, together with all the other interested Britishers, were prone to dilate upon the civilizing "mission" of Great Britain in India. Some persuaded themselves—and others—that Britain was a kindly schoolmistress, teaching material well-being and the higher Anglo-Saxon virtues to her class of rather backward Hindu students and preparing them for the noble but difficult task of establishing a parliamentary government and a capitalist prosperity according to English models. It should be remarked, however, that Great Britain as yet appeared more anxious to promote her own economic interests than to educate the native population. The British "Empire of India" spent almost sixty million dollars on railways and canals and almost a hundred million on army, but only thirty million on schools. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that of the total population of the immense Indian Empire more than 94 per cent could neither read nor write.

"Civillizing Mission" of Britain

On the whole, nevertheless, Great Britain had been amazingly successful throughout the nineteenth century in gaining and holding overseas dominion. As Britain was the workshop of the world, so her Empire was the premier economic and political association.



CHAPTER XXI

LATIN EUROPE, 1870-1914

I. THE LATIN TRADITION



GROUPED as Latin nations are those whose languages are derived from the Latin of the ancient Roman Empire. They include France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Rumania, together with French-speaking Belgium¹ and the southern (French- or Italian-speaking) cantons of Switzerland. They include also the daughter nations of Portugal, France, and Spain in the New World: Portuguese-speaking Brazil, French-speaking Haiti (and Quebec in Canada), and Spanish-speaking countries of Mexico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Central America, and South America. The former constitute "Latin Europe," and the latter "Latin America."

Latin
Europe

Latin
America

Similarity of language has served, especially under the influence of nineteenth-century romanticism with its gospel that a community of culture emanates from a community of language, to give currency to the phrase "sister Latin nations" and to foster a mutual sympathy among them, particularly among their intellectuals and on occasion among their statesmen and warriors. A multitude of volumes were written in the middle and latter part of the century about the "Latin spirit," the "Latin genius," the "Latin tradition." Italians, Frenchmen, and all the others, including Rumanians, were reminded that they were direct descendants of the ancient Latin-speaking people, immediate heirs of the Roman Empire, natural custodians of Roman law and classical civilization.

Linguistic
Tradition

Roman
Heritage

¹ The upper classes throughout the country and the masses in southeastern Belgium speak French. Flemish, or Dutch,—a Germanic language—is spoken by the masses in northwestern Belgium. Belgium is thus a bilingual nation, half Latin and half Teutonic, but it is conventionally reckoned a Latin nation.

Besides, they have been characterized by steady adherence to the form of Christianity which their ancestors were among the first to adopt back in the days of the Roman Empire. None of them underwent at the time of the Reformation any general conversion to Protestantism, and all of them, in so far as they profess any religion, have remained largely Catholic (except Rumania, which has remained predominantly Orthodox). Only in France (and French Switzerland) has Protestant dissent been considerable, and here it is much less vital in the twentieth century than it was in the sixteenth.

**Catholic
Tradition**

Each of the Latin nations (except Rumania) has played an important part in overseas expansion. The leading explorers and discoverers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were Italian, and in recent times Italy has been expanding anew in Africa and the Levant. The great colonial and commercial empires of the sixteenth century were Spanish and Portuguese, and, though separated politically from their respective mother-countries in the nineteenth century, they have continued to cherish the culture and to spread the influence of Spain and Portugal. France built an extensive colonial empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and yet another, even more extensive, second only to Great Britain's, in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Belgium, too, has latterly acquired a huge imperial domain in central Africa. Much of this imperialism has been motivated by economic developments common to capitalistic Europe rather than peculiar to the Latin nations, but capitalistic motives have been more strikingly obvious in the case of Dutch or British expansion, while in the case of Latin imperialism they have been more clearly supplemented by missionary and conquering zeal inherent in the Catholic and Roman traditions.

**Imperi-
alism**

It should be borne in mind that none of the Latin nations, except Belgium, underwent in the nineteenth century such swift and intensive industrialization as was experienced by Great Britain, Germany, or the United States. The Industrial Revolution, of course, permeated France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and produced significant changes among their populations. Yet the changes here were neither as sudden nor as sweeping as in non-Latin countries. The majority of Latins continued to live in rural communities, to cul-

**Industrial
"Back-
ward-
ness"**

tivate the soil, to be farmers and, in relatively large numbers, peasant-proprietors; and numerous Latin artisans managed to keep out of factories and to go on with handicrafts. Even Belgium maintained some balance between her industry and her agriculture and between her machine and hand production; her valuable lace industry, for example, remained preëminently a hand industry, and a large proportion of her population owned small farms. Despite the fact that the Latin peoples were traditionally and notoriously thrifty, they acquired, in an age of industrialization and industrial capitalism, the reputation of being "backward" and "unprogressive."

This reputation for "backwardness" seemed to be further substantiated, at least in the minds of "Anglo-Saxon" critics, by the difficulties which Latin nations encountered in trying to operate the modern instruments of representative, parliamentary government. Every Latin nation, at some time in the nineteenth century, consciously imitated the political institutions of Great Britain or the United States, framing written constitutions, erecting parliaments and responsible ministries, enfranchising the masses, and, in general, providing on paper for the kind of government which obtained in England or America. Yet its practical functioning was conditioned and modified, not only in Italy, Spain, and Portugal (and the republics of Latin America), but also in France and Belgium, by peculiar Latin traditions and usages.

Political
"Back-
ward-
ness"

Latins had a less lively personal sense of political responsibility than "Anglo-Saxons." They were less interested in self-government and more indifferent to its prosaic results. They were less inclined to form large and well-organized political parties, regularly alternating with each other in the administration of public affairs. On the other hand, they were prone to follow this or that personal leader, who would represent a "group" rather than a "party" and would have to rely for the exercise of political power upon constantly shifting alliances with other "groups."

Besides, there were more fundamental differences among Latins than among "Anglo-Saxons" concerning the constitution and the objects of government. Englishmen were generally committed to royalty and a state church, and Americans to republicanism and the separation of church and state. Each Latin people, on the other hand, was split into quarrelsome factions of royalists and

republicans, of clericals and anti-clericals, and in each the rise of Marxian socialism evoked especially militant partisanship.

Finally, among the Latins there was a greater expectation of what government could and should do, and at the same time a greater reluctance to pay direct taxes to the state and a greater impatience with the drab operation of democratic institutions. Wherefore, revolutionary demonstrations were fairly frequent, if not always serious, and dictatorship was ever a possibility and sometimes a reality.

Despite reputed "backwardness" in material and political progress, there was in the abiding traditional civilization of the Latin nations an elegance, a richness, a color, an interest in ideas, an artistic sense, which fascinated other peoples and attracted an ever-increasing number of tourists to Paris and the French Riviera, to Rome and Florence, to Seville and Madrid, to Brussels and Antwerp. France, as the foremost Latin nation, the one most famed for its rôle in modern history and for its contemporary art and scholarship, was particularly alluring to foreigners. The French might be "irresponsible," as Englishmen said, or "decadent," as Germans averred, but France was regarded by millions outside her own borders as the most truly civilized country, and her capital Paris as the most beautiful and most sophisticated city in Europe and probably in the world. To France we shall give first attention in our survey of the history of Latin Europe from 1870 to 1914.

Cultural
Renown

2. THE THIRD FRENCH REPUBLIC

How the Empire of Napoleon III (the "Second French Empire") came to an inglorious end with his defeat by the Germans at Sedan, and how at Paris on September 4, 1870, a self-constituted "provisional government" proclaimed France a "republic," we have told in an earlier chapter.¹ The "provisional government" was led by Leon Gambetta, who had been conspicuously opposed to Napoleon III's régime and who was most eager to ensure the permanence of a "Third Republic" in line with the Jacobin tradition of the First Republic of 1792² and the Second of 1848;³ and, so long as

Provi-
sional
Govern-
ment of
1870

¹ See above, pp. 148-149.

² On the First French Republic (1792-1804), see Vol. I, pp. 628-657.

³ On the Second French Republic (1848-1852), see above, pp. 80-83, 126-129.

the war with Germany lasted and the mass of Frenchmen perceived the necessity of presenting a united front to a common enemy, royalists joined with republicans in support of the "provisional government."

In January 1871, when Paris surrendered to the Germans and a truce was agreed to in order that the French people might elect a National Assembly to decide whether peace should be made or the war continued, a cleavage appeared between republicans and royalists. The former, inspired by the flaming patriotism of Gambetta and sharing his conviction that peace could be made with Germany only on terms humiliating to France and inauspicious for the endurance of the Third Republic, were bent on continuing the war. The royalists, on the other hand, counselled the making of peace. On this issue the first electoral campaign under the Third Republic was waged in February 1871, with the result that, of the 650 deputies elected to the National Assembly by universal manhood suffrage of the French nation, about 400 were royalists and only about 250 were republicans.

National
Assembly
of 1871
and Its
Royalist
Majority

The National Assembly, meeting at Bordeaux, naturally refused formally to sanction the Republic, contenting itself with naming as "head of the executive power" Adolphe Thiers, the Liberal royalist who had been prominent in the bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe.¹ The Assembly then removed to Versailles and in due time ratified the treaty of Frankfort (May 1871). Thereby France ceded Alsace and the greater part of Lorraine to the newly created German Empire and promised, in addition, to pay a war indemnity of five billion francs.²

Headship
of Thiers

Peace
with
Germany,
1871

By this time, however, the National Assembly had had to cope with a serious insurrection of the Commune of Paris. The Commune had been formed to govern Paris, while the capital was besieged by the Germans and hence cut off from the rest of France. The members of the Commune included middle-class radicals as well as some workingmen of socialist or anarchist proclivities. Though they might differ among themselves as to ultimate purposes, they were one in hostility to the National Assembly—its royalist majority, its sitting at Versailles instead of at Paris,

The Com-
mune of
Paris and
Its
Griev-
ances

¹ See above, pp. 72-73, 75-76.

² See above, p. 175.

its willingness to conclude peace with Germany, and its unwillingness to do anything to relieve the continuing economic distress of the Parisian lower classes.

So the Commune at Paris led a revolt against the National Assembly, repudiating its authority, declaring that the city was self-governing, and summoning radicals in other localities to establish similar communes and to federate them with the Capital's. "Communes" were actually set up at Lyons, Marseilles, and a few other towns, in imitation of Paris, but they were soon overthrown. Indeed, the mass of the French people throughout the provinces were even more eager to suppress domestic strife than they had been to end the foreign war; they solidly backed Thiers in ordering regular troops to capture Paris and end the Commune.

Revolt of
Com-
mune,
1871

For two months—April and May 1871—Paris underwent a second siege, this time at the hands of French soldiers, and this time with unparalleled ferocity on both sides but with success ultimately attending the national arms of France. The defending "Communists" fought furiously, but, overpowered by numbers and outplayed in generalship, they gave way little by little. In desperation, they slew the hostages they held (including the archbishop of Paris) and set fire to public buildings (destroying the City Hall and the palace of the Tuileries). On the heights of Montmartre they made their final futile stand. Nor did the victors display any leniency. Frenzied by the stubborn resistance they encountered, the troops of the National Assembly killed many of the prisoners they took. And after the Commune was ended and order restored, a kind of judicial terrorism continued.

Its Sup-
pression

The horrible episode of the Paris Commune had significant consequences in France for at least a generation afterwards. It weakened extreme radicalism, by intensifying the dread of socialism and anarchism among the upper and middle classes and the peasantry, and also by silencing in death or banishment the chief propagandists of revolutionary violence among the urban working class. At the same time, it somewhat lessened the popularity of the royalist cause. The royalist Assembly and ministers had done a good work, it was generally conceded, in suppressing the Commune, but the stern measures they took gradually reacted against them.

Triumph
of "Mod-
erates"

On the other hand, the republican cause profited from the fact that it was purged of its extremist element and rendered "moderate."

By the end of May 1871, Thiers and the National Assembly had made peace with the Germans and restored order in France. The republican minority contended that the Assembly had now complied with its mandate from the people and should therefore authorize the election of another assembly to formulate a constitution for the Republic. The royalist majority were not so anxious for new elections, however, and in August 1871 they passed the Rivet law, whereby the National Assembly assumed full power to prepare a constitution and conferred on Thiers the interim title of "President of the French Republic." From 1871 to 1875 the Assembly remained the supreme governing and constitution-making body in France, and some very important things it did.

Work of
National
Assembly,
1871-1875

In the first place, under the direction of the National Assembly, the government reorganized the public finances and floated additional loans, so that in 1873 the final installment of the war indemnity was paid to Germany and foreign troops were withdrawn from French soil. Secondly, army reforms were effected. Following the example of victorious Prussia, the principle of universal compulsory service was adopted, the term being fixed as five years in the active army.¹ New fortifications were constructed along the German frontier and the defenses of Paris were strengthened.

Payment
of Indem-
nity and
Reform of
Army

Thirdly, the National Assembly devised a constitutional government for France. This it did most painfully and after much delay. There was no serious division in the Assembly about continuing the highly centralized local government, under prefects and sub-prefects, which Napoleon had organized at the beginning of the nineteenth century,² but about the central government conflict raged not only between the monarchical majority and the republican minority, but also within the monarchical majority.

The monarchists in the Assembly (and in the country at large) were split into three factions. (1) The "Imperialists," as the supporters of the Bonaparte family were called, suffering from

¹ The principle was not fully applied, however. It proved impractical to enforce a five-year term, and there were numerous exemptions.

² See Vol. I, p. 652.

the odium of the recent disastrous war, were least numerous and influential of the monarchical factions. (2) More important were the "Legitimists," dyed-in-the-wool royalists, who comprised most of the old nobility, many socially prominent persons in Paris and other towns, especially of northern France, and a large following among the Catholic clergy all over the country and among the peasants in certain regions, particularly Brittany and Vendée. They were faithful to the memory of the old régime, devoted to aristocracy and the Catholic Church, and hostile to the political and social heritage of the Revolution. Their candidate for the throne of France was Henry, Count of Chambord (1820-1883), grandson of Charles X.¹

(3) At least as numerous as the Legitimists were the "Orleanists" (or "Liberal Royalists"), recruited mainly from liberally minded aristocrats, conservative bourgeois, and relatively well-to-do peasants, who were anxious to find a compromise—a "just mean"—between revolution and reaction, between democracy and monarchy, between clericalism and modern society, and who thought it could be attained through a liberal, constitutional régime similar to Great Britain's and presided over by the Count of Paris (1838-1894), grandson of King Louis Philippe.²

Between the Count of Chambord and the Count of Paris no love was lost, and between their respective partisans there was an obvious incompatibility of principles. It is not to be wondered at that the National Assembly, with its fundamentally divergent elements, made slow progress in framing a constitution for the Third French Republic. Republicans seemed to be hopelessly outnumbered by royalists, and royalists to be irreconcilably divided between Legitimists and Orleanists.

For a time in 1873 a royalist agreement appeared likely. Legitimists and Orleanists were alike angered by the public confession of the supposedly royalist President, Thiers, that a republican form of government was the only practicable way out of the *impasse*. They united to force his resignation and to elect Marshal MacMahon, an unbending royalist, as his successor. Shortly afterwards, moreover, the Count of Paris paid an expiatory visit to his cousin, the Count

Factions
among
Royalist
Majority


Conserva-
tive Le-
gitimists

Liberal
Orleanists

MacMa-
hon, Pres-
ident of
Republic,
1873

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 768-769, 785-788.

² See above, p. 80.



to amend the constitution; otherwise, they would meet separately. The upper chamber, the Senate, would comprise 300 members, chosen by indirect election for nine years.¹ The lower and more numerous chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, would be elected by direct universal manhood suffrage every fourth year (or oftener, if its dissolution should meanwhile be decreed by the President and the Senate).

The executive power was entrusted nominally to a President, elected for seven years and eligible for reelection, but actually to a Cabinet of Ministers. The ministers must have the backing of a majority in the Parliament; if they fail to carry the measures they propose or if either chamber passes a vote of "lack of confidence," they must resign and leave to the President the task of forming a new ministry which can command the chambers' confidence. This was virtually the British system of parliamentary government with its ministerial responsibility. It appealed to liberal royalists as a convenient means by which, when they secured a majority in Parliament, they could easily substitute for the president a king according to their own heart, a king who would reign but not rule.

With the drafting of the constitutional laws, the National Assembly brought its labors to a close in 1875; and the first parliamentary elections under the new constitution of the Third Republic were held. The outcome was the return of a republican majority to the Chamber of Deputies and of a royalist majority to the Senate, and the continuation of fierce partisan strife.

The President, Marshal MacMahon, with the support of the Senate, retained his office and utilized it along with his personal prestige to advance the royalist cause. He encouraged army officers to participate actively in propaganda for the restoration of the monarchy, and, in order to stimulate ecclesiastical cooperation to the same end, he appointed (under the Concordat) persons of strongly royalist conviction to high church office and did what he could to satisfy Catholic requests. He contributed liberally to the fund for erecting, "as an expiation for the sins of revolution," the great basilica of the Sacred Heart on the heights of Mont-

¹ Until 1884, the number of Senators elected for nine years was 225, and the remaining 75 were elected for life.

Indecisive Election of 1876

Royalist Policy of President MacMahon

martre, and he gave moral support to the agitation of prominent Catholics for French intervention in Italy in behalf of the pope.

Against the President, the republican majority in the Chamber of Deputies had a redoubtable leader in Gambetta, who allied the forces of anti-clericalism with those of republicanism. In the Chamber and in the country at large he assailed the royalists because they aided the church, and he attacked the church because it was directed by royalists and for royalists. A bitter diatribe which he delivered in the Chamber early in May 1877, in the course of which he uttered the memorable phrase, "Clericalism, there is the enemy," was the immediate occasion for a test of strength between himself and the royalist President.

Republican Policy of Gambetta

Issue of Clericalism

On May 16, 1877, Marshal MacMahon appointed a royalist (and clerical) ministry and adjourned the Chamber of Deputies for a month; then, with the sanction of the Senate, he dissolved the Chamber and ordered the holding of new elections throughout France. The resulting electoral campaign was exciting and spectacular. Both Gambetta and the President undertook speech-making tours. None could doubt MacMahon's sincerity, but few could withstand Gambetta's oratory. The republicans won a decisive victory, and as soon as the new Chamber met it forced the resignation of the royalist cabinet and the appointment of a republican ministry.

Election of 1877 and Republican Victory

For another year Marshal MacMahon doggedly struggled on against a hostile Chamber and ministry, but partial elections to the Senate, early in 1879, assured republican control of the upper house as well as the lower, and left the royalist President in a hopeless situation. He resigned, and in his place the republican majority of the combined Chambers elected Jules Grévy, one of their own number. Thus, nine years after its beginning, the Third French Republic was at last in republican hands. In the following year (1880), as tokens of republican triumph, the seat of government was transferred from Versailles to Paris.

Gambetta did not long survive the triumph; after a brief term as prime minister he was accidentally killed in 1882. But though his following was already breaking up into a number of factional groups, France continued to be dominated by men loyal to the republican form of government. Royalists remained, but they

lacked capable leaders and they gradually lost a good deal of their popular following. With the death of "Henry V," Count of Chambord, in 1883 the hopes of the Legitimists were dashed,¹ and the Orleanists were already too dispirited, and the masses too used to the Republic, to admit of any immediate attempt to enthrone the Count of Paris.

In following the history of the French Republic from the year 1879, when it came completely and finally under the control of professed republicans, one is struck by the continuously preponderant rôle of bourgeois politicians. The working majority in Chamber and Senate, the presidents of the Republic, the ministers, the chief officers of local administration, all were "politicians" and almost all were of the middle class—lawyers or physicians, teachers or journalists, industrialists or financiers—well educated and comfortably well-to-do. There were no noblemen or clergymen among them, and, perhaps more surprising, few peasants or urban workingmen. The latter classes voted for bourgeois office-seekers who promised them most, but otherwise they took little part in government.

One is struck by the perpetual factionalism among the politicians. Despite the fact that the Republic had been established only after a nine-year political struggle with royalists and was chronically threatened with subversion, its protagonists failed to maintain a comprehensive "republican party" and, instead, formed a bewildering variety of "groups" under rival "leaders."

The republican "Union of the Left," which had been formed under Gambetta's guidance to oppose Marshal MacMahon and turn him out of the presidency, dissolved as soon as victory was achieved. Several personal followings, or groups, emerged, representing divergent tendencies which were labelled "Moderate" and "Radical" respectively. The Moderates sought to reassure the propertied classes with the slogan of "liberalism truly conservative." The Radicals made special appeals to "the people," lauding the Jacobinism of the French Revolution and the First Republic. Both were intensely

¹ Similarly, the prospects of the "Imperialists," or Bonapartists, which had been improving somewhat since 1875, were darkened by the death in 1879 of the Prince Imperial, "Napoleon IV," the youthful son and heir of Napoleon III. See above, pp. 149-150, and the genealogical table at p. 124.

patriotic, the Moderates evincing somewhat greater enthusiasm for colonial expansion, and the Radicals for national concentration at home. Both were anti-clerical, the Radicals more so. For two decades, from 1879 to 1899, the Moderates usually outnumbered the Radicals, and one of the Moderates, Jules Ferry, a lawyer and journalist, was particularly influential in shaping the legislation of the Republic during the years from 1879 to 1885.

Ferry and
the Mod-
erates

The outstanding leader of the Radicals was Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929), a physician who developed "radical" ideas about religion and society from a study of John Stuart Mill¹ and Auguste Comte,² and "radical" ideas about democracy from three years' observation in the United States (1866-1869), and who, by aid of peppery remarks in the Chamber and in the newspaper which he founded in 1880, exerted a gradually growing influence. Clemenceau was a bitter foe of Ferry and most other moderate republicans (as well as of royalists and conservatives of the "Right"),³ and he repeatedly declined to enter any ministry with them. There were not enough Radicals to take over the government themselves, but there were enough to embarrass other republicans that might. This helps to explain why "ministerial instability" became a characteristic of French public life under the Third Republic. Ministries succeeded each other in kaleidoscopic fashion. From 1871 to 1914, while Great Britain had nine different ministries, France had not fewer than fifty!

Clemen-
ceau and
the
Radicals

Ministe-
rial Insta-
bility

Nevertheless, the vast administrative personnel of the centralized state remained and gave real continuity and stability. Moreover, a change of ministry did not usually involve a change in policy. One set of politicians might quickly succeed another in high office, but general tendencies would remain about the same in the omnipotent parliament and would be reflected in consistency of legislation over a relatively long period. For example, all republican groups and some royalists coöperated in enacting in 1881, and in retaining thereafter, important guaranties of individual liberty: a law

Guaranty-
ing
Personal
Liberties

¹ See above, pp. 265, 267.

² See above, pp. 263-265.

³ The leader of the "Right" during this period was Albert de Mun (1841-1914), nobleman, ex-army-officer, brilliant speaker, and ardent apostle of social reform in accordance with the teachings of the Catholic Church. He was accustomed to say of himself and his royalist and clerical allies, "We are the counter-revolution."

establishing freedom of speech and the right of holding public meetings without any preliminary authorization on the part of the government; and a very liberal press law.

There was less unanimity about satisfying the demand of urban workingmen that they be allowed full freedom to organize and conduct trade unions,¹ but, largely through the efforts of Waldeck-Rousseau, an influential member of the Moderate cabinet of Jules Ferry, a law was put through parliament in 1884 according full recognition and protection to labor combinations.

The conferring of material benefits upon the largest and most influential classes of the electorate was a constant care of the bourgeois politicians of the Third Republic—because they were especially interested themselves in economic “prosperity” and because they wanted the approval and votes of their constituents. The republicans, no less than Napoleon III, perceived the desirability of encouraging commerce, industry, and agriculture. Some 30,000 kilometers of new railway were constructed. Harbors were deepened, and spacious new ones were provided at Le Havre and St. Nazaire. The beautification and expansion of Paris went on, and here great international expositions were held in 1878, in 1889, and in 1900.

To the agricultural classes, still numerically preponderant in France, the parliament and the ministries were noticeably tender. With one hand, they concealed from them the burden of taxation by substituting a host of indirect taxes for direct taxes on land; and with the other hand they extended many positive favors. A special ministry of agriculture was created (1881). Financial grants were made in aid of vine-growers (beginning in 1879). Bounties were voted for the culture of silk, flax, and hemp, and for the breeding of horses. Farmers were encouraged to form coöperative societies for collective buying and selling. Mutual loan banks and insurance agencies were established under state guaranties to assist peasant proprietors (1894). Agricultural schools were opened and endowed. And a system of tariff protection for French agriculture,

¹ A partial legalization of trade unions had been enacted in 1864 under Napoleon III. See above, p. 131. The French act of 1884 was analogous to the British acts of 1871 and 1875. See above, pp. 333-334.

NOTE. The picture opposite, “First Communion in a Peasant Village,” is by a popular French painter, Jules Breton (1827-1905).

which was partially constructed by the law of 1885, was capped by a comprehensive tariff act of 1892. That these measures had no little efficacy is indicated by the fact that the mass of the peasants, especially in southern and central France, became staunch advocates of the Republic, and also by the fact that the annual value of the country's agricultural product, which between 1800 and 1860 rose from four to six billion francs, mounted in 1913 to over eleven billion.

But the relative growth of French machine industry, and of French urban centres, was even more remarkable under the Third Republic. Machines in factories multiplied ten-fold in horsepower, from 870,000 to 8,600,000. The output of coal mines was doubled, and that of blast furnaces sextupled. Though the principal market for French manufactures was the domestic market, foreign exports increased by 25 per cent. It was to protect infant industry, no longer quite infant, as well as to promote agriculture, that the tariff of 1892 was devised and adopted.

The accumulation of capital went on apace in France. The wealth of the country, roughly estimated at 200 billion francs in 1872, was calculated at 300 billion in 1913. This increase represented in part the growing profits of industrial enterprise accruing to a comparatively small number of manufacturers, and in considerable part the savings of peasants, artisans, and shopkeepers—the proverbially thrifty Frenchmen—who habitually invested in government bonds of their own country and of foreign countries too. Indeed, one reason for the “backwardness” of French industry as compared with that of Britain or Germany was the preference of French investors, for putting their money into government securities rather than into business. France had the largest public debt of any country in the world, but practically all of it was owed to her own citizens, who thus, in the receipt of their interest, were pensioners of the state. Besides, French citizens drew more and more tribute from other countries, for the total of French foreign investments rose from twelve billion francs in 1871 to forty-five billion in 1914, a rate of increase much higher than that of the national wealth.

Indus-
trializa-
tion

Increased
Wealth

Foreign
Invest-
ments

NOTE. The picture opposite, of a boulevard in Paris, is by a famous impressionist painter, Claude Monet (1840-1926). On Monet, see above, pp. 286-287.

Another significant development under the Third Republic was the reëmergence of France as a colonial Power second only to Great Britain in the extent and richness of overseas dominion. When the republicans took over the government in 1879, France possessed a few remnants of her empire of the eighteenth century,¹ together with Algeria, which had been "occupied" under Louis Philippe and subsequently "annexed" and "subdued," and certain other territories appropriated by Napoleon III in the Pacific and southeastern Asia.² Some of the republicans, especially Clemenceau and his Radical following, were indifferent to this colonial heritage, and inimical to further colonial expansion. They thought it would fritter away the energies of the mother-country and distract attention from radical reform at home.

But Jules Ferry and his Moderate associates were bent on pursuing a vigorous colonial policy. The extension of imperial dominion outside Europe would do much, they argued, to restore French prestige, sadly lowered in Europe by the outcome of the recent Franco-German War, and it would provide French business men and bankers with new fields for profitable trade and investment. In this matter Ferry and the moderate republicans found allies in clerical conservatives, who perceived in French colonial expansion an opportunity to resuscitate the glory which had attended the old Bourbon monarchy overseas and likewise to open up new areas for the activity of Catholic missionaries.

Jules Ferry was the chief champion of the "new empire." While he was prime minister in 1881 he despatched a French expedition from Algeria into the troublesome neighboring state of Tunis and obliged its Moslem ruler—the bey—to submit to a French protectorate. Then, in 1883-1885, when he was again prime minister, he shipped to the Far East another expeditionary force, which compelled China to consent to the establishment of a French protectorate over her vassal states in Indo-China—Annam and Tongking. Likewise, by directing a bombardment of the chief port of Madagascar, he frightened the native sovereign into signing a treaty whereby that huge island in the Indian

¹ Some islands in the West Indies and the Gulf of Newfoundland, the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean, five commercial posts in India, a strip of Guiana in South America, a foothold on the Senegalese coast of Africa.

² New Caledonia, Cochin-China, and Cambodia. See pp. 76, 133-134.


Ocean became virtually a French protectorate. By similar means he brought under French control a part of Somaliland, on the African coast at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Ferry, moreover, patronized French exploratory expeditions and trading companies in the interior of Africa, particularly along the Congo and Niger rivers.

The methods employed by Ferry in the acquisition of colonies were denounced by Clemenceau and other Radicals in France, but once colonies were actually acquired no French political group thought seriously of abandoning them. Indeed, from Ferry's active beginnings the expansion of the French colonial empire proceeded with accelerating speed, and, while many Frenchmen were accused of indifference to the heightening grandeur of their overseas dominion, outright opposition to it seemed to grow ever weaker. French Indo-China was steadily enlarged, mainly at the expense of Siam and China, and rapidly consolidated into a prized dependency with an area larger than the mother-country's and with a population half as large. In Africa, during the 80's and 90's French empire-building was especially ambitious and successful. Vast stretches of the Sahara and the western Sudan were explored and linked up with Algeria and Tunis on the north and with the Congo, Niger, and Senegal territories in the south and west. In 1892 the Negro kingdom of Dahomey on the west coast of Africa was conquered. In 1896 a revolt in Madagascar was suppressed and the island was transformed from a protectorate into a colony. In 1912, after protracted international negotiations and armed intervention, a French protectorate was established over the greater part of Morocco.

By 1913 the "empire" of republican France included not only the scattered minor colonies which were French before 1871 and the more recent acquisitions of Indo-China and Madagascar, but also a huge block of African territory constituting the five great administrative divisions of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa, and comprising an area of three and a quarter million square miles (almost fourteen times the area of France) and a population of approximately thirty million (about three-fourths the population of France).

French
Colonial
Empire in
1913

This colonial empire of France was even less French in population than the British Empire was British. In not a single French



NOTE. All French territories are shown in white. The administrative region of "French West Africa" is made up of Maurelania, Senegal, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, and the French Sudan. "French Equatorial Africa" comprises the French Congo.

dependency did persons of European stock outnumber persons of non-European stock. The large majority of French subjects on the African continent were Negroes, Berbers, or Arabs, mainly Moslem in religion; in Indo-China, Annamese and Chinese, almost wholly Buddhist; in Madagascar and the Pacific, Polynesians; and in the West Indies and Guiana, Negroes and mulattoes. Most of the colonies were sparsely inhabited, relative to the density of population in France or any other European country, and many of them, by reason of climate or soil, were unfit for European settlement. Moreover, the practically stationary population of France after 1871, together with a remarkable reluctance of Frenchmen to leave home, helps to explain why, even in regions suitable to European colonization, immigration from the mother-country was comparatively slight. In northern Algeria, the best developed of the French colonies and the most attractive to immigrants, some 500,000 Frenchmen settled between 1871 and 1914, but even here they were outnumbered six to one by native Berbers and Arabs. In Tunisia, the 75,000 colonists from France were fewer than those from Italy, and both together were outnumbered by the natives twelve to one. Elsewhere, there were hardly any French settlers at all—only French administrators, army officers, missionaries, and commercial agents.

Its Non-
French
Popula-
tion

There can be no doubt, however, that France surpassed Great Britain in the success with which she stamped her own impress of language, manners, and culture upon alien "backward" peoples and gained their loyalty and coöperation. If France did not colonize her empire, she at least went far to "Gallicize" its indigenous population. She was assiduous in establishing French schools for her distant subjects, as well as in providing them with material things which would bring them within the orbit of European, and French, civilization. And French colonial governors were usually tactful in handling the natives; they were not so prone as British administrators to fix a gulf between "white" people and "black," between "God's people" and "lesser breeds without the law."

Galliciz-
ing the
Colonies

While no French colony was "self-governing" in the sense that British "Dominions" were self-governing, certain French colonies were treated as integral parts of France, and French colonists and "citizens" within them were privileged to elect

Senators and Deputies to the central parliament at Paris. Colonies thus privileged were those which had been longest in French possession and were most "Gallicized": Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Guiana, in America; the trading posts in India; the island of Réunion; and northern Algeria. Elsewhere, throughout much the larger part of the French colonial empire, the authority of the republican government at Paris was exercised either indirectly through a native prince, as in the "protectorates" of Tunisia, Morocco, Annam, and Cambodia, who took orders from a "resident-general"; or directly through a "governor-general," as in West Africa, Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar.

From her overseas empire, France reaped considerable advantage, especially for her industrialists and financiers. The colonies were not permitted to levy tariffs against imports from the mother-country, but were required to give preference to French manufactures, trade, and investment. The value of the annual commerce between France and her colonies steadily increased from 350 million francs in 1879 to nearly two billion in 1913; and by the latter year French capital investments in the colonies amounted to four billion francs. To be sure, the financial income which France derived from her colonies was exceeded by the expenditure which she made to acquire and hold them—expenditure on distant and frequent military expeditions, on police, on civil service, on navy. Yet there was some prospect and much hope that in the future, when the colonies were more fully developed, they would be a financial as well as a moral asset to France. That they were a military asset, instead of liability, was eventually proved during the World War, when Algerians, Senegalese, and Annamese fought bravely and died heroically on European battlefields in defense of France and her empire.

The imperialistic policy of the Third French Republic had been shaped, as we know, by the activity of Jules Ferry and the parliamentary support given him by moderate republicans, and also by royalists and "clericals," against the forensic criticism and electoral opposition of Radicals. The Moderates, however, were staunchly republican and inclined, as disciples of Gambetta, to be "anti-clerical"; and they were none too proud of appearing to be in alliance with royalists and

Govern-
ing Them

Colonial
Advan-
tages—
and Dis-
advan-
tages

Ferry and
Anti-Cler-
icalism

"clericals." On one issue, that of "clericalism," they could heed the chief demand of their fellow republicans, the Radicals, and coöperate with them in safeguarding the Republic against ecclesiastical advocates of monarchical restoration. Hence the same Jules Ferry, at the very time when he was alienating Radicals by advancing imperialism abroad, was conciliating them by launching a campaign against clericalism at home.

Education was a major issue in the anti-clerical campaign. Since the time of the first Napoleon, Catholic religious instruction had been given in most French schools, and under Napoleon III there had been a marked increase in the number of schools conducted by Catholic teaching orders. Now, under the Third Republic, two demands for educational reform were insistently voiced. One was for a compulsory extension of the country's school system to the end that every French boy and girl, like every German boy and girl, should be rendered literate and trained in citizenship. As Gambetta explained, the Prussian schoolmaster had won the last war, and the French schoolmaster must win the next. The other demand, most militantly insisted upon by Clemenceau and extreme Radicals, was for the supremacy of lay (and republican) over clerical (and royalist) influence throughout the primary school system, so that every French boy and girl should be inoculated with republicanism and immunized against "reaction."

Question
of Edu-
cation

In the early 1880's Jules Ferry, as minister of public instruction, heeded both demands and, through a coalition of radical and moderate republicans against the protesting minority of royalists and conservatives, obtained parliamentary enactment of a series of educational laws. Compulsory attendance at some school was prescribed for all children. Parents might still elect to send their children to "free" (church) schools, but if they did they would have to support such schools out of their own pockets. On the other hand, a system of "public" or "national" schools was established, to be financed and directed by the republican government. Attendance upon them would be free, but in them none but laymen acceptable to the government might teach and no religious instruction might be given.

Ferry
School
Laws

Ferry and his allies accompanied the reform of primary education with other anti-clerical measures. To remove a group of Catholic clergymen who were particularly violent in denuncia-

tion of the public schools as "godless" and "atheistical" and further to handicap the free (church) schools, the government decreed the dissolution of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuit Order) and its expulsion from France. Moreover, it revived obsolescent eighteenth-century statutes against religious congregations of monks and nuns which had not been formally "authorized" by the state, ordering their dissolution and forbidding their members to conduct schools. And, in accordance with the demand of Radicals for a thorough laicizing of national life, the republican majority in parliament enacted a law prescribing that all marriages, to be legal, must be performed by civil magistrates, and another law empowering civil courts to grant divorces and annulments of marriage.

All these educational and marital measures became known as "laic laws." By Frenchmen of the "Left" they were deemed necessary to check the reactionary influence of the Catholic Church in national life and to ensure the permanence of "progressive" republican institutions, while by Frenchmen of the "Right" they were interpreted as purely partisan manoeuvres dictated by a "sect" of radicals and Freemasons and designed to spread a hatred of religion and especially of Catholicism under the cloak of "anti-clericalism."

The majority of the French electorate seemed to acquiesce in the adoption and enforcement of the laic laws, but many Catholic clergymen and laymen were now more than ever convinced that the republican régime must be overthrown if the church in France was to be saved from the destructive process of laicizing. These, therefore, redoubled their efforts to discredit the Republic, at the very time, in the late 80's, when socialist agitators, returning from exile (for participation in the Paris Commune of 1871) or springing up afresh in the wake of contemporary industrial progress, were prevailing upon urban workingmen to resent their economic plight and to blame it upon the politicians of the Republic. There was little likelihood of any agreement between such "socialists" and the "clericals" except in general fault-finding, but herein lay a serious danger to the Republic. Socialists and clericals might jointly create such widespread disaffection as to prepare the way for a dictatorship if not for a royalist restoration.

Other
"Laic
Laws"

Catholic
Opposi-
tion to
Laicism—
and to
Republic

This danger loomed large with the advent of Boulanger on the political scene. He was a general who had fought in the Franco-German War and in Tunis and who, almost unique among his fellow army officers, had been an outspoken foe of monarchy and friend of republicanism. Professing devotion to radicalism in general and to the cause of radical social reform in particular, he was appointed in 1886, on the recommendation of Clemenceau, to a seat in the cabinet as minister of war. He then used his public office for personal aggrandizement. He assumed a histrionic pose at military reviews. He talked about a war of revenge against Germany. He endeared himself to the rank-and-file of the French army. The increasing popularity of "the general on horseback" alarmed Clemenceau and other republican leaders. Recalling how Napoleon had risen to power, they forced General Boulanger to resign his office (1887) and quit the army.

Boulanger, the General in Politics

By opponents of the government the General was acclaimed a "martyr" to corrupt bourgeois politicians, and about him quickly crystallized a "revisionist party," demanding that he become a dictator and "revise" the constitution. The Bonapartist faction was prominent in the new party, and to it rallied most royalist and clericals, and many moderates and even some radicals whose nationalism was temporarily superior to their republicanism. The movement toward Boulanger was quickened by contemporaneous disclosure of serious financial scandals touching the family of the President of the Republic, Jules Grévy, who had been re-elected to his high office in 1886 for a second term of seven years. Thoroughly frightened, the various republican groups united, forced the resignation of Grévy (December 1887), and elected to the presidency of the Republic Sadi Carnot, an eminently respectable man who had avoided narrow partisanship and who possessed the additional advantage of being the grandson of the very famous Lazare Carnot who had organized the armies of national defense in the dark days of the First Republic.¹ For some time longer, nevertheless, the Boulanger excitement continued. The General stood for election to the Chamber of Deputies wherever a vacancy occurred and proved his widespread popularity by carrying one district after another, the

His Nationalist and Revisionist Party

¹ On Lazare Carnot, see Vol. I, pp. 632-633.

climax being reached in January 1889 when he rolled up a big majority in Paris.

It was thought by his followers that had Boulanger acted promptly after his electoral victory in Paris, he might have overthrown the Republic by a *coup d'état*. But he preferred talk to action, and let slip the chance to make himself dictator. The republican government was more resolute; it immediately ordered his arrest and trial on charges of conspiracy. Whereupon Boulanger fled ignominiously across the border into Belgium, and was tried and condemned in his absence. Ensuing popular elections endorsed this verdict, and the Boulangist cause collapsed utterly when the "brave General" committed suicide at Brussels in 1891.

Several consequences of the Boulanger episode deserve mention. First, the republican government adopted new policies in respect of the army and foreign affairs. By reducing the period of active service in the army from five years to three (1889) and by retiring notorious reactionaries from high command in the army, it reassured radical Frenchmen who had been fearful of the subversive influence of the military.¹

On the other hand, by contracting a close alliance with Russia (1891-1894), it countered the charge of zealous nationalists that the Third Republic was friendless and cowardly in foreign policy.² Second, the prospect of monarchical restoration, whether of Bourbon king or of Bonapartist emperor, receded into the background. It had failed to materialize when the opportunity was seemingly most favorable, and the recurrence of a like opportunity was now rendered more dubious not only by the withdrawal of royalists from influential army posts, but also by a cleavage among the "clericals," who, up to this time, had been almost a unit in support of monarchy.

For in 1892 Pope Leo XIII, convinced that French Catholics were making a grave mistake in identifying their religion with royalist politics, addressed to them a famous encyclical letter urging them to desist from attacks upon the Republic, to accept the existing form of govern-

¹ The reduction of the term of service did not reduce the peace-strength of the army, for several classes of persons who had been exempt from five-year service were now obliged to perform three-year service. The Radicals were concerned with republicanizing the army rather than with reducing its strength.

² On the Franco-Russian alliance, see below, p. 556.

ment, and to concentrate upon obtaining from it in constitutional manner the repeal of the laic laws. This advice served to split the French Catholics. It was spurned by many of them, especially among the religious orders, the secular clergy, and the nobility, who merely reëmphasized their devotion to the royalist cause. But on the other hand, the papal advice was heeded by a considerable number of Catholics, including their chief spokesman in the Chamber of Deputies, Count Albert de Mun, who renounced monarchy and "rallied" to the Republic.

*The
Rallies*

Finally, the outcome of the Boulanger "affair" produced a temporary reaction against republican radicalism as well as against monarchy. The radical groups were relatively strong while the Republic was in obvious danger, but, as soon as the Republic appeared to be "saved," radicalism at least of the Clemenceau variety lost a good deal of backing. The feeling spread that, to allay partisan passions which the Boulangist movement had aroused, domestic concord should be promoted and that mild Moderates could do this better than belligerent radicals. Then, too, the simultaneous rise and spread of Marxian socialism in France dealt a double blow to conventional radicalism. Some of its working-class followers deserted it to join outright socialist groups, while some of its bourgeois disciples united with moderates and conservatives to form a common front against socialism.

*Reaction
against
Radical-
ism*

Marxian socialism was not indigenous to France as it was to Germany,¹ and its development had been retarded in France by several other handicaps—the bloody suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871, the comparative sluggishness of French industrialization, the continuing predominance of agriculture and peasant proprietorship, the abiding tradition of individualism among French workingmen, and the tendency of professed French Socialists as of other Frenchmen to split into factions rather than to constitute a unified party. In spite of handicaps, however, Marxian principles were gradually propagated among the proletariat in industrial centres by a number of middle-class intellectuals and radicals. One of the first and most tireless of such propagandists was Jules Guesde, a Parisian clerk and journalist, who, returning from the exile to which he

*Marxian
Socialism
in France*

¹ On Marxian socialism in general, see above, pp. 268-274.

had been condemned for participation in the Commune, founded in 1876 a "Labor Party," which, four years later, adopted a characteristically Marxian platform. In the 80's appeared several other Socialist groups, but Guesde was unable to unite them with his personal following, and not until the early 90's did the movement achieve any noteworthy advance. By this time, Guesde's agitation was reënforced by the conversion of several young intellectuals, including Jean Jaurès, professor of philosophy in the University of Toulouse, and two brilliant young lawyers—Alexandre Millerand and Aristide Briand. In the general elections of 1893, the various Socialist groups together obtained fifty seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Some labor legislation was adopted by the French parliament in the 90's. It fell far short of the demands of Marxian Socialists

Labor
Legisla-
tion in
1890's

and likewise short of the proposals of Count Albert de Mun and his group of Social Catholics among the Ralliés. But without pressure from both extremes, Catholic and Socialist, and also from a section of radical republicans who, sharing in the popular drift toward socialism, took the name of Socialist Radicals,¹ the moderate republican groups who at this time were most largely represented in parliament and in the ministries would hardly have sponsored the measures of social reform which they did. Three of these measures are noteworthy. (1) The "great act" of 1892 regulated the employment of women, forbade the employment of children under thirteen years of age, prescribed a maximum working day of ten hours for all laborers, prohibited manual labor on one day every week, preferably Sunday, and provided safeguards for miners. (2) An act of 1893 ensured free medical attendance to workingmen and their families. (3) An act of 1898 obliged employers to pay compensation for personal injuries sustained by employees.

The "era of good feeling" which succeeded the collapse of the Boulangist movement and which was characterized by coöperation between Moderates and Ralliés and by the labor legislation just indicated, proved brief. It was rudely interrupted by the rise of anti-Semitism, and the disruptive development of the "Dreyfus affair." A certain Edouard

Rise of
Anti-
Semitism

¹ The French name for the group is *Radical Socialiste*, which is usually but faultily translated into English as "Radical Socialist." The emphasis is clearly upon Radical.

Drumont, already of some notoriety as the author of diatribes against the Jews and their "pernicious" influence on French political and social life, founded at Paris in 1892 a sensational newspaper, *La Libre Parole*, whose stock-in-trade was frenzied appeal for "national union" against the "Jewish peril." Its appeal was adroit and many-sided. It was "socially minded," preaching to workingmen that their real oppressors and the real foes of labor legislation were Jewish capitalists who dominated French industry and politics. It was "clerical," blaming the irreligious tendency of the Republic upon the influence of Jewish intellectuals and politicians. Above all it was "patriotic," insisting that France could not wage war for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine so long as Jews were suffered to honeycomb the French army and betray its secrets to their kinsmen in Germany.

Fairly quickly, this hysterical anti-Semitic agitation became the means of reviving and extending the motley Nationalist party which had waxed and waned with Boulanger. Two notable events in 1894 gave impetus to the agitation: first, the exposure of grave financial scandals in connection with a corporation which had been chartered by the French republican government to construct a canal across the isthmus of Panama, involving several Jewish bankers and parliamentarians; and second, the disclosure that a certain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, had been convicted by court-martial of selling military secrets to agents of the German government and consequently had been sentenced to degradation and to penal servitude for life on Devil's Island off the coast of Guiana. Here, apparently, was convincing substantiation of the charges of corruption and even of treason which Drumont and his kind were making against Jews and against the republican politicians. To the anti-Semitic Nationalist party flocked the elements which were traditionally hostile to the Third Republic, and also many republican patriots and a considerable number of workingmen. The assassination of the President, Sadi Carnot, by an anarchist in the same eventful year of 1894, appeared to symbolize the fate that was closing in upon the republican régime.¹

Revival of
National-
ist Party

Panama
Scandal
and Drey-
fus Case

¹ Sadi Carnot was succeeded in the presidency by Casimir-Périer, a wealthy conservative, the grandson of the famous finance minister under Louis Philippe. See above, p. 72. Casimir-Périer encountered so many difficulties with the repub-

Of the Panama scandals no exculpation could be advanced by ardent republicans; these had to admit that the scandals, though most regrettable, were real. In the matter of the Dreyfus case, however, there was a different outcome. In 1897, after carefully investigating the matter, the head of the espionage section of the French army, Colonel Picquart, expressed his belief that the original court-martial had made a mistake, that the officer who had sold military secrets to Germany was not Dreyfus but a certain Major Esterhazy. Immediately, radical republicans backed Picquart's demand for a reopening of the case, while the higher military officers, feeling that the "honor" of themselves

Dreyfus- and the whole French army was at stake, refused to
ards vs. question the verdict of the original court-martial
Anti- and some of them took to forging documents not only
Dreyfus- and some of them took to forging documents not only
ards to strengthen the case against Dreyfus but also to
incriminate Picquart. Indeed, on the evidence of these documents, new military courts-martial tried both Esterhazy and Picquart, acquitting the former and disgracing the latter. Whereupon Émile Zola, the novelist,¹ entered the lists in defense of Picquart and Dreyfus, by publishing a scathing denunciation of the anti-Semitic press and party, the alleged forgers of incriminating documents, and the army officers concerned. Though Zola was promptly convicted of libel, his open letter was a most effective means of arraying "Dreyfusards" against "anti-Dreyfusards." As against the latter, embracing royalists, clericals, and extreme nationalists, and threatening to subvert the existing republican government, the former soon comprised those who would preserve the democratic, laic republic—moderates, radicals, socialist radicals, socialists.

The several groups of "Dreyfusards" in parliament created a political alliance, or *bloc*, agreeing to avoid subjects of controversy among themselves and to utilize their combined majority in "republican defense." The victory of their cause, foreshadowed by the zeal of Zola, was little in doubt after the confession and suicide of one of the army forgers and after Esterhazy's flight from France in

lican groups in parliament that he resigned in 1895. His successor was Félix Faure, a moderate republican, rather empty-headed though imposing in appearance and inordinately fond of ceremony and show. Faure died in office in 1899.

¹ On Zola, see above, p. 277.

1898. In 1899 a *bloc* ministry was formed, including Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists,¹ and presided over by Waldeck-Rousseau. Simultaneously, the *bloc* elected to the presidency of the Republic Émile Loubet, a convinced republican of radical proclivities. In the same year, moreover, the French supreme court decreed that Dreyfus should be tried anew; and the resulting second court-martial, though still pronouncing him guilty, recommended, in view of "extenuating circumstances," that he be pardoned. The pardon was at once granted by President Loubet, and in 1906 the supreme court annulled unconditionally the verdict of the courts-martial and restored Dreyfus to office in the army. Picquart also was vindicated and reinstated, and in 1908 was made minister of war. Zola, who died in 1902, was given a state funeral and buried in the Pantheon.

Rehabilitat-
ing
Dreyfus

The republican *bloc* was not content with rehabilitating Dreyfus and discrediting his detractors. With passionate earnestness, it took advantage of popular reaction against the evident bad faith or bad judgment of royalists and conservatives, and, while the iron was hot, struck finally at those agencies in army and in church which had been employed repeatedly—under Marshal MacMahon, in alliance with Boulanger, and most recently in connection with the Dreyfus affair—to embarrass and subvert the Republic. As for the army, the process of transferring the higher offices from royalists to republicans, from conservatives to radicals, was speeded up; the military establishment was strictly subordinated to the civilian ministry; a spirit of pacifism was encouraged, and in 1905 the term of service in the army was further reduced from three years to two.

Republi-
canizing
the Army
Staff

In respect of the church, the *bloc*, impelled by its Radical and Socialist members, pursued an ever firmer policy of anti-clericalism and repression. In 1901 the ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau put through parliament an Associations Act, providing that

¹ The Socialists, though quite willing to endorse and support the major program of the *bloc*, were divided about participating in its ministry. Guesde and Jaurès and the majority were opposed to any such direct collaboration with "bourgeois" groups, and when Millerand accepted the post of minister of commerce in the Waldeck-Rousseau cabinet they expelled him and his followers (including Briand) from the Socialist party. Millerand and his personal followers thus became "Independent Socialists."

every religious order or congregation which wished to continue its work in France must obtain specific authorization from the government and submit to continuous governmental regulation. Loud was the protest from the religious orders, from zealous laymen, and from the pope. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority which the *bloc* obtained in the general elections of 1901 only rendered

Repress-
ing Cleri-
calism:
Associa-
tions Act
of 1901

its anti-clericalism more pronounced. The moderate Waldeck-Rousseau was succeeded in the premiership by Emile Combes, a very active Freemason and doctrinaire Radical, under whose rigorous enforcement of the Associations Act almost all the religious orders (excepting only those engaged in hospital work or in the training of foreign missionaries) were denied governmental authorization and formally dissolved, thousands of their members leaving France and seeking refuge in Spain, Belgium, Great Britain, or the United States.

Expulsion
of Reli-
gious
Orders

Blow at
Church
Schools

This campaign against the religious orders imposed special hardship on church schools in France. There was an alarming shortage of lay teachers who could take the place of the religious; time was required to train such lay teachers as might be secured, and greater financial support was needed for them. The result was, as Combes expected, a steady growth of the non-religious (frequently anti-religious) state schools at the expense of the religious "free" schools, so that by 1913-1914 four and a half million French children were attending the former and only one million the latter.

But meanwhile, Combes was inducing the *bloc* in parliament to give serious attention to an even more startling proposal—the abrogation of the concordat which had regulated the relations of France with the Catholic Church ever since its original negotiation by Napoleon I and Pope Pius VII in 1801,¹ and the adoption by the French Republic of a substitute scheme for the "separation of the churches from the state." To clear the way for favorable action on the proposal, Combes had President Loubet pay an official visit to the King of Italy at Rome in April 1904, in full knowledge that such a visit must offend the pope, who since the seizure of Rome by Italian troops in 1870 had refused to accord recognition to the King and had requested Catholic sovereigns not to visit

Proposal
for Sepa-
rating
Church
and State

¹ On the Concordat of 1801, see Vol. I, pp. 653-654.

him. Pius X, who had recently been elected pope, duly protested. Whereupon Jaurès, the leader of the Socialists in the French parliament, speaking in behalf of the majority of the *bloc*, demanded "reprisals" for what he termed foreign interference in the political affairs of France; and Théophile Delcassé, the foreign minister in the cabinet of Combes, recalled the French ambassador from the Vatican.

Rupture
with
Papacy

Already another Socialist, Aristide Briand, had been at work with a parliamentary commission drafting a bill "for the separation of the churches [Protestant and Jewish, as well as Catholic] from the state." Now that diplomatic relations with the papacy were ruptured, the time appeared ripe to bring the bill into parliament and have it enacted by the nation's representatives without seeking the consent of the pope. There was somewhat more opposition to the bill than had been anticipated, and debate on it was bitter and protracted. But, despite the fact that the stubborn Combes was forced out of the premiership while the bill was in its early stages, the Radicals and Socialists were strong and determined enough to retain control of the ministry and eventually, late in 1905, to enact the Separation Law.

Under this law, the concordat of 1801 was formally denounced. State support of bishops and priests of the Catholic Church, and of Protestant pastors and Jewish rabbis, was ended, except that pensions might temporarily be paid to aged clergymen. Title to all property of the churches

Separation
Act of
1905

was vested in the state, though associations of laymen were authorized to make arrangements with state officials for the use of church edifices for public worship. And, of course, the state would no longer nominate bishops as it had done under the concordat. The Protestants and the Jews accepted the Separation Law more or less cheerfully; they were traditionally allied with the Radical political groups in opposition to the Catholic Church, and they now formed the prescribed associations of laymen and otherwise conformed with the provisions of the law. To the Pope and to leading French Catholics, however, the law appeared very objectionable. In its preparation the ecclesiastical authorities had not been consulted. It was contrary to canon law in that it entrusted the management of ecclesiastical affairs to laymen. It was unjust in that it confiscated church property, and, by withdrawing state financial support from the church, virtually re-

pudiated a debt which the state owed the church ever since the wholesale secularization of ecclesiastical property in the days of the French Revolution. For these reasons, Pope Pius X condemned the law and forbade its observance; and French Catholics formed no associations for public worship.

Two years of chaos ensued in ecclesiastical affairs. Extremists in the Republican *bloc* urged that Catholic buildings should be closed and Catholic worship stopped, while zealous Catholics proclaimed their anxiety to die on the thresholds of the churches as martyrs in defense of Christianity and religious liberty. At

Separation
Amendment of
1907

length, in 1907, through the tactful efforts of Briand, who the year before had been read out of the Socialist party for accepting membership in the ministry, the French parliament made a concession, permitting clergymen to use church edifices for public worship even if the previously authorized associations of laymen were not formed.

Despite this concession, the central purpose of the anti-clerical legislation of the *bloc* from 1899 to 1907 was largely achieved. By

Republican Anti-Clerical Success

the Associations Act, the educational legislation, and the Separation Law, the possibility of utilizing the Catholic Church for political propaganda against the Republic was greatly lessened. Bishops and priests, while continuing to protest against the "laic laws" and what they termed the "persecution" of the church, and to urge an eventual change of attitude on the part of the government, were faced with the immediate necessity of adapting ecclesiastical organization and efforts to existing conditions. While some bishops and priests remained militantly royalist in sentiment and thought,¹ a growing number of the clergy, and of laymen also, accepting the Republic, turned their attention from political to social action and undertook, with no little success, a strictly religious and moral apostolate among workingmen and intellectuals.

By 1907 the *bloc* of "republican defense," which had been an outcome of the "Dreyfus affair" and which was responsible for the latest and most drastic anti-clerical legislation, was disinte-

¹ Some Catholics, especially among the nobility and among the youths, were sympathetic with a new royalist movement which crystallized in the first decade of the twentieth century about the society and newspaper of *L'Action Française*, founded by Charles Maurras, an extreme nationalist and privately a disciple of the positivism of Comte and a disbeliever in Christianity though publicly a defender of Catholicism as a national heritage.

grating. In vain its leader of the time, Clemenceau, prime minister from 1906 to 1909, tried to hold it together by stressing anti-clericalism and advocating still more drastic measures "to protect the Republic against the priests." Most of the Radicals loudly seconded the counsels of Clemenceau, but many other members of the *bloc*, especially among the Moderates, were becoming a bit tired of anti-clericalism as a political slogan and a bit sceptical about any further danger to the Republic from priests. Moderates were now less inclined to fear the groups of the Right than the Socialists of the Left.

Disinte-
gration
of *Bloc*

Socialist growth was phenomenal. In 1905 hitherto separate groups of Marxians managed to surmount their differences and to establish a Unified Socialist party, under the joint leadership of Jaurès and Guesde; and so effective among the French electorate was the campaign of the Unified party that its representation in the Chamber of Deputies mounted to 54 in 1906, to 76 in 1910, and to 101 in 1914. Simultaneously, a movement of "revolutionary syndicalists" gathered headway still further to the Left; by 1914 half a million workmen adhered to its program of "direct action" by labor unions to bring about a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Socialist
Advance

Against the rising tide of social unrest, Clemenceau unrelentingly set his face, and in this he was supported by Moderates and Conservatives and by a majority of the Radicals. But neither Conservatives nor Moderates liked his ecclesiastical policy, and when his finance minister, Joseph Caillaux, proposed the imposition of a progressive income tax, they united with the advocates of social legislation to throw Clemenceau out of the premiership (1909) and to bring Briand in. Briand put through parliament one significant piece of social legislation, establishing a system of old-age pensions for the mass of wage-earners, but in the country he had to cope with disturbances inspired by Revolutionary Syndicalists and culminating in a general strike of railway men. It was ironical that Briand, by utilizing the army to suppress the strike, should become the hero alike of the Right and of Clemenceau's Radicals and the villain of the extreme Left. The republican *bloc* was clearly a thing of the past, and as it receded, ministerial instability reappeared in an aggravated form. In the three years 1911-1914, just before the World War, nine ministries succeeded one another.

The *bloc* during its heyday from 1899 to 1905 had been so absorbed, we know, in safeguarding the republican form of government within France, in waging war with French clergymen, and in weeding royalists out of the French army that it had had little time or inclination to concern itself with foreign affairs. Indeed, a large part of the *bloc*—Socialists and Radicals—seemed to forget about Alsace-Lorraine and to content themselves with decrying “militarism,” deprecating the alliance with Tsarist Russia, and espousing a vague but optimistic “internationalism.” It was doubtless the very indifference of the governing majority to foreign affairs which enabled a brilliant statesman, Théophile Delcassé, to remain the foreign minister of France continuously from 1898 to 1905, first in a Moderate cabinet and then in the *bloc* cabinets of both Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes.

Foreign
Policy of
Delcassé,
1898-1905

Delcassé sedulously cultivated the alliance of France with Russia, and adroitly supplemented it with agreements with other Powers. He gained from Italy in 1902 a secret written pledge that she would not join her ally, Germany, in any war against France. He negotiated with Great Britain in 1904 an *entente cordiale*, which assured British backing for French occupation of Morocco. Then, in 1905, a tempest arose in international relations and in French politics. Germany insisted that she must be consulted about Morocco's fate and that Delcassé must be removed from the French foreign office. A grave crisis had come in Franco-German relations, and how it would be met depended upon France: she might accede to the German demands or she might fight. Delcassé inclined to the latter alternative. But his Radical colleagues in the cabinet, awakening suddenly to the terrifying possibilities of their foreign minister's policies, decided to sacrifice him and to seek a peaceful settlement with Germany.¹

German
Crisis of
1905

The international crisis of 1905 served to arouse French concern about foreign affairs and gradually to develop differences of opinion in parliament and within the *bloc* itself on foreign policy. One opinion, voiced by Caillaux and shared by the Unified Socialists and by many Radicals, was that France should effect a *rapprochement* with Germany to ensure

Caillaux
and
Pacifism

¹ On the resulting Algeciras Congress, and on the general international relations of the period, see below, pp 561-562.

the peace of Europe and to lighten the grievous burden of militarism. Another opinion, held by more nationalistically minded members, including not only those of the Right and the Centre but also Clemenceau and his personal following of Radicals on the Left, was that German aggressiveness constituted a standing threat against French security and could be met only by "preparedness" on the part of France.

For a time the rival tendencies appeared to be so nicely balanced as to neutralize each other. In 1911, however, occurred a second crisis in Franco-German relations over the fate of Morocco, and Caillaux, who was premier and foreign minister at the moment and quite conciliatory, had to purchase the Moroccan protectorate for France by agreeing to cede to Germany a large slice of French Equatorial Africa. This tipped the balance against the "pacifists" and in favor of the advocates of "preparedness." Caillaux was forced out of office and was succeeded in the premiership and ministry of foreign affairs by Raymond Poincaré, a native of Lorraine, lawyer and scholar, a man of substance and intense patriotism. Under Poincaré's leadership, anti-clericalism and socialism became matters of relatively less importance to parliament and to the country at large than matters of national defense.

Poincaré
and
Prepared-
ness,
1911-1914

In 1913 Poincaré was elected President of the Republic, and Delcassé was appointed French ambassador to Russia. In the same year the parliament was prevailed upon to enact, despite the lively protests and opposition of Caillaux and his Radical and Socialist associates, new military measures, lengthening the period of compulsory service in the French army from two years to three and increasing the financial appropriations for its equipment and maintenance. The stage was being set, in France as elsewhere, for the World War.

3. THE KINGDOM OF ITALY

The kingdom of Italy, we must remember, was in 1871 a very recent creation. It represented the successful realization of Cavour's scheme for Italian unification, involving the forceful absorption, by the kingdom of Sardinia, of all the other states of the peninsula. King Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia had actually taken the title of King of Italy in 1861, just after the French army had helped him to expel Austria from Lombardy

and the duchies, and the "redshirts" of Garibaldi had enabled him to appropriate Naples and Sicily. Then, in 1866, the kingdom of Italy had obtained Venetia by joining Prussia in the Seven Weeks' War against Austria; and in 1870 it had utilized an opportunity afforded by the Franco-Prussian War to overpower the Pope and annex Rome.¹

Formal political unity was thus achieved, but not a really national unity. Localism and sectionalism were rife, partly because the physical features of the country were divisive, and partly because different historical traditions had developed in the several regions through centuries of political separation and rivalry. Especially between North and South the contrasts were great. Italy as a whole was overwhelmingly agricultural, but what machine industry there was had been introduced into the North and was almost wholly confined to the North. The majority of the Italian people were illiterate, but the percentage of illiteracy was three times greater in the South than in the North.

The government of the Italian kingdom represented a continuation and extension of the Sardinian constitutional régime, which had been copied from Great Britain's, and embodied in the *Statuto* of 1848.² The King reigned but did not rule, and his theoretically great powers were practically exercised by a ministry responsible to a bicameral parliament consisting of a Senate, partially hereditary and partially appointive, and an elective Chamber of Deputies. But though the King was "limited" and the Chamber of Deputies "elective," the government was not democratic. It was an oligarchy of those elements of the middle and upper classes that sympathized with the liberal nationalist philosophy of Cavour and his kind. For long no one was permitted to vote or hold office who did not own property and could not read and write. The vast majority of peasants and urban workingmen were thus disfranchised.

The liberal régime had difficulties with the Catholic Church. The minority of Italians who constituted the governing class of the kingdom were strongly inclined toward religious scepticism and radical anti-clericalism, by reason both of the general intellectual fashion of the time all over Europe and of the particular

¹ On the unification of Italy, see above, pp. 150-159, 166-169, 177-178.

² See above, p. 88.

ecclesiastical complications attending the political unification of Italy. On the other hand, the Italian nation was Catholic by habit and tradition, and the large majority, however critical they might be of the administration and secular policy of the church, were sincerely attached to its cult and sacraments. In the circumstances the royal government saw fit to maintain Catholicism as a kind of national institution. It continued the previous Sardinian practices of paying the salaries of the clergy, passing upon the appointment of bishops, permitting religious instruction to be given in the schools, and declining to sanction divorce. At the same time, following Cavour's example in Sardinia, it gradually reduced the number of monastic establishments throughout the country, repeatedly confiscated church property, and tolerated, at times actively promoted, anti-Catholic propaganda.

Relations
between
Church
and State

Special difficulty the kingdom had with the papacy. In 1871, shortly after the seizure and occupation of Rome by troops of King Victor Emmanuel II, the royal government sought to reconcile the position of the supranational papacy with that of nationalist Italy by having the parliament enact a "law of papal guaranties." The law accorded to the pope the ownership of the Vatican and Lateran palaces and the villa of Castel Gandolfo, the honors due a reigning sovereign, the right to communicate freely with governments and peoples abroad, and an annual subsidy of three and a quarter million lire from the national treasury as compensation for the loss of temporal possessions. But Pope Pius IX rejected the law, insisting that its acceptance would involve his recognition of a government which had unjustly invaded Rome and despoiled the papacy of needful temporalities and freedom, and furthermore that "papal guaranties" should be made by international treaty rather than by parliamentary act of Italy. So Pius IX would not accept any money from the Italian government or soften his hostility to it. He persisted in regarding himself as a "prisoner" and in calling upon foreign nations to intervene in his behalf. By the *non expedit*, he forbade Italian Catholics to vote or hold office under the royal government.

The
Roman
Question

Law of
Papal
Guaran-
ties, 1871

Papal
Hostility

This uncompromising attitude of the Pope was undoubtedly advantageous to his international prestige, for so long as he was

not on friendly terms with the kingdom of Italy, foreigners could not suspect him of undue subservience to Italian interests. But in Italy the enmity between kingdom and papacy had unfortunate results for both. The Pope alienated from the church a large number of patriotic Italians who resented his opposition to the nation's political unity and disregarded his injunctions, while the kingdom was deprived of the public services of many Italians who, obedient to the Pope, removed themselves from the nation's political life.

The Italian government and its electorate were, as we have said, a minority, but the minority, though for two decades remarkably homogeneous in its preponderantly bourgeois complexion and its uniform devotion to liberalism, nationalism, and anti-clericalism, was not a political unit. Rather, it broke up, like the bourgeois republicans in France, into a large number of "groups," each forming about some particular politician. In general, there were two conventional categories of such "groups," those of the "Right" and those of the "Left." The former were a trifle more aristocratic and a trifle less anti-clerical than the latter, but perhaps the significant differences were sectional and occupational. The leading politicians of the Right came mainly from the industrial upper and middle classes of Piedmont, Lombardy, and Tuscany, while those of the Left hailed principally from the professional and intellectual bourgeoisie of Sicily and Naples.

From 1870 to 1876 groups of the Right were in power. Then for two decades, from 1876 to 1896, groups of the Left usually controlled the government, at first under the leadership of Agostino Depretis, a native of Lombardy rather than of the South, who was prime minister, with two short interruptions, from 1876 to 1887, and afterwards under the direction of Francesco Crispi, an ambitious Sicilian, who presided over several ministries between 1887 and 1896. From 1896 to 1903 groups of the Right again predominated, and thereafter until the eve of the World War the kingdom was administered most of the time by a coalition of Left groups under the guidance of Giovanni Giolitti. The politicians mentioned—Depretis, Crispi, and Giolitti—were influential not only in fashioning Left groups into something like a party-machine (in the American sense) but also in determining major policies for the Italian nation. The difference between

Left and Right about major policies, however, was more theoretical than real. Hardly appreciable change occurred, except in respect of political patronage, when a ministry of the Right succeeded a ministry of the Left, or *vice versa*.

The royal government, whether of Right or of Left, was sympathetic with industrial and commercial interests and did much to foster them. Thousands of miles of railway were built. Old roads were repaired and new ones constructed. Harbors were developed. Governmental bounties were given to merchant shipping; and, to encourage Italian industry and increase its financial profits, a system of tariff protection was instituted. In spite of the fact that Italy had no coal or iron of her own and had to import these basic necessities of modern industry, the solicitude of her government was helping forward slowly but surely an economic transformation, most noticeably in the North but to some extent throughout the entire peninsula. The annual value of Italy's foreign trade, hovering around 440 million dollars from 1870 to 1897, rose steadily thereafter until it reached 1,200 million in 1913. Between 1897 and 1913, exports of manufactured goods almost tripled: Milan surpassed Lyons as the chief silk market in the world; and Italian cotton factories captured the home market and increased their foreign sales from five to fifty million dollars' worth. By 1914, moreover, the Italian merchant marine was tied with the Japanese for sixth place among the commercial fleets of the several nations of the world.

Indus-
trializa-
tion

While the Italian government, both of Right and of Left, was industrially minded, it was also nationalistically minded. It was the heir of that patriotic spirit which had possessed Cavour and Garibaldi, and which beckoned imperiously on to a great destiny not merely for the Italian people in a state of their own but also Italy in the world at large. Now that Italy was a sovereign Power, she must be a Great Power. What Germany and France were doing with army and colonial empire, Italy likewise must do.

Nation-
alism

The Italian army was reorganized and enlarged, at least on paper, through the adoption of the principle of compulsory military training (1875). Large sums of money were spent on military equipment and fortifications and on a navy. In 1881 Italian nationalism—and imperialism—was markedly stimulated by the

French occupation of Tunis, which was nearer to Italy than to France, which had more Italian than French residents, and which, as the land of ancient Carthage, possessed a greater sentimental interest for Italy than for France. Why had Italy, her patriots asked, been behindhand in appropriating Tunis? Because of Italy's international isolation, her government replied; and to put an end to that and to prevent any repetition of French "aggression,"

Militarism and Imperialism
Triple Alliance, 1882
 Italy in 1882 contracted with Germany and Austria-Hungary the famous Triple Alliance, which endured until 1915. Almost immediately Italy proceeded to establish a colonial empire in eastern Africa along the Red Sea. By commercial and military occupation and by treaties with native chieftains and with Great Britain, she acquired, between 1882 and 1890, the sparsely peopled, blisteringly hot tracts of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and thence set out to subdue the Negro kingdom of Abyssinia (Ethiopia). The Abyssinians, however, put up such a stiff resistance and at Adowa in 1896 routed an Italian army so decisively that Italy agreed to make peace and respect Abyssinia's independence.

To elevate Italy to the position of a Great Power, to defray the expenses of army and navy, public works and colonial ventures, and incidentally to support the financial corruption which was fairly prevalent in Italian politics, the government imposed a heavy burden of taxation upon the nation and still found itself faced with recurrent threats of bankruptcy and with the necessity of economizing on expenditure for social and educational betterment. Thus, a law which the Italian parliament enacted in 1877 for compulsory schooling of children between the ages of six and nine was only partially and half-heartedly enforced because the government preferred to devote its financial resources to other objects. Illiteracy declined very slowly among the masses of the Italian people.

The economic condition of the mass of peasants and urban workingmen was indeed sorry. The standard of living was low.

Poverty and Emigration
 The taxes were high. Population increased at a faster rate in Italy than in any other European country, and at a faster rate than did the opportunities for employment. In the circumstances, there was a good deal of popular unrest. Some of it was registered in a remarkable emi-

gration of Italians, seeking a happier economic lot and an escape from military conscription in foreign fields, chiefly across the ocean in the United States, Argentina, and Brazil. In 1900 the number of emigrants was 350,000, and in 1910 it was 530,000. Not all these emigrants left home permanently. In fact, a large portion of them, in some years almost a half, returned to Italy after earning money abroad. Nevertheless, it was officially stated in 1910 that through emigration the kingdom of Italy had permanently lost to countries of the New World as many as five and a half million citizens, 80 per cent of whom were peasants, mainly from southern Italy.

Popular unrest was evidenced by this large-scale exodus of Italian peasants from the South, and by the spread of Marxian socialism and revolutionary violence among the industrial proletariat in the cities, especially of the North. A Socialist party was founded at Milan

Rise of
Socialism

in 1891 and, taking advantage of a somewhat broadened suffrage which had been enacted in 1882, it managed to elect twelve members of the Chamber of Deputies in 1895. The party, however, was more influential outside parliament than inside, and outside among the proletarians its propaganda was supplemented, and surpassed in extreme radicalism, by that of anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists, who would have nothing to do with any parliamentary régime and would concentrate, instead, on "class warfare," organization of labor, and acts of violence against employers and government. In

And Syn-
dicalism

1900 King Humbert,¹ who had succeeded to the throne on the death of his illustrious father, Victor Emmanuel II, in 1878, was assassinated by an anarchist, and in 1904 the government of the succeeding monarch, Victor Emmanuel III, had to employ the army to put down a general strike at Milan which was being conducted with violence and obvious revolutionary purpose.

Impelled from all sides, the Italian government, soon after the set-back to its imperialistic designs on Ethiopia and the resulting retirement of Crispi (1896), began to devote more attention to internal reform, and gradually evolved a program of labor legislation. In 1898 old-age pensions were provided, and workingmen were compulsorily insured against accidents and sickness. In 1902 an important fac-

Concilia-
tory
Reforms

¹ On the royal succession in Italy, see the genealogical table at p. 94, above.

tory law was enacted. In 1908 a weekly day of rest was prescribed for labor. In 1912 private insurance companies were nationalized. And during this period, other measures of social significance were adopted. The state took over from private companies the operation of the railways. Municipalities were authorized to own and operate public utilities. Trade unions were legalized and their funds and activities safeguarded. Some progress was made in the arbitration of labor disputes. Coöperative societies for banking and for wholesale buying and retail selling were fostered, particularly in the rural districts.

There was response, moreover, to the insistent popular demand for the supplanting of restricted class government by full political democracy. Back in 1882 an electoral reform had somewhat broadened the suffrage by reducing the property qualification, but until 1912 the retention of a literacy test and of some property qualification served to restrict the electorate to a comparatively small minority of the Italian nation. Now, at this latter date, Giolitti and his coalition of groups of the "Left" were moved to enact a really drastic electoral law, establishing universal manhood suffrage as the method of choosing the Chamber of Deputies. In the general election of 1913—the first under the new democracy—the Socialist party increased its representation in the Chamber from 43 to 78, and the bourgeois "Left" was so weakened that Giolitti resigned the premiership. A new "nationalist" ministry was formed under the leadership of Antonio Salandra.

Nationalism was arising anew in Italy. It was being stimulated among the masses by the concurrent rise of democracy and among the younger generation of intellectuals by literary and philosophical currents of which Gabriele D'Annunzio was the leading representative. It was already evident, side by side with socialist agitation, during the first decade of the twentieth century, when demands multiplied in parliament and in the country at large for greater armaments, larger colonies, more vigorous foreign policy, and more serious and sustained efforts to "redeem" those provinces of *Italia irredenta*—Trent, Trieste, and the eastern

NOTE. The portrait opposite is of a priest—Padre Sebastiano Albero—by the Anglo-American painter, John Sargent (1856–1925), on whom, see above, p. 289.

coast of the Adriatic—which were peopled by Italians but still ruled by Austria-Hungary.

Then, in the second decade of the new century, this extreme nationalism advanced rapidly toward fulfillment. In 1911-1912, under the ministry of Giolitti, Italy waged war with the Ottoman Empire¹ and subjugated its African provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, between Tunis and Egypt. In 1912-1913 Italy played an important diplomatic rôle in the Balkan Wars² and brought Albania, across the Adriatic, within her "sphere of influence." In 1915, under the ministry of Salandra, Italy denounced her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, and, to conquer *Italia irredenta*, plunged into the World War. One of the journalists most vigorous in urging this step was a former left-wing Socialist, Benito Mussolini. In nationalism Italy was seeking a solution of her many social and political problems.

4. THE KINGDOMS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Side by side in the Iberian peninsula were the two countries of Spain and Portugal whose histories and cultures, and whose nineteenth-century political developments, were strikingly similar. The whole peninsula had an area double that of the Italian peninsula and somewhat larger than France, though its total population was only about two-thirds the population of Italy or France. Of the Iberian peninsula, Spain embraced six-sevenths of the area; Portugal, the remainder.

Both Spain and Portugal were national states of long duration. Both had founded huge colonial empires oversea, and if the mother-countries had been bled of men and resources by their imperial undertakings they had the satisfaction of knowing that on the American continents were a Greater Spain and a Greater Portugal, whose populations retained the respective national languages and constituted, together with the population of the Iberian peninsula, aggregates of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking peoples larger than those that spoke Italian or French.

In the nineteenth century, Spain and Portugal experienced

¹ See below, pp. 493, 501.

² See below, p. 502.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Victims of the Fiesta," is by the Spanish painter, Ignacio Zuloaga (born 1870). On Zuloaga, see above, p. 289.

similar vicissitudes. Both countries, it must be borne in mind, continued to be predominantly agricultural, with a land-owning aristocracy and a privileged clergy as the most influential classes, and with a land-working peasantry comprising the majority of the population. The peasant masses were quite used to the leadership of noblemen and clergymen, and as a rule, unless their own vital interests were touched or their habits too seriously interfered with, they left politics to their "betters." The politically minded persons in both Spain and Portugal were drawn almost wholly from the minority of nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie, and urban proletariat, though we should remember that some members of these classes were as indifferent to ordinary political events as any peasant. Among the bourgeoisie, professional men and intellectuals were relatively numerous and chronically inclined to political activity. Only with the advent of the Industrial Revolution did manufacturers and bankers become important and influential, and this occurred in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in particular parts of Spain and Portugal—in Catalonia, at Madrid and Lisbon, in mining areas and shipping centres. The urban proletariat, too, comprised for long merely shop-keepers and workers in domestic hand industry. Only with the slow development of large-scale mining, manufacturing, and commerce was the proletariat swelled by numbers of day laborers in foundry and factory and on railway and dock.

Throughout the century, extremes of political and intellectual viewpoint were especially evident in Spain and Portugal. "Reaction" represented one extreme: a cherishing of the "good old times," an anxiety to maintain or to restore the strenuous Catholicism, the social stratification, the governmental absolutism, which had characterized the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and a fierce hostility to every tendency in another direction. The opposite extreme was represented by "revolution": an extolling of modern "progress" and "reason," a determination to promote the laicizing of the state, the levelling of society, the democratization of government, and the material prosperity of the country, all in line with the latest fashions abroad, and a hot hatred of any group which might stand in the way, such as "clericals," "aristocrats," or "conservatives."

Social
Classes
and Con-
ditions

Extremes
of "Re-
action"
and
"Revo-
lution"

Between extremes of "revolution" and "reaction," government was troublously carried on during the period with which we are here dealing. In name it was normally "constitutional" and "liberal," as well as monarchical,¹ but in reality it was a cabal of political and military chieftains who rested their rule on the indifference of the masses, the support of the army, and the interesting custom of agreeing among themselves on a more or less regular alternation of office-holding and distribution of patronage. The royal governments of Spain and Portugal were probably less "corrupt" than that of Italy, but they were more frank and systematic in their corruption.

In Spain, the political and military chieftains who supported the constitutional monarchy and in turn filled its offices grouped themselves in two "parties": the Conservative, organized by Canovas del Castillo (1828-1897), lawyer and journalist, and allied with a set of army officers headed by Marshal Campos; and the Liberal, formed by Mateo Sagasta (1827-1903), an engineer, and supported by another set of army officers including Marshal Serrano. Difference in policy between Conservatives and Liberals was slight. The former were a little more favorable to the church and the aristocracy, while the latter harbored some anti-clericalism and paid at least lip service to the principle of political democracy. On major policies they were practically a unit; and, throughout the reign of Alphonso XII (1875-1885) and the regency of his wife, Maria Christina (the mother of Alphonso XIII), from 1885 to 1902, Canovas and Sagasta nicely alternated in office without appreciable change of general tendencies.

Constitutional
Monarchy in
Spain

Internal order was maintained. Republican criticism, on one hand, and Carlist agitation,² on the other, were repressed. Catholic support was obtained by respecting the concordat of 1851 with the papacy, by not restricting the religious orders, and by leaving public education mainly under the control of the clergy. A large army and a fairly large civil service, tasting the bounty of the government, were seemingly quite loyal to it. "Regionalism"—the separatist movement for home rule which persisted among Catalans and Basques—was held in check.

¹ In Spain, that is, after 1875. See above, pp. 200-201.

² On the "Carlists," see above, p. 200 n.

To serve agricultural and industrial interests, a policy of tariff protection was elaborated, mainly by Canovas and the Conservatives, though eventually acquiesced in by the Liberals. To meet a political demand of "progressive" intellectuals and workmen, universal manhood suffrage for elections to the Congress of Deputies was inaugurated by Sagasta and the Liberals in 1890, and then, to balance the votes of interested urban dwellers with those of the more indifferent rural population, the exercise of the suffrage was made compulsory for all male citizens by enactment of the Conservatives in 1907.

Externally, the principal effort of the royal government, whether Conservative or Liberal, was directed toward retaining the remnants of the once great Spanish empire overseas—Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Carolines, and a foothold in Morocco. The effort was very costly to Spain in men and money and it repeatedly invited disaster. Yet national pride and the prestige of the monarchy seemed to demand that the effort be made. In 1878 Spanish armies and the tact as well as the prowess of Marshal Campos managed to put an end to a stubborn revolt which had raged in Cuba for ten years. In 1893 Marshal Campos, at the head of a large expeditionary force, suppressed a native outbreak in the Spanish zone of Morocco. In 1895 a second revolt began in Cuba, and presently the difficulty of putting it down was enhanced by an uprising in the Philippines and, more ominously, by the intervention of the United States. In the ensuing Spanish-American War (1898), Spain lost her navy, sacrificed the lives of several thousand of her citizens, and piled up a big national debt; and by the treaty of Paris which concluded the war, she recognized the independence of Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. The next year she sold the Caroline Islands to Germany.

Cuban
Revolt,
and
Spanish-
American
War, 1898

Weaken-
ing of
Spanish
Monarchy

At the turn of the century the Spanish kingdom began to totter. Partially it was an outcome of the Spanish-American War, the substantial losses and even more the blow to patriotic pride and to faith in the existing government which the Spanish people thereby suffered. Partially it was a result of the passing of those veteran politicians who had had long experience in managing the country: Canovas del Castillo was assassinated by an anarchist in 1897,

and Sagasta died in 1903. Partially it was a rather sudden fruition of social unrest and partisan strife. Alphonso XIII, nominal King since birth in 1886, came of age in 1902 and was crowned with all the pomp of his Bourbon and Habsburg forbears, but how long he would reign was dubious.

Alphonso
XIII

Republicans increased their following in parliament and throughout the country, and the virulence of their criticism of the monarchy and the church. Carlists and their reactionary sympathizers, especially among the Basques and among the religious orders, protested anew the legitimacy of Alphonso's régime and redoubled their assaults on its "liberalism." Socialists and Syndicalists came to the fore in industrial centres, combating employers on one hand and the government on the other, and staging strikes and demonstrations. Regionalists, seeking home rule for Catalonia, engineered at Barcelona in 1909, in conjunction with Socialists and Syndicalists, a rebellion which was put down by the army with some difficulty and much vindictiveness. Anarchists committed outrages and resorted to assassination. And over in Morocco—in the one remaining fragment of Spain's imperial domain—native rebellion was becoming chronic and exacting an ever larger toll of Spanish soldiery—with increasing prospects of military mutiny.

The royal government was moved to attempt certain reforms. Some social legislation was enacted, regulating factories, authorizing the formation of coöperative societies, legalizing trade unions, and establishing employers' liability. An educational law of 1902 provided for state supervision and direction of elementary schools, and another of 1909 prescribed attendance at them for all children.

Attempted
Reforms

In 1909-1910, an attempt was made, under the auspices of a Liberal premier, José Canalejas, and with the backing of anti-clericals and revolutionaries, to alter the relations of church and state in Spain. A so-called "padlock act" prohibited the establishment of any more Catholic religious houses without governmental sanction, and diplomatic relations with the papacy were broken off, preparatory, it was believed, to a separation of church and state like that in France. At once there was such loud outcry, and such organized opposition to the government, that diplomatic relations with the papacy were resumed in 1912, and anti-clerical projects halted. On this matter, however, few Spaniards

were satisfied. "Reactionaries" were outraged that an anti-clerical campaign had been begun. "Revolutionaries" were disgusted that it had been stopped. And supporters of the constitutional monarchy, compelled to take one side or the other, indulged in mutual recriminations.

The King himself, Alphonso XIII, and the government, under pressure from him, persevered in an imperialist policy in Morocco,

perhaps to distract attention from troubles at home. By treaties with France and Great Britain, Spain in Morocco secured a definitive protectorate over the northern coast of Morocco and outright ownership of an extensive though not very valuable tract of territory—Rio de Oro—on the western coast of Africa south of Morocco.¹ But in order to possess and administer the portion of Morocco allotted to her, Spain was obliged to maintain large military forces in that country and to employ them in an exceedingly trying kind of warfare against native tribesmen. The King and his ministers were resolute, but a growing number of Spaniards were critical. And, as a further portent, a republican revolution occurred in Portugal in 1910.

The Portuguese kingdom had been governed during the second half of the nineteenth century in much the same way and with much the same difficulties as had the Spanish kingdom since the accession of Alphonso XII in 1875. There were two parties of constitutional royalists, "Regenerators" and "Progressives," corresponding respectively to Spanish Conservatives and Liberals, and, like the Spanish parties, manipulating local officials and popular elections so as to take turns in holding office and dispensing patronage. There were the same opposition groups: reactionary Miguelists, corresponding to Carlists; revolutionary Republicans; and a slowly growing number of Socialists, Syndicalists, and Anarchists. There was the same indifference to politics on the part of the mass of peasants, and the same reliance on army and navy for vital support of the régime.

From 1848 to 1889, the constitutional monarchy seemed to

¹ In 1900 Spain had obtained title to another and smaller African colony—Rio Muni, on the central west coast between German Kamerun and French Equatorial Africa. Altogether the Spanish colonies in 1912 were confined to Africa and comprised an area of 140,000 square miles and a population of less than a million.





function fairly well. There was a respite from civil strife and an orderly operation of government. Nevertheless, the prevalence of political corruption and the exigencies of maintaining a colonial empire far larger than Spain's, and one now quite beyond Portugal's resources,¹ gravely embarrassed the national finances and served to divert the attention of the government from other matters. Taxes were burdensome, popular education was neglected, needed social reforms were postponed, and tens of thousands of the most industrious and ambitious inhabitants of the country emigrated to the more prosperous Portuguese-speaking land of Brazil.

Under King Charles I (1889-1908) financial crises recurred with alarming frequency, opposition to the régime gathered headway, and factional quarrels developed among its professed supporters. The King himself was extravagant, Charles I,
1889-1908 and primarily intent, it seemed, on getting all the money he could from the national treasury to spend on personal pleasures. On several occasions, when he failed to get what he wanted from parliament, he dissolved it and ruled without it by means of "ministerial decrees." The last such occasion, and the most flagrant, was in 1907 when the King entrusted his faithful prime minister, João Franco, with dictatorial powers. Franco was determined to effect sweeping reforms, as well as to please the King in financial matters, but against him and his master the forces of opposition coalesced. In vain he filled the jails with political prisoners. In 1908 King Charles and the crown prince were assassinated while driving through the streets of Lisbon; and Franco's dictatorship came to an inglorious end.

Emmanuel II, the inexperienced youth who succeeded Charles on the damaged Portuguese throne, was unable to cope with the situation. The murder of a prominent Republican physician in October 1910 was the signal for a revolution. Republican Revolution of
1910 Soldiers in Lisbon, cooperating with armed civilians and with sailors from warships in the Tagus, overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed the Portuguese Re-

¹ Portugal still possessed in 1910 a colonial empire surpassed in area only by those of Great Britain, France, and Germany. It covered 800,000 square miles—almost twenty-five times the area of the mother-country—and comprised the following territories: in or near Africa, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Portuguese East Africa (or Mozambique), and the Cape Verde Islands; in India, Goa, Damaun, and Diu; in China, Macao; and in the Malay archipelago, part of Timor.

public. King Emmanuel sought refuge in England, and a provisional government was formed at Lisbon.

A constitution was adopted in 1911, patterned rather closely after that of the Third French Republic. The new régime was different in name from the old, and was manned by a different set of politicians. And in the one matter of religion it attempted to pursue a different policy. For eight years, from 1910 to 1918, it was pronouncedly anti-clerical. Religious orders for men and women were expelled from the country and their property confiscated for the benefit of the state treasury. Separation of state and church was decreed: the state ceased to pay salaries to clergymen, and, under the guise of safeguarding the Republic, severe restrictions were placed upon the church.

Meanwhile the Republican party broke up into quarrelsome factions. Royalists and reactionaries provoked insurrections. Socialists and radical revolutionaries inspired riots. Groups of military or naval officers employed their men with increasing frequency to force out of office a minister whom they disliked or to put themselves in office. The Republic could achieve no lasting constructive reforms and could hardly preserve order. It was not really a democratic republic, but only a stage-setting before which petty dictators came and went to the cheers of the Portuguese people, whose ordinary life went on about as usual.

Instability of Portuguese Republic

5. THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM

How the southern provinces of the Netherlands separated themselves from the northern (1830-1839) and became the independent state of Belgium, under international guaranties, has been related in an earlier chapter.¹ The nation thus newly established was distinguished from other Latin countries throughout the ensuing century in three noteworthy respects. First, Belgium was more quickly and thoroughly industrialized than any other Latin nation, and with remarkable increase and comparative contentment of her population. Though embracing an area barely one-third the extent of diminutive Portugal, Belgium had in 1910 a population larger by two millions. Moreover, unlike Portuguese or Italians, few

Industrialization

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 788-789.

Belgians left their native land; indeed, immigration into their country exceeded emigration from it.

A second peculiarity of Belgium was the absence of any Belgian "nationality," in the correct sense of this term. There was no Belgian nationality, as there was a French nationality in France, or an Italian in Italy. Approximately half of the Belgians, those in the northern sections of the country, spoke Netherlandish or Dutch (it was called "Flemish" in Belgium), while the other half, known as "Walloons," in the southern sections, spoke French. Yet, despite the fact that in speech and "nationality" Belgium was only half "Latin," we are justified in regarding it historically as a Latin nation. Not only was French the native speech of all persons in the southern half of the country, but it was the customary language, all over the country, of the upper and middle classes; and the Flemish-speaking peasants and workingmen of the north were as uniformly accustomed to Latin Christianity as Italians or Spaniards or the mass of Frenchmen.

Two Nationalities:
Dutch and French

The third feature distinguishing Belgium from other Latin nations was the marked stability of her government during the whole century succeeding her establishment as an independent nation and the comparative orderliness of her political life. In politics, as well as in industry, she kept pace with Great Britain. She was disturbed by no revolutionary upheaval or military *coup* and by no serious conflict between royalists and republicans. The liberal constitutional monarchy which had been instituted in 1831 in conscious imitation of the British—with a king who reigned but did not rule, with a bicameral parliament representing the upper and middle classes (but not the masses) and making the laws, and with a cabinet of ministers conducting the administration and responsible to the parliamentary majority—this régime actually went on functioning more nearly like the British than did any of the other governmental systems which Latin nations copied from the "mother of parliaments." As in Britain, so in Belgium, there were two or three major political parties rather than a bewildering variety of "groups," there was comparative stability of ministries, and there was gradual broadening of the franchise, with transition from oligarchy to democracy, within the general framework of the constitutional monarchy.

Orderly Constitutional Government

The principal controversy in domestic politics, for a long time, was over the relations of church and state, particularly in regard to education. As the need for more schools grew apparent and the state attempted to meet the need, the question arose as to whether religious instruction should be given in public schools. On this question were formed, as early as 1847, two major political parties: the Catholic party, seeking to prescribe moral and religious instruction in the schools and to entrust it to the Catholic clergy; and the Liberal party, espousing the idea of neutral schools and inveighing against "clericalism." Between 1847 and 1884 Liberals controlled parliament and presided over ministries for terms aggregating twenty-eight years, and during this period of their supremacy they abolished religious instruction in the schools and for a time severed diplomatic relations with the papacy. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, the Liberal party lost heavily to a rising Socialist party, which, formally organized in 1885, soon attracted to its standards a multitude of urban workingmen and also a good many intellectuals eager to effect radical reform.

School
Question

Liberal
Ascend-
ancy,
1847-1884

Rise of
Socialist
Party

Catholic
Ascend-
ancy,
1884-1914

Democra-
tizing the
Govern-
ment

The Catholic party, benefiting from the rivalry between Socialists and Liberals and from its own championship of social reform, obtained a parliamentary majority in 1884 and retained it, together with the responsible cabinet, for the next thirty years and until the World War. Not only was religious instruction restored in most of the public schools, but elementary education was so extended as greatly to reduce the percentage of illiteracy in the country. Under Catholic auspices, moreover, the government was largely democratized. In 1894 the property qualification for exercising the suffrage was removed, and every male Belgian who was over twenty-four years of age and had resided a year in the same commune was accorded the right to vote in national and local elections. At the same time the principle of plural voting was introduced by according one or two extra votes to an elector in possession of certain financial or educational qualifications. In 1898, in furtherance of popular democracy and to remove a handicap and grievance of the lower classes in northern Belgium who knew Flemish but not

French, the former language was put on an equal footing legally with the latter. In 1899, by another electoral reform, proportional representation was instituted, whereby the parliamentary seats to be filled by a given district would be distributed among the several parties or candidates in proportion to the number of votes polled by each. In their opposition to the Catholic party, which had sponsored these reforms, both Socialists and Liberals attacked especially the clerical influence in education and the system of plural voting. In 1913 the Socialists conducted a general strike in behalf of "one man, one vote," but the elections of 1914 preserved a Catholic majority.

Some significant social legislation was enacted by the Belgian parliament, especially after 1890. Factories were regulated. Trade unions were fully legalized and their funds safeguarded (1898). A system of old-age pensions was adopted (1900). Considerable progress was made, moreover, in decently housing the working classes and in otherwise providing for their material well-being.

In a somewhat singular manner Belgium became a colonial power. Her second King, Leopold II (1865-1909),¹ was an astute and none too scrupulous business man, to whom an Anglo-American journalist and explorer, Henry Stanley, pointed out in the 1870's the rich rubber resources of the huge Congo region in central Africa. The King proceeded to organize a private commercial company with himself as president and chief stockholder, to beguile native chieftains into turning over their lands in the tract to the company, and then to obtain international sanction (1884-1885) for the erection of the company's lands into the "Congo Free State," with himself as its personal sovereign. Leopold II invested heavily in the undertaking, and reaped rich rewards. By 1908, however, there were numerous disclosures of outrages and practical slavery visited upon the natives of the Congo to make them get rubber for the King and his "company," and insistent demands inside and outside Belgium for sweeping reforms in the Free State. Leopold II yielded to the pressure of public opinion sufficiently to propose in 1908 that the Congo Free State should be transformed into a Belgian colony

Social
Legisla-
tion

Leopold
II's Congo
Domain

Trans-
ferred to
Belgium,
1908

¹ For the royal succession in Belgium, see the genealogical table of the Saxe-Coburg family at p. 350, above.

—with liberal financial compensation to himself for his “sacrifice.” The Belgian government, against the energetic opposition of a minority in parliament, accepted the proposal, and thus, in 1908, Belgium acquired an overseas empire with an area almost eighty times her own.

The royal successor of Leopold II, his nephew Albert, was destined not only to preside over the reformation of the Congo but also to command the Belgian army in action. For Belgium was the first country to be invaded in force in the World War.



CHAPTER XXII

NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1871-1914



IN THE countries of northern and eastern Europe were greater contrasts than among the Latin nations of southern Europe. Among the former were very diverse languages (Teutonic, Slavic, etc.), wide differences of religious and cultural tradition, and all degrees of industrial development from "advanced" Germany to "backward" Russia.

Moreover, there survived in northern and central Europe a contrast, which had ceased to exist in southern Latin Europe, between imperial states and national states. Latin Europe was now composed entirely of national states, each, with the exception of Belgium, embracing a distinctive nationality; it contained no polyglot empire. Northern and eastern Europe included some national states—Holland, Germany, the Scandinavian and Balkan countries—but the greater part of it was still covered by three sprawling "old-fashioned" Empires—the Habsburg (or Austro-Hungarian), the Russian, and the Ottoman—each attempting to hold together an agglomeration of peoples. And whereas written constitutions and forms of liberal or democratic government were now usual in every country of Latin Europe, they were restricted in northern and eastern Europe mainly to the group of national states in the far northwest and in the far southeast. The Russian and Ottoman Empires made no pretense of being "constitutional" or "popular" until just before the World War, and in Austria-Hungary and Germany the democratic features of written constitutions were counterbalanced in practice by the abiding power and influence of dynasty, aristocracy, army, and civil bureaucracy.

I. THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF THE HOHENZOLLERNS

The German Empire, as fashioned under the nominal leadership of Prussia's Hohenzollern King, William I, and the actual

guidance of his chief minister, Prince Bismarck,¹ comprised twenty-five states, besides the "imperial territory" of Alsace-Lorraine, each a sovereign state² with a government of its own and with control over many local matters, such as education and public health. For the Empire as a whole, no law could be enacted without the consent of a Bundesrat (Federal Council) composed of personal agents of the several state governments. At the same time, popular—and democratic—participation in the central government was guarantied by the constitutional provision that all male citizens of the Empire, over twenty-five years of age, should have the right to vote for members of a Reichstag (Imperial Parliament), whose consent, as well as that of the Bundesrat, was requisite to the enactment of laws. Nevertheless, the democratic Reichstag could exercise no such control as the British or French parliament might exercise. It was estopped by the fact that the national ministry, headed by a Chancellor, was responsible not to it but to the Emperor and, more fundamentally, by the rôle which undemocratic Prussia was privileged to play in the Empire.

Prussia, it must be remembered, continued to be governed internally in accordance with the constitution which Frederick William IV had promulgated in 1850, with its formal recognition of the "divine right" of the King to choose his ministers at will and with its practical limitation of the diet, or state parliament, to mere acceptance or rejection of royal proposals by representatives of the upper and middle classes.³ This same Prussia was now become the most powerful and influential state in the German Empire. Prussia had made the Empire. Of the area and population of the Empire, Prussia embraced almost two-thirds, while the other twenty-four states

¹ On the creation of the German Empire, see above, pp. 175-176.

² Of the twenty-five states, four were kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg); six were grand-duchies (Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, and Saxe-Weimar); five were duchies; seven were diminutive principalities; and three were "free cities," or republics (Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck).

³ On the Prussian constitution, as distinct from that of the German Empire, see above, p. 99.

NOTE. The statuary group opposite is by the German sculptor, Reinhold Begas (1831-1911). The main figure is Emperor William I; the figure at the left is Moltke, and at the right, Bismarck. On Begas, see above, p. 295.

together contained barely one-third. Naturally, Prussia—not so much its people as its government—occupied a commanding position in the government and administration of the Empire. The Hohenzollern King of Prussia headed the Empire; he bore the title of “German Emperor” and appointed or dismissed at will the Chancellor of the Empire. The Prussian military system had to be the Empire’s military system. And enough votes were accorded to the agent of the King of Prussia in the Bundesrat to enable him to veto any reduction of army or taxes or any amendment to the imperial constitution which a majority in the Reichstag might approve.

For almost twenty years after 1871 William I was Emperor, and Bismarck was Chancellor, of the German Empire. Throughout this period Bismarck was the chief figure in the domestic politics of his own country and in the international politics of Europe. In the first years of his chancellorship, a large majority of the Reichstag (and, of course, the Bundesrat) supported the measures which he advocated for consolidating the Empire.

Emperor
William I
and Chan-
cellor Bis-
marck

The legal systems of the several states were supplanted by uniform codes of law for the entire Empire. An act of 1873 created an imperial railway bureau, which did much to unify the various state railways and to coördinate them with the military, postal, and telegraphic organizations of the Empire. A Bank Act of 1875 transferred the control of banking from state governments to the Bundesrat, and the establishment of the Imperial Bank (Reichsbank) in 1876 expedited the financial operations of the central government and contributed to its stability and prestige.

Welding
the Em-
pire
Together

To assure the general security of the Empire and specifically to prevent France from waging a “war of revenge” for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck pursued a twofold policy of “preparedness,” diplomatic and military. On one hand, he kept France isolated by arranging friendly “understandings” between Germany and the Empires of Austria-Hungary and Russia, by negotiating subsequently the defensive Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and by taking constant care to cultivate

Safe-
guarding
the
Empire

NOTE. The picture opposite, “In a Berlin Café,” is by a German impressionist painter, Paul Hoeniger (1865-1924).

cordial relations with Great Britain.¹ On the other hand, he kept Germany heavily armed. As the German Empire had been established by "blood and iron," so by iron at least it must be preserved. Accordingly, compulsory military service, which had been extended in Prussia in 1862, was applied in 1871 to the whole Empire, the "peace strength" of the German army being fixed at 400,000. On this matter Bismarck had some trouble with the Reichstag by reason of his proposal that the necessary financial appropriations be made a permanent charge on the treasury. This the majority of the Reichstag refused to sanction, and Bismarck eventually accepted a compromise whereby appropriations for the army were voted for a

**Army
Compro-
mise**

definite term of years—seven at first, and later five. From time to time, therefore, the government had to submit its military policy to debate by the nation's representatives, but Bismarck soon learned that by utilizing a "war-scare" on the eve of any such debate, he could usually get from the Reichstag what he wanted for the army.

All this early legislation which Bismarck sponsored tended to emphasize the predominance of the central, imperial government over the governments of the several states, and in enacting it the Chancellor had the active support of political parties which

**Political
Parties**

were the most nationalistic. These were: (1) the National Liberty party, the party of the industrial and intellectual bourgeoisie whose nationalism (and devotion to material concerns) was fast eclipsing their liberalism, and whose popular following was the largest of any German party in the 1870's; and (2) the Free Conservative party, a party of "enlightened" landlords, chiefly Prussian but glad to forward nationalizing tendencies.

Of the two other political parties which had been in evidence in Prussia during the 1860's,² the Conservative party was still the representative of numerous "old-fashioned" landed nobles and squires, Lutheran clergymen and army officers, eminently respectable and quite wedded to the "old régime," while the Progressive was a party of doctrinaire middle-class radicals whose liberalism was still superior to their nationalism. The Conserva-

¹ On Bismarck's diplomacy from 1871 to 1890, see below, pp. 550-555.

² On the four parties prior to 1871—Conservative, Free Conservative, Progressive, and National Liberal—see above, pp. 162, 163, 171-172.

tives were too narrowly Prussian to sympathize fully with Bismarck's all-German mood after 1871 and too devoted to divine-right monarchy to evince any enthusiasm about his flirtations with democracy, but inasmuch as they had long been in the habit of regarding Bismarck as one of themselves, they were not inclined to quarrel with him, and on some matters, notably on his army policy, they backed him vociferously. The Progressives, however, were a thorn in Bismarck's side. Not at all satisfied with the German constitution of 1871, they demanded its drastic revision in accordance with the British system of parliamentary government and ministerial responsibility. Being pacifist, too, they opposed Bismarck's pet army plans. And, with their lengthy high-flown discourses in the Reichstag, they wearied the Chancellor, who was more given to action than to speech.

The opposition to Bismarckian policies was not confined, in the Reichstag, to the Progressive party. It was voiced by several minor groups: (1) a few Socialists; (2) a few "Guelfs," deputies from the former kingdom of Hanover which Prussia had annexed in 1866 and who, led by Ludwig Windthorst, the last prime minister of that kingdom, were anxious to restore its autonomy;¹ (3) a Dane or two from northern Schleswig, demanding the retrocession of this province to Denmark;² (4) a group from the Polish-speaking areas of Posen and West Prussia whom the rising German nationalism of the time only served to fire with a fiercer Polish nationalism; (5) the deputies from Alsace-Lorraine, who, on their first appearance in the Reichstag in 1874, made solemn protest against the incorporation of their territory with the German Empire, and subsequently were quite critical of the Empire and its legislation; and (6) a somewhat larger group of deputies who, coming principally from the traditionally freer states of South Germany, were anxious to safeguard "states' rights" against too much Prussianizing or nationalizing, and who, being Catholic in religion, were fearful of intolerant interference from the Protestant majority in the Empire.

Bismarck was particularly nettled by the Catholic states' rights group, and his desire to repress it by striking at the Catholic Church was shared by the majority in both the imperial

¹ On the annexation of Hanover by Prussia, see above, p. 170 and note.

² On the dispute between Germany and Denmark over Schleswig, see above, p. 165.

and Prussian parliaments. National Liberals and Free Conservatives thought the Catholics lacking in German patriotism and too much disposed to follow the dictates of a "foreign power"—the papacy—which, now fortified by the dogma of infallibility,¹ might be more dangerous than ever to German independence and unity. Many Conservatives, staunchly Lutheran, were ready to seize any opportunity to resume battle with Rome. And the Progressives, intent upon stressing the liberal and materialistic aspects of modern civilization, found themselves in the curious position of supporting Bismarck in his hostility to the Catholic Church. Indeed, it was a Progressive leader who applied the high-sounding phrase *Kulturkampf*—"battle for civilization"—to the struggle which was waged during the 1870's in Prussia and throughout the German Empire between the government and the church.

In 1872 Bismarck fired the first guns in the *Kulturkampf* by expelling the Jesuits from Germany and breaking off diplomatic relations between Prussia and the Vatican. Then followed, in May 1873 and May 1874, rounds of artillery fire from the Prussian parliament in the form of anti-Catholic enactments, sometimes styled the "May laws," and sometimes cited, from the name of the Prussian minister of education, the "Falk laws." The most significant of them prescribed that every official of the Catholic Church in Prussia—every bishop and every priest—must be a German citizen, a graduate of a German university, and duly "authorized" by the government; all ecclesiastical seminaries were placed under state control; and, as a special measure against Polish Catholics, all religious instruction must be given in German. Catholic bishops in Prussia, with the approval of their colleagues elsewhere in Germany and of Pope Pius IX, at once protested against the May laws and refused to observe them. Whereupon the Prussian parliament made refractory clergymen liable to loss of citizenship and to imprisonment or exile. With such severity were these penalties enforced, moreover, that within a single year six Catholic bishops were jailed, and in over 1,300 parishes Catholic worship ceased.

German Catholics fought back with unexpected unanimity²

¹ See above, pp. 303-304.

² The German government had counted on a good deal of indifference among

and increasing effectiveness. Encouraged by the papacy and by their "martyred" bishops, they rallied in support of the ecclesiastical "administrators" who by stealth took the place of the bishops and preserved a church organization in Germany, and likewise in support of political leaders, such as Windthorst, the Hanoverian "Guelf," who built up a distinctively Catholic party—the so-called Centre party—to work openly at the polls and in parliament for the repeal of the anti-Catholic legislation. The Centre party championed religious liberty and social reform, and soon commanded the suffrages of Catholic workingmen as well as of other Catholics. In the general election of 1874 it polled one and a half million votes and increased its representation in the Reichstag from 60 to 90. And before long, within the Reichstag, Windthorst was skillfully aligning with the Centre party most of the minor groups which for one reason or another were inimical to Bismarck—Poles, Alsatians, Guelfs, even Socialists. Eventually, when a section of the Conservatives took fright at the anti-religious implications of some of the legislation and began to coöperate with Windthorst, Bismarck grew alarmed and decided that the time had come to halt the *Kulturkampf*. Too many of his other policies were endangered by the coalition forming against him on his religious policy, and in Marxian Socialism he began to perceive a greater menace to what he held dear than in Roman Catholicism.

In 1880 the Prussian parliament, on Bismarck's recommendation, empowered the government to use its own discretion in administering the May laws. Diplomatic relations were presently resumed with the Vatican; and in 1886 the most oppressive anti-Catholic measures were formally repealed. Bismarck thus confessed that his *Kulturkampf* had been a failure. It served to raise up and solidify a Catholic party which, under able leadership, persevered in what was to Bismarck an unholy alliance with democrats and socialists and all the other dissident groups who sought radical political changes.

On the heels of the *Kulturkampf* came Bismarck's campaign the Catholic masses and on a large active secession from the Catholic Church to the so-called "Old Catholic Church," which had been set up by a few disaffected Catholics shortly after the definition of the dogma of papal infallibility in 1870 and which the government did its utmost to foster. The "Old Catholic Church," however, simply could not be nursed into vigorous life; its total membership in Germany reached a peak of 52,000 in 1878 and then steadily declined.

against Socialism. As the Industrial Revolution progressed in Germany, as mining and the metal industries developed in Westphalia and Silesia and the textile and other machine industries in Saxony and the Rhineland and Alsace, Socialist propaganda made headway among the urban working classes.¹ In the general election of 1874 Socialists obtained nine seats in the Reichstag. In 1875 they formed a compact "Social Democratic" party through the fusion of two previously rival groups. In the ensuing general election of 1877 they polled half a million votes and increased their representation in the Reichstag to twelve. The principles which the party preached were the very antitheses of Bismarck's and were calculated, in his opinion, to subvert the state.

Marxian Socialism Making use of public excitement and horror attending two unsuccessful attempts by madmen in 1878 to assassinate the venerable Emperor William I, and claiming that the madmen were Socialists, Bismarck dissolved the existing Reichstag and secured the election of a new one whose majority shared his opinion of Social Democrats and of what should be done with them. At once, despite the protests of a minority composed of Centrists, Progressives, and the minor dissident groups, the majority passed a severe law against Socialist propaganda. This law, originally enacted for a term of four years, was subsequently reënacted several times and remained in force until Bismarck's retirement from office in 1890. It forbade the circulation of Socialist literature, empowered the police to break up Socialist meetings, and removed the trial and punishment of Socialist offenders from the jurisdiction of the regular courts to that of the police.

Yet here again Bismarck failed of his purpose. The more rigorous was the enforcement of the anti-Socialist legislation, the more effective became the "martyrdom" of Socialists and the more solidified and influential became the Social Democratic party. The party preserved its organization in Germany, conducted energetic propaganda from neighboring countries, and increased its representation and volubility in the Reichstag.

Socialists and Catholics were not the only groups that aroused Bismarck's ire and evoked repressive measures from him. He

¹ On the Industrial Revolution in Germany, see above, pp. 44, 206-207; and on the rise of Socialism in Germany, see above, p. 271.

had the average Prussian noblemen's contempt for the Poles. He tried to force upon them the use of the German language during the *Kulturkampf* in the 70's, and he sponsored in the 80's certain enactments of the Prussian parliament directed, on the one hand, toward the curbing of Polish political activity and, on the other, toward the transfer of farms from Polish to German ownership. But his efforts against the Poles only served to intensify their opposition.

Repres-
sion of
Minorities

Alsace-Lorraine, which he had taken from France in 1871, Bismarck did his best to Germanize. He encouraged immigration into it from other parts of the Empire, and he secured from the Reichstag large appropriations for making the University of Strasbourg an important centre of German intellectual life and cultural influence. Yet the attitude of the elected representatives from Alsace-Lorraine in the Reichstag was not reassuring, and Bismarck persisted in treating the provinces as conquered territory and denying them equality with the other German states.

Toward Jews, too, Bismarck was none too kindly disposed, though for political and financial reasons he refrained from public attacks upon them and actually rebuked a prominent Lutheran clergyman, Adolf Stöcker, for some of his anti-Semitic activities in the 1880's. Nevertheless, the bitterly anti-Jewish agitation of Stöcker and the National Socialist party which he founded, was quite consonant with the illiberal attitude and policies of Prince Bismarck toward most minority groups in Germany.

A very important change in national policy Bismarck wrought with the aid of Conservatives and Centrists during the last decade of his chancellorship, and that was a change from *laissez-faire* liberalism to economic nationalism. The movement in behalf of such a change did not originate with Bismarck or with any particular person. It was a natural outcome of the demands of German industry and agriculture, of the popular reaction to rising Socialism, and of the heightening political nationalism of the 60's and 70's in Germany.¹ It manifested itself toward the close of the 70's in the relative decline of those German political parties, National Liberal and Progressive, which had borrowed their economic doctrines from the English liberals and stood for *laissez-faire*, and a

Toward
Economic
National-
ism

¹On the rise of the newer economic nationalism, or "neo-mercantilism," see above, pp. 225-227.

corresponding gain of those parties, Conservative and Centrist, which were more inclined to paternalism. The resulting change in national policy which Bismarck was brought to favor was threefold. From being an essentially free-trade country, Germany became a leader in tariff protectionism. From being a purely European Power, Germany became a World Power with extensive overseas dominion. From being ostensibly unconcerned with relations between capital and labor, Germany became the chief exemplar of governmental intervention.

Tariff protectionism was inaugurated by act of the Reichstag in 1879. Bismarck's purpose in sponsoring this measure was to protect German "infant industries" against the competition of the older and more developed industries of Great Britain, to increase the taxable wealth of Germany, and to get enough income for the federal government from customs duties to relieve it of the necessity of levying assessments on the several states, as it had been obliged to do since 1871. The tariff act of 1879 did give new financial strength to the federal government, and, even more clearly, a marked impetus to Germany's industrial development. Indeed, the agrarian classes complained that the tariff of 1879 was too favorable to urban industry, and in order to redress the balance between industry and agriculture and to promote self-sufficiency for the Empire in food-stuffs as well as in manufactures, they secured by supplementary tariff acts of 1885 and 1887 greatly increased protection for agriculture without lessening the protection of industry.

Before the adoption of the policy of tariff protectionism Bismarck had opposed overseas imperialism. In 1871 he had rejected the French offer to cede colonies to Germany in lieu of Alsace-Lorraine; and throughout the 70's he stuck to his belief that Germany should devote all her energies to strengthening herself internally and on the continent of Europe and should avoid colonial undertakings. But the merchant's desire to sell his goods, the capitalist's desire to make lucrative investments, the Christian missionary's desire to convert the heathen, and the patriot's desire to exalt Germany as a Great World Power, all contributed to an irresistible national yearning for German colonies. Merchants led the way; missionaries soon followed. In 1879 a German trading company acquired privileges in the Samoan Islands. In 1882 an important

German colonial society undertook, with much success, to unite business men in support of colonial ventures and to arouse popular interest in them. Within a brief time, commercial companies of Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen obtained concessions from native chieftains, and established trading posts in several areas in Africa—Southwest Africa, Togoland, Kamerun, and East Africa—and in several islands of the Pacific—the Marshall Islands, a part of New Guinea (flatteringly labelled Kaiser Wilhelmsland), and the group of islands presently christened the Bismarck archipelago.

Prince Bismarck, in his new rôle as champion of German commerce and industry, conquered his earlier scruples and followed the merchants and missionaries with his official blessing. In 1884-1885 he prevailed upon the Reichstag to sanction formal protectorates over the distant trading posts in Africa and in the Pacific. In 1886 he secured governmental subsidies for regular steamship service between Germany and the protectorates. Before his retirement in 1890 the process was far advanced of delimiting the mercantile protectorates and transforming them into crown colonies, administered by imperial officials and policed by German troops. By this time Germany was in possession of a colonial domain of close to a million square miles—almost five times the area of the mother-country—though its population was relatively slight and almost entirely aboriginal, either Negro or Polynesian.

The pursuit of imperialism and the adoption of protectionism were obviously intended primarily to increase the profits of German manufacturers and traders, and incidentally of German landlords, though it was frequently alleged that they served also to raise the wages of German workingmen and to open to them new forms of employment. For the express benefit of workingmen, however, significant social legislation was enacted in Germany in the 80's. In 1883 a bill was passed ensuring workingmen against sickness, and in 1884 employers were compelled to ensure their employees against accidents. In 1887 laws were enacted limiting the labor of women and children, establishing a maximum number of working hours for employees in various industries, and setting Sunday apart as a day of rest. In 1889 provision was made for insuring workingmen against old age and invalidity. There can be no

Social
Legisla-
tion

doubt that all this labor legislation, together with a system of free labor exchanges which the government shortly set up, and with the development of trade unionism, prepared the German people from below, as protectionism and imperialism and governmental fostering of technological advance prepared them from above, to become one of the most efficient industrial nations.

Before his new economic policies were fully matured, the long period of Prince Bismarck's domination came to an abrupt close. He lost a sturdy friend when his Hohenzollern sovereign, the aged Emperor William I, died in March 1888. William's son and successor on the thrones of Prussia and the Empire was Frederick III, who was reputed to be "liberal," but whether he deserved the reputation and would have acted in accordance with it no one really knows, for he was a very sick man when he succeeded his father and he died in June 1888 after a reign of only ninety-nine days. Whereupon his son, the grandson of William I, became King of Prussia and German Emperor as William II.

William II (1888-1918) was a young man, twenty-nine years of age at the time, imbued with the same ideas of divine-right monarchy and the same predilection for militarism as had characterized William I, but with a vanity, a volubility, and an impulsiveness which were engaging to some people but irritating to Bismarck, who was now an elderly man quite used to handling the reins of government without much direction or advice from his sovereign. From William II's standpoint it soon became a question, as he subsequently expressed it, "whether the Hohenzollern dynasty or the Bismarck dynasty should rule." In March 1890 differences between the young Emperor and the old Chancellor reached a climax. Bismarck was anxious to retain close ties between Germany and Russia, while William II thought them incompatible with the alliance between Germany and Austria. William II refused to sanction Bismarck's plan to renew the repressive legislation against the Socialists and, if necessary, to cow parliament and people into submission by armed force. Bismarck declined to accede to an order from William II which would have given to all cabinet ministers access direct to the Emperor instead of indirect through the Chancellor. So William II demanded Bismarck's resignation, and the Iron Chancellor with-

**Brief
Reign of
Frederick
III, 1888**

**Accession
of
William II**

**Bis-
marck's
Dismissal**

*Line of Nassau,
Cousins of Orange-Nassau*

FREDERICK WH
(1744-1796)
King of Prussia
1786-1796
m. Louise
Hesse-Darmstadt

FREDERICK WH
(1770-1840)
King of Prussia
1797-1840
m. Louise
Mecklenburg

FREDERICK WH
(1795-1888)
King of Prussia
1840-1888
m. Elizabeth
of Bavaria

FREDERIC
(1831-1888)
King of Prussia
German Emperor
m. Victoria,
Queen Victoria

WILLIAM
(1859-1918)
King of Prussia
German Emperor
1888-1918
m. Augusta
of Saxony

William
(1882-1941)
German Emperor
m. Cecil
Mecklenburg

William
(1906-1941)

WILLIAM
(1792-1839),
Duke of Nassau
m. Pauline of
Württemberg

ADOLPHUS
(1817-1905),
Grand Duke of
Luxemburg
1890-1905
m. Adelaide
of Anhalt

WILLIAM IV
(1852-1912),
Grand Duke of
Luxemburg
1905-1912
m. Maria of
Portugal

ADELAIDE
(1894-1924),
Grand Duchess
of Luxemburg
1912-1919

CHARLOTTE
(1896-1939),
Grand Duchess of
Luxemburg
1919-
m. Felix of
Bourbon-Parma

John
(1921-1979),
Heir of Luxemburg

after 1890 until in the years just before the World War it averaged only about 25,000.

The forms of political action remained much the same under William II as under Bismarck. There were no important constitutional changes, though there was a good deal of agitation for the democratizing of the Prussian government. Of the five major political parties of the Empire, the Centrists, Conservatives, and National Liberals almost, if not quite, held their own; the Progressives decreased and the Social Democrats increased. In the general election of 1912 the Social Democrats polled four and a quarter million votes to two million polled by the Catholic Centre, one and three quarters million by the National Liberals, and one and a half million each by the Progressives and the Conservatives.

The extraordinarily large number of Social Democratic voters did not necessarily signify, however, that a Socialist revolution was imminent. Many such voters were trade unionists who did not desire any violent overturn of the existing régime but hoped rather to convince it that it should grant more demands of organized labor, while many others were middle-class "radicals," who, though not enthusiastic about the professed economic doctrines of the Social Democratic party, had come to feel that in the political sphere the party was the most promising agency for reforming imperial institutions and introducing real democracy into Germany. Which helps to explain why, as the German Socialists grew more numerous, most of their leaders and the majority of the rank and file were more prone to talk about reform than to engage in revolution.

Between 1890, when Bismarck retired from office, and 1914, when the World War began, the German Empire had four Chancellors: Caprivi (1890-1894), Hohenlohe (1894-1900), Bülow (1900-1909), and Bethmann-Hollweg (1909-1917). None of them had any such driving force or popular prestige as Bismarck possessed. They were spasmodically interfered with and dictated to by the mercurial William II, who appointed and dismissed them at will. It was but natural that many different, and even contradictory, tendencies were displayed by the German government from 1890 to 1914.

Count George von Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck in 1890, was a Prussian army officer who had served with some distinc-

tion in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871. Not being a great landowner like his predecessor, however, he was somewhat despised by the Prussian aristocracy and was inclined, perhaps for that reason, to like business men and to admire England. For political support in the Reichstag he relied less on the Conservatives than on the National Liberals and Progressives, in harmony with whose wishes he allowed the anti-Socialist laws to lapse, negotiated an important treaty with Great Britain, and modified the German tariff. By the treaty with Great Britain (1890), Germany abandoned certain colonial claims in Africa and obtained the cession of the island of Heligoland in the North Sea. By the new tariff enactment, the principle of reciprocity was approved; and in accordance with it commercial treaties were negotiated with Austria-Hungary, Russia, Rumania, and Italy, whereby Germany lowered her import duties on grain from these countries in return for the reduction of their tariffs on her export manufactures. This arrangement was as unprofitable to German farmers as it was profitable to German industrialists and merchants; and the Prussian Conservatives, or "Agrarians," were moved mightily against Caprivi. In vain the Chancellor sought to humor them. They demanded his dismissal by the Emperor, and William II complied in 1894.

Caprivi,
1890-1894

Caprivi's successor was Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a fine old aristocrat from South Germany, who in his younger years had been the leading advocate in his native Bavaria of national unification under Prussian auspices, and who had then served successively in the Franco-German War, in the diplomatic service, and as governor of Alsace-Lorraine. Now, at seventy-five years of age, he was not much more than a distinguished figurehead, the actual conduct of the government being less in his hands than in those of the Emperor and of Prince von Bülow, secretary of state for foreign affairs and a polished versatile Prussian landlord. In domestic matters the government leaned heavily on the industrial and commercial classes for support in the Reichstag and in the country at large. It was in response to pressure from these classes as well as in furtherance of a policy which Bismarck had inaugurated that Hohenlohe and Bülow—and William II—devoted chief attention to the extension of German dominion, trade, and investment overseas.

Hohen-
lohe,
1894-1900

The Emperor himself declared in 1895 that "the German Empire has become a world empire."

In 1897 the murder of two Christian missionaries of German nationality in China provided the pretext for landing German troops in the bay of Kiaochow and wresting from China some economic concessions for German merchants and bankers and the lease to Germany of some 200 square miles on the peninsula of Shantung. In 1899, following the Spanish-American War, Germany purchased from Spain the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. In 1899-1900, by agreement with Great Britain and the United States, Germany acquired the major part of Samoa.

In the meantime the German government was interesting itself in the Ottoman Empire. William II made a great show of his visit to the Sultan at Constantinople, and presently the Turkish army was being reorganized and drilled by German officers, and Turkish war materials were being purchased in Germany. In 1899 a group of German bankers obtained from the Sultan a concession for the building of a railway across Asiatic Turkey from the Bosphorus to Bagdad.

Several factors conspired at this time to embark Germany on a policy of navalism, supplementary to her already highly developed militarism: the contention of many merchants and publicists that a powerful navy constituted the best surety of extended commerce and investment; the practical lesson of the importance of sea power learned from American triumph over the Spaniards and from British victory over the Boers; the propaganda of patriotic societies, especially the German Navy League; the personal enthusiasm of William II, whose art of phrase-making did excellent service to the cause in such pithy sayings as "Germany's future lies upon the water"; and, last but not least, the organizing powers of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who was appointed secretary of state for the navy in 1897 and who retained that post until 1916. In 1898 was enacted the first, and in 1900 the second, of the important measures which built up for Germany an imposing navy, with a total tonnage second only to the British.

The retirement of the aged Prince Hohenlohe in 1900 and the advancement of Prince von Bülow to the Chancellorship served to promote more cordial relations between the imperial government and the Prussian Conservatives. Bülow had a suavity in handling Prussian reactionaries and

Bülow,
1900-1909

the Emperor likewise, which Hohenlohe and Caprivi lacked; he was fundamentally more sympathetic with them; and he was freer to do what he wished as Chancellor than as a subordinate minister. He managed to yoke the agrarian Conservatives with the industrial National Liberals in a parliamentary coalition, or *bloc*, by prevailing upon the latter to consent to the abandonment of the policy of commercial reciprocity, which had been followed since the advent of Caprivi, and the adoption, in 1902, of a much higher tariff on agricultural imports.

In the Prussian parliament, moreover, to the delight of extreme German nationalists, Bülow sponsored the enactment of measures, more drastic than Bismarck's, against the Poles, limiting the use of their language and compelling them to sell land to German buyers. Yet, in spite of Bülow's best efforts to enforce his anti-Polish legislation, in spite of appropriations of a hundred million dollars to enable Germans to dispossess Poles, the provinces of Posen and West Prussia contained a larger—and more militant—Polish population in 1910 than in 1880.

As Bülow's domestic policy was dictated chiefly by Prussian Conservatives, so his foreign policy was determined mainly by imperialistically minded business men (particularly influential in the National Liberal party) and directed toward enlarging Germany's "place in the sun"—territorial and economic. Germany tightened her economic grip and military hold on the Ottoman Empire. She sought economic concessions in Morocco and attempted to frustrate French political designs there. She encouraged Russia to fight Japan in 1904-1905, and four years later, under threat of going to war herself, she forced Russia to accede to Austrian aggression in the Balkans. These activities, accompanied by William II's striking references to Germany's "mailed fist" and by the rapid growth of the German navy, evoked apprehension in Russia and France and also in Great Britain. Italy, too, showed signs of weakening in her attachment to Germany.

Within Germany, critics of the newer imperial policies were not wanting. Neither Socialists nor Centrists nor Progressives had ever taken kindly to the enormous financial outlays for army and navy; and in 1906, when Bülow asked of the Reichstag additional appropriations for the suppression of a native insurrection in German Southwest Africa, these parties seized the opportunity to put Bülow and his policies to a national test. They rejected

the request, and, as they constituted for the moment a majority of the Reichstag, Bülow ordered its dissolution and the election of a new Reichstag. The ensuing electoral campaign of 1907 was hotly contested, but so stirring were the patriotic appeals addressed to the German people by the Emperor himself, and so clever were the political manipulations of the Chancellor, that, though the Centrists about held their own and the Socialists actually increased their popular vote, the government parties obtained a majority of the seats in the new Reichstag, the Socialist representation being cut in half. Henceforth, the opposition was considerably chastened. And it was an ironical commentary on the election of 1907 that the resignation of Bülow two years later was brought about by the hostility of patriotic Conservatives to his taxation schemes and by the clamor of a militarist group, led by the Crown Prince, against the Chancellor's "lack of forcefulness" in checking the French in Morocco.

Critical Election of 1907 Bethmann-Hollweg, who succeeded Bülow in the Chancellorship, came of a wealthy family of Prussian landlords and, trained in law, had made his career in the Prussian civil service. He maintained his predecessor's foreign and domestic policies essentially intact, though for legislative assistance he relied chiefly on a coalition of Conservatives and Centrists. He displayed no lack of forcefulness in asserting Germany's right to be considered a World Power of the first order, and in 1911 he had the satisfaction of securing, in settlement of the Moroccan dispute with France, the addition of 100,000 square miles of French Equatorial Africa to the German colony of Kamerun. Then, too, despite the fact that the Socialists again increased their representation in the Reichstag by the general election of 1912—this time from 43 to 110—Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded in obtaining the support of all the major political parties, the Social Democratic alone excepted, for his great army bill of 1913, raising the peace footing of the Empire from 656,000 men to 870,000 and involving an extraordinary expenditure of a quarter billion dollars. Even the Social Democrats voted for the special "war levy" when the Chancellor consented to make it in the form of direct taxation of incomes and inheritances.

Bethmann-Hollweg, 1909-1917 The unanimity in the Reichstag of 1913 was an augury of the unanimity—and enthusiasm—with which the German nation the next year followed William II and Bethmann-Hollweg into

the World War. That Germany as a whole would hold out for four years against an encompassing league of powerful nations would prove conclusively that national unity—as well as material progress—had been enormously advanced by the Hohenzollern German Empire.

2. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, THE DUTCH NETHERLANDS, AND SWITZERLAND

To the north, west, and south of the German Empire was a fringe of small nations, Teutonic in speech, preponderantly Protestant in religion and, with the exception of Switzerland, traditionally conservative and monarchical in politics. All of them had stirring histories of national independence; and the commercial importance which most of them had long enjoyed was enhanced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the industrial development of their powerful neighbors.

The Scandinavian peoples—Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians—were much alike in origin, language, and religion, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries they passed through a similar social and political evolution. All three lived more by agriculture, commerce, and fishing than by machine industry; in Denmark and even more in Sweden the landed aristocracy was relatively important, while Norway was a “peasant nation.” Among all three some industrialization occurred, and socialism arose and spread its radical teachings. Gradually, in all three, political institutions were modernized and liberalized, and popular education was fostered.

Denmark, by ceding Norway to Sweden in 1814 and by surrendering the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein to Germany in 1864, was restricted to the peninsula of Jutland and its adjacent islands, and thus became, in European area, the smallest of the three Scandinavian countries. Alone of these countries, however, Denmark possessed a colonial empire outside Europe: Iceland, Greenland, the Faroë Islands, and some West Indian islands. By the constitution of 1849,¹ revised in 1866, the King of Denmark shared his supreme political power with a parliament, the lower house of which comprised representatives of “popular” electors over thirty years of age and in possession of certain property qualifications. Throughout the long

¹ See above, pp. 90, 99.

reign of King Christian IX (1863-1906) a political contest was carried on between this lower house, on one side, and the monarch and upper house, on the other. The former sought to liberalize the government by making the royal ministers responsible to parliament, and the King, intent upon strengthening the Danish army, long refused to make concessions to a body which would not vote the military appropriations requested by himself and his personally appointed ministers. From 1872 to 1901 the constitution was hardly more than waste paper. Public funds were repeatedly obtained and spent by the government without parliamentary authorization.

During these years, however, the Danish peasants were steadily improving their economic condition through intensive cultivation of their small holdings and noteworthy development of dairy farming and coöperative enterprise. As they improved their economic position they took a more lively interest in politics, gradually swelling the complaints of middle-class Liberals against arbitrary government, with the result that in 1901 the aged King finally yielded to popular pressure and installed a ministry representing the majority in the lower house of parliament.

The Danish government was now liberal but not yet democratic, and agitation for democratizing Danish political institutions eventually bore fruit in constitutional amendments of 1914-1915, reducing the age limit of voters from thirty to twenty-five, extending the franchise for the lower house of the parliament to all men and most women, and abolishing the appointive seats in the upper house. Already, measures of home rule had been enacted for the Faroë Islands and in 1903 for Iceland. In 1917 Denmark sold her West Indian islands, collectively called the Virgin Islands, to the United States.

Sweden had emerged from the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the loss of Finland to Russia, with the gain of Norway from Denmark, and with a new royal dynasty stemming from Marshal Bernadotte of France who became King Charles XIV (1818-1844).¹ All these happenings had important consequences for Sweden throughout the century. The Bernadotte dynasty, despite its French and revolutionary origin,

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 663-665, 684, 687-688, 703-704, 794. See also the genealogical table at p. 124, above.

proved to be even more stubbornly attached to royal prerogative and reactionary policies than were the Danish sovereigns. The loss of Finland stimulated popular apprehension about Russia and led to a more pronounced militarism in Sweden than in Denmark. And the artificial union of Norway with Sweden produced an unhappy feud between them.

Sweden and Norway were incompatible socially and politically. Sweden was a country of large landed estates with a well-to-do nobility and a dependent peasantry. Norway was a country of small farms, with a peasantry and fisher-folk accustomed to economic independence and to a feeling of contempt for titles of nobility. Moreover, as the nineteenth century advanced, Sweden underwent considerable industrialization with attendant growth of urban classes of capitalists and proletarians, while Norway remained overwhelmingly agricultural and commercial. Then, too, the political institutions of the two countries were divergent. Norway had a typically liberal constitution, which had been prepared just before the union with Sweden and which vested supreme authority in a parliament elected indirectly by taxpayers. In Sweden, on the other hand, the only constitutional check upon royal absolutism until 1863 was the clumsy old-fashioned Estates General with its four houses of nobles, clergymen, burghers, and peasants; and though in 1863 a modern bicameral parliament was substituted for the medieval Estates General, the aristocratic classes controlled it and the King retained an absolute veto over its acts. Thus it befell that Charles XIV and his Bernadotte successors were "divine-right" monarchs in Sweden and "limited" monarchs in Norway.

By the terms of the union of 1815, Norway had been formally recognized as "a free, independent, and indivisible kingdom, united with Sweden under one king." But while the joint King observed the letter of the agreement by tolerating the Norwegian parliament and allowing it to exercise jurisdiction over local affairs in Norway, he insisted on his own centralizing control of the army, the foreign relations, and a good deal of the civil administration of both his realms; and, backed by Swedish popular sentiment, he urged a closer union between the two states. The union was already too close to suit the Norwegians; and following the stubborn refusal of Oscar II (1872-1907) ¹ to sanction the

¹ A portrait of Oscar II faces p. 480, below.

appointment of Norwegian consular agents in foreign countries, the Norwegian parliament in 1905 unanimously decreed the complete separation of Norway from Sweden and the dethronement of the Bernadotte King. The decree was ratified by a plebiscite of the Norwegian people and grudgingly agreed to by the Swedish government. Whereupon the second son of the King of Denmark accepted the crown of Norway and assumed the title of Haakon VII.

Separation of Norway, 1905

The dissolution of the union between Sweden and Norway gave impetus to democratic agitation in both countries. In Norway, universal manhood suffrage had already been introduced (1898); direct elections were substituted for indirect (1906); the suffrage was extended to women, at first with property qualifications (1907) and presently (1913) on the same broad basis as to men; the royal veto was abolished (1913) and the crown rendered purely honorary.

In Sweden, shortly after the death of King Oscar II and the accession of his son, Gustavus V (1907), important constitutional amendments were adopted, providing for proportional representation in both chambers of parliament and establishing universal manhood suffrage for elections to the lower. Meanwhile, Sweden, more than any other

Sweden under Gustavus V

Scandinavian country, was undergoing economic transformation and entering into rivalry with industrialized nations, and she was paying a price for it in dislocation and discontent of her lower classes. Some remedial social legislation was enacted, but that the masses continued to need economic betterment was attested by the spread of Socialism among them and also by the large Scandinavian emigration to America. Sweden, the worst sufferer in this respect, lost between 1870 and 1914 one and a half million citizens, most of whom settled permanently in the United States.

The Kingdom of the Dutch Netherlands—or "Holland," as the country is commonly styled—reverted, after the loss of Belgium in 1830, to its previous position as one of the very small independent states of Europe, with an area less than Denmark's and a population slighter than Belgium's. Unlike Belgium, moreover, it experienced no intensive industrialization but continued to be a land of burghers, farmers, and fishermen. Yet it retained an economic importance in Europe—and the world—out of all proportion to

Dutch Netherlands

the number of its square miles or of its factories and inhabitants. The Dutch Netherlands, we must remember, still possessed a large part of the colonial and commercial empire which had been acquired in the seventeenth century.

Even after the loss of colonies to which the Dutch had been subjected by Great Britain during the Napoleonic wars,¹ they retained an East Indian Empire—Java, Sumatra, the Spice Islands (Celebes, etc.), most of Borneo, and half of New Guinea—fifty-eight times as large as the mother-country and six times as populous, and, in addition, the colonies of Guiana (Surinam) in South America and Curacao in the West Indies. This imperial domain, especially the part of it in the East Indies, was an un-failing source of wealth, as well as prestige, to the Dutch. It provided handsome financial remuneration for many Dutch citizens who carried on its administration and exploitation; and it was so developed and regulated as to secure to Dutch merchants and bankers a practical monopoly of its valuable foreign commerce and of lucrative investments for its internal development.

The commercial—and agricultural—significance of the Dutch Netherlands was further enhanced in the latter part of the nineteenth century by the country's proximity to nations which were now becoming highly industrialized.² It was at the very cross-roads of Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium, whose mutual exchange of wares, often effected across Dutch territory, was profitable to Dutch carriers and middle-men, and whose rapidly growing urban populations provided an enlarging and increasingly gainful market for the produce of Dutch truck-gardens, dairy farms, and deep-sea fisheries. In the circumstances, it was advantageous for the Dutch Netherlands to remain a free-trade country at the very time when policies of tariff protection and economic nationalism were being adopted by all other countries of Continental Europe.

Perhaps because of the economic prosperity of the Netherlands, the Dutch readily acquiesced in a political régime which was extraordinarily conservative. Not even the revolt and secession of liberal Belgium in 1830 shook the absolutism of the Orange

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 713, 725-726.

² The foreign and colonial commerce of the Netherlands in 1913 had a value of nearly three billion dollars, only a little less than that of France. More than a third of Dutch commerce was with Germany.

monarch or altered the subservience of the old-fashioned Estates General. It was not until 1848 that the King, William II, was impelled to grant a constitution,¹ transforming the Estates General into a bicameral parliament and making the royal ministers responsible to it, and also getting rid of serious limitations on religious liberty. At the same time, however, an absolute veto over all legislation was retained by the monarch, while the imposition of heavy property qualifications restricted the parliamentary electorate to the wealthiest class of citizens. Although the qualifications for voting were subsequently lowered, political democracy made slower and more halting progress in the Netherlands than in any other country of western Europe.

During the long reign of King William III (1849-1890), the chief political debates had to do with popular education. On one side, a Liberal party contended for a system of free, public, secular schools in which no religious instruction should be given. On the other side, a Protestant Conservative party and a Catholic party made common cause in behalf of a system of public schools to be directed by the churches and supported by the state. For a time the Liberals appeared to have the upper hand; the state established and financed a system of "neutral" public schools. In 1889, however, Conservatives and Catholics secured governmental financial support for their respective denominational schools.

William III was succeeded on the Dutch throne by his daughter, Wilhelmina, who came of age in 1898 and three years later married a German prince, Henry of Mecklenburg. This marriage, in conjunction with the close commercial and cultural relations between Germany and the Netherlands, aroused apprehension among Dutch patriots and stimulated a popular movement for "national defense." The army was reorganized on the basis of general conscription and large sums were spent on fortifications.

The Kings of the Netherlands, of the House of Orange, had also been, from 1815 to 1890, Grand-Dukes of Luxemburg, a diminutive state bordering on France, Belgium, and Germany. According to an arrangement within the Orange family, the grand-duchy did not pass with the

¹ See above, pp. 90, 99; and on the Belgian secession of 1830, see Vol. I, pp. 788-789, 795.

death of William III in 1890 to his daughter, as the kingdom of the Netherlands did, but rather to a male kinsman, Adolphus of Nassau. The grand-daughter of this Adolphus, was ruling in Luxemburg in 1914 when the grand-duchy, despite an earlier international guaranty of its territorial integrity and neutrality,¹ fell victim to the World War and was overrun by German troops.

Switzerland differed in certain respects from the other "Teutonic" countries which we have just mentioned. It was a land of mountaineers, without seacoast or merchant marine. It was not a "national state," but a confederation of diverse peoples. It was famed for its advanced democracy.

Switzerland

Perched high upon the common Alpine watersheds of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Rhône, Switzerland was hardly larger in area than the Dutch Netherlands. Included in it, however, were some twenty-two republics, or "cantons," differing among themselves in language, religion, and customs, according to their geographical proximity to Germany, France, or Italy. In fifteen cantons, embracing two-thirds of the population of the whole confederation, the German language prevailed. Of the remaining seven cantons, five were predominantly French in speech and two were Italian. Protestants were in a majority in twelve cantons, and Catholics in ten.

That such diverse populations, in an age of intensifying nationalism, could constitute a substantial political union and evince a common patriotic devotion to it is attributable in part to the continuing vital tradition of Swiss independence and in part to the nature of the confederation. The population of any one canton was fairly homogeneous in nationality—it was German, or French, or Italian—and each canton had a government of its own and managed its domestic affairs. The powers of the federal government were limited, and were usually exercised so as not to wound the sensibilities of any canton or any linguistic group.

Of the confederation, political democracy was an outstanding feature. A constitutional revision of 1874, though making no important change in the structure of government, introduced the principle of the popular "referendum" in legislation and at the same time somewhat enlarged the powers of the confederation,

¹ Luxemburg was a member of the German Confederation from 1815 to 1867, when it was "neutralized." See Vol. I, p. 727, and the present volume, above, p. 144. See also the genealogical table at p. 450, above.

authorizing it, for example, to establish and supervise a system of free elementary schools for all Swiss children. In 1891 was adopted, as a corollary to the referendum, the "initiative," that is, the right of a specified number of Swiss citizens to demand the submission of any measure of which they might approve to a referendum of the entire citizenry. By means of initiative and referendum, as well as through parliamentary action, much popular legislation was enacted for the whole of Switzerland, especially from 1890.


In the matter of military defense, the Swiss people, in view of the mounting armaments of all the surrounding Great Powers, and fearful lest their own neutrality, despite the solemn pledges of the Congress of Vienna (1815), might not be respected in case of a general European war, deemed it necessary to authorize the compulsory training and service of all able-bodied young citizens for a certain number of days every year. This "militia," originally sanctioned in 1874 just after the Franco-Prussian War, was strengthened by several laws during the years just preceding the World War, particularly by a law of 1907.

Throughout the forty years from 1874 to 1914 several factors contributed to the economic development of Switzerland. One, of long standing, was the habitual thrift of the hardy natives who still in considerable numbers herded flocks upon the mountainsides or practiced the science of intensive cultivation in the narrow valleys. Second was the more recent but now steadily augmenting influx of foreign tourists who interspersed their Alpine-climbing and sight-seeing with liberal expenditure to inn-keepers and to purveyors of Swiss souvenirs. Third was the still more recent growth of manufacturing—and of industrialization in general—which was doubtless stimulated by tariff legislation and which was represented in 1913 by numerous establishments for the making of textiles, gloves, pottery, watches and clocks, and milk chocolate.

3. THE HABSBURG EMPIRE: THE DUAL MONARCHY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

How the Habsburg Empire, the oldest and most famous of European states, was extruded from Italy in 1859 and from Germany in 1866, and how it was transformed by the Ausgleich of 1867 into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, we have else-





where related.¹ After 1867 economic differences existed and political disputes occurred between the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the realm. Austria experienced a progressive industrialization, especially in and around Vienna and in the provinces of Bohemia and Silesia, with the result that manufacturing, commercial, and banking interests, and an urban industrial proletariat, became very important and vied with agricultural interests and a rural peasantry in influencing Austrian policy. Hungary, on the other hand, remained overwhelmingly agricultural, and hence relatively backward in accumulating industrial capital and in developing either a strong middle class or a numerous proletariat; the masses consisted chiefly of a dependent peasantry, and opposition to the predominance of the landed aristocracy came from the professional classes.

Differences between Austria and Hungary

In view of the economic disparity between the two parts of the Habsburg Empire, there was recurrent haggling between them over the proportional contribution which each should make to the joint governmental expenses. Moreover, the adoption of military reforms in 1868, based on universal conscription, led to many additional bickerings between the two governments when they had to agree, from time to time, on the size of the contingent to be provided by each and on the regulations which should govern the common army.

Notwithstanding periodic disputes, the governments of both Austria and Hungary perceived advantages in the intimate alliance between them in the Dual Monarchy. In combination they could count for more in the world, materially and in prestige, than either could count separately. Their joint fiscal arrangements served to keep an extensive area in east-central Europe free from internal tariff barriers and at the same time, by means of a common external tariff, to provide privileged markets for Austrian industry in Hungary and for Hungarian agriculture in Austria. Furthermore, their joint military forces served to maintain the Habsburg domain as a Great Power, and to double the resistance which Austria or Hungary might offer to rebellion of subject nationalities at home or to aggression by Russia from abroad.

Austro-Hungarian Co-operation

The partners in the Dual Monarchy were especially fearful of Russian influence and intent upon counteracting it, in Ottoman

¹ See above, pp. 172-173.

and Balkan lands, as well as among the Slavic minorities in their own lands. Wherefore they coöperated in supporting a big military establishment, in building a strong navy in the Adriatic, in forming defensive alliances with the German Empire, Italy, and Rumania, and in attempting to curb the expansionist ambitions of the Yugoslav state of Serbia. In 1878, in temporary league with Great Britain, they managed to deprive Russia of some of the fruits of her victory over the Turks¹ and simultaneously to obtain the assent of the European Great Powers to Austria-Hungary's "occupation" of three provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Yugoslav provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novibazar. Then, thirty years later, taking advantage of a revolution within the Ottoman Empire and of serious troubles within the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908), while returning Novibazar to Turkish rule. This forceful and spectacular annexation of two populous Yugoslav provinces, which Serbia coveted, was of immediate advantage to the prestige of the Dual Monarchy but eventually led to the World War.²

In the meantime, the internal politics of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy, as distinct from the Hungarian part, were reflecting the march of the Industrial Revolution and undergoing noteworthy transformation. Alongside the old aristocracy and professional bureaucracy appeared rapidly increasing numbers of business men and proletarians, successively clamoring for participation in government. The industrial and financial bourgeoisie, as well as members of the learned professions, had been enfranchised in 1867, and during the 1870's, through the Liberal party to which most of them adhered, they exerted no little influence on Austrian legislation. They promoted policies favorable to big business and high finance, and in the "liberal" tradition of the Continent they displayed equal anxiety to establish public schools and to banish ecclesiastical influence. They were "enlightened" and "anti-clerical," and, recruited mainly from the German (and Jewish) element in Austria, they were prone to emphasize the German character of the state and the desirability of Germanizing its dissident and "inferior" populations.

¹ See above, pp. 193-194.

² For a fuller account of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy, see below, pp. 501-502, 550-568.

In the 1880's the influence of the bourgeois Liberals was weakened by the rise of the Christian Socialist party. This was a Catholic party, organized by Karl Lueger, a Viennese lawyer of lower-class origins who by impassioned attacks on "Jewish capitalism" and earnest pleas for political democracy, social legislation, and justice to Austria's subject nationalities, attracted a large following among the lower middle class of the cities and among the peasantry of the countryside and also won allies among Catholic Poles and Czechs. One significant result was the enactment of several measures designed to better the lot of workmen. Thus, in 1884-1885, factories and mines were regulated; Sunday labor was forbidden; and the employment of women and children in industry was limited. In 1887-1888, trade unions were legalized and safeguarded, and a system of insuring workers against accidents and sickness, similar to Germany's, was adopted. Karl Lueger himself presently became mayor of Vienna and for ten years utilized his position and popularity to make the capital city a leading exemplar of the municipal ownership and operation of public utilities.

Another significant result was the passing of the "liberal" state, with its narrowly restricted franchise, and the coming of the "democratic" state. A law of 1896 more than tripled the number of parliamentary electors in Austria, and an act of 1907 adopted universal manhood suffrage and rendered its exercise compulsory. By this time, however, the Christian Socialist party was waning, relatively if not absolutely, not so much because of any marked revival of bourgeois liberalism as because of rapid conversion of young intellectuals and urban workingmen to the tenets of Marxian socialism and the newly formed Social Democratic party. In the general election of 1907—the first really democratic election in Austria—the Social Democrats increased their representation in the lower chamber of parliament from 11 to 87. And more ominous in the long run than this evidence of Socialist strength was the evidence which the election of 1907 afforded of the extent of nationalist dissent within Austria.


Here was the cardinal difficulty with which Austria had been persistently confronted ever since the Ausgleich of 1867, a difficulty which had complicated the "liberal" experiments of the 1870's, and which, after 1907, complicated still more the operation of democratic government.


National-
ities in
Austria

It was the difficulty of reconciling an imperial state with the nationalism of its several peoples. Apparently, in the existing circumstances, a solution of the difficulty was beyond the comprehension of the Emperor and statesmen of Austria; and yet, lacking a solution, Austria was ever more seriously menaced by disintegration from within and by dangers from without. During the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, nationalism was being progressively propagated among Austria's non-German subjects, not only by their own local intellectuals, publicists, and political leaders, but likewise by zealous spokesmen of their kinsmen in Russia, Serbia, Rumania, or Italy.

Of all Austria's subject peoples, only the Poles seemed fairly content. There was no free Poland to which they might gravitate, and they were better treated than were the Poles in Russia or in Prussia. On the other hand, Rumanian nationalists dreamed of incorporating the Austrian province of Bukovina in independent Rumania; Slovene nationalists, of uniting with Croats and Serbs to recreate a dimly remembered Yugoslav empire; and Italian nationalists, of completing the political unification of the kingdom of Italy by annexing to it the Italian-speaking districts of Austria—Trent, Trieste, and Istria. Czech patriots were especially furious because the Austrian government had not conferred on the once independent "kingdom of Bohemia" a full autonomy and admitted it to equality with the kingdom of Hungary and the empire of Austria. Czechs constituted, indeed, the forefront and spearhead of all the dissident nationalist opposition to the existing Austrian régime, and on occasion they did not hesitate to avow the liveliest friendship for foreign foes of Austria, particularly for Russia.

At first only a very small number of the most fanatically minded among the subject peoples worked consciously to disrupt the Empire. What the vast majority of them long demanded was cultural freedom and some degree of political autonomy within the Empire. The Austrian government, in fact, did make concessions to them, especially during the 80's and 90's, in respect of cultural nationalism, permitting them the free use of their respective languages, splitting the University of Prague into two—a German university and a Czech university—and allowing the local administration of such cities as Cracow, Prague,





and Trieste to be conducted respectively by native Poles, Czechs, and Italians. But against demands of political nationalism the Austrian government was adamant. There were too many influential Germans in Bohemia to be arbitrarily subjected to a Czech government there; too many in the Slovene province of Carniola to be put under Yugoslav rule. To the staid and unadventurous mind of the Emperor Francis Joseph, the idea of subdividing Austria further was fantastic.

So, conflict between the Austrian government and its subject peoples became ever sharper, on an ever widening front. The more the former tended toward democracy, the greater was the opportunity for the latter to voice their grievances and their demands. Repeatedly, the parliamentary institutions of Austria were paralyzed by fights, both verbal and fistic, in the House of Representatives. For years at a stretch the Emperor and his ministers felt obliged to impose taxes and carry on the administration without express parliamentary sanction. Thus after 1907, while appearing to be a constitutional state with universal manhood suffrage, Austria remained essentially absolutist. Political democracy proved inoperative in a country of diverse populations.

The internal politics of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy were not so complicated, for the simple reason that the Magyar aristocracy made no pretense of sharing the management of Hungary with the masses of their own people, to say nothing of sharing it with any subject nationality. They preserved their hold on large landed estates throughout the realm. They forced the use of their own language in the public schools of the whole kingdom. They did their best to Magyarize the Slovak peasantry in their northern provinces and the Serb population in the south. They abolished all traces of local autonomy in the large Rumanian-speaking province of Transylvania, in the east. In the west, they put more and more restrictions on the partial autonomy which they had granted in 1868 to Croatia.¹ They kept the Hungarian parliament and the ministry at Budapest under their own domination. They persistently refused to extend the suffrage for parliamentary elections; and so high were the property qualifications for its exercise and so intricate were the electoral laws that in 1910, out of a total population of over twenty million in the Hun-

Hungarian Internal Affairs

¹ On Croatia, see above, pp. 94, 160, 172-173.

garian kingdom, fewer than one million were voters, and, though the total population was about evenly divided between Magyars and non-Magys, almost all the seats in the parliament were occupied by Magyars.

The subject nationalities in Hungary were thus even more discontented than those in Austria, although their wholesale exclusion from the Hungarian parliament at Budapest deprived them of a central place, such as the parliament at Vienna provided for dissident Austrian nationalists, where they might collaborate against the existing régime and advertise to the world their grievances and demands.

The poorer classes of Magyars as well as the subject peoples suffered from the aristocratic character of the Hungarian government. Though much was done by the Hungarian parliament to foster popular education, and though some of the worst grievances of the peasants against their landlords were redressed, the remarkable agricultural development which Hungary experienced between 1867 and 1914 redounded chiefly to the financial advantage of the great landowners and governmental oligarchy. This fact was evidenced by a startling emigration from the country, amounting to over a million for the years from 1896 to 1910, and by a widespread popular agitation for electoral reform, an agitation which in the first decade of the twentieth century brought the kingdom to the verge of civil war.

Among the governing classes of Hungary, as of Austria, and also among very large sections of the masses in both parts of the Dual Monarchy existed still a deep-seated veneration for the Emperor-King Francis Joseph, whose long reign since 1848 had been replete with historic significance—the wars of 1849, 1859, and 1866; the establishment of the Ausgleich; the economic and political transformation of the Habsburg Empire. Francis Joseph bridged the years between Metternich and the World War. He had witnessed the rise and fall of Napoleon III, the coming and going of Disraeli and Gladstone, the beginning and the end of the exploits of Bismarck. With something like awe for the seeming changelessness of the Habsburg monarch in the midst of an otherwise swiftly changing world was mingled a very real sympathy for him in the succession of domestic tragedies which attended his reign: the execution of his brother Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, in 1867; the sui-

Francis
Joseph,
1848-1916

cide of his only son Rudolph in 1889; the assassination of his wife by an anarchist at Geneva in 1897; and the murder of his nephew and heir, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo in 1914. Close upon this last domestic tragedy came to the Emperor-King, now in his eighty-fifth year, the World War, the ultimate catastrophe of his long reign.

4. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The Russian Empire was the largest state in Europe and, next to the British Empire, the largest in the world. At the end of the nineteenth century it embraced one-sixth of the land surface and one-twelfth of the inhabitants of the earth. Unlike the British Empire, the Russian Empire was a solid block of contiguous territory, essentially an extension by land rather than by water, and it was a laggard rather than a leader in the essentially nineteenth-century movements of industrialization, liberalism, and constitutional government. The vast mass of Russians remained rural and agricultural. And the Tsar, Alexander II, who had given promise in the early part of his reign of being "liberal,"¹ eventually turned reactionary and fell victim in 1881 to an assassin's bomb.

The assassination of Alexander II elevated to the imperial Russian throne his son, Alexander III (1881-1894), rough-hewn in physique and devoted to the principles of Slavophilism.² His first acts as Tsar were to inflict summary Alexander III, 1881-1894 vengeance upon his father's assassins and to proclaim to the world that "the Voice of God orders Us to stand firm at the helm of government with faith in the strength and truth of the Autocratic power, which We are called to consolidate and to preserve for the good of the people from every kind of encroachment." In carrying out this program, Alexander III called to his assistance two energetic men of like purpose with himself, Plehve and Pobédonostsev. The former, a lawyer of Lithuanian stock, was entrusted with the direction of the state police; and so vigorously did he employ it to enforce obedience to the Tsar's will that the reign of Alexander III was marked by a seeming lull in revolutionary propaganda. Plehve

The practical work of Plehve was supplemented by the counsels of Pobédonostsev, an older man, who had been professor of

¹ See above, pp. 186-190.

² On "Slavophilism," see above, pp. 183-184.

law in the University of Moscow and court tutor to Alexander III, and who was now appointed to the influential and lucrative post of "Procurator of the Holy Synod," lay chairman of the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church. From this post he ordered the life and thought of Orthodox clergymen all over the Empire in accordance with the doctrines which he expounded in speech and publication and which endeared him to the Tsar. To him, parliaments were nothing but breeding-places of the most selfish and sordid ambitions; freedom of the press meant license to disseminate falsehood; limited monarchy was a "vain fancy," and trial by jury "an invitation to the arts of casuistry."

Centralization of administration, with repression of "liberal" dissent, was one of the policies systematically pursued by Alexander III and his chief ministers. He placed the previously autonomous government of the peasant communities, or *mirs*, under the supervision of landed proprietors designated by the imperial ministry. He abridged the authority granted by his father to the provincial *zemstvos* and municipal *dumas*. He frowned upon popular education; ¹ over what elementary schooling there was he fortified the control of the state church; and over the curriculum and teaching staff of the universities his agents exercised rigorous supervision. He re-enforced, likewise, the governmental censorship of publications and even private correspondence. And for infractions of any of these repressive measures, the police under Plehve were empowered to make arbitrary arrests and mete out arbitrary penalties, while waste spaces of Siberia were made to share with insubstantial fortress-prisons of European Russia as detention camps for thousands of "political offenders," some "convicted" and others merely "suspected."

"Russification" was another of the policies pursued by Alexander III and his ministers. It represented an attempt to realize "Russification" the cultural ideal of Slavophile Russian patriots, and it involved repressive measures against any language other than the Great Russian and any religion other than Russian Orthodoxy. It was aimed primarily, of course, at the subject

¹ At the end of the reign of Alexander III in 1894, the percentage of illiterates throughout the Russian Empire was from 50 to 90 in rural communities and from 40 to 65 in urban centres—a higher average than in any other country of Europe.

peoples in the Russian Empire, who were perforce to abandon their distinctive national traditions and to become "good Russians," obeying the Tsar, employing his speech, and adhering to his faith. A virtual persecution was directed against both the Catholic Church in Poland and the Lutheran Church in the Baltic provinces, and also against the Russian sectarians who dissented from the Orthodox Church¹ and the "uniates" in Lithuania and White Russia whose ancestors had been converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. In Poland the harsh edicts of Alexander II, following the suppression of the revolt of 1863, were confirmed and rendered more harsh. Poles were excluded from public office, and from 1865 to 1897 no Pole was permitted to sell land to a non-Russian. In the Ukraine the Little Russian language was pronounced a "dialect," and its use in printing or singing was prohibited. In the Baltic provinces of Estonia and Latvia, Russian was prescribed as the official tongue in 1885; and presently the use of German was forbidden in university lectures and even in private-school instruction, and German place-names were changed to Russian.

Persecution of the Jews was a phase of "Russification." The Russian Empire had some five million Jewish inhabitants, settled mainly in cities of Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Bessarabia. They were disliked because of their Against
Jews clannishness and their somewhat paradoxical reputation for making financial profits and engaging in revolutionary agitation; and Alexander III, backed undoubtedly by popular approval, instituted a series of repressive measures against them. In 1882 he forbade Jews to acquire land. To keep them out of the liberal professions, he restricted the admission of Jews to secondary schools and universities. In 1890 he promulgated a sweeping decree against them; all Jews who lived in the interior of Russia were obliged to emigrate to the western provinces unless they should obtain individual licenses from the government; and in the districts where they were henceforth segregated—the so-called Jewish Pale—they were forbidden to own or lease land and were kept in towns under governmental surveillance. What was still worse for the Jews, many governmental officials, taking their cue from the attitude of the Tsar and his chief ministers, gave free rein to popular anti-Jewish prejudices and tolerated, if they did

¹ On the Russian Dissenters, see Vol. I, pp. 364, 517.

not incite, more or less organized anti-Jewish riots—*pogroms*—attended by plundering and burning and in some instances by massacre. From *pogroms*, as well as from repressive legislation, the Jews suffered greatly; and, despite the efforts of the Tsar's government to make them stay within the Empire, some 300,000 emigrated from it in the single year 1891. Here was the beginning of large Jewish immigration into the United States.

Alexander III was not so absorbed in combating liberalism and forwarding "Russification" within his Empire as to neglect any opportunity to extend its territorial boundaries or to heighten its international influence. He pushed forward the conquest of Turkestan and its border states to the South. He established an effective military régime throughout the Caucasus. He laid the foundations for Russian supremacy in Persia. While preserving formal peace with his European neighbors, he was ever alert to advance Russian influence among the Slavic peoples in the Balkans. And when it became clear to him that the German Empire was backing Austria rather than Russia in southeastern Europe, he heeded the anti-Teutonic agitation of Slavophile publicists and grew cold to that intimate friendship which had endured between the Romanov dynasty of Russia and the Hohenzollern of Prussia since the eighteenth century.


In the early 90's Alexander III entered into an alliance with France. In his opinion, and in that of the majority of Russian patriots, coöperation between the chief Slavic nation and the chief Latin nation would have the triple advantage of curbing Teutonic pretensions in Europe, strengthening Russia in her duel with Great Britain for predominance in Asia, and opening up the money market of Paris for loans needful to the internal development of the Russian Empire and to the maintenance of its heavy armaments.

The death of Alexander III in 1894 did not change matters. His son and successor, Nicholas II (1894-1917), was a weak man, inclined to fatalism and mysticism, but with a streak of petty obstinacy characteristic of weak men and with a special deference to his wife, a neurotic woman, who, though a granddaughter of Queen Victoria and quite English in upbringing, displayed in Russia an almost insane devotion to autocracy and the Orthodox Church. Nicholas II let it be known from the outset that he considered any lessening of the Tsar's

Imperial
Expansion

Alliance
with
France

Nicholas
II,
1894-1917



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
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authority a "senseless dream." He reposed the utmost confidence in Pobédonostsev and retained him as procurator of the Holy Synod. He kept Plehve in office and promoted him in 1902 to the post of minister of the interior with almost dictatorial powers.

For eleven years—from 1894 to 1905—Nicholas II persevered in the policies which his father had developed. He maintained the same repression of liberal dissent, the same foreign policies, the same "Russification." In this last respect, he eased, it is true, the persecution of Russian religious dissenters and softened the application of the laws against the Catholic and Protestant churches. Yet under his auspices the Armenian Church in the Caucasus was interfered with and despoiled; the legislation against the Jews was rigorously enforced, accompanied by *pogroms* such as that at Kishinev in 1903 in which several thousand Jews were massacred; and to the grand-duchy of Finland, whose separate constitution and nationality even Alexander III had respected, Russification was now applied. In 1899 Nicholas II substituted Russians for Finns and Swedes in the civil administration of the grand-duchy. He introduced a Russian police. He conformed the Finnish army with the Russian. He prescribed that all Finnish legislation should be drafted by Russian ministers in conjunction with the secretary of state for Finland, and to this post he presently appointed the redoubtable Plehve.

Continuing
"Russification"

In
Finland

Nicholas II liked to think of himself, in a mystical way, both as an avenger of the Slavs throughout the world and as a promoter of the world's peace. He convoked at The Hague in 1899 a great international congress for the limitation of armaments and the assurance of peace among all nations.¹ Also, in pursuit of aggressive policies in the Far East, he allowed the Russian Empire to break the peace and to drift into a bloody and fateful war with Japan. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 proved to be of unimagined significance for the Russian Empire and we shall say more about it presently.

Imperialism and
"Peace"

Meanwhile we must note a very important development which had been going on in European Russia during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II, at first unobtrusively, but by 1904 very clearly. This was the Industrial Revolution. Not only in Poland, where there was already a good deal of industrialization, but also

¹ See below, p. 547.

in other parts of European Russia, industrial and commercial activity quickened. Coal fields and iron mines began to be extensively worked in the Ukraine and in the Urals. Oil wells began to be exploited in the Caucasus and about the Black and Caspian Seas. Factories became numerous in Kiev, in St. Petersburg, in Moscow. Shipping rapidly increased in the ports of Riga and Odessa and likewise in those of Vladivostok and Archangel. Between 1881 and 1904 the annual output of pig iron was quadrupled, reaching a total of three million tons and putting Russia in fourth place (after Great Britain, the United States, and Germany) among iron-producing nations. During the same period the annual output of coal multiplied sixfold, from three million tons to eighteen million. The number of factory operatives in the larger industries doubled, and the value of machine-made goods more than tripled.

This notable growth of Russian industry towards the close of the nineteenth century was due in part to a cheap and plentiful labor supply provided by the influx of ex-serfs into the cities, and in part to the loans of capital by foreign investors, especially French. With the aid of foreign capital and native labor, railway construction was rapidly prosecuted in Russia, and railways stimulated trade and industry.

The Russian Empire as a whole, we must remember, remained predominantly agricultural. In 1914 six-sevenths of its total population were engaged, directly or indirectly, in agriculture; and its industrial production was overshadowed by its production of wheat and cattle. Nevertheless, the percentage of urban population had risen from a tenth in 1874 to a seventh in 1914;¹ and a seventh of the total population of 130 million was not a small number. By this time the Empire had as many town dwellers as France and many more factory towns than Italy.

The development of Russian industry served to increase the size of the middle classes and still more of the urban proletariat, and hence to add to the difficulties of the autocratic government. Plehve did what he could to oppose the industrial development, contending that it would create an urban society inimical alike to the autocracy and to the rural classes upon which the autocracy ultimately rested. But Plehve and his many Slavophile partisans were unable to check the newer economic and social

¹ A third of the population of Russian Poland was urban at this time.

tendencies; and in another Russian statesman of the time, Count Serge Witte, Russian industrialists, as well as Russian patriots, found a friend and champion.

Witte was a native of Tiflis in the Caucasus, where his father (of Dutch extraction) was an imperial administrator. Educated at the University of Odessa, he was identified for a time with railway construction and finance in southern Russia. Thus, while remaining a political conservative, he became an interested advocate of "Western" commercial and industrial development. Appointed head of the department of railways in the imperial ministry of finance by Alexander III, he was promoted to be minister of communications in 1892 and minister of finance in 1893. For ten years he retained this post under Nicholas II and used his official and personal influence with the Tsar to promote policies favorable to big business in Russia, policies of economic nationalism analogous to those which Bismarck had adopted in Germany. He sought to develop home industries by means of tariff protectionism and financial reforms. He strengthened the state banks, rapidly extended the state system of railways, and, in keeping with the newer economic imperialism, fostered Russian expansion, commercial and capitalist as well as military and political, in Persia and Manchuria. At the same time Witte was anxious to increase the "efficiency" of Russian labor, and with this end in view he undertook to reduce drunkenness and promote temperance by making the liquor business a state monopoly. He also provided for governmental mediation in labor disputes and for governmental regulation of mines and factories.

Witte's policies elicited much criticism from reactionaries of the type of Plehve and Pobédonostsev. There was widespread complaint that he was sacrificing agricultural to industrial interests and that his tariff protectionism was costly to peasants and workingmen. Besides, there was the obvious fact that the industrialization which Witte encouraged was being attended, just as Plehve had prophesied, by the growth of urban movements menacing to the traditional autocracy—liberalism among the bourgeoisie and socialism among the proletariat.

In the circumstances, opposition to the Tsar's government, which, under the watchful eye and vigorous repression of Plehve

Witte's
Fostering
of Indus-
try

Reaction-
ary Oppo-
sition

and the state police, had lain dormant since the days of Alexander II, notably revived and spread in the first years of the twentieth century. One of its most curious features was the participation of many otherwise ultra-conservative landowners and peasants. These had no thought of revolution, nor were they lacking in personal loyalty to the Tsar, but they were annoyed and angered by what they deemed the disproportionate emphasis which Nicholas II permitted Witte to put upon industry and commerce. To appease them Witte in 1902-1903 invited committees of the *zemstvos*, in which they were heavily represented, to recommend what reforms, particularly what agricultural reforms, should be undertaken by the Tsar. The result was that, of the seven hundred reports which were accordingly submitted, four hundred found fault with Witte's economic policies and with the political system which had sanctioned them. It was the blame heaped by Plehve and Pobédonostsev upon Witte for the hostility to autocracy implied in these reports that caused Nicholas II in 1903 to retire his distinguished minister of finance. The landed classes were glad to see Witte go, but the "liberal" element among them was only strengthened by the Tsar's apparent determination to retain most of Witte's policies.

Nor were the bourgeoisie content with the merely economic measures which an autocratic government had taken in their behalf but which it might rescind as arbitrarily as it had dispensed with Witte. The growing class of merchants, factory-owners, and bankers came to believe that their security depended upon the limitation of autocracy and the establishment of a constitutional government in which they would have direct say, and hence they swelled the numbers and enhanced the influence of liberal, "Westernizing" intellectuals. A group of these intellectuals organized in 1904 a liberal party, the "Union of Liberators."

To complaints from the conservative land-owning class and to demands of the liberal bourgeoisie were added an extraordinary unrest among peasants and a notable development of extreme revolutionary movements among urban proletarians. The revolutionary anarchism which Michael Bakunin¹ had preached in the middle of the nineteenth century

¹ Bakunin (1814-1876) had been a Russian army officer until observation of

and the "mutual-aid" anarchism which Prince Peter Kropotkin¹ championed in the latter part of the century were stealthily propagated in Russia and had no little influence on the formation of secret societies of extremely radical (and frequently unbalanced) intellectuals, workers, and peasants who had a penchant for conspiring against the government, assassinating its officials, and suffering martyrdom.

More significant, however, was the penetration of the gospel of Karl Marx into Russia in the 80's and its effect during the 90's on the rise of two distinct revolutionary movements.

One of these was represented by the Social Democratic party, formed in 1898, adhering to the precepts of Marxian socialism in all their "Western" rigidity, and securing disciples from among doctrinaires and urban workingmen. The other was the Socialist Revolutionary party, founded about 1900, which tried to adapt Marxian socialism to the traditional communal life of the mass of Russian peasants; it advocated socialization of the land and its distribution among those who actually tilled it. The Socialist Revolutionaries gained a large following of peasants and soon vied with middle-class Liberals and aristocratic Constitutionalists for leadership in political and social reform. At first, the Social Democrats were not as numerous or as influential, and in 1903 they split on a question of tactics into a left-wing majority party (Bolshevik), and a right-wing minority party (Menshevik).

Still another fruitful source of opposition to the existing régime in Russia was the reaction which the process of "Russification" aroused among its victims—Poles, Jews, Finns, and other subject peoples. These, anxious not to be Russified, were prepared to coöperate with any Russian group that promised respite or Tsarist methods in Poland led him to resign from the service and to become a revolutionary. He derived his anarchism principally from Proudhon (see above, p. 100), but he gave it a peculiarly atheistic and violent character. Bakunin was less a theorist than a man of action. In the 60's and 70's, from Geneva as his headquarters, he was constantly organizing and inflaming anarchistic groups of workmen in France, Italy, Spain, and Russia. For the spirit and teachings of the man, see especially his *God and the State* (1882).

¹ Prince Kropotkin (1842-1921), a Russian nobleman and scholar, and for a time an army officer, became in turn a Liberal, a Socialist, and eventually an Anarchist. He was imprisoned in Russia from 1874 to 1876 and in France from 1883 to 1886. He advocated the development of a system of close but voluntary coöperation which should render government from above superfluous. See his *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1899) and his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (1900).

relief from persecution. Many Jews drifted into the Social Democratic or the Socialist Revolutionary party. **Unrest among Subject Peoples** Many Poles made common cause with the "Liberators." In the case of Finland, the native population, whether Finnish or Swedish, joined with Russian liberals in demanding that the Tsar respect the Finnish constitution and cease his interference in the grand-duchy's internal affairs.

Against all these various forms of opposition and criticism, Plehve and other loyal agents of the autocracy kept up a tireless and seemingly effectual fight. From 1900 to 1904 Plehve's "system" was in full swing throughout the Empire. Police search of private houses, suppression of newspapers, and arbitrary arrests, jailings, and banishments were daily occurrences. And the "system" might have gone on indefinitely, had not a foreign war supervened—the Russo-Japanese War.

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 Japan, anxious to put a stop to Russian advance in the Far East, particularly in Manchuria and Korea, went to war in February 1904. She had the advantage of naval superiority, rapidity of mobilization, and relative proximity to the scene of hostilities. She also had the advantage of popular enthusiasm for the war. To the consternation of the Russian government and the surprise of the world at large, the Japanese won victory after victory. In May 1904 they drove Russian armies from the Korean border and north of Port Arthur. In July they destroyed Russian fleets venturing out from Port Arthur and Vladivostok. In September they forced the main Russian army back into Manchuria. In January 1905 they brought the long siege of Port Arthur to a successful issue. In February and March they won the protracted but eventually decisive battle of Mukden. In May 1905 they annihilated the last Russian warships, which had made a despairing voyage all the way from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan. By the treaty of Portsmouth (New Hampshire), in September 1905, which was signed for the Tsar by Count Witte, Russia acknowledged her reverses by surrendering to Japan Port Arthur, the peninsula of Liaotung, and the southern

NOTE. The portrait, opposite, of the King of Sweden and Norway, Oscar II, is from an etching by the Swedish artist Anders Zorn (1860-1920). On Oscar II, see above, pp. 459-460.

half of the island of Sakhalin, and by agreeing to leave Korea to Japan and Manchuria to China.

Contributing immeasurably to the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War was the inability of the Russian government, on the one hand, to marshal all its forces against far-away Japan while revolution was threatening it at home, and, on the other hand, to silence its domestic critics while it was losing battle after battle in foreign war. As one telegram followed another from the distant fighting front in Manchuria, admitting a succession of Russian defeats, it was borne in upon the Russian people as never before that the autocracy must be responsible. Under it, officials were corrupt, generals in-competent, common soldiers needlessly sacrificed, national wealth wasted, and national honor stained. This feeling of national humiliation manifested itself in popular mutterings and disorder. In July 1904 Plehve, the most conspicuous symbol and most energetic agent of the autocratic régime, was blown to pieces by a bomb. In November an informal assembly of prominent members of local *zemstvos* and municipal *dumas* petitioned the Tsar to reform the political system by guarantying individual liberties, extending local self-government, and instituting a national parliament.

Russian
Unrest

Nicholas II ignored the petition and appointed General Trepov, a man of the same mould as Plehve, to head the police. But Trepov soon had his hands full. Middle-class Liberals held political banquets and delivered provocative speeches. Workingmen staged political strikes at Moscow, Vilna, and other industrial centres. At St. Petersburg a procession of strikers, headed by an Orthodox priest, Gapon by name, was fired upon by troops on its way to present a petition to the Tsar, the "Little Father"; and the resulting bloodshed earned for the day (January 22, 1905) the title of "Red Sunday." In rural districts, bands of peasants wandered about under Socialist Revolutionary leaders, pillaging and burning the mansions of noble landlords and country gentlemen. The Tsar's uncle, the Grand Duke Serge, was assassinated at Moscow in February 1905; and numerous other political murders ensued.

Revolutionary
Uprising
of 1905

Faced with growing disorder, the Tsar falteringly made conces-

NOTE. The portrait, opposite, of the Tsar Nicholas II, is from a painting by the Russian artist Valentine Syerov (1865-1911).

sions. Hoping to appease the subject peoples, he promised religious toleration, licensed the use of Polish in private schools, and relaxed the enforcement of anti-Jewish legislation. Hoping to quiet the peasants, he remitted the arrears owed by them for their shares in the communal lands. Pressed by Liberals, he consented to work out a plan for constitutional government. Then, after further hesitation, and after further rioting in the country, he announced in August 1905 that he would constitute a parliament—an imperial Duma—to counsel with the government in the making of laws. This he followed up, continually under pressure, by dismissing Pobêdonostsev, Trepov, and other ultra-reactionary ministers, by summoning Count Witte to be premier, and by issuing in October 1905 a kind of constitution in the form of a “manifesto.” The October Manifesto guaranteed

**Tsar's
“October
Mani-
festo”**

personal liberties, established a moderately popular franchise for the election of the Duma, and stated that no law should be valid without the Duma's consent. Two months later, Nicholas II was prevailed upon to concede practically universal manhood suffrage for Duma elections.

Meanwhile, in November 1905, the Tsar was moved by a general strike in Finland to restore the autonomy of that grand-duchy. The Finnish Estates General accordingly met at Helsingfors in December 1905—for the first time since 1899—and drafted a “modern” constitution for Finland, substituting for the medieval Estates General a single-chamber parliament chosen by universal suffrage, female as well as male, with provision for proportional representation. This democratic constitution Nicholas II ratified in 1906 in his capacity as Grand Duke of Finland.

**Autonomy
for
Finland**

In Russia, however, the great revolutionary wave of 1905 soon spent its force and in 1906 began slowly but surely to recede. The conclusion of peace with Japan put an end to the series of disgraceful defeats abroad and enabled the government to utilize the army for the restoration of order at home. Then, too, after nearly two years of foreign war and domestic rioting, many Russians began to long for peace and quiet and for the economic advantages which public order would bring. Moreover, the revolutionary elements commenced to disintegrate and to waste their strength in factional quarrels. Bolshevik Communists quarreled with Menshevik Commu-

**Ebbing of
Revolutionary
Tide, 1906**

nists, and both with Socialist Revolutionaries. Socialist Revolutionaries were distrusted by Liberals, and Liberals—professional men and *zemstvo* members—soon split into rival parties.

A radical group of Liberals, forming the Constitutional Democrats (popularly known as the "Cadets") under the leadership of a professor of history, Paul Milyukóv, refused to recognize the finality of the Tsar's decrees and demanded that the first Duma should act as a constitutional convention and devise a form of government in which the Tsar should be a mere figurehead and the whole administration should be entrusted to a ministry responsible to parliament. Another group, the "Octobrists," comprising more conservative Liberals, especially the *zemstvo* men, were content to accept as definitive the Tsar's "October Manifesto," with its provision for a Duma as a check upon, but not as a complete substitute for, the traditional autocracy.

Cadets
and Octo-
brists

In measure as the revolutionary elements in Russia disintegrated and fell to quarreling, the reactionary elements plucked up courage, closed their ranks, and prepared to do battle for the preservation of the autocracy, the large landed estates, and all the traditional practices and policies of the old régime. Such elements, made up of great nobles and landlords, courtiers and bureaucrats, army officers, Orthodox clergymen, and Slavophile patriots, organized a "Union of the Russian People," which early in 1906 inaugurated a counter-revolutionary movement. "Black bands," or "black hundreds," as the agents of the Union were popularly styled, engaged in reactionary terrorism, committing outrages against radical sympathizers and especially inciting mob violence against Jews. Leaders of the Union also exerted pressure on the Tsar to withdraw the concessions he had made, and Nicholas II showed himself more amenable to pressure from this quarter than from the other. By decree of March 1906, he expressly excluded from parliamentary discussion the constitutional laws of the state, asserted the Tsar's unrestricted control of army, navy, and foreign affairs, authorized the imperial ministers to promulgate laws when the Duma was not in session, and provided that if the parliament should not approve the budget in any year, the government might continue in force the budget of the preceding year. Then Nicholas II dismissed Count Witte

Reaction-
ary
Revival

Stolýpin,
Prime
Minister,
1906-1911

from the premiership, and put an energetic conservative, Peter Stolýpin, in the strategic position of minister of the interior.

Stolýpin repressed revolutionary agitation with a severity that resembled Plehve's and treated quite cavalierly the Duma, which had been elected and assembled at St. Petersburg in May 1906. When it proposed reforms, he brusquely dissolved it and ordered new elections. In vain, some two hundred Cadet members of the Duma drew up, at Viborg in Finland, a solemn protest. They were penalized, and the few attempts at insurrection were ruthlessly suppressed.

The opponents of autocracy, despite governmental interference at the polls, obtained a majority in the second Duma, which met in March 1907. Again there was an *impasse*. Again the government dissolved the Duma. This time, however, Nicholas II issued a new "constitutional law," clearly intended to assure the election of future Dumas which would not oppose the government. The suffrage was elaborately restricted, and by means of a class system of voting, akin to Prussia's, greater weight was given to landlords than to other classes in Russia.

The new electoral arrangements operated as Nicholas II and Stolýpin intended. The third Duma, chosen in October 1907, was composed mainly of landlords with a sprinkling of bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. The overwhelming majority, made up of Conservatives and Octobrists, were quite resigned to the maintenance of the Duma as a purely consultative body; and even the Cadet minority were willing to abandon obstructionist tactics and to play the rôle of polite critics. Outside the Duma, Socialist

Revolutionaries and Social Democrats and the disaffected subject nationalities persevered in opposition, but they no longer terrified the government as they had recently done nor swerved it from its purpose. The revolutionary upheaval of 1905 had subsided, and the only apparent outcome, aside from the democratic reform in Finland, was a slightly altered form of imperial government, appropriately described as "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic tsar."

From 1907 to 1914 the Russian government and administration seemed to have slipped back into the old grooves. The Duma, it is true, was suffered to remain, and in some notable instances

its advice was accepted. Certain moderate land reforms were effected. A scheme of workingmen's insurance was adopted. Elementary education was extended under the supervision of the Orthodox Church. But in general the government led and the Duma followed. Indeed, Stolýpin was as really free of parliamentary dictation and as determined to maintain the system of reaction as Plehve had been. He repressed revolutionaries, and imprisoned or banished suspects. He enforced the laws against the Jews and sponsored new legislation against the Poles. The dagger thrust of a Jewish lawyer in a theatre at Kiev removed Stolýpin in September 1911, but not the régime which he represented and faithfully served.

Meanwhile the Tsar was growing ever more mystical, ever more responsive to his wife's fancies. The emotional Tsarina, in turn, sought providential guidance from a strange assortment of religious fanatics and charlatans, the most notorious and sinister of whom was Rasputin. This untutored Siberian peasant, with powerful physique and magnetic personality, and with a dubious reputation for saintliness, was presented at court in 1907 and soon contrived, through faith-cure treatments of the Tsar's sickly son and heir, to obtain a psychical domination over the Tsarina. She came to regard him as a loved friend and divine counsellor, and to ensure that no important governmental appointment should be made without his approval. In the direction of policy Rasputin was usually but a tool of extreme reactionaries, although the most unexpected persons were named to the highest offices through his favor.

Mysticism
at Court

Rasputin

The best efforts of the reactionary statesmen of Russia were expended on restoring the Empire's international prestige which had been so badly damaged by the Russo-Japanese War. In 1907 was negotiated a friendly understanding with Great Britain, which had the effect of supplementing the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance with a Triple Entente. Then in 1910, following Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serge Sazonov, a brother-in-law of Stolýpin, was entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs. Meanwhile, the government undertook a needful reorganization of the Russian army, planned an additional network of strategic railways (to be completed in 1917), approved the construction of a new and powerful navy, and in 1913 secured the sanction of Tsar

Efforts to
Regain
International
Prestige

and Duma for lengthening the term of service in the infantry. It was apparent that Russia, repulsed in the Far East, was preparing to resume an ambitious policy in the Near East.

When the storm of world war broke in August 1914, the Tsar Nicholas II, deigning to appear in person before the Duma, testified to "the tremendous outburst of patriotic sentiment, of love and loyalty to the throne, which, like a tempest, traverses our entire land." But the government that helped to make the war did not remain to end it. As the Russo-Japanese War had shaken the Tsar's throne, so the World War would topple it.

5. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE BALKAN STATES

In spite of territorial losses to which it had been subjected in 1878, the Ottoman Empire was still, at this latter date, a truly imperial domain.¹ In Europe it stretched across the Balkan peninsula from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, including Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, and, of course, the ancient capital of Constantinople. In Asia, it reached from the Ægean Sea to the Persian Gulf and from the Black to the Red Sea. Between Europe and Asia it owned most of the Ægean islands, including Crete, and in northern Africa the provinces of Tripoli and Barca (Cyrenaica). In addition to these outright possessions the Ottoman Empire still preserved a nominal suzerainty over Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novibazar (now administered by the Habsburg Empire), over Bulgaria (now under a prince of its own), over Cyprus (now governed by Great Britain), and over Egypt (since 1866 under a practically independent ruler).

Yet this Empire extending into three Continents was no longer the menacing Great Power which it had been back in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For more than a hundred years it had palpably been declining in strength and prestige, until now it was quite outranked by at least six European states (Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), and fear of what it might do to Europe was lost in the prospect of what Europe could do to it.

In an age when the Industrial Revolution was profoundly affecting most other European countries, increasing the size and

¹ On the losses of 1878, resulting from the Russo-Turkish War, see above, pp. 193-196.

taxable wealth of their populations, promoting the consolidation and democratizing of their governments, and enabling them to strengthen their armaments, the Ottoman Empire remained exceptionally backward in economics and politics and material force. Relative to its territorial extent, or to the population of most other European Powers, the population of the Ottoman Empire was sparse and practically stationary, hardly exceeding twenty-five million between 1878 and 1914 and depending almost wholly on primitive agriculture. It was utterly unable to furnish the increment of financial resources requisite to keep the country in step with the political and military progress of industrial nations.

Economic
Back-
wardness

Then, too, in an age when most of the Great Powers of Europe were national states, commanding the enthusiastic loyalty of their dominant peoples, the Ottoman Empire still harbored the anomalous religio-military imperialism of a much earlier period. Its emperor—the Sultan—was not merely a secular autocrat like the Russian Tsar. He was also both a Turkish overlord and the “caliph,” a kind of honorary pope, for all orthodox (Sunnite) Moslems throughout the world.

A Non-
National
State

Moreover, the Ottoman Turks, who constituted a compact and fairly homogeneous population in Anatolia (Asia Minor) and who supplied the Sultan with the majority of his officials and, what was of prime importance, with the backbone of his army, were only a minority of the inhabitants of the Empire, and they were slow to develop the nationalism which became characteristic of Europe in the nineteenth century.

Such a backward, old-fashioned regime was bound to experience extraordinary difficulties, internal and external, in attempting to survive alongside the industrial nationalist Europe of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) had begun his reign by making a pretense at “modernizing” the Ottoman Empire; he had promulgated a liberal constitution of the current Western type. But so vociferous was the opposition of ardent Moslems to any such novel substitute for the venerable traditions of the Empire, and so temperamentally arbitrary was the Sultan himself, that the constitution of 1876 was promptly “suspended,” and for more than thirty years it remained a dead letter. Then, too, far more seriously, Abdul Hamid early in his reign had tried by

Sultan
Abdul
Hamid II

force to put down insurrections of Bosnians and Bulgarians within the Empire and to halt Russian aggression from without. But the resulting Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 only brought into lurid light the strength and the many-sided character of the forces operating against the Ottoman Empire.

First was the vaulting desire of European Great Powers to profit politically and financially from the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Russia took territory from the Empire in 1878, and the only way by which the Sultan could keep her from taking more was to invoke the outside aid of Great Britain and Austria-Hungary and to pay a price to each: Cyprus to the former, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Novibazar to the latter. Furthermore, the Sultan had to agree, by the peace treaty of 1878, to collaborate with the Great Powers on a program of "reforms," whose execution would be almost certain to arouse the hostility of his own Turkish subjects and yet the failure of whose execution would afford foreigners a chronic excuse for intolerable interference. Besides, the public finances of the Ottoman Empire, already in confusion, were so completely disordered by the Russo-Turkish War that in 1881 the Sultan was obliged to place them under the direction of a commission of foreign bankers. This in turn not only mortgaged heavily the income of the Turkish treasury and added greatly to the taxation and unrest within the country. It also put foreign capitalists, particularly those of Britain, France, and Germany, in a strategic position to obtain profitable concessions for themselves and to clinch the stranglehold of their several governments on the Empire.

A second disrupting force was nationalism among the Balkan peoples of the Ottoman Empire. This had already eventuated in the establishment of a national Greek state in 1832, and in 1878 in the enforced recognition by the Sultan of the complete independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the full autonomy of Bulgaria, and the partial autonomy of Eastern Rumelia. None of these states was satisfied with the settlement of 1878, and what each had gained only heightened its ambition to draw to itself fellow nationals who were left under Ottoman rule. Hence from each proceeded an increasingly inflammatory propaganda of publications, armed bands, and secret societies.

Aggres-
sion of
Great
Powers

Balkan
National-
ism

Such nationalist incitement could not be confined to the Christian Balkan peoples. It proved contagious, and was presently communicated to Armenians, to Albanians, and even to Arabs. Nor were the Turks wholly immune. Some of their intellectuals, attending the universities in France or Germany, or otherwise coming into contact with "Western" civilization, were thereby infected with nationalism, but most Turks caught it while attempting to suppress subject peoples feverish with it. The more the Greeks and Serbs and Armenians insisted that they were equal or superior to the Turks, the more the Turks sought to put them in their proper inferior place. The more violent the former grew, the more vindictive became the latter. Massacres, which had been infrequent and sporadic while the Ottoman Empire embraced Moslems and Christians, became commonplace when the Empire comprised a variety of self-conscious and self-seeking nationalities.

Rising
National-
ism in
Asia

The Sultan Abdul Hamid II, with no little skill and cunning, managed to stave off the seemingly inevitable dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. He played off one Great Power against another, and one Balkan state against another. At first he relied mainly upon Great Britain to check Russian aggression. Eventually he came to regard Germany as the most dependable prop for his Empire; Germany seemed to be comparatively disinterested, at least politically and territorially, and she was strong enough to serve as a counterpoise to either Russia or Britain. So the Sultan employed German army officers to reorganize his army and German financial experts to advise him on matters affecting the treasury. He welcomed somewhat theatrical visits of the German Emperor, William II, to Constantinople in 1889 and 1899. He granted to German bankers important economic concessions, including the construction of a great railway across Asiatic Turkey from the Bosphorus to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf (1899).

Ger-
many's
New In-
fluence

In internal affairs Abdul Hamid employed espionage and terrorism to uphold his absolute power. And when Christian peoples grew too restive and threatened revolt, he slyly encouraged fanatically Moslem tribesmen, Kurdish or Albanian, to fall upon them and engage in massacre.

Domestic
Terrorism

Yet the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire proceeded apace. In 1882 Great Britain, already in occupation of Cyprus, effected

a military occupation of Egypt and established a virtual protectorate over that nominal dependency of the Ottoman Empire.¹ In 1885 the Bulgarians in Eastern Rumelia drove out their Turk-

Loss of
Eastern
Rumelia,
1885

ish governor and secured the incorporation of their partially autonomous province with the fully autonomous principality of Bulgaria, which thereby was almost doubled in size and likewise in potential menace

to the Empire. In 1896 the Greeks in Crete revolted, and the next year in their behalf the kingdom of Greece went to war with the Ottoman Empire. This time, the Sultan's army put up a stiff fight: it overwhelmed the Greek army on the mainland and advanced on Athens. Whereupon the "protecting Powers" of

Græco-
Turkish
War of
1897 and
Cretan
Autonomy

Greece—Russia, Britain, France, and Italy—intervened and ended the Græco-Turkish War. Greece had to pay a war indemnity and consent to a "rectification" of her northern frontier advantageous to the Ottoman Empire. Yet though Greece was not per-

mitted to annex Crete, the Ottoman Empire practically lost it; it was to enjoy autonomy under the protection of the four Great Powers, and these named a son of the Greek King as its governor.

The Armenians, too, rebelled in 1894. The rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed, and Kurds and other furious Moslems slaughtered at least 100,000, and perhaps 200,000, Christian

Armenian
Question

Armenians. The Great Powers expostulated with the Sultan, but obtained only one of his facile promises

that "reforms" would be instituted. No real reform was forthcoming, however, nor could it be in the circumstances of excited Armenian nationalism and aroused Moslem fanaticism.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, domestic criticism of the Sultan's government affected Moslems as well as Christians, Asiatic provinces as well as European, and created a widespread revolutionary unrest. In part it was a sign of the nationalist spirit which was beginning to take possession of the Turks. In part it was a reaction against a government which permitted foreigners to exploit the country and put intolerable financial burdens on its own subjects, and yet which could not preserve order at home or prevent the loss of territory and prestige abroad. In part, also, it was an outcome of the closer contacts which railway con-

Growing
Domestic
Criticism
and Un-
rest

¹ See above, pp. 377-379.

struction—one of the most notable achievements of Abdul Hamid's régime—enabled the peoples of the Ottoman Empire to develop with one another and with western Europe. Whereas the total railway mileage of the Empire in 1885 was only 1,250, most of it being in the European provinces, it amounted in 1908 to 4,400, of which almost three-fourths were in Asia, serving to carry "Western" ideas as well as commodities to Angora and Bagdad, Damascus and Mecca.

One of the most respected of Turkish statesmen, Kiamil Pasha,¹ had already reached the conclusion that the Ottoman Empire should be constitutional and liberal after the British model. For urging the adoption of such a policy he had been retired from the office of chief minister ("grand vizier") in 1896, but around him gathered a sizable party of enlightened "liberal" Turks. More radical than Kiamil Pasha were a group of comparatively young men, the "Young Turks" as they were popularly styled, who formed secret societies and spread clandestine propaganda, especially within the Turkish army, preparatory to a revolution which should transform the Ottoman Empire into a national state whose whole population would be infused with a common patriotism and a common desire for "progress." One of the most active "Young Turks" was Enver Bey, an army lieutenant stationed at Salonica, who with fellow officers there organized the strongest and most famous of the revolutionary societies, the "Committee of Union and Progress."

Kiamil
Pasha
and the
Liberals

Enver Bey
and the
Young
Turks

In July 1908 this Committee executed a military *coup* at Salonica. It proclaimed in force the long-suspended constitution of 1876 and threatened the Sultan with deposition if he should offer resistance. Abdul Hamid II, thoroughly frightened, made haste to accept the new order. He endorsed the "restoration" of the constitution. He decreed abolition of censorship and espionage. He called the liberal Kiamil Pasha to be the first grand vizier of the constitutional régime. Only a few persons attempted open opposition, and they were speedily despatched. In December 1908 a duly elected parliament met at Constantinople and began to debate proposals of general reform.

"Young
Turk"
Revolution of
1908

¹ Kiamil Pasha (1832-1915), an Egyptian by birth and a soldier by training, had been taken into Ottoman governmental service in 1861.

By this time, however, the Empire was in tumult. Kurdish troops in Asia revolted against the liberal government and committed fresh depredations against the Armenians, Internal Tumult mutinies occurred in Arabia and Mesopotamia, and in Albania and Macedonia conditions were anarchical.

A sharp cleavage appeared, moreover, between the liberal Grand Vizier and the nationalist Enver Bey; and, to cap the climax, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria took advantage of the internal difficulties of the Ottoman Empire to detach territories from its

Austrian
Aggres-
sion and
Bulgarian
Independ-
ence

suzerainty and to impair still more its external prestige. In October 1908 Austria-Hungary proclaimed the end of Ottoman sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina and the incorporation of those provinces with the Dual Monarchy.¹ Simultaneously the autonomous Prince of Bulgaria declared the complete independence of his country (including Eastern Rumelia) and assumed the title of King. Helplessly though haltingly the Turkish government acquiesced in what it could not prevent and for comparatively small financial indemnities surrendered Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina without a struggle.

Affairs were obviously going from bad to worse, and at length in April 1909 Enver and the Committee of Union and Progress, Deposition of Abdul Hamid II, 1909 with the support of the army, executed a second *coup*. This time Abdul Hamid II was deposed and imprisoned, his mild elderly brother was made nominal Sultan with the title of Mohammed V, the liberal cabinet of Kiamil Pasha was supplanted by a Young Turk ministry, and the parliament became a National Assembly.

From 1909 to 1918 the Ottoman Empire was practically under a military dictatorship of the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress, in which Enver Bey (soon promoted to the dignity of Enver Pasha) was the most vigorous and influential figure. The central purpose of the Young Turks was to regenerate the Empire by nationalizing it, and to nationalize it they believed they had to make it Turkish. So they prescribed Turkish as the official language of the Empire, planned a system of Turkish national schools, and proclaimed that henceforth the Turkish army would be based on the

Young
Turk
Dictator-
ship

¹ As a sop to Turkish pride, Austria-Hungary handed back to the Ottoman Empire the other province of Novibazar which she had been occupying since 1878.

principle of compulsory service for all citizens—Arabs equally with Turks, and Christians equally with Moslems. They had the existing army in back of them and used it to enforce their will, not only on disaffected minorities, but also on the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the attempt to “Turkify” the Ottoman Empire proved disastrous. There were altogether too many non-Turks to be “Turkified,” and the non-Turks were now too nationalistic themselves. Moslem Arabs in Asia as well as Christian peoples in the Balkans resented and resisted the Young Turk régime. In the case of the Balkan peoples, resistance was ever more actively abetted by kinsmen in the adjacent states of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. And the more resistance the Turkish government encountered, the more interference it invited from abroad.

Attempted
“Turki-
fication”

In September 1911 Italy suddenly announced her intention of appropriating the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica in northern Africa. The Young Turk government replied with a resolute declaration of war and despatched Enver Pasha to defend the provinces. But the ensuing hostilities involved a double loss for the Empire. Not enough Turkish forces could be supplied to prevent Italy from despoiling the Empire in Africa, and yet enough were sent across the Mediterranean to encourage the Balkan nations to attempt a spoliation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. For before the Turco-Italian War was concluded, the Balkan War of 1912-1913 began, and from this issued the World War of 1914-1918. In other words, the Ottoman Empire, under Young Turk leadership, was almost continuously at war for seven years, from 1911 to 1918. It was the death-throe of the Empire.

Turco-
Italian
War,
1911-1912

Postponing a more detailed account of the Tripolitan and Balkan Wars, we may now turn our attention to developments in the several Balkan states between 1878 and 1912. We begin with Greece, which, it will be remembered, had obtained her formal independence in 1832, a new royal dynasty in 1863 in the person of King George I, and in 1864 a new constitutional democratic government.¹ The actual operation of parliamentary government was handicapped by factionalism and political corruption of the leaders, but despite political and financial difficulties the country

Balkan
States,
1878-1912

Greece

¹ See above, p. 200.

made noteworthy progress, intellectually and materially, in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The kingdom of Greece, as it existed from 1832 to 1913, embraced but a minority of the Greek nationality. The majority were still under Ottoman rule—in Macedonia, Thrace, at Constantinople, in Smyrna and other towns along the seacoast of Asia Minor, in the Ægean islands and Crete. In 1897, as we know, Greece made an effort to wrest Crete from the Empire. The effort failed of its immediate purpose, but it brought to the fore an outstanding Greek leader, Eleutherios Venizelos. Venizelos, a Cretan by birth, had headed the revolutionary movement for the union of Crete with Greece, and was largely responsible for the management of the island's autonomous government which issued from the war of 1897. By 1910 his popularity was so great in the kingdom of Greece that King George I, against his own personal wishes, was impelled to invite Venizelos to the mainland and to entrust him with the premiership of Greece. Venizelos reformed the Greek government, effected a reorganization of its army and navy, and negotiated with Serbia and Bulgaria a Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire. He thus prepared Greece, internally and externally, just as Cavour had prepared Sardinia, or Bismarck had prepared Prussia, for wars of national unification.


The Rumanian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia had been accorded autonomy in 1856 and permitted in 1862 to form the united principality of Rumania.¹ In 1866, its native prince was deposed and in his place a member of the German family of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was installed as Prince Charles I.² Then in 1878, as an outcome of the Russo-Turkish War, the principality was recognized as an independent state, and in 1881 it was designated a "kingdom," Prince Charles I becoming King Charles I and crowning himself with a steel crown wrought from Turkish cannon captured at Plevna.³


This Rumanian kingdom, like the Greek, was ambitious to extend its sway over the large portion of its own nationality that dwelt outside its restricted frontiers. Unlike the Greeks, however,

¹ See above, pp. 140-141.

² This family was related to the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia and German Emperors. Charles I of Rumania was a brother of that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen whose candidacy for the Spanish crown in 1870 had been the pretext for the Franco-Prussian War. See above, p. 147.

³ See above, pp. 192, 194.





the "unredeemed" Rumanians were not confined to the Ottoman Empire. Villages of them were scattered here and there throughout Macedonia, but far more numerous were the Rumanian populations of the Russian province of Bessarabia, the Hungarian principality of Transylvania, and the Austrian crown-land of Bukovina. In other words, the problem of national unification confronting Rumania was much more complex than that facing Greece; the latter would have to reckon with the Ottoman Empire, the former with both Russian and Habsburg Empires. Immediately after 1878, anti-Russian sentiment prevailed, and in 1883 Rumania concluded a secret alliance with Austria-Hungary and thus became a satellite of the famous Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy. For the next thirty years German influence was dominant in Rumania. The political institutions of the country were modelled after Prussia's, with a parliament elected by a class system of voting which assured to the well-to-do upper classes a complete control.

During the reign of Charles I (1881-1914), Rumania made noteworthy economic progress. Agricultural production was stimulated by the introduction of modern farm machinery and the development of accessible foreign markets in industrialized Austria and Germany. Simultaneously, through investment of foreign capital, began the profitable exploitation of the country's rich mineral resources, its coal and especially its petroleum. The mass of Rumanian peasantry did not share proportionately, however, in the wealth which accrued to foreign investors or to domestic landlords and middle-men. Rumania was a country chiefly of large landed estates, whose owners were reluctant to countenance any reform which might endanger their own economic interests, and prone to deflect peasant criticism from themselves to the considerable number of Jews who dwelt in the towns of Rumania and constituted a large part of her trading and money-lending class. This economic situation, in combination with traditional religious fanaticism, resulted in the virulent anti-Semitism which characterized Rumanian society and politics during the era.¹ But anti-Semitism was only one symptom of

¹ Rumania had agreed by the treaty of Berlin (1878), as a condition of her national independence, to grant full religious toleration and to admit Jews to civil and political equality with other inhabitants. Subsequently, however, the Rumanian government, backed undoubtedly by public opinion, practically nullified the agreement.

poverty and unrest among the Rumanian peasantry. Emigration was another, and periodic rioting was still another.

Between the Rumanians at the north and the Greeks at the south, the central Balkan territories were inhabited by Slavic-speaking peoples. All of these might be termed Yugoslavs—that is, “Southern Slavs”—in contradistinction to the “Yugoslavs,” “Eastern Slavs” (Russians) or “Western Slavs” (Poles and Czechs). Conventionally, however, the term “Yugoslav” was confined to the Southern Slavs in the western half of the Balkan peninsula: Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro, in the Banat of Hungary, and in the western Macedonian provinces of the Ottoman Empire; Croats in the Hungarian crown-land of Croatia; and Slovenes in the Austrian province of Carniola. The remaining Southern Slavs, in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula, were customarily styled “Bulgarians” rather than “Yugoslavs.”

In the case of the Serbs, two independent states were erected: Montenegro and Serbia. Montenegro,¹ or “Black Mountain,” near the Adriatic, was a very diminutive state, which had long been governed in a patriarchal fashion by native princes and whose full independence of the Ottoman Empire was finally acknowledged by the treaty of Berlin in 1878. The Prince of Montenegro at the time was Nicholas I (1860–1918), a rude but often benevolent despot of the fighting type and something of a poet withal. He was a warm admirer of Russia and a firm friend of the Tsar. In 1905 he granted a democratic constitution, and in 1910 he assumed the title of King in place of Prince.

Serbia, the larger and more important of the two Serbs states, had been autonomous since 1830 and became an independent principality in 1878. It was a country of peasants, backward and even primitive; and it was long a prey to the rivalry of opposing claimants to its throne and to the interference of jealous foreign Powers in its internal affairs. The rivalry was between partisans of the family of Karageorge, the original peasant leader of Serbian rebellion against the Ottoman

Only a very few of the quarter million Rumanian Jews were granted citizenship or permitted to vote or hold office.

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 707–708, 782, 784–785, and the present volume, above, pp. 192, 194.

Empire, and partisans of the family of Miloš Obrenovic, the soldier who had secured autonomy for Serbia. The latter were in power from 1859 to 1903, though the relatively long sway of the Obrenovic dynasty was punctuated by occasional insurrections of the Karageorge faction and by brutal assassinations. This dynastic feud not only kept Serbia in a disorderly condition but also tended to make Serbia a kind of football in the game of international intrigue between Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Prince of Serbia during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was Milan Obrenovic, a man of some natural talents and of notoriously scandalous life. Pro-Austrian by inclination, he was angered by Russia's greater solicitude for Bulgaria than for Serbia in the peace settlement of 1878, and in 1881 he formed a close secret alliance with Austria-Hungary. In 1882, with Austrian backing, he transformed his state from a principality into a kingdom; and in 1885 he utilized Bulgaria's annexation of Eastern Rumelia as the pretext for going to war with his Slavic neighbor. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 was a series of victories for Bulgarian arms, and Serbia would have been utterly crushed had not Austria-Hungary intervened and stopped the war. The result was that Serbia passed completely under the tutelage of the Habsburg Empire, and King Milan lost whatever popularity he had commanded in Serbia. To defray the expenses of his war against Bulgaria, he had to impose burdensome taxes; and in a last effort to regain popular approval he promulgated in 1889 a democratic constitution. Two months later he abdicated in favor of his young son, Alexander I (1889-1903).

Alexander's reign was even more troublous than Milan's had been. The new King set aside the constitution and ruled through favorites. He alienated the extreme nationalist party by adhering to the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and when, towards the close of his reign, he suddenly expressed pro-Russian sentiments, he was deemed insincere. Then, too, he outraged a large part of the nation by his marriage with an ambitious woman of unsavory reputation, and by the favors he showered upon her relatives. A group of army officers, members of a secret society known as the "Black Hand," conspired with the Karageorge faction to overthrow the Obrenović dynasty. In 1903 the conspiracy eventuated in the murder of King Alexander and some fifty of his ministers and

attendants, and in the accession to the blood-stained throne of Serbia of the grandson of Karageorge, Peter I.

King Peter's accession marked a turning-point in Serbian history. It definitely ended the Obrenović dynasty and hence the feud which had impaired the internal unity of the nation. It likewise ended the subservience of Serbia to Austria-Hungary and thus gave free rein to the development of a Serbian nationalism in harmony with Russian desires and zealous to make the kingdom of Serbia the core of a Yugoslavia which should embrace not only all Serbs still under Ottoman rule but all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the Habsburg Empire. King Peter was very much of a soldier-patriot, and also something of a democrat. He restored the constitution of 1889 and chose his ministers from the majority party—the ultra-patriotic Radical party—in the parliament. The leader of this party was Nicholas Pašić, an engineer who had been educated in Switzerland, an ardent patriot, able and unscrupulous. While the King devoted his chief energies to army reform, Pašić reorganized the national finances at home and encouraged nationalist propaganda abroad. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Serb-speaking provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, which Serbia was then unable to prevent, served only to intensify anti-Austrian feeling among the Serbs and to quicken the determination of the Serbian government to seek territorial compensation, as soon as possible, wherever it might be found.

The Bulgarians, who comprised the Slavic population in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula—and a majority of the
Bulgaria Slavic population throughout Macedonia—had been promised a comprehensive national state of their own by the treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey in 1878, but the ensuing Congress of Berlin, fearful lest the projected Bulgaria should be a mere appendage of the Russian Empire, seriously reduced its territory and split what was left into two states: the autonomous "principality of Bulgaria," and the semi-autonomous "province of Eastern Rumelia." The sop to Russia was that a nephew of the Tsar Alexander II, Alexander of Battenburg, was chosen to preside over the principality. For a time, this Prince Alexander was obediently pro-Russian. In accordance with his uncle's dictation, he suspended the democratic constitution which Bulgarians had devised and appointed Russians to high office in his army and civil administration.

Presently, however, he tired of Russian tutelage and decided to put himself at the head of those Bulgarian patriots who resented any foreign interference whatsoever. In 1883, consequently, he defied the Tsar by dismissing Russian advisers and establishing constitutional government. Then in 1885 a revolt of Bulgarians against the Ottoman government in Eastern Rumelia enabled him to incorporate this province with his principality; and when Serbia attempted to seek "compensation" from him, his Bulgarian army roundly trounced the Serbian army.

Unfortunately for Prince Alexander, there was delay in getting the Ottoman Sultan and the Russian Tsar to agree to Bulgaria's annexation of Eastern Rumelia, and when Alexander abjectly appealed to the Tsar for assistance, a group of impatient Bulgarian nationalists forced him to abdicate (1886). In selecting as his successor Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a clever German prince, related to the reigning families in Great Britain and Belgium,¹ the Bulgarian parliament angered the Russian Tsar still more. For several years the Tsar treated Ferdinand as a usurper and connived at military conspiracies against him. Nevertheless, Ferdinand clung to his throne, and with the aid of a resolute prime minister, Stefan Stambalov, he gradually strengthened his position both inside and outside Bulgaria. Eventually Stambalov became so dictatorial that he was forced out of office and assassinated (1895), but by this time Ferdinand was so firmly entrenched in power that the Russian Tsar finally recognized him as rightful ruler of Bulgaria. Some years later, in 1908, Ferdinand utilized the opportunity afforded him by the "Young Turk" revolution within the Ottoman Empire to sever the nominal bonds between Bulgaria and the Empire and to elevate himself from the status of an autonomous Prince to that of an independent King.

In the meantime neither Ferdinand nor his patriotic subjects had forgotten the Greater Bulgaria which had been projected in 1878. For many years, however, its realization seemed remote. The Great Powers would not agree to Bulgarian aggrandizement on a large scale, and the Bulgarian army alone was considerably smaller and weaker than the Ottoman army. Besides, Greece and Serbia had designs of their own on Macedonia, and were resolved that their fellow nationals in that region should not be

¹ See the genealogical table at p. 350.

subjected to Bulgarian rule. The result was bitter rivalry and enmity among the Balkan states, and chronic disorder fomented by them in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

The revolution of 1908-1909 within the Empire, the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and the seizure of power by the "Young Turks," with their determination to reform and nationalize the Empire, paved the way for at least a temporary change in the traditional relationships of the Balkan states—a change from quarreling among themselves to coöperating against a common foe. For the more the Young Turks tried to "Turkify" the Christian peoples of Macedonia and Thrace, the more the several Balkan states perceived the advantage of united resistance. Then, in 1911, the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War seemed to provide an excellent opportunity for the Balkan states to act. Italy was despoiling the Ottoman Empire in Africa. Why should not they despoil it in Europe?

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was the prime mover in creating the Balkan League. Satisfying himself that Austria-Hungary would not oppose him, he tactfully employed the good offices of Russia to persuade Pašić and King Peter of Serbia to form an alliance with Bulgaria in March 1912, and shortly afterwards he negotiated with Venizelos a similar Græco-Bulgarian alliance. Thus concerted action against the Ottoman Empire was arranged for by Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, with Montenegro acceding, and between Bulgaria and Serbia a tentative division of the spoils was outlined. Northern Albania and the extreme western part of Macedonia would go to Serbia; the rest of Macedonia and Thrace would pass to Bulgaria; and the Russian Tsar would be invited to arbitrate any differences that might arise. Feverish military preparations ensued throughout the Balkans, the Albanians rose in revolt, and in October 1912 a declaration of war by tiny Montenegro was the signal for joint attack of all the Balkan allies on the Ottoman Empire.

The Empire made heroic efforts to overawe and overcome the allies. Kiamil Pasha, reinstalled as grand vizier, obtained an express pledge from the Great Powers that they "would not permit any modification of the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey." The Turkish army was mobilized, and Enver Pasha and other officers were summoned from Tripoli to Thrace. And,

to concentrate all its energies in the Balkans, the Ottoman government terminated the Italian war by signing the peace-treaty of Lausanne (October 1912), formally ceding Tripoli and Cyrenaica to Italy and allowing Italy to occupy and administer twelve of the Ægean islands, the so-called Dodecanese.¹

Despite frantic endeavors, the Turks proved unequal to the emergency. To the surprise of the Great Powers, and even of the Balkan allies, Ottoman resistance all but collapsed. While Serb and Greek armies were capturing Salonica and Monastir and overrunning Macedonia almost at will, the Bulgarians were investing Adrianople and hammering the main Turkish army back through Thrace to within a few miles of Constantinople. In December 1912, less than two months after the beginning of the war, the Ottoman government sued for peace, and negotiations were opened at London.

The negotiations were interrupted in January 1913 by a frenzied revolution at Constantinople which overthrew the pacific Kaimil Pasha and put the bellicose Enver Pasha in the saddle. But the resumption of hostilities brought no consolation to the Turks. In March Adrianople capitulated to the Bulgarians, and in April Scutari, the last Turkish stronghold on the Adriatic, surrendered to the Serbs. Finally, in May 1913, even Enver Pasha consented to accept the peace terms of the Balkan allies as amended by the Great Powers and incorporated in the treaty of London. The Ottoman Empire thereby formally yielded all its European territory except Constantinople and a narrow strip along the Dardanelles.

Treaty of
London

It was one thing to despoil the Ottoman Empire, and quite another to divide the booty. Here, the greed and mutual jealousy of the Balkan allies came into full play, and were further stimulated by conflicting policies and ambitions of the Great Powers. The triumph of the Balkan allies against the Turks was generally interpreted as a gain for the prestige of Russia and correspondingly as a blow to the prestige of Austria-Hungary and Germany. An enlarged pro-Russian Serbia would be menacing to the con-

¹ The Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912 had been confined to irregular but fierce fighting in Africa between an Italian military expedition on the one side and the Turkish garrisons and native tribesmen under the leadership of Enver Pasha on the other, and to an Italian naval expedition in the Ægean. Italy, after obtaining title to Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Barca) by the treaty of Lausanne, gave them the collective title of "Libya."

tinuing integrity of the Habsburg Empire with its large Yugoslav population in Bosnia and Croatia. Consequently Austria-Hungary was determined to prevent Serbia from reaping the fruits she expected from her victory over the Turks. For a time it seemed likely that a vast world war would immediately issue from the Balkan War, but a compromise was arranged by the Great Powers. Serbia was allowed to expand southward, but she was barred from the Adriatic by the erection of an independent state of Albania, over which a German prince would rule and in which Italy would have a privileged position.


But thereby, if a world war was staved off, another Balkan war was precipitated. For Serbia, deprived of the portion of Albania promised her in her treaty of alliance with Bulgaria, demanded "compensation" in that part of Macedonia which had been tentatively allotted to Bulgaria. This demand King Ferdinand was encouraged by Austria-Hungary and pressed by his own army-chiefs to refuse. In vain the Russian Tsar attempted to arbitrate between Bulgaria and Serbia. Both were unbending, and, complicating their feud, a bitter quarrel developed between Bulgaria and Greece over the disposition of Thrace. In June fighting began between Bulgaria on one side, and Serbia and Greece on the other; and soon the latter were reinforced by Rumania and the Ottoman Empire. Rumania, fearful of being overshadowed by a Greater Bulgaria, wanted to expand her own territory if the other Balkan states were expanding theirs, while the Turks perceived an opportunity to regain at least a portion of what they had lost by the treaty of London.

This second Balkan War was as brief as it was sorry. Within the single month of July 1913 the Turks recaptured Adrianople while armies from Rumania, Greece, and Serbia invaded Bulgaria and closed in upon Sofia. Unable to elicit any assistance from the Great Powers, who could not agree among themselves as to what should be done, King Ferdinand bowed to the inevitable and early in August concluded with the other Balkan states the treaty of Bucharest. Thereby the spoils of the previous war were distributed. To Serbia was assigned the greater part of Macedonia. To Greece were allotted Crete, southern Macedonia (including Salonica), and a section of western Thrace. To Bulgaria was left a bit of Macedonia and

**Balkan
War
against
Bulgaria,
1913**

**Treaty of
Bucharest**

the region of central Thrace down to the Ægean, though she was forced to cede her province of Dobruja to Rumania and subsequently to relinquish Adrianople to the Ottoman Empire.



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1914
Compare with maps on pages 180 and 195.

The Balkan Wars served to intensify the nationalism and stimulate the predatory ambitions of the several peoples and governments involved. The Bulgarians, embittered by the knowledge

that they had contributed most to the defeat of the Turks and yet had gotten least from it, were doubly eager to avail themselves of any opportunity to take revenge on Serbia and to appropriate Macedonia for themselves, and in the circumstances it was but natural that King Ferdinand should seek a close alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany and even with the Turks. The Turks, too, became rapidly more nationalist. Enver Pasha tightened his dictatorship, speeded up the process of "Turkification," and cemented the military and economic alliance with Germany.

Most ominous, however, was the impassioned attitude of the Serbs. Elated by their successive victories over Turks and Bulgarians, they evinced a fierce hostility against Austria-Hungary, which had snatched from them some of the fruits of their victory in the recent war and which stood squarely in the way of their ambition to unite Croats and Slovenes with themselves in a great national Yugoslavia.

It thus transpired that nationalism in the Balkans, as soon as it had despoiled the Ottoman Empire, menaced the Habsburg Empire with disruption. Vainly the statesmen of Austria-Hungary struggled to remove or lessen the menace. It became truly alarming in June 1914 when the heir of the Habsburg Emperor Francis Joseph was assassinated at Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by members of the Serbian "Black Hand."

Stimula-
tion of
Balkan
National-
ism

Serb
Menace
to Austria-
Hungary



PART VI
AN EMBATTLED AND
NATIONALIST WORLD

SINCE 1910

- XXIII. THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
- XXIV. THE WORLD WAR
- XXV. AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD WAR
- XXVI. DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS
- XXVII. INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DISORDER
- XXVIII. COSMOS AND CHAOS

CHAPTER XXIII

THE PROMISE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

I. ENLIGHTENED PROGRESS



RELIEF prevailed at the opening of the twentieth century that the world was making progress at a rapidly accelerating rate. An "enlightenment," dawning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had now reached bright noon-
CLIMAX OF ERA OF ENLIGHTENMENT
tide in a truly progressive age

of science, of increasing control over nature, of broadening personal liberty, of expanding democracy, of growing brotherhood of individuals and of nations. The Era of the Enlightenment seemed clearly to be drawing to a climax.

Science was at length triumphant. Its principles were now revered and exploited for the welfare of mankind. Under its beneficent sway, men could fly in the air, swim under the water, converse with one another wherever they might be, escape physical pain, lengthen their span of life, and possess knowledge and enjoy creature-comforts beyond the experience of any philosopher or prince of previous ages.

Machine industry was concurrently ascendant. It was now a common European phenomenon, and from Europe it was spreading out to the farthest corners of the earth, conferring inestimable benefits upon mankind. By aid of machinery human beings might produce more food than they could eat, more clothing than they could wear, more buildings than they could inhabit. They need fear famine and inclement weather no longer. They might have, indeed, not only the bare necessities of life but an abundance and range of luxuries which no king of earlier times, not even Louis XIV, had possessed, and a still more extraordinary leisure in which they might rest from toil and engage in play. Europe, once reputed a poor and sparse continent, was now rich and populous. Exclusive of

SCIENCE
MATERIAL COMFORT

an unprecedented emigration to America and Australasia, the number of Europeans doubled within a century until in 1910 they totalled over 400 million, representing a density of population more than twice that of Asia and ten times greater than America's or Africa's.

There appeared to be no longer any serious problem about the production of wealth. Machinery had solved it. There were, admittedly, some problems about the distribution of wealth. But these, too, it was confidently believed, must and would be solved shortly. Economic nationalism which Bismarck had championed in Germany and which was now being developed all over the Continent promised at least a partial solution of the problem of equitable wealth distribution, and the social legislation which Lloyd George and his fellow British Liberals were sponsoring pointed to a similar outcome. Marxian socialism was cocksure that it had a complete solution of the problem, and the rapid increase of its following during the first decade of the twentieth century was special proof of the optimism and millennial enthusiasm of the time.

Education, not merely of the classes, but of the masses, was being fostered as never before in the world's history. Universities were being reorganized and expanded, new ones founded, and attendance at them was multiplying. A host of professional schools and technical institutes were springing up. Public libraries were bulging with books and magazines. Newspapers were being printed and circulated in enormous quantities. Elementary schooling was compulsory in most countries, and secondary schooling becoming popular. In the next generation, it was prophesied, every European would be able to read and write; and with new leisure for self-improvement and new facilities for higher education, what an intelligent and informed race would issue forth! Enlightenment would be universal and progress assured.

Liberty was surely broadening out, and all those personal rights which for centuries had been denied men were now being written into solemn constitutions and sworn to as a permanent legacy of the enlightened age. Slavery was gone. Serfdom was gone. Even passports for travellers were going. True, the state was newly interfering in private business and abridging certain economic liberties; eco-

conomic nationalism, as we have elsewhere observed, was not really liberal.¹ Yet the trend toward basic personal liberties of conscience, worship, speech, publication, association, meeting, and profession was uninterrupted and apparently compelling. It was most manifest in western Europe, but with the spread of constitutionalism (and industrialization) it was making notable headway in the Habsburg Empire and even in the Empires of Russian Tsar and Turkish Sultan.

It seemed also that the Europe of the twentieth century must be democratic. Kings might remain as ornamental figureheads, but whatever the nominal form of government might be, whether royal or republican, it would almost certainly represent and be guided by the majority of the whole citizenry of the several nations. All this democratic movement was hailed as happy fruition of centuries of effort to get rid of despotism and oligarchy, and as unmistakable evidence that in the enlightened Europe of the new century the will of "the people" would everywhere prevail.

There still were wars—the Spanish-American, the South African, the Russo-Japanese, the Turco-Italian, the Balkan. But these were outside Europe or in "backward" regions of Europe. There still were some internal tumults—"revolutions" in Russia, in Turkey, in Portugal. But these too were in "backward" countries, and were accounted a result of temporary resistance to democratic progress. By and large, Europeans were now too intelligent, too educated, and too humane to wage vast destructive wars among themselves, and besides, under the new industrial order, any such war would be altogether too expensive. Just as the duel and the blood feud had disappeared, so there would be an end to the causes of revolution and a surcease of international war.

Such, in brief, were the principal items in the optimistic creed and program of influential leaders—and presumably of the masses—of Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century. The items were especially impressive and convincing, not only because they were obviously being realized in Europe, but also because the whole world was being Europeanized and with almost magical swiftness was undergoing conversion to the same optimistic creed. Imitation had always been the sincerest form of

Triumph
of Democ-
racy

War a
"Back-
ward"
Phenom-
enon

¹ See above, pp. 224-227.

flattery, and enlightened Europe was not reluctant to be the object of flattery.

2. EUROPEANIZATION OF THE WORLD

The process of Europeanizing the world—of making Europe the model for material and intellectual development in all the other continents—had been going on since the sixteenth century. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century, however, did it gather great momentum and give promise of speedy and universal realization. Toward providing the whole world with a common pattern of life and ideals, essentially European, greater progress was made during the forty years from 1870 to 1910 than during the four centuries previous.

The explanation of this phenomenon lies partially in Christian missionary enterprise, but far more in the Industrial Revolution and its attendant galvanizing of European economic (and political) activity. Both the capitalistic and the religious foundations of the European imperialism of the latter part of the nineteenth century we have indicated and discussed elsewhere.¹ Here we shall sketch its course and summarize its achievements, taking care to distinguish three major types of "Europeanization." One was represented on the American continents and in Australasia, South Africa, and northern Asia. This involved a large-scale colonization by European peoples and hence a transplanting of all the peculiar features of European culture. It was literally an "expansion of Europe." The second was exemplified in Asia and in northern Africa, where European civilization came into contact with other long-established civilizations, superimposing itself upon them and modifying them without destroying them. The third type of Europeanization appeared in central Africa and in South Sea islands. Here, primitive indigenous cultures were undermined by European political domination and economic exploitation with relative rapidity and yet without assistance from any considerable influx of European colonists.

If Europe is anything more than a geographical expression, then the American nations—and likewise Australia, New Zealand,

¹ On the economic aspects of the "new imperialism," see above, pp. 227-231, and on its religious aspects, see above, pp. 321-325.

South Africa,¹ and even Siberia and the Philippine Islands—are, and for a long time have been, as much a part of Europe as Britain, Spain, or Russia. Their languages are European. So are their religious beliefs, their social customs, their cultural traditions. Their histories are inextricably interwoven with Europe's. They have thought similar thoughts, cherished similar ideals, followed similar fashions, experienced similar vicissitudes. In the main they are European in blood; and if it be insisted that one or another of them includes such alien breeds as Negroes, Indians, Maoris, Mongols, or Malays, it should be recalled that these are Europeanized in every other respect and that racial purity does not exist in any nation on the continent of Europe. Altogether, the American countries—and the other regions mentioned—constitute with Europe a common area of Western, or European, civilization.

First
Type: Ex-
pansion of
Europe

Area of
"West-
ern" Civi-
lization

In 1914 the population of the American continents was little short of 200 million, half that of Europe. Of the total, a little more than 50 per cent were English-speaking, while the remaining 94 million were "Latin Americans"—speaking Spanish, Portuguese, or French.

American
Conti-
nents

Of self-governing Canada and Newfoundland, we have spoken elsewhere.² Here we merely remark the essentially European character of their society, politics, and culture. Of the United States, we shall speak only of outstanding developments which were strikingly similar to Europe's. The United States grew enormously in population during the nineteenth century, partly because of natural increase of the European stock that had come to it as colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, partly because of a similar increase of the African stock that had been imported as slaves, partly because of a swelling stream of new immigrants from Europe.³

United
States

¹ On the Europeanization of these British Dominions, see above, pp. 63-66, 366-376.

² See above, pp. 64-66, 367-369.

³ The number of European immigrants, amounting to 400,000 for the forty years from 1790 to 1830, totalled almost 20 million for the forty years from 1870 to 1910. The original stock, and most of the early immigration, was British. Beginning in the 1840's, large numbers came from Germany and Ireland, and, in the latter part of the century, from Scandinavia, Italy, Hungary, and the Slavic countries. In 1914, 15 per cent of the total population of the United States were foreign born, and 10 per cent Negroes.

Like Europe, the United States was nationalistic. It sought, with noteworthy success, to "Americanize" all its inhabitants—immigrants and Negroes as well as original white stock—which meant that they were Europeanized in a particular English fashion and with special devotion to their own national government and history. English was the unifying language, and English were the common literary traditions, though at the same time the political and social developments were regarded as peculiarly "American." Like western Europe, moreover, the United States evolved and applied on a gigantic scale a system of free public schools, by means of which illiteracy was almost completely done away with and patriotism promoted. Like Europe, the United States became ever more democratic in the form and operation of its political institutions. Qualifications of religion and property were gradually abolished and universal manhood suffrage was introduced about the same time as in France. Two major political parties alternated in the conduct of the national government, just as in England, though the United States was more sluggish than England in giving rise to a third, "Labor," party. And the United States, like Germany and Italy, was doomed to fight, at about the same time, a great war of national unification—the Civil War, or "War between the States," of 1861-1865.

The United States felt the same intellectual currents as did Europe, and almost if not quite at the same periods. First, it shared in the mid-century vogue of liberalism and romanticism, under whose twin influence it inaugurated a distinctively "American" literature, realized the ideal of "free churches in a free state," elaborated the freedom of education, and waged a crusade against Negro slavery. Subsequently, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it participated in the European drift toward "realism" and economic nationalism, adopting high tariff protectionism, enacting some labor legislation, going in for the newer navalism and overseas imperialism, and in its literature beginning to indulge in "muck-raking," in sociology and psychology.

NOTE. The picture opposite, entitled "Promenade in the Forest," is from a typical painting by Henri Rousseau (1844-1910). Rousseau, a petty customs official, without any formal training in art, painted many "primitive" pictures, which were frequently ridiculed but which have had a vogue and considerable influence on "modern" art. Rousseau's fondness for tropical forests, evinced in almost all his pictures, was derived from his experience as a young soldier with the French army in Mexico in the 1860's.

Following the example of European Great Powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—the United States at the end of the nineteenth century embarked on definitely imperialist policies. Hawaii was appropriated in 1898. In 1899–1900 the Samoan Islands were partitioned with Germany and Britain. In 1898 was brought on the Spanish-American War, eventuating in the annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines and in a virtual protectorate over Cuba. In 1900, in coöperation with European Powers, a military expedition was sent into China. In 1901 a native revolt in the Philippines was suppressed by force. In 1903, the separation of Panama from Colombia was engineered, and across the isthmus a “zone” was acquired in which the Panama Canal was promptly built.

The Latin American nations were essentially European too, though their cultural ties were with another part of Europe from that with which the United States was most intimately connected. In one respect they were less “European” than the United States; that was in blood. Whereas the vast majority of the inhabitants of the United States (and Canada) were of European stock, a very large proportion of the inhabitants of most Latin American countries had aboriginal Indian or Negro blood in their veins. There had not been in Latin America the wholesale extinction of Indians or the strong feeling against racial intermixture which characterized “Anglo-Saxon” America. In the West Indies and along the coasts of the Caribbean, Negro blood predominated, while in Mexico, Central America, and a large part of South America most of the “common people” were Indians or cross-breeds. Only the wealthy upper classes were apt to be “pure” Spanish or Portuguese.

Latin
America

Yet, though many Indians preserved their tribal speech and customs, the prevailing civilization all over Latin America was unmistakably European and Latin. The language of officialdom, of schools, armies, courts, newspapers, and of polite society, was Spanish or Portuguese, and the only publicly professed religion of any importance was Catholic Christianity. Like Latin Europe, too, Latin America was predominantly agricultural, and in politics it presented marked resemblances to Spain and Portugal.

NOTE. The picture opposite, “Building the Panama Canal,” is from the painting of the American artist Jonas Lie (born 1880). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York.

There was the same indifference of the masses to ordinary political action, the same supremacy of particular classes and professional politicians, the same cliques of "liberals" and "anti-clericals," or of "conservatives" and "clericals," the same preponderant influence of army officers, the same tendencies toward dictatorship and sudden revolution. All the Latin-American governments were republican in form, but presidents were usually superior to constitutions and rifles more decisive than ballots.

The Latin tradition was sustained and reënforced, moreover, by a steady immigration from Latin Europe, especially from Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and also by an habitual sending of the sons of the upper classes to institutions of higher learning in Spain or France. This meant a strengthening of cultural ties between Latin Europe and Latin America, and more particularly a familiarity of the governing groups in most Latin-American countries with the latest Parisian ideas and fashions.

Then, too, Latin America was increasingly dependent on Europe—and on the United States—in the economic sphere. It remained overwhelmingly agricultural at a time when most of the "Western" world was undergoing intensive industrialization. It grew surpluses of coffee, wheat, cattle, sugar, tropical fruit, etc., the markets for which were in North America and Europe; and for the development of its agriculture, for the exploitation of its natural resources—notably its mines and oil-wells—and for the development of its armies and public works, it sought loans in Paris, London, or New York and granted "concessions" to European or North American corporations.

Nationalism played a somewhat different rôle in Latin America—at least in Spanish America—from what it played in the

<p>Nations of Latin America</p>	<p>United States or in Latin Europe. Instead of uniting a linguistic nationality in a single national state, it confirmed the political separatism of an earlier day and fostered rivalry among a gradually increasing number of proudly sovereign states. The Portuguese-speaking people of South America managed to hold together and to emphasize their unity in the federal state of Brazil, but the Spanish-speaking population of the New World had begun their independent political career as eight distinct nations, and within a century the number swelled to eighteen. The eight which emerged from the Wars of Independence of 1810-1825 were: Mexico, Central</p>
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America, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile. In 1828 Uruguay revolted against Argentina, and after resisting Brazilian aggression established its independence in 1830. From Colombia seceded Venezuela in 1829, Ecuador in 1830, and Panama, much later, in 1903. In the 1840's Central America broke up into the five separate republics of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Costa Rica, while Santo Domingo became a state distinct from Haiti. Cuba, after repeated revolts and the intervention of the United States, gained general recognition as an independent republic in 1899. Each of the eighteen Spanish republics, thus established, had a distinctive nationalism of its own, and likewise the Portuguese republic of Brazil and the French Negro republic of Haiti.

The largest and in many ways the most important of the Latin-American nations was Portuguese-speaking Brazil. Its area exceeded that of continental United States (exclusive of Alaska), and its population rose from 4 million in 1830 to over 30 million in 1910. Its economic resources and development were remarkable. By 1914 it was furnishing almost three-fourths of the world's coffee, exporting large amounts of timber and minerals and meat, and producing manufactured goods of an annual value of half a billion dollars.

The political foundations for this economic progress had been laid by a monarchical régime, which had been established by a branch of the Portuguese royal family in 1822,¹ and which lasted, as the Empire of Brazil, from that date to 1889. Especially helpful was the long reign of the Emperor Pedro II (1831-1889), an enlightened prince and inveterate reformer. The slave trade was abolished in 1853, and Negro slavery, abated in 1871, was ended, without civil war, in 1888. In 1889, however, the Empire of Pedro II was abruptly overthrown. Influential landlords resented the loss of their slaves, and army officers chafed at the subordinate position in which the Emperor kept them. The latter therefore supported the Republic which one of their number, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, proclaimed in November 1889, and the former offered no resistance. Pedro and his family were exiled. State and church were separated.

¹ On the establishment of the Brazilian Empire by Pedro I in 1822, see Vol. I, pp. 781-782. On the relationship of the Brazilian Emperors to the Portuguese royal family, see the table, in the present volume, at p. 432.

A republican constitution, modelled closely after that of the United States, was adopted in 1891.


Fonseca might profess liberalism and democracy, but actually his régime was a military dictatorship and one of scandalous corruption. In 1891 he was overthrown by another army chief-tain, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, who in turn had to deal in 1893 with a stubborn insurrection of still other military and naval officers. Following the retirement of Peixoto in 1894, the republican government passed into civilian hands and gradually gained stability and respect.

Of the Spanish-American states, the foremost, in one way or another, were Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Argentina, during the first half of the nineteenth century, was a prey to civil war and military dictatorship, but from 1862, under a more orderly republican régime, it significantly gained in population and in material well-being. It became a great grain-growing and meat-producing country, and its capital city of Buenos Aires became the metropolis of the southern hemisphere and one of the most beautiful and cultured urban centres in the world. In military and naval strength, Argentina ranked with its neighbors, Brazil and Chile, forming with them the so-called group of A-B-C Powers.

Chile, occupying the long narrow strip of territory along the Pacific west of Argentina and the Andes, achieved fairly early a kind of political stability. The civil government, republican in form, was conducted most of the time by the conservative upper classes in harmony with the military. Education was fostered, agriculture and commerce promoted, art cultivated, and the cities of Santiago and Valparaiso developed. As an outcome of a war with Bolivia and Peru in 1879-1883, Chilean rule was extended northward over the provinces of Tacna and Arica, with their rich nitrate deposits.

Mexico was the most populous of all the Spanish-American states; though exceeded in area by Argentina, it had twice as many inhabitants. Yet Mexico was relatively "backward," exemplifying in an extreme form the traditional social cleavage which to some extent characterized all Latin America. Most of the country's basic agriculture was conducted on extensive plantations, which were owned and exploited by an upper class of cultured well-to-do persons, Spanish





in descent and tradition and influential in state and church, and on which lived and toiled a lower class of ignorant, poverty-stricken peasants—or “peons,” as they were called—largely Indian in blood and servile in condition. Among the upper class emerged the usual divisions of conservative and liberal, clerical and anti-clerical, but such divisions ordinarily meant little to the lower class. In the 1850's and 1860's, it is true, Benito Juarez, a full-blooded Indian and a declared champion of the lower class, led a revolutionary movement and succeeded in overcoming French interference and in putting the intruded Emperor Maximilian to death (1867).¹ Juarez, nevertheless, displayed far more energy in fighting “reactionaries” and promulgating decrees against the Catholic Church than in improving the lot of the peons. And his successor, Porfirio Diaz, who was virtual dictator of the country from 1877 to 1911, though less hostile to the church, was not at all concerned with social reform.

In certain respects Mexico made progress under Diaz. Foreign capital was employed for the construction of railways and the development of the country's mineral and oil resources. Fiscal reforms were instituted and general administration improved. Some Mexicans waxed wealthy, and likewise a considerable number of American, British, and other foreign investors. But in measure as Mexico was brought into contact with the outside world and as Diaz aged and became more despotic, Mexican “liberals” multiplied and the Indian masses grew restless. At length in 1910, a wealthy landowner, Francisco Madero, raised the standard of constitutionalism and agrarian reform and, with several disaffected army officers, took the field against Diaz. Diaz resigned and fled to Europe, and Madero was made president—without accomplishing any agrarian reform, however. Then a counter-revolutionary movement ensued; General Victoriano Huerta overcame Madero and had him put to death in 1914. Next, revolutionary satellites of Madero, with the support of the United States, overthrew Huerta (1915), and, after much quarreling and fighting among themselves and an armed intervention by the United States, one of them, Venustiano Carranza, got the upper hand, and under his auspices a new constitution was adopted in 1917 and drastic anti-clerical legislation enacted. But

¹ See above, pp. 142-143.

not until later when the "Mexican Revolution" took on a more radical complexion, was social reform seriously attempted.¹

Conditions similar to those in Mexico existed in most of the lesser Latin American states. But their economic backwardness and political revolutions must not be allowed to overshadow the very real European civilization which obtained throughout Latin America.

In Asia, the greatest of all the world's continents, European influence had been continuously exerted since the sixteenth century, but in only two parts of Asia did it produce such a fundamental Europeanization in language and culture as was simultaneously produced in America. One part was the northern plain—the vast expanse of Siberia—into which Russian colonists trickled during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and poured during the

Western
Civiliza-
tion in
Two Re-
gions of
Asia

1. Siberia

eighteenth and nineteenth, bringing with them Russian speech, Russian customs, Russian Christianity, and the rule of the Russian Tsars. In the frozen "far north" of Siberia and in the desert regions to the south, primitive tribes remained; but by the latter part of the nineteenth century Siberia as a whole was quite Russian and was rapidly expanding.

The other fundamentally Europeanized part of Asia was the Philippine archipelago, which, subject to Spanish rule from 1565 to 1898, experienced a development similar to Spanish America's. There was much racial intermixture, and the emerging "Filipino" nationality, though predominantly Malay in blood, was Spanish in speech, Catholic in religion, and Latin European in culture. Some Moslem and some pagan tribesmen remained, it is true, in out-of-the-way islands of the archipelago, and its conquest by the United States introduced a new and alien rule. Yet neither of these circumstances could alter the basic fact that on the whole the Philippines were as European as, say, Mexico or South Africa.

2. Philip- pines

The vast region of India and the East Indian Islands of Sumatra, Java, and Celebes had been in contact with European Powers—Portugal, the Netherlands, France, or England—for as long a time as the Philippines had been subject to Spain, or Siberia to Russia. Until the nineteenth century, however, the

¹ See below, pp. 789-792.

contact was primarily commercial, and secondarily political. With the exception of certain centres on the Malabar coast of India, whither Portuguese colonists and missionaries came in the sixteenth century, familiarizing natives with the Portuguese language and converting them to Catholic Christianity, there was no real Europeanization of a cultural sort. The population of India was altogether too numerous and too deeply rooted in its own complex culture to be much affected in this respect by the presence of European merchants or "governors" in a few coastal cities.

Second
Type of
European-
ization:
Superim-
posing
Western
on other
Civiliza-
tions

In the nineteenth century, European influence was enormously extended and quickened in India—and in other parts of Asia too—as an accompaniment of the Industrial Revolution. With the rapidly increasing eagerness of the industrialized nations of Europe to secure raw materials, to sell manufactured commodities, and to invest surplus capital, and with their greatly improved means of establishing and exercising overseas imperial sway, European merchants were no longer content with limited coast traffic in Asia or with cumbersome dealings of chartered commercial companies with native princes and potentates. They must penetrate inland, building railways, stringing telegraph wires, accustoming natives to machine-made goods and machine-age civilization; and all these things they could accomplish more satisfactorily if their particular national state in Europe acquired supremacy throughout the economically backward area. Industrialized European nations now had naval and military establishments and financial resources adequate to bring Asiatic rulers to terms.

Stimu-
lated by
Industrial
Revolu-
tion

Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a new European imperialism was inspired and expedited in India and indeed over the greater part of the huge Asiatic continent and its adjacent large islands. It involved, in many areas, an expansion and intensification of direct European rule, and, on a wider front and even more significantly, it served to spread European material civilization and European political ideas on top of the abiding linguistic, religious, and social cultures of the several Asiatic peoples. In a word, there was now a material Europeanization of Asia.

Applied
on Large
Scale in
Asia

How the British constructed and ruled the Empire of India

has elsewhere been explained.¹ Here we shall merely catalogue the acquisitions of Asiatic territory by European Powers, and then pass on to a summary consideration of the Europeanization of Japan and China, with a few supplementary words about Siam and the Moslem regions of the "Middle East."

Great Britain added to her Indian Empire in the 1880's Burma and Baluchistan. In southeastern Asia she bordered Singapore and Malacca with the Federated Malay States (1874, 1909) and across the sea to the east appropriated a third of the island of Borneo (1881-1888). In southwestern Asia, she acquired between 1839 and 1901 a series of protectorates from Aden at the foot of the Red Sea to Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf, and by agreement with Russia in 1907 a "sphere of influence" in southern Persia. From China she wrested Hongkong in 1842, leased Weihaiwei in 1898, and shortly afterwards obtained a privileged position in Tibet and the Yangtze valley. At the opening of the twentieth century, Britain governed a third of the whole population of Asia.

France, besides continuing to hold a few trading posts on the coast of India, built up an empire of Indo-China. In 1896 she delimited with Great Britain "spheres of influence" in Siam, and in 1899 she leased Kwangchow from China and obtained a privileged position in the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Hainan. By 1914 France ruled twenty million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Buddhists.

The Dutch East Indian empire, whose administration had been transferred from the Dutch East India Company to the government of the Netherlands in 1798, was greatly extended and solidified through the conquest and exploitation of the interior of the islands of Sumatra, Java, Celebes, of two-thirds of Borneo, and of a half of New Guinea. Java alone had almost four times the area and population of the Netherlands. Altogether the Dutch Netherlands in 1914 dominated fifty-four million Asiatics, the majority of whom were Moslems.

Portugal still maintained a few trading posts in India and the port of Macao in China. Germany in the 1880's took possession of 70,000 square miles of northeastern New Guinea, rechristening it Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and in 1898 leased from China the port of Kiaochow, with 200

¹ See above, pp. 66-67, 379-383.

square miles. Russia held Siberia and pushed its frontier, in the second half of the nineteenth century, through Turkestan and other regions of west-central Asia to the borders of India, Afghanistan, and Persia, and in 1907, by agreement with Great Britain, obtained a "sphere of influence" in northern Persia. By 1910, over a third of the area of Asia was immediately subject to Russia. In addition, we may note that the United States, by its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, acquired near the Asiatic continent the Philippines, with an area of 100,000 square miles and a population of ten million.

By Americans

Altogether, in the first decade of the twentieth century, almost three-fifths of the entire area of Asia (and adjacent Malaysia) was ruled by European Powers (including the United States), and a little over four-ninths of the total population of 925 million. In other words, the number of Asiatics subject to direct European influence of a governmental sort was larger than the total population of Europe itself.

Still nominally independent of European rule were two sections of Asia: the "Far Eastern" countries of China, Japan, and Siam, together comprising a little more than a quarter of the area, and about half the population, of the Continent; and the "Middle Eastern" regions of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia, embracing together a little less than one-seventh the area and one-twenty-third the population of the continent. But all these lands were now being influenced by European material civilization as they had never been before. Japan, in particular, was already a Great Power in the European sense, more strikingly Europeanized in government, industry, and armaments than any Asiatic country actually administered by Europeans.

Remaining "Independent" Countries

There had been some European commercial and missionary penetration of Japan back in the sixteenth century.¹ Portuguese traders had "discovered" Japan in 1542, and Francis Xavier, a famous Jesuit, had inaugurated Catholic missions there in 1549. By the end of the century Japanese converts to Christianity numbered 300,000; and Spaniards and Dutchmen were competing with Portuguese for Japanese trade. Presently, however, the major native princes and the leading

Japan

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 72, 77, 392.

exponents of native religion (Buddhism or Shinto) became alarmed lest their influence should be undermined, and their power destroyed, by the ambition and intrigue of Europeans. In 1587 foreign priests were ordered to leave the country on penalty of death, and in 1614 Christianity was definitively banned. In 1624 Spanish merchants, as well as missionaries, were excluded, and in 1638 Portuguese. Thousands of native Christian converts were put to death, and commercial intercourse with the outside world was rigidly restricted to one closely supervised station to which a few Dutch ships might come. Otherwise no foreigner might enter Japan, while absolutely no native might go abroad and no ocean-going ships might be constructed. For over two centuries, from 1638 to 1853, Japan was practically cut off from Europe, and Europe from Japan.

The "reopening" of Japan to European influence was an outcome of a naval expedition, under Commodore Matthew Perry, which the United States despatched to the Far East in 1853 with instructions to secure from the Japanese government a pledge of protection for American trade. The Japanese were duly impressed by the spectacle of Perry's four warships steaming into Uruga Bay near Yokohama, still more impressed by the sewing machines and other devices which he exhibited as samples of Western industrial civilization, and most impressed by the sight and sound of the big grim cannon which his ships carried as the final proof of Western superiority. So vastly impressed, indeed, was the Japanese governing prince that in 1854 he signed with Perry a treaty, by which Japan promised to allow American merchantmen to visit two ports. Very shortly, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Russia obtained similar privileges. Then, in 1859, another envoy from the United States, Townsend Harris, negotiated a new treaty whereby the port of Yokohama was opened to American commerce. And, again, similar treaty rights were soon accorded to merchants of other foreign countries.

The prince who signed these commercial treaties in the name of Japan was not the sovereign of the country, but only the hereditary chief official (or "Shogun") of the Emperor (or "Mikado"). The Mikados belonged to a "divine" family which was supposed to have sprung from a sun-goddess and to have

reigned in Japan continuously since the seventh century B.C.¹ Being so very sacred, they had long since taken to living in ceremonial seclusion in the "holy city" of Kyoto and leaving the exercise of regal authority to one or another of the feudal princes—or "daimios"—of the realm, who thus was styled the Shogun. Since the end of the sixteenth century the daimio of the Tokugawa clan had been the Shogun, and to keep himself in power he had had to wage war repeatedly with other daimios.

The Shogun's action in "opening" Japan to foreigners in the 1850's was resented by other daimios and by the Mikado as a sacrilegious reversal of traditional policy, and was utilized by them to undermine the Shogun's authority and to reassert the Mikado's. But even the anti-foreign sentiment of daimios and Mikado was altered when, in 1863-1864, bombardments of Japanese ports proved the effectiveness of Western gunnery and the inability of Japan to defend herself unless she possessed the Western type of cannon. Hence daimios who had recently been most vehement in reviling "European barbarians" now suddenly changed their tune and began to insist that Japan should freely admit the Westerners, learn from them, and excel them in their own arts. At the same time they retained their hostility to the Shogun and demanded that the powers which he had been exercising should be restored to the Mikado.

The ensuing agitation against the Shogun thus involved a demand for an assimilation of Western civilization and likewise a mounting enthusiasm for national unification under the Mikado and for the national religion of Shinto of which he was at once the sacred representative and the chief object of worship. It eventuated in the Japanese Revolution of 1867-1868. The last of the Shoguns was compelled to abdicate and to retire into private life, and the youthful but able Mikado, Mutsuhito, was made actual as well as titular monarch of Japan. By a remarkable act of patriotism, the chief daimios surrendered to him their respective feudal rights and possessions, and the lesser nobles followed their example. Then in 1871 feudalism was formally abolished by imperial decree. The ex-daimios and certain other leaders in the revolution were rewarded with new titles of nobility borrowed

Japanese
Revolution of
1867-1868

¹ There is solid historical evidence that it has reigned since at least the fifth century A.D.

from European usage and with high offices and ample salaries under the new centralized government. The peasants were freed from servile dues and made owners of the land they tilled and immediate subjects of the Empire.

Under Mutsuhito (1867-1912) Japan was rapidly Europeanized, militarily, politically, and educationally. Young Japanese were sent to Europe (and America) to observe and study. Europeans (and Americans) were welcomed to Japan. Christian missions were tolerated. Foreign trade was encouraged. European counsel was eagerly sought, and European models closely followed, in modernizing the political, economic, and military institutions of the country. The Japanese army was reorganized in the 1870's on the Prussian pattern, and a navy was constructed in accordance with British advice. Codes of civil and criminal law were fashioned after those of France and Germany. A public-school system of the "Western" type was established, and universities were set up at Tokio and Kyoto. In 1889 the Emperor promulgated a constitution, vesting legislative power in a bicameral parliament, the upper chamber being aristocratic and the lower "liberal" that is, elected by the propertied classes.

Simultaneously the material civilization of Europe (and America) was making swift progress in Japan. The first railway, steeling the eighteen miles from Tokio to Yokohama, was opened in 1872. By 1914 Japan had 6,000 miles of railway, almost all of which were owned by the state. Moreover, within fifteen years of the repeal of the old law prohibiting the construction of seagoing ships, Japan had 138 such vessels, and by 1914 her merchant marine exceeded the French in tonnage and was plying to Europe, America, Australia, and India. The cotton industry, which was non-existent in Japan prior to 1880, grew so fast that in 1914 Japanese cotton factories contained two and a half million spindles, which turned out 550 million pounds of yarn.

The foregoing figures testify that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, Japan experienced (like Europe and the United States) the Industrial Revolution. And with it emerged trade unions and serious labor problems as well as business corporations and high finance. Industrial bourgeoisie combined with agricultural aristocracy to

direct governmental policies, and workingmen became infected with imported principles of political democracy and even of Marxian socialism.

In part because Japan was imitating so many other features of European development, in part because her industrialists were anxious to extend their operations and add to their profits, and in part because her population was cramped and uneasy and her army officers ambitious and ultra-patriotic, the Japanese government was not content merely to Europeanize the homeland. It must perform the imperialistic mission of propagating its own brand of Europeanization, and incidentally of expanding its own military and political sway, in the Far East. Early in the 1890's, Japan began seriously to meddle in Chinese affairs, and in the resulting Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 she detached Korea from the Chinese Empire and acquired the island of Formosa. She would likewise have acquired Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula had not Russia, with the backing of France and Germany, intervened and stopped her.

Chino-
Japanese
War of
1894

It soon became clear that Russia had designs of her own on Port Arthur and also on Manchuria and Korea; and at length in 1904 she went to war with Russia. For this, her first struggle with a European Power, Japan was well prepared. She had the advantage, moreover, of being relatively near to the scene of hostilities and of commanding the united loyalty and intense patriotism of her whole population. The story of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 has been sketched elsewhere.¹ Here it suffices to note that, by the treaty of Portsmouth terminating the war, Japan took over from Russia the lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung peninsula, reacquired the southern part of the island of Sakhalin which she had ceded to Russia back in 1875, and obtained from Russia a pledge of political disinterestedness in Korea and Manchuria.

Russo-
Japanese
War of
1904

With Russia out of the way and with the support of Great Britain (which had been in alliance with Japan since 1902),² Japanese officials and financiers proceeded with a "peaceful penetration" of Korea, until in 1910 its native ruler was deposed and it was formally incorporated, under the name of "Chosen,"

¹ See above, pp. 480-481.

² See below, p. 557 and note.

with the Japanese Empire. The territory thus annexed, about twice as large as the American state of Ohio and thrice as populous, was valuable as a granary for Japan, a market for Japanese goods, and a field of investment for Japanese capitalists.

**Japanese
Annexa-
tion of
Korea,
1910**

The Chinese Empire, though "opened" to European trade and influence somewhat earlier than Japan, was much more sluggish in undergoing Europeanization. In considerable part this was attributable to the size of the Empire and to the peculiar nature of its civilization. In area and in population it was approximately equal to the entire continent of Europe. The large majority of its 375 million inhabitants dwelt along the river valleys of the Hoang (or Yellow), the Yangtze, and the Si, and were included within the eighteen provinces of China proper, which territorially constituted about a third of the Empire as a whole.

**Chinese
Empire**

**China
Proper**

China proper was the core of the Empire. But there were numerous outlying provinces. (1) Manchuria, to the north, had been united with China in the seventeenth century when an ambitious Manchu warrior had supplanted the native dynasty of Chinese Emperors. Since then, a Manchu dynasty had ruled the whole Empire. (2) The Amur coastal district, north of Korea, was a relatively undeveloped dependency of the Empire. (3) Mongolia, to the north-west of China proper, was a vast territory almost seven times the size of France but with fewer people than Paris and these chiefly nomadic. "Inner Mongolia" adjoining Manchuria, was under the immediate rule of the Manchu Emperors of China, but "Outer Mongolia" was too remote and too unruly, and, although a Chinese agent was maintained at Urga, the hereditary khans were practically independent. (4) Sinkiang, in the far west of the Empire, embraced the regions of Eastern Turkestan and Kuldja. (5) Tibet, south of Sinkiang (and west of China proper), was another vast and sparsely settled region. At its capital of Lhasa resided the Buddhist "pope," the Dalai Lama, whom the Tibetans regarded as their religious head and ultimate authority. The Empire was represented by a few Chinese officials and some Chinese soldiers.


**Man-
churia**


Mongolia


Sinkiang

Tibet


Altogether, the Chinese Empire was vast, yet notably persistent.







The
Chinese
Empire
1910



If any European analogy is sought, it may be found in the ancient Roman Empire rather than in any modern state.

There had been some intercourse of Europe with the Chinese Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹ It had been primarily commercial and secondarily religious. Europeans had met Chinese Emperors and officials, had traded in Chinese sea-ports, and had converted some Chinese to Christianity. But these achievements had been spasmodic and relatively unimportant. They had not affected the mass of the Chinese people or appreciably altered the traditional course or content of Chinese civilization. In the seventeenth century, China, like Japan, had banned Christian missionaries and all but banned European merchants.

In the nineteenth century, however, China was forcefully "opened" and kept open by the newly industrialized Great Powers of Europe. The process began in 1840 with the so-called **Opium War of 1840** waged by Great Britain against the Chinese Empire. It grew out of a quarrel between the Chinese government, which had forbidden the importation of opium, and British traders at Canton, who persisted in bringing opium from India into China. It was marked by British bombardment and capture of several Chinese cities on the coast, and was terminated by the treaty of Nanking (1842) in accordance with which the four ports of Amoy, Ningpo, Foo-chow, and Shanghai, in addition to Canton, were opened to British traders, the island and city of Hongkong were ceded outright to Britain, and China had to pay a war indemnity. The fruits of British victory were soon shared with other Western nations—American, French, Belgian, Prussian, Dutch, and Portuguese—for the governments of these nations during the next decade obtained similar treaty privileges for their citizens.

In 1856 both France and Great Britain made war on China, the former to avenge the murder of a missionary and the latter on the ground that the crew of a ship sailing under the British flag had been arrested and jailed as pirates by a Chinese official. The British again occupied Canton, while a combined Franco-British military expedition captured the defences of Tientsin and advanced toward Peking, the Emperor's capital. Only after protracted negotiations and the arrival of the expedition at the very gates of Peking was the

**Second
Chinese
War of
1856**

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 66, 69-70, 72, 77, 392.

Second Chinese War ended by the treaties of Tientsin (1860). China now agreed to open six additional ports (including Tientsin) to foreign trade, to legalize the opium traffic, to receive foreign ministers at Peking, to tolerate and protect Christian missionaries, and to guaranty the safety of Europeans travelling in the interior.

In 1860, the very year of the Emperor's yielding to Britain and France, Russia extorted from him the Amur coastal district in the far northeast, and here she founded Vladivostok and used it as a point for radiating her influence in Manchuria.

Russian
Aggres-
sion, 1860

More steps toward the dismemberment of the Chinese Empire were taken in the 1890's. They were inaugurated by the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, already referred to, as an outcome of which the Empire was compelled to cede Formosa and the Liaotung peninsula (within striking distance of the capital city of Peking) to Japan and to renounce suzerainty over Korea. Russia at once stepped in, as we know, with the support of Germany and France, and prevented Japan from taking the strategically important peninsula of Liaotung. But this action signified no tender regard on the part of Western Powers for the integrity of the Chinese Empire. Only three years later (1898), Russia wrung from the Emperor a "leasehold" of Liaotung (including Port Arthur) for herself, and with it numerous economic concessions in Manchuria. In the same year, Germany, on the pretext of indemnifying herself for the murder of two missionaries of German nationality, acquired a similar ninety-nine-year lease of Kiaochow and similar economic concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung. Also, in the same year, France demanded and obtained a like lease of Kwangchow and like economic rights in the island of Hainan and the mainland provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan. Great Britain, not to be left behind by her imperialist rivals of Continental Europe, made due representations at Peking, eventuating in a lease of the port of Weihaiwei, opposite Port Arthur, "for as long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the possession of Russia," in an additional ninety-nine-year lease of the Kowloon peninsula, opposite Hongkong, and in the recognition of Britain's "privileged position" in the Yangtze valley.

Subsequently, in 1904-1905, as we have learned, Russia and

Japan warred over their respective shares in the "dismemberment" of the Chinese Empire. Russia was forced to surrender the Liaotung peninsula to Japan and to give Japan a free hand in Korea. Shortly afterwards, however, Japan and Russia were agreeably delimiting "spheres of influence" between themselves throughout the northern area of the Empire. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and acquired railway concessions in Manchuria. Russia in 1913 obtained a virtual protectorate over Outer Mongolia.

In the meantime, between 1842 and 1912, and more especially from the 1890's, European influence was progressively affecting the Chinese Empire in different ways and by various means. The "opening" of China proper to foreign trade, missionary enterprise, and financial investment, as well as the transfer of outlying provinces to foreign rule and the lease of seaports to foreign Powers, brought into the country a steadily augmenting number of Europeans (and Japanese), with Western customs and ideas. From the "treaty ports," in which Europeans had their own settlements and law courts, and from the Catholic and Protestant missions, which gradually dotted the interior as well as the coast and with which were associated schools, hospitals, and orphanages, and from the official representatives of Western nations, radiated ever more widely a knowledge of European industry, European politics, European "progress," and a desire to emulate the West in all these respects. The peasant masses were least touched—there was such a multitude of them! and they were so habituated to old customs! But in the cities were "Western" stirrings, and ambitious young natives began to go abroad, observing and studying the West in its universities and commercial centres, and to return imbued with patriotism and a conviction that China, like Japan, to save herself, must be "Westernized."

In the economic sphere some Westernization was obviously going forward. The value of Chinese foreign trade grew from 215 million dollars in 1875 to 608 million in 1914,¹ and by the latter date some 6,000 miles of railway were in operation within the Empire and 2,300 miles more under construction.

In other respects, nevertheless, the Westernization of China

¹ Most of the tonnage of foreign shipping was distributed in 1913 as follows: Great Britain, 38,120,000; Japan, 23,422,000; Germany, 6,320,000; France, 1,233,000; the United States, 900,000; and Norway, 740,000.

European
Influence
in China

was seriously impeded by the enormous size of the country and the bitterness of the popular reaction against "Back-ward-ness" of Chinese Government chronic interference and aggression of the European Great Powers and Japan, and by the unwillingness or inability of the Chinese government to adopt and pursue any such revolutionary program as had enabled Japan to become politically and militarily European. The Chinese Empire was presided over by the Manchu dynasty, originally alien to the real Chinese and now seemingly decadent. The Emperor Kuang Hsü (1875-1908) was a small boy when he ascended the throne and, though he was hailed as "the son of Heaven" and surrounded with the utmost pomp, he remained a weakling, dependent upon the reactionary advice of court mandarins, upon the uncertain support of a corrupt group of military chieftains and civil governors, and upon the vigorous but capricious promptings of his aunt, the Empress Dowager, Tz'ü Hsi, who had been regent during his minority. Had it not been for this remarkable old lady, the Manchu dynasty would not have lasted as long as it did, and she was the personification of hostility to "Europe" and the "West."

Following the Chino-Japanese War and just when all the European Great Powers seemed most intent on dismembering his Empire (1898), Kuang Hsü surprised everyone by issuing a series of reforming decrees. The imperial bureaucracy was to be reorganized and Westernized. An imperial university and a system of schools were to be established for the study of modern European science as well as ancient Chinese classics. A central cabinet of ministers of the European type was to be instituted, and corresponding changes wrought in the high command of the army. These decrees aroused a storm of opposition from officials, civil and military, who by conviction or interest were wedded to the old order and also from some moderate reformers who thought the action of the Emperor too precipitate. The Empress Dowager Tz'ü Hsi put herself at the head of the opposition and coöperated with a prominent army general, Yüan Shih-kai, to effect a palace revolution in September 1898. Kuang Hsü was practically imprisoned, and obliged to assent to the restoration of a regency under Tz'ü Hsi. For the next ten years the crafty forceful Dowager Empress was

**Reform
Edicts of
Emperor
Kuang
Hsü**

**Reaction
under
Empress
Tz'ü Hsi**

the ruler of China, and the nominal Emperor a shadowy figure in the seclusion of the palace.

Tz'ü Hsi promptly annulled the réform decrees, put several reformers to death, and announced her intention of combating all foreign influences. Encouraged by her attitude, reactionaries throughout the Empire gave vent to their hatred of foreigners, and the more violent among them formed a body known as "Righteous Patriotic Fists," or "Boxers," who attacked the property of aliens and massacred Christian missionaries and their Chinese converts.

**Boxer
Move-
ment and
Its Sup-
pression**

In the spring of 1900 Boxer outrages occurred in all the major cities and reached a climax at Peking, where the German minister was killed and the foreign residents were closely besieged and threatened with extermination. Whereupon an international military expedition, comprising soldiers or marines of Russia, Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, hastily assembled at Tientsin, fought its way to Peking, and put the Chinese troops to rout and the imperial court to flight. In 1901 Tz'ü Hsi reluctantly accepted the Allied terms of peace: China would pay to the several Powers indemnities totalling 333 million dollars, would safeguard foreigners and foreign interests within her territories, and, as a precautionary measure, would permit foreign Powers to maintain armed forces for self-protection at Peking and Tientsin.

The reactionary policy of Tz'ü Hsi thus proved worse than a failure, and henceforth the somewhat chastened Empress Dowager tried to make amends by restraining anti-foreign agitation and introducing some Europeanizing reforms. The traditional classical education of Chinese officials was modified and some attention given in the schools to natural science, European history, political economy, and modern languages. A commission was sent abroad to investigate the political institutions of the West, and Chinese students were encouraged to attend universities in Europe and America.

These reforms were not radical enough to satisfy the growing party of "Westernizers" among the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals, many of whom by this time had studied abroad and all of whom were coming to believe that Chinese regeneration depended upon getting rid of the Manchu dynasty and its conservative bureaucracy. The leader of the party was Sun

Yat-sen, a man of humble origin who had been trained in medicine and had become a Christian and who, though compelled to live in exile, exerted a tremendous influence on the formulation and propagation of a revolutionary program of nationalism, republicanism, and political and social democracy. In 1908 the almost simultaneous deaths of the Dowager Empress Tz'ü Hsi and the puppet Emperor Kuang Hsü served to quicken the revolutionary agitation of Sun Yat-sen and his radical following, for the succeeding Emperor, Hsüan T'ung, was only an infant.

In vain the conservative régime at Peking made concessions to the radicals, sanctioning provincial assemblies in 1909 and convoking a National Assembly in 1910. The followers of Sun Yat-sen refused to compromise with the existing government and in October 1911 rose in arms against it. Ambitious military chieftains, including the powerful Yüan Shih-kai, refused or delayed to obey the orders of the court to suppress the rebellion, and very soon the revolutionaries were in possession of several important cities and provinces. In December 1911 a provisional republican government was established at Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as President, and in the following February the boy-Emperor Hsüan T'ung¹ abdicated and the Manchu dynasty ceased to rule.

To consolidate the new Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-sen turned over the presidency to General Yüan Shih-kai; and to render it democratic, a constitution was adopted at Nanking in March 1912 providing for a popularly elected parliament to which the president and his ministers should be responsible. All of which was hailed by optimistic "progressives" in Europe and America as indicating the speedy triumph of the latest and best principles of government and society throughout the world.

In fact, however, the Chinese Revolution of 1911-1912 was but an episode in the long and very painful process of European-

¹ This was his ceremonial name. After his abdication he was known as Henry Pu-yi. For a time he continued to live in the palace at Peking and to receive a pension from the Chinese Republic. Subsequently he made his escape and became a pensioner of Japan, through whose interested offices he was installed in 1932 as Emperor of Manchuria (Manchukuo). See below, p. 796.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Chinese Woman," is from an etching by a German artist, Emil Orlik (1870-1932).

izing the Chinese Empire, and for sometime afterwards China's internal affairs went from bad to worse. The failure and overthrow of the imperial government destroyed the prestige and ended the orderly functioning of the traditional civil and military bureaucracy; and the Republic was too novel and too weak to provide a substantial substitute. Its informed and sincere supporters were only a small fraction of the Chinese nation, intellectuals of the stamp of Sun Yat-sen, inexperienced in practical politics and inclined to be very doctrinaire. Between these, constituting a majority in the parliament and forming a political group known as the Kuomintang, and a self-seeking President with an army in back of him, an unequal conflict soon raged. Parliament enacted laws, and the President ignored or violated them. Then, in 1913, when the Kuomintang inspired a revolt, Yüan Shih-kai easily suppressed it and followed up his success by exiling Sun Yat-sen and destroying the parliament. In 1915, by virtue of a "referendum" which he carefully directed, Yüan proclaimed the restoration of the monarchy with himself as Emperor. Resistance was again offered by the Kuomintang and this time also by jealous generals, and only death from disease in 1916 saved Yüan Shih-kai from death by violence.

Siam was the third country of the Far East which underwent considerable Europeanization during the latter part of the nineteenth century without losing its identity or sovereignty. True, it was pressed in upon by France from ^{Siam} the east and by Great Britain from the west. Both of these European Powers deprived it of border provinces, and in 1896 they agreed upon a division of the whole country into "spheres of influence" for themselves. Nevertheless, thanks to an adaptable and far-sighted King, Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the greater part of Siam remained intact and won general respect for the orderly progress it made toward Westernization. Chulalongkorn abolished slavery, erected schools and hospitals, modernized the army, remodelled the civil administration, and introduced scientific and mechanical features of Western civilization. He established a standard coinage, postal and telegraph services, and a department of public health. He built a thousand miles of railway. He lighted his capital city of Bangkok with electric

NOTE. The picture opposite, "British Bridge in Canton," is from an etching by a British artist, A. Hugh Fisher (born 1880).

lights. He had several of his sons educated in England. At the same time he promoted Siamese nationalism and retained the traditionally autocratic form of government, believing that Siam would make greater progress under benevolent despotism than under the newfangled democracy then in vogue in Europe.

The Moslem "Near East" and "Middle East" felt the impact of Western European civilization simultaneously with the non-

Moslem Near East Moslem "Far East," although the relative poverty of the Moslem world as a whole, together with the traditional tribalism and religious fanaticism of its peoples, tended to make it less alluring and less amenable to European exploitation and hence to European imperialism.

In another place we have described the delayed Europeanization of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire—the intro-

Turks duction of railways, the scramble of European Powers for economic concessions and political preëminence, the resulting development at the beginning of the twentieth century of a sentiment of nationalism and a demand for reform among Turks and Arabs.¹ The Arabs undergoing some

Arabs Europeanization were those of Mesopotamia, Syria, and the narrow settled coasts of Arabia. Much the greater part of the Arabian peninsula was desert, peopled by nomadic warlike tribes who were left usually to their own devices. The Moslem population of Turkestan, too, was mainly nomadic, though, being better off economically and less bellicose, it was gradually absorbed into the Russian Empire, as we have elsewhere noted,²

**Afghanis-
tan** and brought under Russian influence. Afghanistan, a region considerably larger than France and almost as large as the whole Japanese Empire, was so mountainous and unproductive, and its population, though numbering fewer than six million, was so adept at fighting, that it successfully resisted encroachments of Russia from the northwest and Great Britain from the southeast and preserved both its independence and its "backwardness."

Persia, the seat of an ancient empire and civilization, had been for centuries an independent Moslem state, presided over by a
Persia "king of kings," or "shah," and characterized, like most Moslem countries, by religious fanaticism, economic primitiveness, some delightful domestic art, and chronic

¹ See above, pp. 490-493.

² See above, p. 474.

warfare between ambitious chieftains. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Persia's internal affairs were immensely complicated by rivalry between the European Great Powers of Russia and Great Britain for control of the country's resources and government. If Russia supported and influenced one faction, Great Britain supported and dominated an opposing faction. If Russia obtained a concession, Great Britain must be compensated by securing another. At least this was the situation until 1907, when the two Powers agreed to recognize each other's "sphere of influence" in Persia—Russia's in the north and Britain's in the southeast and along the Persian Gulf—and to coöperate in exploitation. Which was better for them but worse for the Persians.

In resisting foreign imperialism and effecting needed internal reform, no real leadership was provided by the sovereigns. One Shah after another travelled repeatedly in Europe, but what they chiefly derived therefrom was a lively taste for European pleasures and an inordinate extravagance in satisfying it. To get all the money they could, they imposed burdensome taxes, abetted the official corruption which ate like a canker throughout the government, and mortgaged themselves and their country ever more heavily to Russia and Britain. In vain a party of Nationalists arose and forced the grant of a constitution in 1906 and the deposition of a Shah in 1908. Russian troops, on the pretense of "preserving order," invaded and occupied the northern part of the country, and the Nationalists fell to quarreling among themselves. For a time in 1911 an improvement of Persian conditions was promised by the appointment of disinterested Swedish officers to modernize the native army and of a resourceful young American, Morgan Shuster, to reform the national finances. Within a year, however, Russia obliged the Persian government to dismiss Shuster, who had declared with more truth than prudence that the selfish policies pursued by the Russian and British were largely responsible for the misgovernment and anarchy prevalent in "weakened, war-cursed Persia."

Northern Africa, like western Asia, had long been overwhelmingly Moslem. Here, since the seventh century, the indigenous Egyptians and Berbers had been largely fused with conquering Arabs and subjected to a succession of essentially oriental despotisms—Arab or Turkish—characterized by common Moslem culture and by incessant strife

North
Africa

within and depredations from without. Gradually, too, Moslem religion and Arab customs had been communicated to Negro tribesmen along the eastern coast of Africa and across the Sahara desert into the Sudan. Timbuctu had become a Moslem commercial centre in the sixteenth century, and by the second half of the nineteenth century the whole interior of the vast African continent bade fair to become Moslem like the North.

By this time, however, the partition and exploitation of Africa by European Great Powers was more startling and impressive than the conversion of primitive Negroes to the tenets of Islam. We have already explained how the more civilized part of Africa—the northern coastland along the Mediterranean—the part which had always been in contact, friendly or hostile, with Europe—was loosed from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and appropriated piecemeal by various European Powers: Algeria by France between 1830 and 1870; Tunis by France in 1881; Egypt by Great Britain in 1882; Tripoli and Cyrenaica by Italy in 1911-1912. Morocco alone had had no nominal connection with the Ottoman Empire, but its native Sultan in the nineteenth century had as many troubles at home and abroad as the Khedive of Egypt, and though like the Ottoman Sultan he profited for some time from the rivalry of European Powers he eventually in 1912 had to submit to a division of his country into a major French protectorate and a minor Spanish protectorate.

Prior to 1880, Europeans knew relatively little of Africa as a whole and usually styled it the "Dark Continent." Nor had there been much interest in it beyond the northern shore and the few coastal stations which Portuguese and Dutch, French and British had established here and there as stopping-places on the way to India or for traffic in "gold dust" or, much more lucratively, in Negro slaves. The Portuguese had been most persistent and tenacious in occupying territories on the east and west coasts (Mozambique and Angola, respectively), and the Dutch and British in promoting some real colonization in a limited area of South Africa. But the net result, in respect of the Europeanization of Africa, was slight, and with the abolition of the slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century it promised to become even less.

In fact, nevertheless, the abolition of the slave trade proved

Third
Type of
European-
ization:
Partition-
ing the
Dark
Continent

to be the prelude to a swift partition of almost all Africa among European Powers and a rapidly ensuing extension of European influence from the coastal regions into the far interior. For the abolition of the slave trade was inspired by humanitarian zeal and the new industrialism, and both these phenomena continued to function. Humanitarians were not content to abolish traffic of British or other European slave dealers on the coasts of Africa. They must interfere with the slave-dealing of Arabs and Negroes, and bring light to all benighted humanity; they must push inland and uplift potential slaves and acquaint them with Christianity and European civilization. Moreover, the new industrialism demanded rubber and other raw materials which tropical Africa could supply, and at the same time raised up the hope that a Europeanized Africa would provide a profitable field for European salesmanship and investment and, through the achievements of modern sanitation, for European colonization.

European penetration of the "Dark Continent" was inaugurated just after the middle of the nineteenth century by a number of intrepid explorers and adventurers, of whom three or four merit mention. David Livingstone (1813-1873), a Scottish physician, went to Africa in 1840 as a Protestant missionary, but he won fame less as an evangelist than as an explorer. For thirty years he headed expeditions into the wild jungles of south-central Africa and published accounts which fascinated scientists and aroused a lively interest throughout Europe and America. Towards the close of his life Livingstone seemed to have been lost in the jungle, and a New York newspaper proprietor capitalized the widespread curiosity concerning Livingstone's fate by despatching a clever and adventurous Anglo-American journalist, Henry Stanley (1841-1904), to find him. Stanley "found" Livingstone in 1871, and then engaged in important explorations of his own, circumnavigating the great lakes of Tanganyika and Victoria and tracing the whole course of the Congo River. The thrillingly told tale of his trip *Through the Dark Continent* went through countless editions, while Stanley himself interested King Leopold II of Belgium in the commercial possibilities of the Congo region and became the chief "promoter" of that greedy monarch's "Congo Free State."¹

Exploration

Livingstone and Stanley

¹ On Leopold II and the Congo Free State, see above, pp. 437-438.

Another famous European adventurer in Africa was Karl Peters (1856-1918), a German student of British colonial activities and the organizer and chief propagandist of a German colonial society. In 1884 with a few companions he landed on the east coast of Africa, and, by plying native chieftains with grog and presenting them with an assortment of toys, he obtained from them within ten days as many as a dozen "treaties" ceding to his company about 60,000 square miles of territory. The next year he prevailed upon Bismarck to take the company and its land under the formal protection of the German government, and within the next five years, by methods similar to Peters's, German East Africa was expanded into a domain of 200,000 square miles.

Even more celebrated as an African "empire builder" was the Englishman Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902). The son of an Anglican clergyman, he was intended for the church, but being sickly in his youth he was sent off in 1870 to "rough it" in Natal (in South Africa) and soon found wealth (as well as health) in the newly discovered diamond fields at Kimberley. Then, after returning to England and studying at Oxford, he went back to South Africa and became its outstanding "promotor," financier, and statesman. He acquired an enormous fortune from mining and commercial activities. In 1889 he organized the British South Africa Company, which obtained title, in manner resembling Karl Peters's, to the vast area known later as Rhodesia. From 1890 to 1896, as prime minister of Cape Colony, he actively advanced plans for incorporating the Dutch republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State with British South Africa and extending the sway of the British Empire the whole length of Africa northward from the Cape of Good Hope to Alexandria on the Mediterranean. At his death in 1902 he left a part of his fortune as an endowment to provide for the education of select young men from "Anglo-Saxon" countries—the British colonies, the United States, and Germany—as "Rhodes Scholars" at the intellectual centre of the British Empire, the University of Oxford.

Under pressure from such active propagandists as Rhodes, Peters, and Stanley, and from a host of explorers, traders, prospectors, and missionaries, who roamed over Africa in the 70's and 80's, and in accordance, furthermore, with the evident wishes of industrialists and journalists and zealous patriots at home,

various European governments were soon parcelling out almost the whole of the African continent among themselves. A claim to a region was asserted, a flag raised, "treaties" negotiated with native chieftains, a police force landed, and a protectorate or "colony" established. When rival claims to the same region were asserted, the respective European governments involved would negotiate a special "deal," whereby one would be left in possession of the disputed area and the other receive compensation elsewhere, usually at the expense of native tribes. In the incredibly brief span of twenty-seven years—from 1885, when an international congress at Berlin authorized the erection of King Leopold II's Congo Free State and laid down certain simple rules which the Powers should observe in acquiring African territory, to 1912, when Morocco passed finally under Franco-Spanish "protection"—the entire continent, with the exception of two very minor countries (Ethiopia and Liberia), was partitioned by European nations.

Appropriation

The partition occasioned a good deal of friction in international relations, but it was eventually accomplished without direct or immediate recourse to armed conflict among the European Powers. The aspiration of Portugal to link up Mozambique on the east coast with Angola on the west, and the desire of the Dutch Boers to retain their independence, alike ran counter to the ambition of Britain to extend her African empire northward from Cape Colony; the Portuguese aspiration was sacrificed by a treaty of 1891 and the Dutch desire by the Boer War of 1899-1902.¹ Still further north, the project of a continuous stretch of British dominion from the Cape to Cairo was threatened by the extension of German East Africa inland to the frontiers of the Congo Free State, and by the ambition of France to join Algeria and Tunis not only with her holdings in Senegal and on the Congo but also with her foothold on the Somali coast of the Red Sea in a huge imperial domain that would cover northern Africa from west to east. Britain thought fit to compromise the German claim in a treaty of 1890 and thereby to concede at least a temporary severance of her projected north-and-south empire. But in respect of France, Britain deemed it safe to be less yielding.

In 1898 a French expedition headed by an army officer, a certain Captain Marchand, proceeded all the way from the mouth

¹ On the Boer War, see above, pp. 373-374.

of the Congo (on the west coast) to the upper valley of the Nile (in eastern Africa), and here in the Egyptian Sudan, at a little village called Fashoda, the captain hoisted a French flag and asserted French claims to the surrounding country. But the British insisted that the Egyptian Sudan was a part of Egypt and that Egypt was in their own "sphere of influence," and against the French Captain Marchand at Fashoda advanced from Khartum the British General Kitchener with a larger expedition and bigger guns.¹ Under protest and with great reluctance, Marchand withdrew from Fashoda; and by treaty of 1899 France yielded to Britain the Egyptian Sudan. This treaty of 1899 proved to be the forerunner of the close *entente* concluded between France and Britain in 1904, whereby the latter was entrenched in Egypt and the former assured of a privileged position in Morocco.


The last phase of international negotiations concerning Africa, prior to the World War, had to do chiefly with the effort of Germany to thwart the French in Morocco and, failing in this, to secure "compensation" for Germany at the expense of French Equatorial Africa. A settlement was eventually arrived at in 1911-1912,² but the accompanying exacerbation of Franco-German ill will helped to prepare the way for the World War.

By 1914 Europe owned almost all of Africa. Of the eleven and a half million square miles of territory in the continent, almost four million were French, three and three-quarters million were British, nine hundred thousand were German and about the same number Belgian, eight hundred thousand were Portuguese, six hundred and fifty thousand Italian, and a hundred thousand Spanish, while only the remaining four hundred thousand (barely a thirtieth part of the whole) belonged to independent native states. Included in the area reckoned as owned by Europe were, to be sure, certain countries which still retained native sovereigns, but so long as the Khedive of Egypt had to follow the advice of a British "resident," and the Bey of Tunis or the Sultan of Morocco had to obey the instructions of French "high commissioners," such countries could hardly be termed independent.

¹ Kitchener had just won the decisive victory of Omdurman (near Khartum) over the Sudanese natives and had thus fortified the "rights" of Great Britain in the Egyptian Sudan. See above, pp. 378-379.

² See below, p. 563.

Included within European Africa, moreover, were gigantic tracts either quite unfit for European habitation, such as French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, and British Nigeria, or quite



SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1914

unprofitable for European exploitation, such as the great Sahara Desert. Yet none could doubt that toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth, enormous strides were taken toward a real Europeanization of Africa. It was not merely that European Powers held political sway or that European immi-

European
Civili-
zation in
Africa

grants were coming into South Africa from the British Isles and into North Africa from Italy and France. The Negro tribesmen of tropical Africa were being taught by European missionaries and school teachers, were learning European languages and ways, were more or less docilely working for European capitalists and serving under European army officers. Even the Arabs of desert Africa were becoming accustomed to the profits of European trade and the penalties of European police. Optimists, with whom the first decade of the twentieth century abounded, were eloquent in voicing the expectation that within another generation or two the formerly "Dark Continent" would bask in the full sunshine of European civilization—with railways and telegraph wires radiating everywhere, with modern science bringing salubrity to the tropical jungles and fertility to the desert sands, and with the twin spirits of "progress" and "prosperity" duly communicated from white men to black and tan.

Two African countries were still independent—and correspondingly "backward." The larger of the two was Abyssinia (or

Ethiopia

Ethiopia), a landlocked Negro state wedged in the mountainous country between Somaliland and the Egyptian Sudan. Its dominant tribes had been Christian of a primitive sort since the fourth century, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century its "King of Kings," the Emperor Menelek II (1889-1913), who claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, succeeded in fighting off Italian invaders and winning from Italy, and other European Powers, a recognition of Abyssinian independence.¹ Even the Emperor Menelek, however, was not averse to Europeanizing his army and permitting French capitalists to construct a railway from his capital to the coast.

The smaller of the two independent African states was Liberia, which had been established on the west coast in 1847 by eman-

Liberia

cipated Negro slaves from the United States. Its civilized English-speaking inhabitants were greatly outnumbered and given a good deal of trouble by barbarous natives in the hinterland, and gradually its area was hemmed in and reduced by encroachments of the British from the west and of the French from the east and north. In the first decade of the twentieth century it was a small, poor country, and the main

¹ See above, p. 424.

question was whether it would be Europeanized and rendered "progressive" through its own efforts or through the forceful intervention of France or Britain or perhaps the United States.

By 1914 Africa, along with Asia, was being subjected to a process of Europeanization which bade fair to produce in the near future, out of the distinctively Western civilization of Europe, America, and Australia, a truly great and unifying world civilization. And by this time, the world as a whole was known as it had never been known before. In 1909 an indefatigable Arctic explorer, Robert Peary, reached the North Pole and in the ice which covered the ocean depths below planted an American flag. In 1911 a Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, perilously making his way over the big, ice-encased, and mountainous continent of Antarctica, reached the South Pole.

Discovery
of North
and South
Poles

3. INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION AND PEACE

The twentieth century, as it opened, promised to Europeanize the whole world and likewise to promote peaceful co-operation among the advanced and powerful nations on whom the progress of Europeanization seemed to depend. These nations still waged wars, it was admitted, against "backward" peoples and in "uncivilized" parts of the world, but it was obvious that among themselves there had been no violent conflict since 1871—almost half a century—and it was confidently predicted that once the world was truly Europeanized there would remain little or no reason for international war anywhere.

Peace
among
Great
Powers,
1871-1914

The principle that the leading large nations constituted a "Concert" of Great Powers which should set an example to lesser Powers of substituting negotiation for violence, harmonious coöperation for discord, was newly exemplified in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin,¹ which prevented the Russo-Turkish War from precipitating a much vaster struggle wherein Great Britain and Austria-Hungary might easily have become involved with Russia. In 1885 Austria, with the consent of the other Great Powers, stopped a war between Bulgaria and Serbia. In 1897 Russia, Great Britain, France, and Italy coöperated to end an armed conflict between Greece

Concert of
Europe

¹ See above, pp. 193-196.

and the Ottoman Empire. In 1913 an "ambassadorial conference" of the Great Powers sat at London to expedite the pacific settlement of the Balkan Wars.

The "backward" area of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states was not the only region where the Concert of Europe functioned with considerable success from 1878 to 1914. Africa was partitioned in accordance with general regulations laid down by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin of 1884-1885, and in detail through an ensuing series of diplomatic negotiations and compromises among the Powers concerned. In China, moreover, the European Great Powers jointly intervened in 1900, with Japan and the United States, to suppress the Boxer insurrection; and with politeness if not perfect sincerity they unanimously endorsed the American proposal that China's territorial integrity should be maintained and her trade doors kept open to all.

Nor was the Concert of Europe the only effective agency of inter-state coöperation. There appeared also a kind of Concert of America. In 1881 the United States invited the several countries of Latin America to participate in a Pan-American Conference "for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." The first such conference was held at Washington in 1889, a second at Mexico City in 1901, a third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and a fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910. The results were somewhat disappointing, and yet they indicated an increasing desire for international conciliation.

Coöperation was spreading and taking many forms among "civilized" nations of the world. All these supported the international Red Cross society (1864). Thirty formed a Universal Telegraph Union (1875). Twenty-three agreed to make common use of the metric system of weights and measures (1875). Sixty adhered to a Universal Postal Union, created in 1878, with headquarters at Berne (in Switzerland). Nineteen ratified a convention of 1883 for the standardization of patent laws. Fifteen signed another convention of 1887 providing for practically uniform copyright laws.

The judicial settlement of international disputes was apparently gaining favor likewise. Great Britain and the United States developed a habit of submitting their disputes to arbitration—the *Alabama* claims in 1871-1872, a controversy over Bering Sea

Pan-
American
Confer-
ences

Inter-
national Co-
operation

in 1892, a quarrel over the boundary between Alaska and Canada in 1903—and with such success that the possibility of war between the two major English-speaking countries seemed more and more remote and unthinkable. In 1886 Pope Leo XIII arbitrated a colonial dispute between Germany and Spain. In 1902 King Edward VII of Great Britain arbitrated a boundary dispute between Chile and Argentina. In 1909 France and Germany submitted a Moroccan dispute to international arbitration.

Arbitra-
tion

It should be borne in mind that all the governmental arbitrations and conventions and all the coöperative efforts of Pan-American Conferences and the Concert of Europe betokened popular interest in international solidarity. As the nineteenth century advanced and the Industrial Revolution progressed and the most diverse localities and nationalities were knit together by railways, steamships, telegraphs, and cables, the number and importance of common concerns rapidly increased. There was a prodigious stimulation of trade and travel from one country to another.

Interna-
tionalism

The international character of industrial and commercial capitalism was emphasized by banks and corporations which outgrew the country where they originated and became world-wide in their ramification and functioning. The international character of the problems of industrial workers was stressed by international congresses of Socialists and by international federations of coöperative societies and trade unions. An international agricultural institute was founded at Rome in 1905. Similarly, in the political sphere, earnest advocates of parliamentary government organized an international Parliamentary Union (1889), and proponents of woman suffrage and feminism took to holding international congresses. Religion, too, felt the same general impulse. Protestant Christians of a hundred divergent creeds met in world congresses, and Catholic Christians, more mindful than ever of the universal traditions of their faith, instituted in 1881 a series of Eucharistic Congresses, which drew large numbers of clergymen and laymen from many climes now to Paris, now to London, now to Jerusalem, now to Montreal. For the advancement of science and learning, moreover, there were periodical world congresses of distinguished physicists, chemists, biologists, historians, and economists, and exchange of professors

and students between the universities of different countries. There was developing around the globe a community of intellectual interests, the product of what has happily been termed "the international mind."

Pacifism was undoubtedly growing. Especially after 1878, associations of professed pacifists multiplied throughout the Western world, and their international congresses became regular annual events after 1889. The movement was patronized, moreover, by outstanding industrialists. Alfred Nobel, a Swedish scientist and capitalist, devoted the major part of the princely fortune which he had amassed from the manufacture of high explosives to the cause of international peace. Andrew Carnegie, a Scottish-American business man, drew liberally upon the wealth that he had accumulated in the iron and steel industry to endow pacifist propaganda and to build a "temple of peace" at The Hague and a Pan-American "palace" at Washington.

To the generation of pacifists that flourished in the first decade of the twentieth century, war, at least among great civilized nations, seemed anachronistic and therefore fated to disappear in the near future. The capitalists of every progressive country had too many foreign investments or were too involved in foreign trade to welcome war, and they were too influential to be ignored by their several governments. The industrial workers had too much to lose from a state of war in the way of employment and wages, and, besides, many of them were so actively identified with international Socialism as to threaten a revolutionary overturn of any government which might engage in foreign war. The intellectual classes were too "enlightened" and by this time too internationally minded not to perceive the fallacies in all arguments and pretexts for war. The Christian churches were traditionally committed to support of peace.

Pacifists were somewhat troubled by the obvious fact that since 1860 military and naval armaments had been increasing in almost every country. To be sure, most advocates of heavy national armament, themselves influenced wittingly or unwittingly by the pacifist spirit of the age, insisted that all such armament was strictly defensive, that it constituted mere preparedness against dreadful but possible eventualities and was the surest pledge of enduring peace. Never-

**Rise of
Pacifism**

**Peace and
Arma-
ments**

theless, foremost pacifists scented danger in military and naval preparedness, and many other persons who were not professionally pacifist complained of the growing burdens of taxation which that kind of "peace insurance" entailed. A conspicuous and attractive plank in the pacifist platform, therefore, was the demand for a limitation of armaments by international agreement, coupled usually with a plea for the establishment of an international court of arbitration.

For the express purpose of meeting this demand, the Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, with the concurrence of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, convoked an international peace conference at The Hague in 1899. "The preservation of peace," the Tsar said, "has become an object of international policy." At the conference the sovereign states of Europe and Asia and likewise the United States and Mexico were represented—twenty-six nations in all. No agreement could be reached on any general limitation of armaments, but steps were taken to restrict the use of certain weapons in the event of war, to codify international law, and to establish a court of arbitration.

Hague
Peace
Confer-
ences,
1899, 1907

In 1907, with the prompting of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States and on the formal invitation of the Tsar, a second international peace conference was held at The Hague, representing this time forty-four governments, including nineteen in America. Again the much-mooted question of general limitation of armaments was left unanswered, but certain humane amendments were made to the laws of maritime and land war, an international prize court was provided for, and conventions were adopted requiring a formal declaration of war before the opening of hostilities and restricting the employment of force for the collection of foreign debts. Finally, the holding of similar conferences at regular intervals in the future was recommended.

Here, optimistic pacifists imagined, was a real beginning of an organized international community, with its capital at The Hague, with its periodic congresses, with its statutes and codes, with its court of arbitration. If the German Empire, the United States, and Switzerland could be organized and function successfully as federal states without internal strife, why should not external war be banished through an International Federation of the World? In fact, the

International
Federation?

international court of arbitration was duly instituted, and by it several international disputes were pacifically settled between 1901 and 1914. A third Hague conference was projected for 1915; it might take a big step forward on the road of international coöperation and peace.

Before 1915, however, the promise of the twentieth century had taken on a somewhat different complexion. The pacifist ideal was not to be realized so easily. In truth, as we now look back upon the first years of the twentieth century, we can all see that they held an even greater promise of war than of peace and that the pacifists of the time, like most of their contemporaries, looked so intently on evidences of material and scientific progress as to neglect the more fateful evidences of impending disaster.

4. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

In the midst of optimism about the bigger and better Europe, about the Europeanization of the world, and about the world's peace, there was room for some pessimism. International competition was more real than international coöperation.

The "state system" of Europe, and of the world, was anarchical. Coöperation was ordinarily determined by and directed toward the supposed self-interest or self-importance of each state involved. In last analysis, force or the threat of force was the supreme arbitrament. Every state had some armaments, and hence all were called "Powers," but those that had very big armaments were distinguished as "Great Powers." Among "Powers" these there might be a theoretical "Concert"—and an actual one on the rare occasions when they thought their several self-interests could thereby be served without sacrifice of individual prestige—but the continuous and fast-developing feature of their mutual relationships was competition. The competition, superficially at least, was for prestige—being most feared and therefore most respected by the rest of the world.

Economic Competition The Industrial Revolution was accentuating the competition among the Great Powers. It was prompting economic nationalism, with attendant tariff controversies and scrambles for the exploitation of "back-

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Ave Maria in the South Seas," suggesting interaction of European civilization and non-European primitiveness, is from the painting by Paul Gauguin (1848-1903). On Gauguin, see above, pp. 287-288.

ward" regions.¹ It was also providing means for a new assertiveness of patriotic ambition.

Imperialistic competition was especially menacing. So far, there had been no outright war between European Great Powers over the newer economic and political partition of the world, but the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Boer War of 1899-1902, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912 were portentous. The weakness of the Chinese and Ottoman Empires and the inability of such lesser Powers as Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium to hold their extensive colonial empires if they should be attacked, were as obvious as were the conflicting ambitions of the Great Powers.

Nationalism, sentimental quite as much as economic, complicated and imperilled the relationships among European states. It had already, in the middle of the nineteenth century, inspired a series of wars for the political unification of Italy and of Germany. Since then it had overspread all eastern Europe and been intensified everywhere by the rise of popular schooling and popular press and by the multiplying propaganda of scholars and artists, publicists and patriotic societies. It embittered relations between France and Germany and gravely menaced the integrity and very existence of some of the imperial Powers, most notably Austria-Hungary.

Aggravating the situation was the marked tendency of the Great Powers of Europe to align themselves by formal alliance or informal *entente* in rival aggregations. Each aggregation viewed the activities of the other with increasing suspicion and fear. Each competed with the other in pushing its own members farther along on the path of military preparedness and in attempting to draw lesser Powers into the orbit of its influence and control. Yet neither was quite sure how solid it was, or how solid its rival, or how dependable were its satellites among the lesser Powers.

¹ For a fuller account of economic nationalism and accompanying phenomena of imperialism and militarism during the period from 1880 to 1914, see above, pp. 225-235.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Prayer in a Moslem Mosque," is from a painting by Jean Louis Gérôme (1824-1924), a romantic French artist much interested in interpreting the world of Islam to the world of Christendom.

A "balance of power" between rival aggregations became alarming only in the twentieth century. From 1871 to 1890, it had hardly existed. From 1890 to 1905, though in process of formation, it promised to be a stabilizing rather than a disruptive force. Only from 1905 did it point to ultimate disaster. How this came about, we shall try to make clear by a brief survey of international relations from 1871 to 1914.

The Franco-German War of 1870-1871 had served to establish the military and diplomatic hegemony of Germany, and for the next twenty years Prince Bismarck, as Chancellor of the German Empire, was undoubtedly the most influential statesman in Europe. His international policy, in its broad outlines, was simple. He would maintain the military superiority of his country. He would be content with what had been won in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871.¹ He would especially seek no further territorial aggrandizement in Europe, which might arouse the hostility of Russia, or any outside Europe, which might provoke colonial and maritime rivalry with Great Britain. He would keep the peace and he would make sure that France kept the peace.

Bismarck was well aware of the humiliation which France had suffered from the war of 1870-1871 and of her willingness to seize the first favorable opportunity to recover Alsace-Lorraine and repair her damaged prestige. He did not fear an attack upon Germany by France single-handed, but he was acutely conscious that if she were to obtain active assistance from any of the other Great Powers a second Franco-German war might result differently from the first. Wherefore, the German Chancellor devoted his major diplomatic efforts to keeping France isolated and deprived of potential allies.

In the main, the international situation from 1871 to 1890 was favorable to Germany, and the astute, and not too high-principled, Chancellor took full advantage of it. First of all, he adopted a most conciliatory attitude toward Austria-Hungary. He had purposely been lenient in dictating terms of peace to the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1866; and after 1871 the internal exigencies of the Dual Monarchy, and the desire of the Habsburg family to recoup what they had lost in Italy and Germany by

¹ See above, pp. 169-170, 175-177.

pursuing an expansionist policy in the Balkans, led the governing classes of Austria-Hungary to seek support of Germany's strong military arm and Bismarck's dexterous diplomatic hand. Then, too, Bismarck could count upon the friendship of the newly formed kingdom of Italy. Many Italians remembered that it was through an alliance with Bismarck's Germany that they had been enabled to wrest Venetia from Austria in 1866. Besides, the Italian government was at feud with the papacy, and so was the German in the 1870's, at the very time when France was dominated by "clericals," many of whom favored intervention in Italy for the purpose of restoring the pope's temporal rule.

With Great Britain, Bismarck sedulously avoided conflict. He insisted during the war of 1870-1871 upon the scrupulous observance of Belgian neutrality—an object dear to the British foreign office—and he hesitated for a decade and more about engaging in overseas imperialism. When eventually in the 1880's he yielded in this matter to the importunities of German merchants and patriots, he took special pains to avoid quarrels with Great Britain. He knew that British imperialists were far more troubled by the aggressiveness of Russia in Asia and of France in Africa than by Germany's belated and relatively modest imperialism. He knew also that many English intellectuals admired the German people and extolled the "Teutonic race" which had produced the two leading states of modern Europe—Germany, the master of the Continent, and Great Britain, the mistress of the seas. He knew that it had become a tradition of the British foreign office to avoid "entangling alliances" upon the continent of Europe so long as British maritime supremacy was unquestioned. From all this, Bismarck could be confident that Germany need not fear an alliance between Great Britain and France.

Russia was a very different quantity. Her growing rivalry with Austria-Hungary in the Balkans might prevent Germany from cultivating equally friendly relations with the two, and if Germany should favor Austria-Hungary, Russia would tend to gravitate toward an alliance with France. But several circumstances aided Bismarck to forestall a Franco-Russian alliance. Politically, autocratic Russia was more sympathetic with monarchical Germany than with republican France. The Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) detested the revolutionaries who were reputed to have learned their doctrines in France, and he grate-

A "balance of power" between rival aggregations became alarming only in the twentieth century. From 1871 to 1890, it had hardly existed. From 1890 to 1905, though in process of formation, it promised to be a stabilizing rather than a disruptive force. Only from 1905 did it point to ultimate disaster. How this came about, we shall try to make clear by a brief survey of international relations from 1871 to 1914.

The Franco-German War of 1870-1871 had served to establish the military and diplomatic hegemony of Germany, and for the next twenty years Prince Bismarck, as Chancellor of the German Empire, was undoubtedly the most influential statesman in Europe. His international policy, in its broad outlines, was simple. He would maintain the military superiority of his country. He would be content with what had been won in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871.¹ He would especially seek no further territorial aggrandizement in Europe, which might arouse the hostility of Russia, or any outside Europe, which might provoke colonial and maritime rivalry with Great Britain. He would keep the peace and he would make sure that France kept the peace.

Bismarck was well aware of the humiliation which France had suffered from the war of 1870-1871 and of her willingness to seize the first favorable opportunity to recover Alsace-Lorraine and repair her damaged prestige. He did not fear an attack upon Germany by France single-handed, but he was acutely conscious that if she were to obtain active assistance from any of the other Great Powers a second Franco-German war might result differently from the first. Wherefore, the German Chancellor devoted his major diplomatic efforts to keeping France isolated and deprived of potential allies.

In the main, the international situation from 1871 to 1890 was favorable to Germany, and the astute, and not too high-principled, Chancellor took full advantage of it. First of all, he adopted a most conciliatory attitude toward Austria-Hungary. He had purposely been lenient in dictating terms of peace to the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1866; and after 1871 the internal exigencies of the Dual Monarchy, and the desire of the Habsburg family to recoup what they had lost in Italy and Germany by

¹ See above, pp. 169-170, 175-177.

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fully remembered how Bismarck had offered him Prussian aid for the suppression of the Polish insurrection of 1863,¹ and how again in 1871 Bismarck had graciously acquiesced in Russia's recovery of the right to maintain warships on the Black Sea.² He felt the need of German support in overcoming British opposition to Russian expansion whether in the Balkans or in Asia.

Of these considerations Bismarck took canny account. In September 1872, a meeting at Berlin of the Emperor William I, the Emperor-King Francis Joseph, the Tsar Alexander II, and their several ministers, served to advertise to the world that cordial and intimate relations existed among the three great Empires of central and eastern Europe. In 1873 the members of this so-called Three Emperors' League agreed to coöperate in the preservation of peace, and, in case war should threaten, to consult together "in order to determine a common course of action."

For a moment in 1875 a press campaign in Germany against the military preparations then going on in France threatened the Russo-German friendship, for the Russian government (and likewise the British), suspecting that the campaign was inspired by Bismarck and was preliminary to a German assault upon France, protested against such a possible development. Bismarck declared with no little asperity that the suspicion was quite ill-founded. The press campaign was halted, and the excitement over the "affair of 1875" soon subsided.

A more serious difficulty for Bismarck was presented by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. The triumph of Russia, and her seeming ability to dictate a peace settlement giving her a dominant position in the Balkans, provoked the liveliest apprehension in Austria-Hungary as well as in Great Britain, and at the ensuing Congress of Berlin (1878) Bismarck undertook to play the rôle of "honest broker" in apportioning the Turkish spoils.³ By reducing the Russian share and by handing over Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Dual Monarchy, Bismarck kept the balance of power in the Balkans nicely adjusted between Russia and Austria, but while he thus strengthened the friendship between Germany and Austria-Hungary he aroused the

¹ See above, p. 166.

² See above, p. 178.

³ On the Russo-Turkish War, the Russian peace settlement of San Stefano, and the ensuing Congress of Berlin, see above, pp. 190-197.

enmity of Russia. The Three Emperors' League was in effect destroyed.

In order to guard Germany against untoward results of Russian ill-feeling, Bismarck in 1879 concluded a defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, in accordance with the terms of which each party bound itself to support the other with all the military forces at its command if either party or both should be attacked by

German-
Austrian
Alliance,
1879

Russia or by another Power backed by Russia.¹ Then, in order still further to offset the danger of Russian hostility, Bismarck turned his attention to Italy. Italy, as has been remarked, was already naturally well disposed toward Germany, but Bismarck was unwilling to bind the two Powers by an alliance unless Austria-Hungary were included, and relations between Austria and Italy were strained by the memory of recent wars between them, and also by conflicting ambitions as to Trent and Trieste and the mastery of the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the Italian government felt the weakness of diplomatic isolation; and in 1881 Italians were angered by French occupation of Tunis, the region of ancient Carthage, which they had begun to think of as the stepping-stone toward a new Italian imperialism. In the midst of ensuing Franco-Italian recriminations, Italy responded cordially to the overtures of Bismarck, consented to banish anti-Austrian propaganda, and in 1882 signed a treaty of alliance with both Germany and Austria-Hungary. This treaty provided that if Italy or Germany were attacked by France without provocation these two allies would go to war with France; and that if any one or any two of the three allies were attacked by two or more Great Powers, all should engage in the conflict. The Triple Alliance, first formed in 1882 for five years, was renewed in 1887 with an additional stipulation that neither Austria nor Italy should attempt to occupy any territory in the Balkan peninsula without preliminary accord, and that such accord should be based on the principle of reciprocal compensation.² Moreover, Serbia and Rumania became satellites of the Triple Alliance. Disgruntled by the favor-

Triple
Alliance of
Germany,
Austria,
Italy, 1882

¹ The existence of the alliance was widely advertised at the time, but its terms were not published until 1888.

² The Triple Alliance was subsequently renewed for continuous periods in 1891, in 1903, and in 1912. Its terms were not fully divulged until the World War.

itism shown by Russia to Bulgaria in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, Serbia contracted a secret engagement with Austria-Hungary in 1881, and Rumania in 1883.¹

In the meantime, danger of conflict between Germany and Russia perceptibly lessened. The assassination of the Tsar Alexander II in 1881 and the accession of the ultra-reactionary Alexander III precluded any immediate understanding between autocratic Russia and democratic France; and the new Tsar, painfully aware of the isolation to which Bismarckian diplomacy had been condemning Russia, reached the conclusion that he must acquiesce in the Balkan settlement of 1878 and seek a renewal of the previous understanding with Germany and, if necessary, with Austria. Bismarck, of course, deemed the inclusion of Austria necessary; and consequently another Three Emperors' League was negotiated in 1881. By its terms, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary mutually promised benevolent neutrality in case any of them should be involved in war with a fourth Power. This arrangement, entered into for a period of three years, was renewed in 1884 for another three-year period.

The new Three Emperors' League was temporarily reassuring to both Russia and Germany, but it was not a very substantial structure. It was weakened by the policy of tariff protectionism which Germany pursued in the 1880's and which, being directed in large part against the importation of Russian grain, roused the ire of influential classes in Russia. It was still more seriously weakened by continuing friction between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. This became acute in 1885, when Austria intervened in a war between Serbia and Bulgaria. A crisis lasted throughout the following year, and in 1887 Russia refused to renew the Three Emperors' League.

Bismarck's failure to keep Russia yoked with Austria-Hungary occurred at the very time when the agitation of General Boulanger was gathering headway in France for a war of revenge against Germany. The German Chancellor, greatly alarmed, took ex-

¹ The Austro-Serbian treaty of 1881 provided that Serbia should not conclude any political treaty with another Power without previous approval by Austria-Hungary, and that each state should preserve friendly neutrality if the other was at war; with minor changes, it remained in force until 1895. Rumania's treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary was endorsed by Germany and lasted, at least on paper, until 1916.

traordinary steps to meet the situation. While renewing and strengthening the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, he made a secret three-year pact, the so-called "Reinsurance Treaty," with Russia, pledging Germany's diplomatic support of Russian predominance in Bulgaria and even of Russian occupation of Constantinople, and obtaining in return a pledge of Russia's benevolent neutrality in case of a French attack upon Germany.

Russo-
German
Reinsur-
ance
Treaty,
1887-1890

At the same time (1887), in order to deter Russia from becoming too aggressive in the Balkans, as well as to hold France in check, he secretly encouraged a special agreement among Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Italy for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the Near East. In 1889 he sought to bring Great Britain into direct alliance with Germany. In this he was unsuccessful, for, while the British government of the day was by no means anti-German, it was unwilling to commit Great Britain to definite participation in a Franco-German conflict. Then in 1890, with the forced retirement of Bismarck from office,¹ the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia was allowed to lapse.

The lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 was a symptom, rather than a cause, of a change which was coming about in international alignments. Previously, Bismarck had been able, by Triple Alliance and Three Emperors' League, to keep France isolated and Russia in check; and with the breakdown of the League in 1887, he had anxiously hoped to preserve the same general situation by means of the separate Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. In fact, however, the growing differences between Russia and Germany (to say nothing of those between Russia and Austria) militated against the Reinsurance Treaty. The treaty had not stopped Russia from building strategic military railways toward the German frontier or Germany from heightening her tariff walls against Russian grain; and Bismarck himself had dealt a blow at financial coöperation between the two countries by discouraging German loans to Russia. There was no such popular backing for a Russo-German alliance as for the Austro-German alliance. By 1890 most German statesmen other than Bismarck were opposed to the continuance of solemn commitments to Russia which might endanger the Austrian alliance and

¹ On Bismarck's retirement from the Chancellorship, see above, pp. 450-451.

which, at the same time, might embroil Germany in quarrels between Russia and Great Britain.

The Russian government would doubtless have consented in 1890 to a temporary renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty, but it would have done so without enthusiasm. It was being pressed by the "Slavophiles" of the time "to purge holy Russia of Teutonic influence," and it was unable to obtain necessary loans from Germany for Russia's industrial development—for the building of railways, the erection of factories, the opening of mines, the stabilization of currency. But what the Berlin bourse withheld, the Paris money market supplied; and by 1890 Russia was already financially dependent upon France. In the circumstances, Russia was naturally drawn to France, and financial need (and also anti-Teutonic Slavophile sentiment) gradually overcame the Tsar's antipathy to the democratic politics of France, while on the other hand the prospect of escape from the international isolation in which France had been since the time of Napoleon III conquered the scruples of French republican politicians about Russian autocracy.

Hence, little by little, following the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia, Russia and France drifted into an alliance. An informal diplomatic entente was inaugurated in 1891, and an exchange of friendly naval visits followed. By a military convention of 1893 Russia promised to employ all her forces against Germany if France should be attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, and France promised to combat Germany if Russia should be assailed by Germany, or by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany. That such a Dual Alliance had come into existence was publicly announced by the French premier in 1895, but its precise terms were revealed only in 1918 when the tsardom was overthrown and the alliance at an end.

In appearance, at any rate, the previous hegemony of Germany (and isolation of France) was thus offset in the early 1890's by a "balance of power" in Europe between the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, on the one side, and the Dual Alliance of Russia and France, on the other. In reality, however, the new alignment was not revolutionary; it did not materially change affairs. Both alliances were expressly "defensive"; and though

Franco-
Russian
Dual
Alliance,
1893

Toward a
Balance of
Power,
1890-1914

the conclusion of the Dual Alliance gave France a sense of security and prestige, it actually operated to discourage any French ambition for the early recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. And, for a time, what Germany seemingly lost through the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was offset by British coöperation.

Great Britain, while maintaining a general policy of aloofness from the international policies of the Continent, was more inclined in the 1890's toward the Triple than toward the Dual Alliance. She had contracted special obligations in 1887 with Austria and Italy in the Mediterranean and Near East; and in 1890, just after the retirement of Bismarck, the way was paved for an Anglo-German entente by friendly negotiations which settled outstanding colonial disputes between the two Powers in Africa and transferred the North Sea island of Heligoland from Britain to Germany. In the 1890's, moreover, in a decade of fast developing imperialism, Great Britain's chief competitors were France and Russia. If it was natural for France and Russia to draw together, it seemed quite as natural for Great Britain to gravitate toward Germany. Certainly no *rapprochement* appeared possible between Britain and France, for the latter's vigorous acquisition of colonies after 1880 served to accentuate imperialistic rivalry between them and to raise many serious territorial questions in Africa and Indo-China. As late as 1898 France and Britain were on the verge of war over a dispute as to their respective spheres of influence in the Egyptian Sudan.¹ Nor did any *rapprochement* appear possible between Britain and Russia. They had been rivals in the Near East since before the Crimean War, and their rivalry had latterly been intensified and extended to Persia, Afghanistan, and the Far East. It was against Russian aggressiveness in China that Great Britain concluded in 1902 a defensive alliance with Japan.²

British
Foreign
Policy

Anglo-
Japanese
Alliance,
1902

Yet as the decade of the 1890's advanced, the expected entente between Britain and Germany failed to materialize. Germany made new imperialistic thrusts into China and the Ottoman

¹ The so-called "Fashoda Incident." See above, pp. 539-540.

² The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 provided that if either Power should become involved in war with two Powers over China or Korea, the other would give assistance. In 1905 the alliance was renewed for ten years with the additional stipulation that both would fight if either should be attacked by a single Power in India as well as in the Far East.

Empire, which in effect were more anti-British than anti-Russian.

Friction between Britain and Germany Then, in 1899, when the British undertook the conquest of the Dutch republics in South Africa, the German press was quite sympathetic with the Boers and critical of the British. And, to cap the climax, Germany began, under enactments of 1898 and 1900, greatly to enlarge her navy. Already, many Britishers were uncomfortably aware that Germany was becoming Britain's most formidable competitor in manufacturing and commerce. It was now apparent to the British that their naval supremacy, and hence their Empire, might soon be threatened by Germany unless they quickened their own naval construction and enormously increased their public expenditure. The relations between Great Britain and Germany were moving, not toward intimate friendship, but toward openly voiced hostility.

Coöperation of Germany and Dual Alliance In the circumstances, the balance of power between Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance seemed of less moment than a possible coalition of Germany with France and Russia looking toward the isolation of Britain. Commercial relations between Germany and Russia were improved in the early 1890's by a reciprocal lowering of tariffs; and soon the two Powers, and France also, were coöperating in the Far East. They jointly compelled Japan to revise her peace settlement with China in 1895, and by concerted action shortly afterwards they severally acquired territories in China. During the Boer War there was a good deal of discussion on the Continent about the need of a "Grand Alliance" of Germany, France, and Russia to give aid to the Boers and set limits to the British Empire. France, secretly consulted by Russia on the subject, declined to commit herself unless Germany should reopen the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany refused to do. But, although no such Grand Alliance was forthcoming, the relations of France and Germany underwent improvement and those of Russia and Germany became really cordial.

Simultaneously, Germany's associates in the Triple Alliance dropped into the background, and the Triple Alliance itself seemed hardly existent. Austria-Hungary, fully occupied with internal troubles, willingly signed a treaty with Russia for the preservation of the *status quo* in the Balkans. Italy, weakened by defeat in Abyssinia, perceived the desirability of halting her

vendetta with France, especially since a strongly anti-clerical and therefore sympathetic French government was now in power. So, two secret agreements were concluded by France and Italy. By the first, a convention of 1900, Italy recognized the French protectorate over Tunis and French claims to Morocco, and France accorded Italy a free hand in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. By the second, an engagement of 1902, Italy and France mutually pledged themselves to remain neutral if either should be attacked by a third Power or if either, "as the result of a direct provocation, should find itself obliged, in defence of its honor or security, to take the initiative of a declaration of war." The text of this arrangement remained a secret until 1918; but the visit of President Loubet to King Victor Emmanuel III in 1904 announced to the world the termination of the open feud between the Latin sisters.

**Franco-
Italian
Agreement of
1902**

With peace assured between Russia and Austria in the Balkans, and between France and Italy in the Mediterranean, Germany encouraged Russia to go to war with Japan in 1904 and cordially seconded her efforts. Then, in July 1905, when Russian troops had been decisively defeated in Manchuria, the German Emperor met the Russian Tsar at Bjorkö and persuaded him to agree to a Russo-German alliance, directed actually (though not expressly) against Great Britain and open to French adherence. France declined to adhere to it, the advisers of the two Emperors deemed it unwise or unnecessary, and it came to naught. It was a kind of anti-climax to a decade of informal coöperation between Triple and Dual Alliances.

**Projected
Russo-
German
Alliance,
1905**

Already the British government, faced with increasing hostility of Germany as well as of continuing hostility of France and Russia, was ceasing to glory in Britain's "splendid isolation" and beginning to consider how she might best secure foreign friends. It still seemed as if close coöperation between Britain and Germany was more practicable than close coöperation between Britain and the Dual Alliance, and accordingly the British government in 1901 sounded out Germany regarding a special understanding between the two countries. Germany insisted, however, that Britain should adhere formally to the Triple Alliance, and the British were unwilling to assume such definite and far-reaching obligations. So the Anglo-German negotiations broke down, and Great

**Britain's
Anxiety to
Escape
Isolation**

Britain looked elsewhere. In 1902 she concluded her alliance with Japan, and presently she turned to France.

The British foreign minister, Lord Lansdowne, proposed to the French ambassador at London a friendly settlement of colonial differences between the two countries. The proposal was welcomed by the ambassador, and also by the French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé; and it eventuated, after several

Anglo-
French
Entente,
1904

months' negotiations, in the conclusion in 1904 of several conventions affecting Franco-British relations in Africa and overseas. These conventions not only gave Great Britain free rein in Egypt, and France in Morocco, but marked the end of a long period of intense imperialist rivalry and paved the way for the development between 1904 and 1914 of particularly friendly relations between the peoples and governments of France and Great Britain—the so-called *Entente Cordiale*.

The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was not an alliance, any more than the similar Anglo-German agreement of 1890 had been. Now, as then, it was hoped that, by removing sources of friction, the countries concerned would be more friendly and coöperative. The Anglo-German arrangement had not achieved that end. That the Anglo-French arrangement turned out differently is attributable to circumstances of the next few years. The defeat of Russia by Japan made the French especially eager to develop the entente, and the growing naval strength of Germany had a corresponding effect on the British. Besides, as we shall presently explain, an international crisis over Morocco in 1905-1906 served to cement the *Entente Cordiale*.

One embarrassing feature of the Anglo-French Entente was evident during 1904-1905 when Russia, the ally of France, was at war with Japan, the ally of Great Britain. British sentiment was still vehemently anti-Russian, and, as we have seen, the impressionable Russian Tsar was then strongly influenced by the German Emperor. With the defeat of Russia, however, the situation changed radically. Russia reacted sharply against German influence, which had been predominant during the preceding ten years and which was blamed (rather unjustly) for the ensuing disaster. On the other hand, Great Britain lost her fear of Russia and began to perceive advantages in coming to terms with her. Consequently, in 1907, the British and Russian governments

managed to arrive at a mutual understanding concerning disputed spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and China, and to sign conventions which paralleled the Entente between Great Britain and France with a second Entente between Great Britain and Russia. Japan, also, was brought into harmonious relations with the new Entente, through a Russo-Japanese convention of 1910 and through the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1911.

Anglo-Russian
Entente,
1907

In Germany, meanwhile, many publicists and the government itself were viewing with alarm what was termed a "hostile encirclement." Italy was suspected, correctly as we now know, of disloyalty to Germany and Austria. Russia had broken with Germany and was again in full alliance with France. Great Britain was in ententes with France and Russia. Japan was in alliance with Britain. Austria, alone of the Great Powers, remained a friend of Germany.

German
Alarm,
and Re-
curring
Crises,
1905-1914

From 1905 to 1914 German diplomacy sought in divers ways to break up the Ententes, to strengthen Austria and increase her prestige, to win the Ottoman Empire as an ally, and to insist upon Germany's right to participate on the same basis as other Powers in world commerce and foreign investment. The new German effort did not break up the Ententes, but it produced periodic crises in the relations between the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France, and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary)—crises which grew ever more menacing to the preservation of any semblance of a Concert of Europe and more symptomatic of an impending war of huge dimensions. These crises had to do alternately with Morocco and with the Near East.

In the case of Morocco, a crisis was precipitated at the end of March 1905. By this time, the French foreign minister, Delcassé, had plans well advanced for the establishment of a French protectorate over the greater part of the country. He had obtained the assent of Italy in 1900 and of Great Britain in 1904; and he had just reached an agreement with Spain whereby she would obtain a protectorate over the part not appropriated by France. To be sure, the independence of Morocco had been affirmed by an international congress at Madrid in 1880. But Morocco was a backward and brigand-

Moroccan
Crisis of
1905-1906

ridden country, bordering on the French empire in Africa and on Spanish posts on the Mediterranean; and its fate seemed to Delcassé to be a practical concern of only France and Spain. The German Chancellor, Bülow, thought otherwise. He was anxious to assert Germany's interest in Morocco and to utilize the occasion to check Delcassé and weaken the Entente between France and Great Britain. Bülow picked a favorable opportunity—exactly three weeks after the decisive defeat of the Russians by the Japanese in the battle of Mukden—when he knew that Russia could give no support to France. On that date he had the Emperor William II disembark at Tangier and declare in a vigorous speech that he came to visit the Sultan of Morocco as an independent sovereign in whose lands all foreign Powers were to hold the same footing and enjoy the same rights.

There followed a brief moment of awful suspense. Then Delcassé resigned, and his colleagues in the French ministry agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question to an international congress. The Congress, meeting at Algeciras in Spain in 1906, did not reveal the cleavage between France and Great Britain which Bülow had hoped for. On the contrary, Britain consistently backed the French position, and so did Italy. The agreement finally reached at Algeciras, while paying lip service to the territorial integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of its Sultan and pledging the "open door" to merchants and investors of all the Powers, authorized France and Spain to instruct and officer a native police force and to oversee the execution of "reforms." To all intents and purposes, it was a French victory.

Civil war in Morocco and outrages against foreigners, especially Frenchmen, afforded the French government an excuse to land marines at Casablanca in 1907. Germany repeatedly expostulated against the continued presence of French troops in Morocco; and in 1908 an attempt on the part of the German consul at Casablanca to protect from arrest a number of deserters from the French foreign legion precipitated a second crisis, which was successfully passed in 1909 by reference of the questions at stake to the Hague Tribunal. The simultaneous negotiation of a special Franco-German convention in 1909 seemed to preclude future misunderstandings. Germany put on record that her interests in Morocco were "only economic"

and pledged herself, so long as "economic equality" was safeguarded, to recognize the political preponderance of France.

But the Franco-German agreement of 1909 was not observed. The French discriminated against German trade and investment in Morocco, and the Germans protested against the tightening of French political and military control. A new and severe crisis was precipitated in 1911 by the action of France in sending an army to Fez, the Moroccan capital, "to restore order." Germany then despatched a warship to the Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to safeguard German mining property, but with a significant hint that the warship would be withdrawn as soon as conditions were sufficiently settled to admit of French withdrawal from Fez. The gravity of the international situation was felt throughout Europe, and military preparations were hurried forward both in Germany and in France. Russia was not yet sufficiently recovered from the Japanese War to be of much assistance to France, but the British proclaimed their full support of France.

Moroccan
Crisis of
1911-1912

The German government did not desire war and after considerable bickering contented itself with concluding a second Franco-German convention, whereby Germany promised not to oppose the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco, and France agreed to maintain the "open door" there and to cede two strips of French Equatorial Africa to Germany. Although France was thus enabled in 1912 to settle the political question of Morocco satisfactorily to herself and to Spain, the Agadir crisis in 1911 served to quicken anti-German sentiment in France, and at the same time to consolidate the friendship between France and Great Britain. On the other hand, Germans felt that their legitimate interests in Morocco had been prejudiced and their position as a World Power jeopardized by the joint machinations of the French and the British.

Even more disquieting than the Moroccan crises were the crises in the Near East, where Russia and Austria-Hungary, instead of France and Germany, were the protagonists. But while in the case of Morocco, Russia, on account of her weakened military position, was able to give but little effective support to her French ally, in the case of the Near Eastern crises Germany had economic motives and powerful military means for backing Austria-Hungary.

Russia vs.
Austria in
Balkans

From the opening of the twentieth century the Austro-Hungarian government favored the political and economic expansion of the Dual Monarchy in a southerly direction through Bosnia and Macedonia to Salonica on the Ægean, and many influential Germans cherished the idea of "Germanizing" the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. So Germany and Austria-Hungary, acting in harmony, gradually extended their political and economic influence in southeastern Europe. In 1899 the Emperor William II ostentatiously visited the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and in 1903 a German company obtained a concession for the construction of a railway across Asia Minor, Armenia, and the fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, to Bagdad and the head of the Persian Gulf. Austrian influence was paramount at the Serbian court from the Congress of Berlin (1878) to the assassination of King Alexander in 1903; and Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, a German by birth, was long estranged from Russia and dependent upon Austria-Hungary. The King of Rumania was a kinsman and ally of the German Emperor, and the wife of the future King Constantine of Greece was a sister of William II. In a word, the Teutonic Powers stood in the way of the Russian ambition of ousting the Turks from Europe and ruling at Constantinople; they began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to exploit his country, and to seek to minimize both Russian and British influence throughout southeastern Europe.

In 1903 the Balkan policy of Germany and Austria-Hungary received a check. A palace revolution at Belgrade put an end to the rule of the pro-Austrian dynasty in Serbia and brought to the throne a King, Peter I, who was ardently in sympathy with the nationalist propaganda of the Serbs and openly dependent on Russia.

The first serious crisis in the Near Eastern Question affecting the new balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente occurred in 1908, when Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of the internal revolution in the Ottoman Empire, formally annexed the Serb-speaking provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby violating a provision of the treaty of Berlin of 1878, and arousing a storm of indignation in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia immediately took steps to back the Serb states and to resist Austro-Hun-

Growing
Influence
of Central
Empires
in Near
East

Change in
Serbian
Policy

Balkan
Crisis of
1908

garian "aggression," but Germany announced her firm intention of giving full military support to Austria-Hungary. Russia, still not fully recovered from the Japanese War and her own internal revolutionary upheaval, thereupon gave way, and Serbia was compelled to make a solemn promise that in the future she would not abet any anti-Austrian propaganda but would live on "good neighborly terms" with the Dual Monarchy. Peace was preserved, but Russian and Serb patriots did not forget the humiliation which their respective countries had suffered at Teutonic hands. Russia and Serbia drew closer together. The latter became more fiercely nationalist and expansionist. The former became intent upon army reforms and the strengthening of her ties in the Balkans.

A second crisis in the Near East was at least threatened by the war which Italy waged against the Ottoman Empire in 1911-1912. Russia was not directly concerned in the struggle, but it was distasteful to Germany as well as to Austria-Hungary, both of which were endeavoring to bolster up Turkish power, and it was bound sooner or later to produce grave consequences, in the Near East and throughout Europe. In the first place it brought Italy's policy in the Near East into conflict with that of Austria-Hungary. Second, the war showed a possible community of world interests between Italy and the Powers of the Triple Entente. Third, and most significant, it opened the way to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, out of which emerged the gravest international crises.

Turco-
Italian
War of
1911

In the course of the Balkan Wars, Austria-Hungary adopted a most unyielding attitude toward Serb ambitions. On threat of war, in which she was backed by Germany, she deprived Montenegro of the important town of Scutari and compelled Serbia to evacuate various Adriatic towns which her armies had conquered from the Turks. Also, by securing the sanction of the Great Powers for the erection of an autonomous Albania, she effectually prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the sea. Then, when Serbia obtained some compensation by warring on Bulgaria, the government and general staff of Austria-Hungary reached the decision that their southern neighbor must be attacked and despoiled. The decision was not immediately acted upon only because Italy and Germany interposed objections.

Austria's
Anti-Serb
Policy

In 1913 the international situation was extraordinarily perilous. Recurrent crises in Morocco and in the Near East had cost every Great Power some measure of prestige. Germany had been outplayed in the Moroccan crises by France and Great Britain. Yet France had been forced to cede African territory to Germany, and Great Britain to yield predominance in the Ottoman Empire. Russia had been outplayed in the successive Near Eastern crises by Austria-Hungary and Germany. Yet Austria-Hungary had been flouted by Serbia and held in leash by Italy, and Germany had to face the fact that instead of exercising an hegemony in Europe, as she had done in the days of Bismarck, she was now "encircled" by a ring of potentially hostile Powers.

But the more a Great Power was threatened with the loss of prestige, the less yielding and conciliatory it was likely to be. By the end of 1913 Austria-Hungary was determined not to submit to any further diplomatic rebuffs or military threats, and so was Russia. So, too, were Germany and France.

In an atmosphere less conciliatory, the current winds were more gale-like than ever. Naval rivalry was in full swing between Great Britain and Germany, and attempts to halt it by mutual agreement had been unsuccessful¹ and had now ceased altogether. Imperialistic rivalry, if assuaged as between Great Britain and France and Russia, was intensified for all these Powers by recent achievements of Italy and new thrusts of Germany in the Near East. Nationalism, in an aggravated form, was everywhere rampant; it was dictating to governments an emotional, rather than a reasoned, behavior; and, quite triumphant now in the Balkans, it threatened speedily to become so throughout east-central Europe.

In Serbia, the King and his prime minister, Pašič, were determined that the war which they had directed against the Ottoman Empire in 1912-1913 should lead to a political unification of all the Yugoslavs. "The first round is won," remarked Pašič; "now we must prepare for the second, against Austria." No wonder that Austria-Hungary tried to

¹ Lord Haldane, on behalf of the British government, had made such an attempt through direct negotiations at Berlin early in 1912. The German government insisted that Britain should pledge neutrality in the case of war, a pledge which the British government would not give.

weaken Serbia and to deprive her of some of the fruits of her victory over the Turks. No wonder, too, that nationalistic Serbs redoubled their subversive propaganda, by means of secret societies and clandestine publications (and with the connivance of government officials), among kindred Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes within the Habsburg Empire.

The threat against Austria-Hungary had no terror for Russia, and Russia sympathized with Serbian ambitions. It did have a terror, however, for Germany; Austria-Hungary was Germany's one dependable ally. France had no immediate stakes either in Serbia or in Austria-Hungary, but she was the ally of Russia and a Russian Balkan quarrel might embroil her in war. Great Britain's position was less certain, and so likewise was Italy's. Great Britain was in an *entente* with France and Russia, and was concerting military and naval plans with them, but she was not bound by a formal alliance and she was notoriously prone "to consult her own interests." Italy was in formal alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary but she simultaneously had a foot in the rival camp and what one of her leading statesmen described as a "sacred egotism." In the very uncertainty as to what Italy and Great Britain might do in a conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Yugoslav nationalism, there was special peril. There was a temptation to gamble.

Meanwhile, during the year 1913, the Powers vied with one another in making preparations against possible attack. Germany increased her standing army from 656,000 men to 870,000 and appropriated almost a billion marks for "extraordinary" military purposes. France lengthened the term of compulsory service from two years to three. Russia adopted a new program of army expansion. Great Britain added considerably to her already huge naval expenditure.

No responsible statesman really desired war, and "enlightened" and "progressive" people still assumed that a general European war would not and could not occur. In the spring of 1914 the German Emperor and the Russian Tsar were still exchanging letters couched in the most endearing terms, and Germany and Great Britain were newly arranging with each other, secretly but quite amicably, for joint coöperation in the immediate financing of the

Concern
of Great
Powers

Military
Prepared-
ness in
1913

Lull
before
Storm

Bagdad railway and in any future partition of the Portuguese colonies.

Nevertheless, despite all appearances and optimistic longings to the contrary, international competition had now reached a stage in which world peace was at the mercy of an accident. Indeed, the powder magazines throughout Europe were so well stocked, and nationalist feeling so strong and the pursuit of prestige so eager, that any untoward event was likely to produce a world-rocking explosion.

5. TOWARD WORLD WAR

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and heir to the Habsburg Empire, was assassinated, together with his wife, at Sarajevo, the chief town of Bosnia, by a band of fanatically nationalist Serbs. The assassination sent a thrill of horror all over Europe and evoked a storm of indignation in Austria and Germany.

Here was a peculiarly favorable opportunity as well as a perfectly obvious obligation, reasoned the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Leopold Berchtold, to have a final reckoning between Imperial Austria and that centre of subversive Yugoslav nationalism, the independent state of Serbia. Berchtold had harried and repeatedly thwarted Serbia during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, but he had been restrained by Germany and Italy from attacking Serbia. Now he would chastise Serbia so severely that she would be unable to endanger the integrity of the Habsburg Empire.

We now know that the assassins of the Archduke, though natives of Bosnia and subjects therefore of the Habsburg Empire, were members of the Serbian secret society of the "Black Hand,"¹ that they had obtained their weapons and training in Serbia, and that they had planned and executed their crime with the assistance of several high officers in the Serbian army. Also, we now have grounds for believing that Nicholas Pašić, the prime minister of Serbia, had foreknowledge of the conspiracy and yet gave the Austrian government no adequate warning. In other words, the Serbian government had a real share of responsibility.

At the time, however, Berchtold lacked proof of Serbia's com-

¹ See above, p. 497.

plicity. Indeed, his own official investigator reported that there was "nothing to prove or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian government's cognizance of the steps leading to the crime." Nevertheless, Berchtold was resolved to act, and he accordingly pretended to have evidence against Serbia which actually he did not possess.

Before venturing to take drastic action, Berchtold sought the consent of his own government and the sanction of Austria's ally, Germany. The Hungarian premier, Count Stephen Tisza, had qualms, however; he thought the policy too adventurous and counselled the Emperor Francis Joseph not to assent to an armed attack upon Serbia. The aged Emperor hesitated, and it required all of Berchtold's powers of persuasion to get him to sign the communication which the Foreign Minister had prepared for secret despatch to the German Emperor William II. "The crime against my nephew," the communication read, "is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire. . . . Though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Serbian government, there can be no doubt that its policy of uniting all Yugoslavs under the Serbian flag promotes such crimes, and that a continuation of this situation endangers my dynasty and my territories. The aim of my government must henceforth be to isolate and diminish Serbia."

Austria's
Appeal to
Germany

On July 5-6 the Austrian ambassador to Germany and a special emissary of Count Berchtold bearing the communication from the Emperor Francis Joseph conferred secretly with the Emperor William II at Potsdam. How fully the Austrians revealed Berchtold's plan we do not know. We do know that William II definitely pledged Germany's unqualified support of Austria in any action she might take against Serbia, even if such action involved war with Russia. He was doubtless influenced by the emotion he felt over the murder of his friend, the Austrian Archduke, and he must have been impressed by the urgency of the situation and by the fear that unless Germany decisively backed Austria she would lose her one dependable ally. William II neither wished nor expected to precipitate a world war. He imagined that Austria could make quick work of Serbia and that German threats would

German
Assur-
ances to
Austria

suffice in 1914, as they had sufficed in 1909, to deter Russia from intervening. He considered, of course, the possibility of Russia's not being deterred this time, but William II was willing to gamble, and his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, an honest but weak man, was meekly acquiescent. So Germany presented a "blank cheque" to Austria-Hungary and underwrote Berchtold's venture.

Thus fortified, Count Berchtold had no serious difficulty in persuading all the members of the Austro-Hungarian government, including Count Tisza, that drastic action should be taken forthwith against Serbia. Then, while the Austrian Chief of Staff was planning the military campaign, Berchtold drafted an ultimatum which Serbia would be almost certain to reject. The ultimatum was presented to Serbia on July 23. It declared that Serbia, by failing to suppress anti-Austrian conspiracies, had violated her solemn promise of 1909 to "live on good neighborly terms" with Austria-Hungary and had therefore compelled the government of the Dual Monarchy to abandon its attitude of "forbearance" and to insist on guaranties of good behavior by the Serbian government. Specifically, Serbia was called upon to ban anti-Austrian publications and societies, to oust any official whom the Austrian government should accuse of subversive propaganda, to discard anti-Austrian textbooks from the Serbian schools, "to accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government for the suppression of the revolutionary movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy," and to signify unconditional acceptance of the whole ultimatum within forty-eight hours.

**Austrian
Ultima-
tum to
Serbia**

On July 25 the Serbian government replied, promising compliance with such demands as "would not impair the country's independence and sovereignty" and offering to refer all disputed points to the international tribunal at The Hague or to a conference of the Great Powers. Simultaneously Serbia ordered the mobilization of her army. Whereupon the Austro-Hungarian government pronounced the reply evasive and unsatisfactory, broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, and likewise ordered mobilization. War was clearly impending between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

**Serbian
Reply**

But a much vaster and more terrible war was also impending. The Russian government felt that if it stood aside from what promised to be a supreme test between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Russian prestige would suffer irreparable harm. It had suffered enough through Russia's standing aside in 1909; it must now be maintained at any cost. In the present emergency, moreover, national sentiment among the Russian people, and among other Slavic peoples also, could be counted upon to back energetic action by the Russian government—and by the Russian army if necessary. Consequently, on July 18—five days before the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia—the Russian foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, had clearly warned the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg that “Russia would not be indifferent to any attempt to humiliate Serbia; Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia.”

Russian
Concern

Besides, Russia soon received assurances of French support, for Raymond Poincaré, the President of the French Republic, paying a state visit to St. Petersburg on July 20-23, declared to the French ambassador that “Sazonov must be firm, and we will support him.” Neither Sazonov nor his sovereign, the Tsar Nicholas II, wished war—any more than did the German Emperor and his Chancellor. But the Russian Foreign Minister was confident that Austria-Hungary could be checked by a firm stand just as Russia had been checked in 1908-1909, and the Tsar, in an exalted mood, hoped for the best. As for the French government, it too had no eagerness for war, though it had a morbid fear lest France should lose her ally and the alliance should lose its prestige; and if, peradventure, general war should come, it might have the advantage of enabling France to undo the defeat of 1870.

French
Assurances to
Russia

On July 26, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, urged that a conference of diplomatic representatives of Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain “meet in confidence immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications” and that “all active military operations be suspended pending results of conference.” The Italian and French governments responded favorably, but the German government, fearful lest such a conference, like the one at Algeiras in 1906, would put

British
Efforts at
Mediation

Germany in a minority and lower the prestige of the Central Empires, replied that the basic dispute concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia alone and that the efforts of other Powers should be concentrated on "localizing" it. With this evidence of Germany's firm stand, Austria-Hungary on July 28 declared war on Serbia, in order, as Berchtold informed the German ambassador at Vienna, "to cut the ground from any attempt at intervention."

Thenceforth events marched fast. Amidst frantic endeavors of diplomats to discover some means of preserving peace without losing prestige, military preparations went feverishly forward. Already, on July 26, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty in the British cabinet, had given orders on his own responsibility that the British fleet, then mobilized for annual manœuvres, should not disperse but should hold itself in readiness for war. Then, on July 29, when news of the Austrian declaration of war reached St. Petersburg, the Tsar was prevailed upon to sanction a general mobilization of the armed forces of Russia.

For a few hours that same night and the next morning the prospect of a peaceful outcome seemed to brighten. William II and Bethmann-Hollweg, who had rashly given a "blank cheque" to Berchtold and blindly allowed him to use it as he would, were suddenly shocked by the realization of the enormous payment in money and men which Germany was almost certain to be called upon to make in honoring the "cheque." They had imagined that they could "localize" the Austro-Serbian conflict; the determined attitude of Russia now filled them with consternation. So, somewhat tardily, Bethmann-Hollweg pressed Austria to negotiate directly with Russia; and when he got no immediate response, he testily wired the German ambassador at Vienna: "As an ally we must refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration because Austria does not respect our advice. Tell Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." And just as the Tsar was ordering Russian mobilization William II frantically wired him imploring him to avoid military measures which "would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid."

The change of front at Berlin had little effect on Count Berchtold, who refused to believe that Germany would really go back

Austria at
War with
Serbia

Develop-
ment of
Crisis

German
Efforts to
Stay
Austria

on the original promise she had made to Austria-Hungary. It did have some effect, however, on the impressionable Tsar Nicholas II, who, on receipt of the telegram from William II, promptly countermanded the order for general mobilization of the Russian army (which had not yet been published) and decreed instead a partial mobilization, "as a precautionary measure," along the Austrian (but not the German) frontier.

Austrian
Obstinacy

What thus began auspiciously, though tardily, ended speedily and direfully. The Tsar's shift of orders threw the Russian military authorities into a panic. They had a detailed plan for general mobilization but not for such a partial mobilization as the Tsar now contemplated, and they begged the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, unless he would disorganize the Russian army and do without it in his negotiations, to bring about another shift in the Tsar's mind. Sazonov saw the point and on July 30 entreated Nicholas II to renew the order for general mobilization. Nicholas hesitated: "Think of the responsibility you are advising me to take! Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their death!" Sazonov persisted, and presently the Tsar yielded. Sazonov rushed to the telephone and informed the Chief of Staff that he was authorized to proceed with general mobilization. "Now you can smash the telephone," Sazonov added; "give your orders, General, and then disappear for the rest of the day."

Russian
Mobiliza-
tion

Russian mobilization transformed the Austro-Serbian war into a Russo-German war. For the German Chief of Staff had no difficulty in convincing William II and Bethmann-Hollweg that the Russians meant business and that any delay in counter-mobilization would spell disaster for Germany. On July 31 Germany presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia, demanding immediate demobilization. Russia did not comply. Germany declared war.

Germany
at War
with
Russia

Germany knew that war with Russia was practically certain to involve France. Accordingly, on the very day of delivering the ultimatum to Russia, Germany presented an ultimatum to France, demanding that she declare her neutrality within eighteen hours. If perchance such a declaration should be forthcoming, Germany was prepared to make the further demand that France permit German troops

Germany
at War
with
France

to occupy the fortresses of Toul and Verdun until general peace should be restored. In fact, the declaration was not made. France merely stated, on August 1, that she "would consult her interests," and at once began mobilization. On August 3, 1914, Germany declared war on France.

Thus, within a week of the declaration of hostilities by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, four Great Powers were in a state of war—Germany and Austria-Hungary opposed to Russia and France. Italy and Rumania, nominal allies of the Central Powers, promptly proclaimed their neutrality, on the ground that the war was not defensive on the part of Austria-Hungary and Germany, but offensive, and that therefore they were not bound to give assistance to their allies. Thereby Italy kept her secret agreement of 1902 with France; and it was not long before Italy, and Rumania likewise, was pressing Austria-Hungary for "compensations" in accordance with provisions of the Triple Alliance.

Great Britain, on the other hand, almost immediately entered the war. The British people, on the whole, had by this time greater sympathy for France than for Germany, and Sir Edward Grey had already informed Germany that he could not bind Great Britain to observe neutrality. On August 2 he went farther and announced that Great Britain would not tolerate German naval attacks on French coasts or shipping. There was still considerable pacifist sentiment in the British cabinet, and a minority in it were critical of the Foreign Minister's manifest partiality for France. On August 4 occurred an event, however, which enabled Sir Edward Grey and the other pro-war members of the cabinet to force out the pacifists and to unite the overwhelming majority of the British parliament and British nation in enthusiastic support of Great Britain's entrance into the war on the side of her fellow members of the Entente—France and Russia.

German troops had been set in motion toward the French frontier, not only against the French border fortresses of Verdun, Toul, and Belfort, but toward the neutral countries of Luxemburg and Belgium, which lay between Germany and less well-defended districts of northern France. Both Germany and France had signed treaties to respect the neutrality of these "buffer states," and France had already announced her intention of adhering to

her treaty engagements. But on August 2 German troops occupied Luxemburg, despite protests from the Grand-Duchess; and on the same day the German government presented a twelve-hour ultimatum to Belgium, demanding that German troops be permitted to cross into France, promising, if permission were granted, that Belgium would be indemnified, and threatening, if resistance was encountered, that the decision of arms would determine the future relations of Belgium to Germany. The Belgian government characterized the ultimatum as a gross violation of international law, refused to grant the German request, and appealed for British help in upholding the neutrality of Belgium.

German
Violation
of Belgian
Neutrality

The neutrality of Belgium had always been an important point in the foreign policy of Great Britain. The British had fought against Napoleon I in part because of the annexation of Belgium by France, and they had been hostile to the ambition of Napoleon III in respect of Belgium. They were not likely to view with pleasure Belgium's incorporation with the German Empire. On August 4, therefore, when news was received in London that German troops had actually crossed the border into Belgium, Sir Edward Grey despatched an ultimatum to Germany, requiring assurances by midnight that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality. Germany refused, on the ground of military necessity, and Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, terribly tired and disappointed, berated the British ambassador: "Just for a word 'neutrality,' a word which in war time has so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper—Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her." At midnight Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Britain at
War with
Germany

On August 7, Montenegro joined her fellow Yugoslav state of Serbia against Austria-Hungary. Then Japan became a party to the war, partially to fulfill her treaty obligations to Great Britain and partially to avenge herself on Germany, for the Japanese had not forgotten the German Emperor's slighting references to them in the past, nor the part Germany had played in preventing Japan from retaining Port Arthur in 1895 after the Chino-Japanese War. Accordingly, on August 17 Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding that she immediately withdraw all her warships from Chi-

Japan at
War with
Germany

nese and Japanese waters and deliver up the leased territory of Kiaochow before September 15, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Upon the refusal of the German government to comply with the ultimatum, Japan declared war (August 23, 1914).

Against the combination of so many foes, Germany and Austria-Hungary obtained support from the Ottoman Empire. Many patriotic Turks had come to believe that the integrity of their empire was menaced far more by the Entente Powers than by Germany and Austria-Hungary. On August 1, the very day that Germany declared war against Russia, the Ottoman government, dominated by Enver Pasha, signed a secret treaty with Germany, promising to aid her against Russia. For a time the Ottoman Empire pretended to be neutral, but at length on October 29, 1914, when military preparations seemed sufficiently advanced, Turkish warships bombarded Russian ports on the Black Sea. Russia responded with a declaration of war, and on November 5, France and Great Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire.


Thus, in the three months from July 28 to October 29, 1914, a conflict between Serbia and Austria broadened into a world war in which Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire were arrayed against Russia, France, Great Britain (with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), Japan, Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. Six of the eight Great Powers were immediately involved, and five of the six continents.

No nation willed the war, and statesmen blundered into it rather than sought it. Nor is there any scientific way of apportioning blame for it among the various sovereigns and diplomats and chiefs of staff whom we have referred to in the preceding pages. Some of them were cunning, some were cowardly, and some of them were merely stupid. They would have been quite unable to precipitate a world war, had they not been, equally with millions of common people, the more or less willing agents of immense forces which for a generation had been predisposing the civilized world to mortal combat. The world was parcelled out among states whose mutual distrusts were quickened by rival nationalisms and rival imperialisms; and the existence among these states of a group of Great Powers, divided in the twentieth century into

Blunder-
ing into
the World
War

two huge armed camps, provided a special impetus to rival militarisms.


The coming of the World War took most governments and certainly the masses of mankind by surprise. The preceding age had been so "enlightened." The first decade of the twentieth century had pointed so unmistakably toward material progress, toward a world of European civilization, toward peaceful development and coöperation. Suddenly, as in the twinkling of an eye, the "promise of the twentieth century" assumed a different significance. There might still be material progress and Europeanization of the world, but what loomed foremost now was a bigger and more destructive war than the world had ever known. The World War, as the event proved, really closed an era of "enlightenment" and inaugurated an era of "disillusionment."



CHAPTER XXIV

THE WORLD WAR

I. FROM MOBILIZATION TO TRENCH WARFARE, 1914



YEARS of World War were introduced with astounding suddenness. For an instant, the popular reaction to it was one of shock, but this soon gave place to a strange sense of resignation. The masses, no more than the governments, had wished war, and yet war was now a grim reality.

Once the die was cast, there was little opportunity or inclination to "reason why." For from declaration of war to mobilization of troops the passage in every belligerent country was immediate and inexorable. By the system of conscription and mobilization which Prussia had developed by 1866 and which other Continental nations had adopted during the generation following 1870, the strength of the peace-time army was doubled or trebled by calling back to the colors reservists who had already received military training; and the regiments thus raised to war footing were entrained for the frontier according to prearranged plans. Within a fortnight from the ordering of mobilization, therefore, five million men or more throughout Europe were suddenly drawn from their ordinary occupations, clothed and equipped for war, gathered into military units, and transported to the frontiers. Mobilization with such rapidity and on such a scale involved a quasi-paralysis of the economic life of Europe, an upsetting of the normal affairs of practically every family in the belligerent countries.

Mobilization was likewise attended in every country by an almost instantaneous merging of partisan differences in national solidarity. Opposition parties lined up behind the several governments. All elements and all strata of society reacted similarly. The specifically "disaffected" groups—revolutionary or anti-militarist—behaved like

**Mobiliza-
tion**

**National
Solidarity**

the rest. In the supreme crisis, pacifism collapsed, and no effective protest was forthcoming from any international society or movement—from the Christian churches, from Marxian socialism, from scholars, business men, or financiers.

Each warring government published its own account of the diplomatic negotiations preceding the war, suppressing whatever appeared unfavorable to its own cause, exaggerating whatever seemed unfavorable to the cause of enemy countries, and on occasion deliberately falsifying the account. These official apologies of the several governments were soon "interpreted" and supplemented by patriotic propaganda; and the pious mythologies, thus built up, and protected by military censorship, became veritable creeds for entire nations, promoting and sustaining the collective morale of each. Everybody was expected to think and say the best of one's own country and its allies, and the worst of the enemy combination, and the vast majority of the warring populations did what was expected of them.

To the winning of the war was directed all this nationalist propaganda. To the same end was directed a radical reorganization of economic life within each belligerent nation. Industry, transportation, agriculture, commerce, and finance were progressively subjected to drastic regulation and control by the several governments, to such a degree as eventually to introduce *de facto* a war-time "state socialism" and to engage all the economic resources as well as the whole man-power of a nation in support of the war.

Thus the economic as well as strictly military effort of the warring governments fused all elements of each nation into an unprecedented unity of purpose—the limited purpose of seeing the war through. Party alignments were wiped out in each country; class divisions and religious quarrels were put aside. National solidarity was exalted as never before, and this fact made it possible alike for the masses and for the classes to endure the protracted hardships and suffering which the war entailed. From the standpoint of social history, this temporary fusion, or unity, is perhaps the outstanding fact of the World War.

At the outset, there was anxious hope that the war might be brief and end in a "knock-out blow." The wars of 1859, 1866, and 1870-1871 had each centred in a single campaign and been decided by a single battle. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-

War
Propa-
ganda

National
"Social-
ism"
and
Unity

1905 had been over within a year, and the Balkan War of 1912-1913 within a few months. With all the latest mechanical inventions, the present war might conceivably set a record for speed and decisiveness. Otherwise, the prospect would be too dreadful to contemplate.

**Expecta-
tion of
Brief War** The common system of mobilization on the Continent made it certain that big armies would be ready to move against each other in little more than a fortnight from the declaration of war. Each of the general staffs had carefully elaborated a scheme for the opening operations with a view to taking the offensive and winning a decisive battle within the shortest possible time. In general, the French and Russians planned to strike Germany simultaneously from two sides. While the French would attempt a general advance along the Franco-German frontier from Charleroi to Nancy and a more concentrated attack in Lorraine, the Russians would hold off the Austrians and invade East Prussia in force. On the other hand, the Germans planned to cope with their hostile neighbors in turn: to overwhelm the French with superior numbers, and then to turn against the Russians.

**Strategic
Plans** To overwhelm the French and any British army which might come to their assistance, the German staff, under its chief, General von Moltke,¹ gathered a decisive superiority of forces on the northern and western wing of the armies facing Belgium and France. Belgium, when summoned to let the Germans pass, courageously refused, and made a stand against overwhelming odds. The gallant defense of the Liège forts allowed the Belgian army to mobilize, but the last fort at Liège fell by the time the German right-wing armies were ready to move forward. These scattered the Belgian army, crossed the country,² and reached

**German
Success in
Belgium
and in
Battles of
Frontier** ¹ A nephew of the Moltke who had commanded in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

² Acts of retaliation which German troops inflicted on Belgium for her resistance—such as the burning of the library of the University of Louvain—provided some substantiation for a host of “atrocities stories” which were utilized to confirm the morale of Allied peoples and to arouse anti-German sentiment in neutral countries. By the latter part of August 1914, most of Belgium was under military occupation by Germany, and a German governor was installed at Brussels. King Albert of Belgium with a remnant of his army was with the French and British.

NOTE. The picture opposite, “A Dawn in 1914,” is from an etching by a British artist, C. R. W. Nevinson (born 1889).


the French border according to plan; and here with a decisive superiority they met the northern wing of the French army (and a supporting "expeditionary force" from Britain). Not only here, but in the whole series of opening engagements known as the Battles of the Frontier, the French armies were defeated. The French offensive from Charleroi to Nancy was halted in its tracks, and the French advance into Lorraine was turned back. All the German armies were ordered forward in pursuit, and on August 25 Moltke wired to William II that "in six weeks the whole story will be concluded."

This interpretation proved an error. The German plan had assembled a superiority of forces at the critical point and had defeated the enemy at the time and place anticipated. But the defeat was less severe than at first appeared, and in the next conflicts the French troops proved far steadier. Above all, Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, held his retiring armies under firm control; transferred troops from right to left; and continued an orderly retreat until he could redispense his forces and stand to fight along a more favorable position. Just south of the Marne, he halted the retreat; and on September 6 his forces turned to deliver battle.

All the armies between Paris and Verdun were engaged in this new conflict. The Battle of the Marne, as it came to be known, comprised five or six more or less distinct battles along a 150-mile front, lasting four days. These actions were fought by troops not yet hardened to war, who had been marching or fighting for three weeks in the hottest of midsummer weather. Along most of the battle front, the actions were indecisive; but the German advance was definitely halted, and in the western sector the British army pushed steadily forward through a gap between the German armies of Kluck and Below. By the morning of September 9 the British had crossed the Marne; Kluck and Below were completely separated; and to prevent disaster the German right wing retreated from the Marne to the Aisne. The armies farther east followed suit, and by September 14 the Germans were on the defensive.

German
Failure at
Marne,
Sept. 1914

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Edith Cavell," is from a painting by an American artist, George Bellows (1882-1925). Edith Cavell was an heroic English nurse in Belgium who was convicted by a German court-martial of sheltering Allied soldiers and was put to death in October 1915. On Bellows, see below, pp. 838-839.



The French in turn had to face the disappointment of not being able to force the defensive position of the Germans, and thus the third phase of the opening engagements in the West ended in a stalemate. But though tactically indecisive, the Marne campaign marked the complete failure of the strategy of a speedy German victory over France. Moltke, the German commander, realized only too clearly the full meaning of the failure of his offensive. On September 9, the day his armies began their retreat, he wrote his wife: "It goes badly—The first hopes have been utterly belied. . . . Bitter disillusionment is already upon us." Moltke himself collapsed from the blow, and a new German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, had to be appointed in the midst of the crisis.

Stalemate
on West-
ern Front

The stalemate along the Aisne left the opposing armies pinned to the ground with their western flanks uncovered and with vital railway communications unprotected. From common necessity both Falkenhayn and Joffre set to work to prolong their lines in this quarter and, if possible, to outflank each other. Falkenhayn, with spirited energy, ordered a new attack in the West in order to cut off Paris from the Channel ports (through which British reinforcements were arriving) and from all northern France. Joffre checked the attack and turned the line northward, but try as he would during the next month he could not outflank the Germans. The net result was a new entrenched front reaching from the Aisne northward to the western tip of Belgium. In the last phase of this "race to the sea," Falkenhayn gathered all available troops and a new army corps of fresh troops raised since the beginning of hostilities and made a fierce attempt to break through to the Channel ports. The British army, centring at Ypres, had to bear the brunt of the assault, which continued without let-up for three weeks. The Battle of Ypres was in fact the longest and most hard-fought battle up to this time. It left both armies exhausted; and with the commencement of winter the Western Front stabilized in entrenched lines running from Nieuport and Ypres (in southwestern Belgium) southward to the Aisne River, thence eastward to Verdun, and thence southward again to Belfort and the Swiss frontier—a total distance of about six hundred miles.

Failure of
Out-
flanking

En-
trenched
Western
Front

The outline of this long Western Front was the result of suc-

cessive fortunes of battle rather than of purpose or design. Its effect was to leave in German hands most of the industrial area of Belgium and northern France, which was to prove a serious handicap to the Allies throughout the war. The Allies, however, maintained securely their hold on the Channel ports, which assured effective lines of communication between France and England and made it easier for the Allies to blockade the German coasts. With their existing supplies, the Allies had little prospect of breaking through the entrenched German position across France. But, on the other hand, the existence of this "impregnable front" committed the German army to the very thing the General Staff had sought to avoid: an interminable siege warfare which might drain away Germany's resources while permitting France and Britain to draw freely upon the outside world.

In the East, meanwhile, the war had reached a similar result.

Start of War in East	The war plans of Russia, Austria, and Germany alike had ended in frustration, and the failure of the German offensive in the West was paralleled by a deadlock along an entrenched Eastern Front.
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Originally the Russian war plan had contemplated offensives against both Germany and Austria, but some years before 1914 the Russian military authorities had promised the French that, in case the main German attack was launched against France, the major part of the Russian forces would be directed at the outset against Germany. This promise was not carried out. When war actually came, the Russians yielded to the temptation to direct their chief effort against the "favorite enemy"—

Russian Success against Austria	Austria. They were rewarded by a striking victory along the whole Austrian front in Galicia. But between the diversion of forces thereby entailed and an extraordinarily faulty execution of the long-planned invasion of East Prussia, the Russian offensive against Germany ended in sensational disaster. The Russian armies which advanced into East Prussia were together numerically superior to the German army, but while the Russian generals dismally failed to coöperate, the Germans (under the central command of
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Russian Defeat by Germany	General Paul von Hindenburg, with General Erich Ludendorff as his chief of staff) acted as a unit and managed to deal with the Russians piecemeal. It thus transpired that in each of the three battles fought in East Prussia
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in August 1914, the Germans brought into action more battalions than the Russians. And at the culminating Battle of Tannenberg (August 26-29) one of the Russian armies was routed with a loss of 125,000 prisoners, while another broke to pieces in attempting a sudden retreat and lost an equal number of men.

By this disaster the Russians lost the strategical opportunity to overrun East Prussia, which was of critical importance to their general war plan. Moreover, it prevented them from fully "harvesting" their victory on the Austrian front (in Galicia). And the loss of 300,000 trained officers and men, with corresponding quantities of war material, was irreparable.

The Austrian misfortunes arose from cross-purposes at the outset of the war. Throughout the diplomatic crisis of July the government at Vienna held to the plan of a war on Serbia alone, on the premise that clear-cut diplomatic support from Germany would keep Russia from actual conflict. When Russia suddenly ordered mobilization and Germany declared war, an Austrian army was already on its way to Serbia; and the government decided to carry through the Serbian campaign as planned. Through shocking mismanagement, this campaign ended in utter defeat, and the Austrian invaders had to retire behind their own frontiers. The troops used for the vain effort could not take their place in the line of battle in Galicia, where the Russian advance had to be met immediately afterwards. With a substantial superiority of numbers, the Russians hammered back the whole Austrian line to western Galicia, and here the exhausted and sadly weakened Austrian army made a stand behind the Dunajetz River. Desperately the Austrian commander called upon the German General Staff for the reinforcements due at this stage—six weeks after the outbreak of war. He called in vain. The Austrian defeat in Galicia had taken place almost simultaneously with the Battle of the Marne, and the Western Front held in ever firmer grip the main strength of the German army.

**Austrian
Failures**

By the end of 1914 the lines in the East settled down in a more or less entrenched front extending from the borders of East Prussia through western Russian Poland and across Galicia to the Carpathian Mountains—a distance of some nine hundred miles. In the East, as in the West, the war had reached a seeming deadlock. On both fronts, and by both sides, the opportunity for

a strategic decision and a "knock-out blow" was lost. The prospect now was a dreadful one of prolonged trench warfare.

2. GROWING MAGNITUDE AND INDECISIVENESS OF WAR, 1915-1916

By the winter of 1914-1915 the war was assuming unprecedented magnitude. Millions of men were under arms, and "trench warfare" was taking the place of field operations. Each of the contending armies was ensconced in a system of trenches, running two or three deep in zigzag parallels, connected with one another by laterals, and connected also with underground "dugouts" in which soldiers rested and supplies were kept. Between the opposing systems was "no man's land," a waste space obstructed with mounds of dirt and tangles of barbed wire, through which infantry must advance if they would capture the enemy's trenches.

On the Western Front, as we have pointed out, such trench systems of the Germans and of the French and British (and Belgians) now faced each other in a line six hundred miles long. On the Eastern Front, the opposing trench systems of the Russians and of the Germans and Austrians were less elaborate but more extensive, covering a distance of some nine hundred miles.

Trench warfare was supplemented by the latest mechanical devices. Cavalry, in the circumstances, could be employed very little, but artillery was used on a scale hitherto undreamed of.

Machine guns were utilized in prodigious numbers, and big cannon were installed all along the trenches to mow down the obstructions in "no man's land," to destroy the enemy's positions, and to screen the charges of infantry. Chemical inventions and appliances were increasingly made use of, so that to shell and shot were added explosive bombs and exploding mines, and considerably later in the war poisonous gases were discharged with deadly effect. Later in the war, too, the Allies built "tanks," cars encased in iron and driven by gasoline engines, which crawled over hills and gullies on caterpillar treads and spat out bullets. Gasoline engines proved, in fact, a most important auxiliary of the new warfare. They were employed not only eventually in "tanks," but immediately in the myriads of motor lorries which supplied troops at the front with ammunition and food and conveyed prisoners and the disabled to

the rear, and also in the host of airplanes which darted above the trenches, spying out the movements of the enemy, fighting off hostile planes, and dropping explosives.

With these new methods of warfare, and with millions of men directly involved on each side, the winning of decisive battles appeared almost impossible. To "carry" trenches required a vast concerted effort of artillery and infantry and an enormous expenditure of shot and shell and of human life. And to provide the millions of soldiers at the front with needful supplies necessitated the persistent and united co-operation of the whole civilian population of every belligerent nation. The financial expenditure was gigantic. Heavy taxes were levied and huge sums were borrowed.

Expensive
Warfare

Nevertheless, in the late winter and early spring of 1915, despite German success in East Prussia and outright conquests in Belgium, northern France, and western Russian Poland, the Allied nations of France, Russia, and Great Britain were sanguine of ultimate triumph. In population, in wealth, and in natural resources they collectively excelled the Central Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary. They made much of the fact that the latter constituted a "beleaguered fortress," against which the Russians would exert increasing pressure from the east, while the French and British (now being rapidly reënforced by volunteers from the British Isles and by armies from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) would push hard from the west. They confidently predicted that their superior numbers and resources would prove decisive and that even without "knock-out blows" they could exhaust the Central Empires and bring them to terms. British sea power was already destroying Germany's oceanic trade, detaching her colonies, and threatening to deprive her of needful supplies, while it was strengthening the French and promising to strengthen the Russians.

Allied Ex-
pectations

In such an optimistic frame of mind the Allied governments arranged a division of the spoils which would accrue to them from their eventual triumph. Back in September 1914, they had solemnly promised one another, by the Pact of London, not to make peace separately but to hold together until they had achieved a common victory. Then, in March 1915, they secretly agreed among themselves that in the future peace settlement Russia should appropriate

Pact of
London
and
Secret
Treaties

Constantinople and all of Poland, France should regain Alsace-Lorraine and dominate the left bank of the Rhine, and Great Britain should take most of the German colonies.

But the Germans hoped for ultimate victory too. They were superbly united and resolute. The military endeavors of Austria-Hungary had been disappointing, but the Dual Monarchy had not been shaken by any actual revolt of its subject peoples—as the Allies had hoped—and some of the most influential Polish leaders, for example, were so anxious to prevent Poland from being Russianized that their continuing loyalty to the Habsburg Empire could be depended upon. Under German leadership, the armies of Austria-Hungary, and of the Ottoman Empire also, could be made efficient and very useful.

Germany and Austria-Hungary admittedly constituted a “beleaguered fortress,” but this fact, in German eyes, had its advantages. It meant that the armies of the Central Empires could operate on interior rather than exterior lines, and that reinforcements could be transferred with relative ease and despatch from one front to another, wherever they might count the most. Besides, the whole military strategy of the Central Empires could be directed by a single authority, the German General Staff, which, by coordinating the efforts of the Austrians, Hungarians, and Turks with those of the Germans, could strike telling blows first in one direction and then in another. In this respect the situation within the “beleaguered fortress” was in marked contrast to that of the besieging hosts, who were subject to the orders of several separate and jealous general staffs—Russian, French, British, and Serbian. Unity of command was as advantageous to the Central Empires as disunity was costly to the Allies.

For the new type of entrenched warfare, the Central Empires at the beginning of 1915 had very real advantages in equipment and trained soldiery. Germany, no more than the enemy Powers, had originally accumulated stocks of munitions sufficient to outlast the opening campaigns, but with methodical foresight the war ministry at Berlin had planned the inevitable expansion of war industry. It had made surveys of German industrial plants, determined what work each could do, and prepared specifications for a rapid change to production of war material. As a result, munitions contracted for after the declara-

German
Hopes
and Ad-
vantages

tion of war were being delivered in huge quantities to the German field armies early in 1915, just when the Allies were facing a serious shortage of munitions—when France was deprived of her major industrial centres, when Britain was only beginning to transform peace-industries into war-industries, and when Russia was literally starving for guns and munitions.

At this time, also, Germany could put reserves of man-power more promptly in the field. Joffre, the French commander, had far fewer of such reserves upon which to draw; and Lord Kitchener, the British war minister, having started with only a relatively small professional army, had to take time to recruit and train wholly new units. Falkenhayn, on the other hand, by a skillful mixing of fresh young conscripts and trained personnel, put a group of new army corps into the field in November 1914; and by the close of the year, in addition to supplying losses in the existing ranks, he had ready another body of fresh troops as large as the entire British army in France.

In the circumstances Falkenhayn sought a military decision without delay. He would attempt a smashing attack upon the British sector of the Western Front before Kitchener's new British army could arrive. Such an attack might well have been decisive. Beyond doubt the general condition of the Western Front at the time offered a better opportunity than was ever to occur again for the Germans to smash through and overwhelm France and Britain.

German
Plan in
West Up-
set by
Austrian
Need

But the Austrian failures of 1914 in the East now embarrassed the German Command. The Russian armies seemed on the point of breaking through the Carpathian Mountains and deluging the Hungarian plain. A second disastrous attempt to invade Serbia had weakened still further the Austrian army and left it divided on two far distant fronts. Moreover, both the diplomatic and the military authorities in Germany were agreed that Italy and Rumania were preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies and against the Central Empires. If they should enter the war, they might overwhelm Austria.

To avert such a catastrophe, Falkenhayn compelled the Austrian foreign minister to offer Italy territorial "compensations" as a price for her continuing neutrality. Italy had been demanding "compensations" (in accordance with the terms of the Triple Alliance) ever since the beginning of the war, but the Austrian

government had been quite unheeded until pressed by Germany, and even now it had no faith that Italy could be satisfied. Public sentiment in Italy was by this time predominantly anti-Austrian and pro-Ally; and, after all, the Allies could promise Italy more territory at Austria's expense than Austria could be expected to do. So Italy, while continuing to negotiate with Austria, signed at London in April 1915 a secret treaty with the Allies. Thereby she obtained from them a pledge that if she helped them in the war she might annex the southern half of the Tyrol (including Trent), Trieste, Istria, and part of the Dalmatian coast, and, in addition, she might enlarge her African colonies and share in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. "This," the British statesman, Lord Balfour, later explained, "is the sort of thing you have to do when you are engaged in war."

**Threat of
Italian
Interven-
tion**

In Rumania were divided counsels. The Hohenzollern King Ferdinand and a number of the country's "elder statesmen"


**Possible
Ruman-
ian Inter-
vention**

wished to be loyal to the Triple Alliance and perceived in taking sides with the Central Empires an opportunity to obtain from the Russian Empire the Rumanian-speaking province of Bessarabia. On the other hand, a majority of the "younger statesmen" were inclined to throw over the Triple Alliance entirely, to unite with the Allies, and to participate in a partition of Austria-Hungary, whence Rumania might secure provinces larger and more valuable than Bessarabia. The Allies offered the main part of Transylvania but they were precluded by Russian and Serbian objections from offering as much as the King and his advisers deemed necessary to overcome their scruples. Consequently the Rumanian government wavered back and forth and awaited the time when its services would command a higher price.

While Falkenhayn was doing his best to keep Italy and Rumania neutral, Hindenburg, the "hero" of the Battle of Tannenberg and now the military idol of the whole German nation, came forward boldly with promises of swift annihilating victory over Russia. The German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and likewise Admiral von Tirpitz backed Hindenburg; and finally, in view of Austria's critical position, Falkenhayn acquiesced.

Wherefore Falkenhayn abandoned (most reluctantly) the prospect of victory in the West and turned East for the campaign of

1915. "With a heavy heart" he sent off to Hindenburg his reserve of fresh troops, "including the best that Germany possessed



in the war." These troops were used up at once in battles fought in a midwinter blizzard—without perceptibly diminishing the pressure of the Russian army against Austria. After this fiasco,

Falkenhayn took the relief offensive in his own hands. The German Drive against Russia, 1915 French and British were already commencing to hammer at the Western Front, and it was impossible to transfer another whole army eastward. But by draining men from each of the divisions in the West, Falkenhayn was able to assemble twelve new divisions in time to save the Austrian front. They were grouped with picked Austrian divisions, under a good general, August von Mackensen, and one of the best German staff officers, Hans von Seeckt, whose careful arrangements produced for the first time the grand-style artillery preparation which thereafter became a characteristic feature of the war. The result was a triumph of Austro-German operations: the Austrian divisions did as well as the German; the Russian line was broken through at Gorlice; and in a fortnight (in May 1915) Falkenhayn's "relief-offensive" advanced ninety-five miles. The whole Russian front in Galicia began crumbling, and the general balance of the war in the East was suddenly reversed.

Rumania dropped at once all idea of intervening against the Central Empires, but even in the full tide of Austro-German success Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. This was a disappointment to Falkenhayn's hopes, although the defeat of the Russians permitted Austria to reënforce her troops on the Italian border. For Austria the crisis had passed, and the mountainous Italian frontier was easily organized for defensive warfare. For over a year, in fact, it stood secure against Italian offensives.

In Poland, meanwhile, the Austro-German advance relentlessly continued, and it presently became clear that the Russian armies were woefully short of munitions. Up to the last minute the war ministry at Petrograd sought to escape blame by concealing and then by denying the fact. It was then too late to supply the shortage; and all that the Russian commander-in-chief, the Grand-Duke Nicholas, could do was to avoid battle and keep retreating. It was thus possible for Falkenhayn to extend his advance in the East without drawing reinforcements from the Western Front. By September 1915 all Poland, together with the greater part of Lithuania, was in military possession of the Central Empires.

Russian losses in the summer of 1915 were not confined to territory. Half a million soldiers were killed, a million wounded,

Italy's
Juncture
with
Allies,
1915

German
Conquest
of Poland

and another million captured. The remaining Russian armies, at least temporarily, were demoralized by defeat and retreat. And it boded ill for the future that the Tsar Nicholas II, now more than ever under the spell of his hysterical wife and her strange bewitcher, the "monk" Rasputin,¹ dismissed the Grand-Duke Nicholas and took nominal command himself of the Russian armies. The Tsar insisted that the war would go on, but he was too irresolute to prevent confusion in the conduct of the war from becoming worse confounded.

Russian
Losses

Having badly battered Russia, Falkenhayn hurried West with some detachments to meet an expected French attack in Champagne. It was in the nick of time. Joffre was launching the most powerful offensive yet seen on any front. The German line was on the point of yielding, and Falkenhayn arrived just in time to cancel an order for retreat which would have broken the entrenched front in France.

Failure of
French
Attack in
Champagne

This crisis passed, Falkenhayn next switched a group of divisions from Poland to the Serbian front and prepared with due care the invasion twice bungled in Austrian hands. As a by-product of the Austro-German victory over Russia, Bulgaria definitely allied herself with the Central Empires (September 1915), accepting their offers of territorial aggrandizement and promising to cooperate with them in the attack on Serbia. In October, therefore, Serbia was assailed simultaneously from the east by Bulgarian armies and from the north by an Austro-German army under Marshal von Mackensen. Against the double invasion Serbia could not stand, and a motley expeditionary force which the Allies managed to organize "for the relief of Serbia" and to land at Salonica (in Greek territory²) was too small to do aught but prevent King Constantine from bringing Greece into the war on the side of the Central Empires.

Bulgaria's
Juncture
with Central
Empires,
1915

Conquest
of Serbia

Within two months, Serbia was overrun by the Austro-Germans and Bulgarians, and her royal family and the remnants of her army were refugees. The same fate was meted out to Montenegro, and Albania also was occupied.

¹ See above, p. 485.

² This involved, of course, an Allied violation of Greek neutrality, but it was excused on the ground of "military necessity" (as Germany had excused her earlier violation of Belgian neutrality) and of assent by the Greek minister Venizelos (who was notoriously hostile to his sovereign).

At the outset of 1915 Germany had been viewed, and had viewed herself, as a beleaguered fortress. By the end of the year Falkenhayn had extended the fortress to include all Poland, most of the Balkan peninsula, and the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia Minor. A new ally in Bulgaria, with a strong army, counterbalanced Italy's turning to the opposite side; and the conquests in the Balkans redoubled the value of Turkey as an ally.

Already, in the winter of 1914-1915, when Russia was in dire need of munitions, the British Admiralty had counselled the Allies to force open the Turkish Straits connecting the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, so that commerce between Russia and Britain might be expedited. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, contended that Allied success in such an undertaking would decide the whole war. Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, afraid of weakening the Western Front and convinced that the war must ultimately be decided there, was opposed to a military diversion at the Straits; and the British had more ships than men to spare. As a compromise, it had been agreed that a naval attack should be made on the Straits, and accordingly, in February and March 1915, a powerful Franco-British fleet essayed to silence and destroy the Turkish land forts lining both sides of the Dardanelles. The attempt failed. Several battleships were sunk, and the others had to be withdrawn.

Much wrangling ensued in Allied headquarters as to whether a military expedition should and could be sent to do what the naval expedition had failed to do. By the time another compromise was reached and an expeditionary force of Britishers, Australians, and New Zealanders, with a sprinkling of colonial French troops, was ready to disembark at the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula (bordering the Dardanelles), the Turks, under a German commander, Marshal Liman von Sanders, had had ample time to perfect their defenses and render the peninsula well-nigh impregnable. The expeditionary force fought gallantly, but it could make little headway, and its commander, Sir Ian Hamilton, was denied necessary reinforcements. It struggled intermittently for several months, and always unsuccessfully. In December 1915 it was finally withdrawn.

Not only were the Turks enabled, through German advice and supplies, to defeat the Allies at the Dardanelles but also to

hold in check an attempted Russian advance through the Caucasus into Armenia and at the same time to threaten the Suez Canal and to capture an Anglo-Indian expeditionary force which had been landed in Mesopotamia. Simultaneously the Bulgarians, likewise buttressed by Germany, were holding the Balkans and keeping an Allied force pinned to defensive positions at Salonica. The Bulgarian and Turkish armies were thus contributing to an almost fatal diversion of Allied troops from the crucial Western Front to isolated sectors in the Near East, while permitting the Germans to overcome Russia and then to concentrate on the West.

Other
Allied
Discomfi-
ture in
Near
East, 1915

Against the brilliant German record of 1915, the Allies could offer merely a drab background of failure. On the Western Front, they had felt obliged to maintain almost constant attacks in order to prevent a greater shifting of German divisions to the Russian front. These attacks had begun before a proper reënforcement of guns and munitions was at hand, and some had been badly bungled. They had perhaps saved the Russian army from annihilation, but they brought no victories and they involved terrible wastage.

General
Allied
Failure in
1915

By the end of 1915, however, the British and French were at last amply provided with munitions. Falkenhayn, knowing this, concluded that Germany could no longer expect to win a "military decision" against them. But to stand indefinitely on the defensive would mean the certain exhaustion of the Central Empires. The war could not go on forever as a stalemate. It must be ended, and this could be brought about only by proving to France that a military victory over Germany was impossible. To wear down French morale, therefore, he proposed a sustained offensive against a favorable point on the Western Front.

German
Plan to
Exhaust
France

The German government endorsed Falkenhayn's proposal, and without waiting for the end of winter the offensive was opened against Verdun (in February 1916). But the opening attack did not succeed as planned. The spirit of the French army stiffened to meet so direct a challenge, and the wearing-out battle dragged on in more and more hopeless effort from February to July. Both armies suffered frightful losses and both were exhausted, but Verdun remained in French hands. And

Assault
on Ver-
dun, 1916

at the end the test of strength lowered the morale of the German nation at large more than the French.

Moreover, the Allies by now were far stronger than in 1915. A much larger British army was provided for by the imposition of universal conscription in January 1916. Both French and British armies were far better supplied with guns and munitions, and even the Russian forces were now being rearmed. Besides, the Allies arranged to co-ordinate their military effort; and at a conference presided over by Joffre in the spring of 1916, France, Britain, Russia, and Italy agreed to concentrate their energies each on a single vigorous offensive. These attacks on various fronts were to be delivered simultaneously in July.

The drain of Verdun diminished radically the French share in the joint effort, but in the East the Austrian commander, Conrad, played directly into the Allied plans. Yielding to the temptation of a decisive victory over Italy, he transferred against her a large part of his best troops and heaviest artillery from the Russian Front, and then opened a drive from the Tyrol. The Italians soon brought this to a halt, and a Russian army (under General Brusilov) then struck the sector whence the Austrian troops and guns had been withdrawn. The Austrian line collapsed quite as brusquely as the Russian line early in 1915. The Russians reoccupied eastern Galicia and took numerous prisoners.

By shifting divisions from other fronts, Falkenhayn was able to stay the Russian advance and reestablish new lines in Galicia. But on the heels of Brusilov's attack, the British and French drove hard at the German front in the West in the region of the Somme. The first assaults failed to break the German position, and slow progress could only be made with heavy loss. But from the German perspective, the general situation of the war was again reversed. Verdun, then at its extreme point of danger, was relieved of serious pressure, and the German forces in the West were thrown on a desperate defensive.

Soon afterwards, at the command of General Cadorna, the Italian army opened an energetic offensive in Istria on the Isonzo front. It profited from Austrian concern with Brusilov and his Russians and began with brilliant promise. Gorizia, a key point, was promptly captured; and once again Austria appeared on the verge of collapse.

Conscription in Britain

Joint Allied Plans

Russian Offensive

Franco-British Offensive on Somme

Italian Offensive

These events elicited a declaration of war from Rumania against the Central Empires, and on the same day (August 27, 1916) Italy declared war on Germany.¹ The failure of the long German effort in the West, at Verdun, and the obvious weakening of the Austrian army convinced the Rumanian leaders that their country's intervention would bring about the immediate débâcle of the Habsburg Empire. As a first impression, this opinion was held unquestioningly by the public at large, not only in Allied nations, but even more poignantly in Germany and Austria.

Ruman-
ia's Junc-
ture with
Allies,
1916

In point of fact, the Rumanians had waited just too long—partly in driving a hard bargain with the Allies.² At the crisis of Brusilov's offensive in Galicia, in June, Rumanian intervention might well have been decisive. But by the end of August the Galician front had been patched up, and Falkenhayn, fully warned, had prepared against Rumania's action. He had been able, even in the thunderstorm of enemy offensives on every front, to gather a new army along the Transylvanian border. This army struck promptly; and soon the whole Rumanian plain north of the Danube was another Austro-German conquest. Instead of destroying the Habsburg Empire, the net result of Rumania's entry into the war was that all the Balkan states (except Greece) were now controlled by the Central Empires.

Conquest
of Ru-
mania

But within Germany, meanwhile, Rumania's declaration of war had produced an immediate crisis of despair. The Emperor William II was thoroughly broken by the news, and to his intimates he declared that the war was lost and that peace must be made without delay. On the country at large the effect was much the same, for the fearfully wearing struggle at Verdun, followed by a storm of enemy offensives at every point, had strained all nerves to the breaking point. In this general mood, Bethmann-

Crisis in
Germany:
Pacifism
and Hin-
denburg's
Suprem-
acy

¹ Italy, in declaring war against Austria back in May 1915, had then refrained from declaring war against Germany. It should be noted that in March 1916, prior to Rumania's intervention, Great Britain had persuaded Portugal to seize German vessels in her harbors and to follow up Germany's resulting declaration of war by sending some Portuguese soldiers to the Allied trenches in France.

² The secret treaty, as finally signed in August 1916 by Rumania with the Allies, pledged her, as the price of her military support, not only Transylvania and Bukovina but also the Serbian Banat and the plain of Hungary as far as the Theiss River.

Hollweg, the Chancellor, with other high officials, prevailed upon William II to dismiss Falkenhayn and to summon Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the supreme command (August 1916).

William II had resisted this step for a year and a half. Ever since 1913 there had been sharp personal enmity between him and Ludendorff; and since the beginning of the war Ludendorff had industriously built up Hindenburg's popularity and prestige in opposition to the Emperor and to Falkenhayn. William II understood clearly that, in summoning Hindenburg and Ludendorff, he was in effect abdicating his "ultimate" authority in the state to a masterful and domineering rival, and he yielded only because the pressure upon him was too great.

The appointment of Hindenburg as commander-in-chief, with Ludendorff as quartermaster-general (and virtual dictator), amounted to a political revolution in Germany, and produced no less radical a change in the character and scope of the war. Falkenhayn's policy of "possibilities," as regards strategy and war aims, gave place by degrees to an unlimited program of conquest and an arraying of almost the whole world against the Central Empires.

Hindenburg's first act after assuming command was to inspect the Western Front, which he and Ludendorff now saw for the first time. The two were appalled by the character of the Somme offensive, still under way; and without delay they ordered the building of the "Hindenburg Line," a heavily fortified line in the rear, whither the German divisions could take refuge from the untenable positions into which they had been forced. In addition, Hindenburg and Ludendorff reported certain conclusions: (1) that against such military resources as the Allied Powers were now bringing into the field, there was no possibility of Germany's winning the war by land offensives; (2) that even by holding to the defensive, the troops could not stand the strain of another continuous battle such as the Somme; and (3) that the only hope was for Germany to turn to unrestricted submarine warfare. Through the submarine Britain might be compelled within the first six months of 1917 to cease effective coöperation with her allies and thereby to leave them with no choice but to make peace with Germany.

In the minds of the new German Command, Britain held the

Change in
Character
of War

Towards
Subma-
rine War-
fare

key position. Allied fortunes had waxed in 1916 with increasing British success on the seas. They would wane rapidly if Britain suffered sea disaster in 1917.

3. BRITISH MARITIME SUCCESSES, 1914-1916

Great Britain's naval superiority had been utilized from 1914 to 1916 in many ways advantageous to the Allied cause. First, it was employed to clear the high seas of enemy warships. One British squadron, it is true, was defeated by a German fleet off the coast of Chile near Coronel in November 1914; but another British squadron was promptly sent out, and in the next month near the Falkland Islands it encountered and destroyed that German fleet. In general, German warships which were at sea when war was declared put hurriedly into neutral ports and were duly interned, and the main battle fleet and some of the finest cruisers of Germany, which happened to be in home waters, stuck close to the German harbors where floating mines and land batteries could protect them against British attack. Occasionally, German cruisers made stealthy trips across the North Sea and bombarded English coast towns. Occasionally, too, German "raiders" took to the high seas and preyed upon Allied merchantmen, but their careers were usually brief and always ended either in capture or in internment in neutral ports.

Britain's
Naval Su-
periority

The British kept their major battle fleet "in reserve," that is, stationed in the waters north of Scotland, carefully guarded against surprise attacks by German submarines or bombers and yet ready to engage the German fleet if it should issue from its havens. In this way the British may be said to have exercised their naval power more by frightening the enemy than by actually fighting him. On one occasion—at the end of May 1916, almost two years after the beginning of hostilities—the German battle fleet did emerge into the North Sea and oblige the British armada to fight. The British lost more lives and ships than the Germans in the battle of Jutland, as the contest was called, but they could afford to lose more, and they were victorious in that the surviving German warships returned to their home harbors and did not again venture out on the high seas.

Battle of
Jutland,
1916

With German (and Austrian) warships driven from the high

seas, Great Britain and France could freely transport troops and munitions to and from oversea areas. French colonial troops from Algeria, Senegal, and Indo-China were thus transported in safety to France to reënforce the Allied Western Front. To France, moreover, for the same purpose, armies were brought not only from Great Britain but also from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India. Thereby, the number of British troops in France grew steadily until, with the imposition of conscription by the British parliament in January 1916, it equalled the number of French troops.

Transport
of Troops
and Sup-
plies

Suppres-
sion of
Irish Re-
volt, 1916

There was opposition to conscription in Ireland, and a group of extremists of the Sinn Fein and Labor parties rose in revolt at Dublin in Easter week of 1916 and proclaimed an "Irish Republic."¹ The majority of the Irish people, however, remained quiet, and, thanks again to British sea power, troops which were despatched from England suppressed the revolt quickly—and vindictively.

The uninterrupted stream of men and munitions which the British poured into France during 1915 and 1916 explains, along with the fighting ability and good generalship of the French, why the Germans in those years could make no such headway in western Europe as they made in the east. But western Europe was not the only field of military operations where British naval supremacy counted heavily. With Germany deprived of the means of aiding her overseas colonies, these were invaded and conquered by Allied forces. The British navy was, indeed, the chief factor in expanding the European war into a real World War.

Conquest
of Ger-
man Col-
onies

In August 1914 the German colony of Togoland in Africa was captured. Then, expeditionary forces penetrated into the larger and more important German colony of Kamerun, gradually overcoming the resistance of its weak garrison and compelling its surrender at the beginning of 1915. Against German Southwest

¹ See above, pp. 362-365. Only about 2,000 Irishmen actively engaged in the insurrection of 1916. About a hundred British soldiers were killed in putting down the "revolt." Afterwards, fifteen "rebels" were executed, and many others, including "suspects," were imprisoned.

NOTE. The portrait-bust opposite is of Lord John Fisher (1841-1920), "First Sea Lord" of the British navy in 1914-1915. It is by the Anglo-American sculptor, Jacob Epstein (born 1880), concerning whom see below, pp. 841-842.

Africa, General Louis Botha¹ inaugurated a campaign with a South African army in September 1914, but anti-British sentiment among a portion of the Dutch-speaking Boers produced within the Union of South Africa a serious revolt. Halting the campaign against German Southwest Africa, therefore, General Botha, with the coöperation of General Smuts, crushed the revolt in the Union. As soon as this was accomplished, early in 1915, Botha and Smuts renewed the attack on German Southwest Africa and completed its conquest in July.

The conquest of German East Africa proved more difficult. Although British warships seized the port of Dar-es-Salaam in August 1914, the German governor of the colony, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, was so resourceful in commanding the loyalty of the natives and in conducting military operations that he kept the British on the defensive throughout 1915 and actually carried the war into British East Africa. In 1916 General Smuts managed to conquer the greater part of German East Africa, but the surrender of Lettow-Vorbeck was not effected until November 1918.

In the southern Pacific, a contingent of New Zealanders captured German Samoa in August 1914, and shortly afterwards Australian expeditions seized New Guinea, Kaiser Wilhelmsland, and the Bismarck archipelago. In the northern Pacific, and in the Far East generally, Japan as the ally of Great Britain was enabled to make short work of German concessions and colonies. Japanese warships seized the Ladrões and Caroline Islands and convoyed to China a military expedition which captured Kiaochow in October 1914.

In the Near East, Great Britain employed her naval superiority to penalize the Ottoman Empire for siding with Germany. At the beginning of Turkish hostilities, in October 1914, Britain formally freed both Cyprus and Egypt from nominal vassalage to the Ottoman Empire. Cyprus was transformed into an outright British colony, and Egypt into a full-fledged British protectorate. Then, while an Anglo-Egyptian army ward off Turkish attacks against the Suez Canal, an Anglo-Indian army was landed at the head

**British
Assaults
on Otto-
man
Empire**

¹ See above, pp. 374-375.

NOTE. The portrait-bust opposite is of Clemenceau, French war premier, by Auguste Rodin (1840-1917). On Rodin, see above, p. 295.

of the Persian Gulf and undertook the conquest of Mesopotamia.

In 1915 the Turco-British phase of the World War was disappointing to Great Britain (and the other Allies). The Anglo-Egyptian army was on the defensive and barely able to hold the Suez Canal. Half of the Anglo-Indian army, after advancing 180 miles up the Tigris, was surrounded by superior Turkish forces at Kut-al-Amara and compelled to surrender in April 1915. And, as we have previously pointed out, the prolonged efforts of the British at the Dardanelles, first by sea and next by land, ended in sorry failure.

Failures
in 1915

In 1916, however, the tide turned and Great Britain gained several advantages in the Ottoman Empire. First, the peninsula of Sinai (between Egypt and Palestine) was conquered by an Anglo-Egyptian army reinforced by Australians and New Zealanders who had been transported from Gallipoli. Second, the town of Kut-al-Amara on the Tigris was retaken by an Anglo-Indian army; in March Bagdad was captured, and by the end of the year the greater part of Mesopotamia was in British hands. Last, but not least, a young Britisher, known as Colonel Lawrence, ingratiated himself with the Arab sherif of Mecca, Hussein, and with his fighting son, Feisal, and persuaded them to head a general Arab revolt against the Turks. Hussein proclaimed the independence of

Successes
in 1916

Arab Aid

Hejaz in June 1916; and presently Feisal, with Lawrence as the liaison officer between him and the British, was making raids against the Turks and spreading nationalist propaganda among the Arabs northward to the very gates of Damascus.

Back of these growing threats against the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as back of the overthrow of Germany's colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific, was British naval supremacy. And less showy but more fundamentally important were the commercial effects of Great Britain's naval superiority. German merchantmen, as well as German warships, were driven from the seas; and the British navy enforced, with growing stringency, a virtual "blockade" of German seaports and interfered more and more with neutral trade with Germany. Germany, of course, continued to import and export goods across the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries, but vessels to or from these countries were subjected to search by the British and commodities clearly

Destruction of
German
Commerce

German in origin or destination were usually confiscated. Germany was thus deprived of profitable foreign markets for manufactures and likewise of a copious supply of needful raw materials.

Britain's industry was correspondingly stimulated. It profited from the slowing down of non-military production in Allied countries, from enemy occupation of the chief industrial centres of France, and especially from the disappearance of German competition. With the stimulation of industry and commerce went a relatively great accumulation of "war profits," so that Britain, retaining her position as workshop and banker of the world, was enabled to lend money to her allies, as well as to furnish them with more munitions.

Britain's
Financial
Superior-
ity

Even Britain would have cracked under the strain of financing and supplying all her far-flung naval and military forces—and acting as banker and munitions-maker for her numerous allies—had she not been in a position to avail herself of the trade with neutrals which she denied to Germany. With the United States, particularly, Great Britain traded freely and permitted her allies to trade, just as she practically forbade American trade with Germany. This meant that, thanks to British supremacy on the high seas, the mills and factories of industrialized America were at the service of the Allies rather than of the Central Empires and that many manufacturers and bankers in neutral America were themselves amassing "war profits" from the sale of munitions and the loan of money to Great Britain, France, Italy, etc. Furthermore, it meant that the United States was more open to Allied propaganda than to that of Germany, and that consequently the majority of American citizens were disposed to sympathize with the Allies rather than with the Central Empires.

Allied Use
of Neutral
Countries

Especially
of United
States

Still another commercial advantage of great importance Great Britain had over Germany, and that was in respect of foodstuffs. At the beginning of the war, Germany with Austria-Hungary was almost if not quite self-sufficing in grain, meat, and most other agricultural staples, while Britain was dependent for most of her foodstuffs on foreign imports. As the war went on, Britain's mastery of the seas assured to herself and her allies a sufficient importation of foodstuffs from the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia, but it worked increasing hard-

ship for the Central Empires, and especially for Germany. Threatened Starvation of Germany Germany had to put more farm-hands in her armies or in her munition plants, with consequent loss of agricultural self-sufficiency; and the British "blockade" steadily lessened the chance of Germany's supplying the deficiency from abroad. By the end of 1916 hunger threatened to undermine German morale.

In the submarine—or "U-boat," as they called it—the Germans had one weapon which, if fully developed and freely used, might nullify the advantages accruing to the Allies from British supremacy on the seas. It might be employed to destroy enemy warships, to interfere with the transportation of men and munitions from England to the Continent, and perhaps to starve out Great Britain. Some enemy warships and transports were actually destroyed by German submarines in the early stages of the war, and in June 1916 the cruiser on which Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, was travelling to Russia for a conference with the Tsar, was sunk by a mine which had been planted by a German submarine. By 1917 it seemed as though a large-scale submarine campaign against British shipping was the one chance—and a good chance—which Germany had of overcoming Great Britain.

So the Germans reasoned. Unfortunately, a large-scale submarine campaign was fraught with danger for Germany as well as for Britain. The ultimate success of such a campaign would depend upon the destruction of many merchant vessels bound to or from England, some of which might be flying neutral flags and carrying neutral passengers. Potential Perils of Submarine Warfare Neutral nations would be apt to protest emphatically against the torpedoing of their ships and the killing of their citizens, and, if Germany were to persevere in the campaign, this or that neutral nation would be almost certain to abandon its neutrality and enlarge the already big circle of her active enemies. The United States, of all the neutrals, had most at stake. American citizens were always travelling to England, frequently on British ships; quantities of American munitions and foodstuffs were being sold in Britain; and the United States was the only Great Power, which was not yet identified with one or the other of the belligerent coalitions.

In May 1915 a German submarine torpedoed and sank, off the

coast of Ireland, one of the largest of British merchant vessels, the Lusitania, which was carrying from the United States to Britain a cargo of arms and some 1,200 passengers, including a hundred American citizens. The United States government had previously protested against British interference with American property on the high seas. Now, backed by strongly pro-Allied sympathy at home, it protested with greater vigor against German destruction of American lives on the high seas. For a year diplomatic notes were exchanged between Germany and the United States, interrupted now and then by new submarine attacks and by acute crises, until in May 1916 Germany acceded to American demands and promised that thereafter, unless she gave due notice to the contrary, no merchant vessel would be sunk without warning and without provision for the safety of passengers.

German
Assur-
ances to
United
States,
1916

It thus transpired that the United States called a halt on Germany's using to the full the one weapon which might directly and seriously cripple Great Britain. In the meantime Great Britain clinched her hold on the seas and on lands oversea; and, by pressing her "blockade" of Germany's home ports, she intensified the threat of starving out the German people and nullifying their military successes on the Continent.

4. THE CRISIS OF THE WAR, 1917-1918

Despite the brilliant successes of the Central Empires against Russia and Serbia in 1915 and against Rumania in 1916, despite the drain of man-power which Germany had latterly exacted from her enemies on the Western Front, hopes of the Allies ran high in the winter of 1916-1917. The course of events seemed as auspicious for the Allies as it was critical for the Central Empires. Germany was suffering from the British "blockade," and her armies could apparently make no headway against France; they had been repulsed at Verdun, and farther west they had been obliged to retire to the "Hindenburg Line." In Austria-Hungary, the death of the venerable Emperor-King Francis Joseph in November 1916 gave impetus to disruptive agitation among subject peoples, and his conciliatory grand-nephew who succeeded him as Charles I soon initiated secret negotiations with the Allies

Allied
Hopes,
1916-1917

Austrian
Peace
Proposals

looking toward the Dual Monarchy's withdrawal from the war.

The Emperor Charles indicated his willingness to let France regain Alsace-Lorraine, Russia take Constantinople, Serbia gain an outlet to the sea and a portion of Albania, and Italy annex Trent. The negotiations, begun in January 1917, broke down in May because of stubborn opposition from both Italy and Germany. Charles sadly confessed that his realm could not fight another year without internal revolution.

The main reason why Germany opposed the Austrian peace proposals was the prospect of winning the war by resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. Hindenburg and Ludendorff advised it. The German Admiralty pronounced it feasible and predicted that it would starve out England in six months. The Chancellor and the Reichstag approved, and public opinion was favorable. Both the military and the diplomatic authorities recognized that in reply the United States would probably go to war, but they thought that American intervention could not thwart the prompt success of the U-boat campaign. The possibility of an American army being sent to Europe was also taken into account, but it was reckoned—quite accurately—that no large force could be organized and transported until long after the six-months period counted upon for the submarines to achieve their aim.

Preparations for the new German effort were matured by January 1917, at the very time when the Habsburg Emperor was making his peace overtures to the Allies. On the last day of the month Germany notified the United States and other neutral Powers that she was withdrawing the pledges previously given and that thenceforth all sea traffic within specified areas adjoining the British Isles, France, and Italy would, "without further notice, be prevented by all weapons." In other words, German submarines would sink at sight all merchantmen, regardless of the flag they might fly and the passengers they might carry. The United States, under the leadership of its President, Woodrow Wilson, at once broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, after debating a project for "armed neutrality," at length on April 6 declared war on Germany.

The American declaration of war was but a logical outcome of

German
Resort to
Subma-
rine War-
fare

America's
Juncture
with
Allies,
1917

the position which Wilson had taken about unrestricted submarine warfare a year previously. It was naturally hailed with popular applause in the Allied countries. It justified their cause anew and temporarily reassured them. Yet, just as the Germans anticipated, America could be of hardly more practical help to the Allies immediately after the declaration of war than she had been previously. Whether American intervention was of significance or not would depend in last analysis upon the success or failure of the German U-boats in 1917.

Almost simultaneously with the intervention of the United States, Russia underwent an internal revolution which also, at the moment, was popularly acclaimed in Allied countries, though actually it was of very dubious value to the Allied cause. Ever since the terrifying military reverses of 1915, affairs in Russia had been going from bad to worse. The temporary comeback which General Brusilov staged in eastern Galicia in the summer of 1916 was more than offset by the increasing incompetence of the Tsarist régime. The Tsar himself was quite unequal to the rôle of commander-in-chief, and the Tsarina, left in charge of the government at Petrograd, blindly followed the whims of Rasputin in filling offices and determining policies, and stubbornly refused to heed the gathering storm of criticism and opposition. In December 1916 a group of noblemen, headed by a relative of the Tsar, hatched a plot against Rasputin as the evil genius of the régime and made doubly sure of getting rid of him by poisoning him and then stabbing him. Not even this assassination brought the Tsarina to reason, for the dead Rasputin exercised upon her disordered mind, and through her upon the Tsar's mind, an even greater influence than had the living Rasputin.

Russian
Revolution
of
March,
1917

During the winter of 1916-1917 popular disaffection overspread Russia. Patriots complained that the government was hampering the prosecution of the war and hinted that it was conducting treasonable negotiations with the enemy. The subject nationalities grew restless. The middle classes grumbled. There were riots of peasants in the country and strikes of workmen in the cities.

Revolution was precipitated by decrees of the autocratic government, on March 11, 1917, that Petrograd strikers should return to work and that the recently reassembled Duma should

again go home. The strikers refused to obey and won over to their side the soldiers whom the government relied upon to suppress them; they then formed a revolutionary "soviet [or council] of soldiers and workingmen." The Duma likewise refused to obey, and its president despatched a telegram to the Tsar, imploring him to name a new and liberal ministry. On March 15, a deputation from the Duma waited on the Tsar at Pskov and convinced him that he must abdicate. Abdicate he forthwith did in favor of his brother, the Grand-Duke Michael. But already it was too late for any member of the imperial Romanov family to command the revolutionaries, and Michael declined to assume the crown.

By agreement between the Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, a provisional government had been established on March 14, 1917, under the chairmanship of Prince George Lvov, a liberal landlord, head of the Union of Zemstvos, and member of the Constitutional Democratic party. It at once proclaimed freedom of association, of the press, and of religion. It liberated thousands of political prisoners and removed the ban on political exiles. It restored full autonomy to Finland and promised to extend it to Poland. It announced that a National Constituent Assembly would shortly be elected by universal manhood suffrage to determine the permanent form of Russia's future government. Simultaneously it labored to infuse new energy into Russia's conduct of the war.

There was rejoicing in the countries allied with Russia and in the United States. Russia, it was popularly believed, would fight harder and more effectively now that she was overthrowing autocracy and becoming democratic. The struggle against the Central Empires would henceforth be, as President Wilson declared, "a war to make the world safe for democracy."

In March, when the Russian Revolution occurred, the British administered a stinging defeat to the Turks in Mesopotamia and captured the important city of Bagdad. In April, when the United States entered the war, General Robert Nivelle, who had succeeded General Joffre as commander-in-chief of the French armies, opened a fierce offensive against the German trenches on the Western Front along the Aisne River. Simultaneously, elaborate preparations were made for an offensive in the Balkans on the part of the Allied army at

Abdication of
Tsar
Nicholas
II

Allied
Offen-
sives

Salonica, now commanded by General Sarraill and comprising 600,000 men. To ensure that the pro-German King of Greece would not embarrass this offensive, an Anglo-French naval expedition was despatched to Athens; in June, it obliged Constantine to abdicate and quit the country and installed the pro-Ally Venizelos as Greek premier under the purely nominal rule of Constantine's youthful second son, Alexander I. In the meantime, the United States persuaded Panama and Cuba to declare war on Germany (April 1917). Siam followed suit in July, and Liberia and China in August. The whole world seemed to be arraying itself on the side of the Allies.

With American intervention and the Russian Revolution to the fore, and with the German army on the defensive, awaiting the outcome of the submarine campaign, it was not surprising that a wave of popular pacifism—or “defeatism”—Defeatism
in Ger-
many swept over Germany. Early in 1916 the German Social Democrats had split into two factions, the majority, under Friedrich Ebert and Philip Scheidemann, continuing to support the government in the prosecution of the war, and the minority, under Hugo Haase and Eduard Bernstein, refusing to approve of further military expenditure.¹ Now, early in 1917, the majority joined the minority in counselling peace and urging democratic reform within Germany, and to the pacifist agitation of the Socialists was added that of the Catholic Centre party. Against this agitation Hindenburg and Ludendorff were adamant. They countered it by promising German victory in the submarine warfare and eventually on the Western Front; and in July they forced the Emperor William II to dismiss the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, whom they accused of being too conciliatory to the Socialists and Centrists, and to appoint in his place a conservative bureaucrat who would be a mere agent of the army chiefs. But even with the backing of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the new Chancellor could not prevent the Centrists and Socialists from putting through the Reichstag in July 1917 a resolution requesting the government to make peace on the basis of “no annexations, no indemnities.”

¹ A third and smaller group of German Socialists, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were even more radical. Known as “Spartacans,” they denounced the war and advocated the establishment of “a dictatorship of the proletariat.” Their leaders were jailed by the German government.

Nor was the internal situation in the Habsburg Empire reassuring. Already, mutinies were occurring in Czech, Croatian, and Polish regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and presently some of their soldiers deserted to the Allies, while "provisional governments" of the several disaffected nationalities were set up at Paris or London. In July 1917, on the Greek island of Corfu, representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs (Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs) signed with Nicholas Pašič, the premier of Serbia, a formal "declaration" of their joint purpose to create at the close of the war a unified democratic state with King Peter of Serbia as their common sovereign.

In the circumstances, seemingly auspicious for a general peace settlement, Pope Benedict XV on August 1, 1917, called upon the warring countries to end "the fratricidal conflict" and to negotiate "a just and durable" peace. He proposed the substitution in international affairs of the "moral force of right" for the "material force of arms," the restoration of all conquered territories, and the mutual cancellation of claims to indemnity, a guaranty of the freedom of the seas, provision for the future adjustment of international disputes by arbitration, a decrease in armaments, and a conciliatory settlement, involving plebiscites if necessary, of rival claims to such territories as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and Trentino. By August 1917, however, neither group of belligerents was willing to listen to papal admonitions. The war was at a crisis. German hope of victory had recently risen again with the progress of the U-boat campaign and with the firm and reassuring attitude of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. And the Allies were more than ever reluctant to negotiate with Germany, now dominated by a High Command which was committed to territorial annexations. President Wilson replied to the Pope, in behalf of "the Allied and Associated Powers," that peace could not be made with such a régime as Germany's. The war must continue.

Back in April, the French offensive on the Aisne had broken down, with terrible losses, and the luckless General Nivelle was supplanted as commander-in-chief of the French armies by General Pétain, with General Foch as his chief of staff. The Allies were barely holding their own

Disaffec-
tion in
Austria

Papal
Peace
Proposals,
1917

Reviving
German
Hopes,
1917-1918

Failure of
Allied Of-
fensives

on the Western Front. Nor was the elaborately prepared offensive in the Balkans, under General Sarrail, any more successful.

While the Central Empires were holding their military conquests on the Continent, Germany was prosecuting her submarine campaign with considerable success. From January to June 1917, German submarines sank nearly four million tons of Allied shipping. If this amount could be doubled during the second half of 1917, Germany, it was recognized, would be enabled to starve out England and also to prevent the transportation of American troops to France.

Subma-
rine
Menace

America did her utmost, after declaring war on Germany, to aid the Allies. She increased her taxes and floated huge "liberty loans," from the proceeds of which she made liberal financial grants to the Allies. She speeded up her production of munitions and other war supplies. She conscripted four million young men and prepared them for active service. She joined her naval forces to those of Great Britain, and constructed hundreds of new transports for conveying soldiers and supplies to Europe. But the doing of all these things took time. It was estimated that at least a year must elapse before the full weight of America's participation in the World War could be felt. In the meantime the German submarine warfare threatened to nullify it completely.

Delay in
American
Aid

In the circumstances, pacifism, or "defeatism," passed from the Central Empires to some of the Allied countries. In France, several bankers and politicians worked to bring about an early peace with Germany on the basis of mutual concessions, and, paralleling their conferences and intrigues, pacifist agitation spread among the French populace and produced serious mutinies in the French army. In Italy, a similar "defeatist" movement gathered even greater headway during the summer of 1917 and threatened to undermine the morale of the Italian army.

Defeatism
in France
and Italy

In Russia, "defeatism" grew rapidly and most alarmingly. As the event proved, the high expectation popularly entertained in France, Britain, and America of the help which the Russian Revolution of March 1917 would be to them was quite unjustified. Most Russian soldiers were much more concerned with getting something for themselves from the provisional government at home than with waging a foreign war;

In Russia

and the provisional government, though anxious to continue the war, was unable to agree upon a generally acceptable program of internal reforms or to resist the importunities of the rapidly spreading "soviets of soldiers, workers, and peasants." In May the conservative Prince Lvov resigned, and was succeeded by a radical, Alexander Kerensky.

This change in the personnel of the Russian government did not silence the destructive criticism or halt the subversive activity of the extreme Socialists, the "Bolsheviks" or "Communists."¹ These, astutely led by Lenin, who had returned from exile in Switzerland under safe conduct from the German government, and by Leon Trotsky, who had returned similarly from America, preached the doctrine that the Revolution should make no compromise with capitalism and the bourgeoisie, that a dictatorship of the proletariat must be established by the Bolsheviks alone, and that the cessation of foreign war was a necessary condition for accomplishing any real domestic reforms. Lenin and Trotsky gradually acquired great influence over the Petrograd Soviet and over other soviets. A large part of the industrial proletariat was soon converted to enthusiastic support of the Bolshevik program, and a multitude of peasants in the armies at the front, if a bit hazy about the economic philosophy of the Communists, were ready to acclaim any group which promised to take them out of the trenches and let them go home. Such readiness on the part of Russian soldiers was quickened, moreover, by propaganda which German agents spread along the Eastern Front.

In vain Kerensky begged the Allies to consent to a general peace "without annexations or indemnities." In vain he labored to combat both Bolshevik and German propaganda, and to restore the discipline of the faltering Russian armies. In vain he launched a desperate offensive, in July, 1917, against the Austrians and Germans. Russian troops mutinied. The Austrians recovered all of Galicia. The Germans captured Riga and penetrated into Estonia. In vain, Kerensky turned to the "Right" and schemed for the establishment of a military dictatorship; he and the army chiefs could not agree upon the dictator, and none of them was sufficiently daring to strike. In vain he turned to the "Left" and promised speedy reforms within Russia. Kerensky was a weak and wordy man, but a much

**Collapse
of Russian
Armies**

¹ On the various groups of "Socialists" in Russia, see above, pp. 479-480.

stronger man would have had difficulty in counteracting Bolshevik agitation and in making the Russian masses fight when they would not fight. In November 1917 a second revolution occurred in Russia. Kerensky's "provisional government" was overthrown, and Lenin at the head of the Communists took charge of affairs.¹

Communist Revolution,
Nov. 1917

One of the first acts of the Communist régime was to agree to a truce with the Central Empires; and in March 1918, after protracted wrangling and practically at the point of the victor's bayonet, a peace treaty was signed at Brest-Litovsk by Russia on one side, and by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It practically involved a German partition of the Russian Empire. Poland, Lithuania, and the Latvian province of Courland were ceded outright to Germany (and Austria). Bessarabia was entrusted to the Central Empires for transference to Rumania, and Armenian districts south of the Caucasus were surrendered to the Ottoman Empire. Finland, Estonia, the Latvian province of Livonia, and the huge area of the Ukraine ("Little Russia") were detached from Russia and recognized as "independent" states.

Russia
Out of
War:
Treaty of
Brest-
Litovsk,
March
1918

Rumania, completely isolated by the collapse and defection of Russia, felt obliged to sue for peace and to agree to a treaty which the Central Empires imposed upon her at Bucharest in the same month of March 1918. Thereby Rumania yielded Dobruja to Bulgaria and certain mountain passes on the Hungarian frontier to the Dual Monarchy; and in return for her promise of close coöperation with Germany and Austria, she was promised Bessarabia.

Rumania
Out of
War

With the surrender of Russia and Rumania, German might was unquestionably paramount throughout central and eastern Europe. The areas appropriated from Russia were administered as dependencies of Germany, which was thus relieved of the necessity of maintaining an eastern battle front and enabled to devote undivided efforts to the task of crushing resistance of Italians, French, and British in the West. "Defeatism" ceased to disturb the German government. The German people as a whole seemed to forget the slogan

Germany's
Will to
Victory

¹ On the Russian Revolution of November 1917 and its domestic consequences, see below, pp. 669-686.

of "no annexations and no indemnities" and to rally behind Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff with renewed enthusiasm for "victory and conquest first, peace afterwards."

In October 1917 Austro-Hungarian armies, taking advantage of the prostration of Russia and the development of "defeatism" among the enemy, undertook to put Italy out of the war. They overwhelmed a demoralized Italian army at Caporetto and compelled the rapid retirement of all the Italian forces from Austrian soil back into Italy as far as the Piave River, close to Venice. Only Austrian inability to bring up arms and supplies necessary for pursuit and the prompt coöperation of France and Great Britain permitted the Italians to reform their lines and to cling to the Piave.

Throughout the winter of 1917-1918, while German diplomats were negotiating peace with Russia and Rumania, General Ludendorff was making gigantic preparations for a supreme German military effort against the Allied armies in France. All available troops were concentrated on the Western Front. All available machine-guns and ammunition were brought hither. The biggest cannon (the so-called "Big Berthas") were put in place to shell Paris at a distance of sixty miles. All was made ready for a series of assaults surpassing any that the world had ever known.

In March 1918 the Germans smote the British trenches in the valley of the Somme, near St. Quentin, and ploughed a path through to Amiens. In April, they hit the British west of Lille and advanced some fifteen miles. In May, they assailed the French along the Aisne and fought their way southward across the intervening hills to the Marne River, reaching Château-Thierry, only about forty miles from Paris. These furious "drives" and sledge-hammer blows netted Germany considerable territory and much booty of prisoners and guns and served to restore the Western Front approximately as it had been in 1914 on the eve of the battle of the Marne. Nevertheless, they were supremely expensive, for they were attended by awful devastation and by a frightful loss of life of Frenchmen and Britishers and of Germans also.

In June 1918 the Austrians made a desperate attempt to supplement the German "drives" in France by assailing the Italian front along the Piave. They crossed the river at several

points, and at one place advanced five miles. But the Italians rallied and dislodged them with heavy losses. This failure of the Austrians on the Piave marked the turn of the tide. Military successes of the Central Empires ceased, and the final triumph of the Allies began.

Supreme
Austrian
Effort

5. THE TRIUMPH OF THE ALLIES, 1918

Despite the collapse of Russia, the submission of Rumania, and the forced retirement of the Italians to the Piave and of the French to the Marne, the Central Empires were not winning the World War. Allied resistance was stiffening in Italy, in France, and on the high seas. The governments of the Allied Great Powers were displaying a greater energy than ever before, and their peoples were evincing anew a firm determination to achieve "peace through victory." What was most decisive, the German submarine warfare was proving ineffectual.

Previously there had been much bungling by cabinet ministers in Allied countries and notorious lack of coöperation on the part of Allied generals. As early as December 1916 the British government had been reformed and put into the competent hands of David Lloyd George. Then, in November 1917, after the disaster at Caporetto, the Italian ministry was reorganized, with Vittorio Orlando as premier and practical dictator. Simultaneously, the French government passed into the active hands of Georges Clemenceau, the veteran politician of the "Radical" Left and a very determined person. And in Woodrow Wilson the United States had a president distinguished equally for his vigor in pressing the war and for his eloquence in sustaining popular morale.

Strengthening of
Allied
Governments

In November 1917 a Supreme Allied War Council was created to coördinate the military efforts of France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States; and in March 1918, in the midst of the furious German drives on the Western Front, the Allied Great Powers at last agreed to entrust to one man the central direction of their military operations in France. For this responsible post, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, a short, grizzled, deep-eyed Frenchman of sixty-five, the foremost military genius of the time, was selected. To Foch were subordinated the French armies under Marshal Pétain and the British under Sir Douglas Haig. Thus in the fourth year

Marshal
Foch

of the war the Allies finally achieved a real coördination of command.

There can be little doubt that popular morale in Allied countries was heightened, as that in the Central Empires was gradually lowered, by the idealistic utterances of Woodrow Wilson. In one of his most famous speeches, in January 1918, he appealed to world sentiment to back the Allied war aims, which, he declared, consisted of "fourteen points": (1) open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, and in the future no secret diplomacy; (2) absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except when the seas are closed by general international agreement; (3) removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers to international trade; (4) reduction of national armaments; (5) impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, with the interests of the subject populations receiving equal weight with the government seeking title; (6) evacuation of Russian territory, with full opportunity for Russia to determine her own future development; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) evacuation and restoration of French territory, and righting of the wrong done in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine; (9) readjustment of Italian frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality; (10) autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) evacuation and restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, with an outlet to the sea for Serbia and with interrelations of the several Balkan states according to historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; (12) secure sovereignty for the Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire, with autonomy for other portions and with freedom of shipping through the Straits; (13) establishment of an independent Poland, including all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and having access to the sea; (14) formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. These "fourteen points," though vague in general and ambiguous in detail, elicited the hearty approval and stimulated the hopes of multitudes, not only in America, Britain, France, and Italy, but also among the "subject nationalities" of the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. Even in the German Empire, a growing number of

people read into Wilson's words a promise that if only they would democratize their country it would be let off easily.

Most significant, the submarine campaign was not bringing Germany the speedy victory which Hindenburg and Ludendorff had predicted. By virtue of the vigilance of the British and American navies and the convoy and patrol systems which they jointly developed, the destruction of Allied shipping by German submarines gradually declined. The tonnage destroyed in the first half of 1917 was four million; in the second half of 1917, two and a quarter million; and in the first half of 1918, less than two million. Meanwhile, shipbuilding was being pushed so rapidly that in 1918 newly launched merchant vessels far exceeded in tonnage old ones destroyed. England, therefore, was not starved out by Germany, nor were the oceanic communications of the Allies seriously interfered with. On the other hand, Great Britain, with the active coöperation of the United States, drastically tightened the "blockade" of German ports and starved Germany to a degree never felt or anticipated before her submarine effort. Meanwhile the United States was contributing men and money to the Allies, and was persuading still other nations to make common cause with them. Brazil declared war on Germany in October 1917; Guatemala, in April 1918; Nicaragua, in May; and Haiti and Honduras in July. By the summer of 1918 the four states of the Mid-European Confederacy were confronted with a hostile coalition of twenty-five independent nations ¹ and five "dominions," ² representing every continent and most of the islands of the world.

Waning
of Subma-
rine
Menace

Most of
World
with
Allies

In June 1918 military successes of the Central Empires on the Continent of Europe ceased. Austria-Hungary was exhausted by her desperate "drive" against the Italians on the Piave. Germany was halted by the British on the Somme and by the French at the Marne, and no reserves of man-power were left her to withstand the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers who were beginning to reënforce the Allied armies in France.


Passing of
Offensive
to Allies

In July, when the Germans attempted to cross the Marne,

¹ Four of these—Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay—broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in 1917 but did not participate actively in the War.

² Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.

Marshal Foch called fresh American troops to the assistance of his French and British veterans and gave battle. The resulting "second battle of the Marne" was a deadly two weeks' combat



THE ALLIED ADVANCE, JULY–NOVEMBER 1918

I July 18–August 7
II August 8–October 10

III October 10–November 1
IV November 2–November 11

and an Allied triumph. Not only was the German advance definitively stopped, but the French drove the enemy back northward across the Aisne River. To the Germans the second battle of the Marne, in 1918, was far more disastrous than the first battle of the Marne in 1914. In 1914 the Germans, with superior artillery and greater

**Second
Battle of
Marne,
July 1918**

stores of ammunition, could entrench themselves on the heights of the Aisne and successfully resist the counter-attacks of the French. In 1918, however, they had no such advantage. They were unable to repair the damage done, and they were helplessly inferior to the Allies in numbers and equipment.

The Allies, flushed with victory and guided by the master-hand of Marshal Foch, did not fail to follow up their success at the Marne. Relentlessly they hammered at the German trenches everywhere in France. While Franco-British armies recaptured Cambrai and Lille, Franco-American armies drove the Germans from St. Mihiel, south of Verdun, and cleared the ground northward in the Argonne along the Meuse River. By the end of October 1918 the Germans were crowded almost completely out of France and compelled to evacuate a large part of Belgium.

German
Expulsion
from
France
and
Belgium

Allied military success was not confined to the Western Front. Already in October 1917 the British army which had previously advanced from Egypt and defeated the Turks in the Sinai peninsula, penetrated victoriously into Palestine under the command of General Edmund Allenby and in coöperation with the Arab forces of Feisal and Captain Lawrence. Turkish resistance, organized and conducted by the German General von Falkenhayn, was stubborn but ineffectual. Jaffa fell to the British in November, and Jerusalem in December. The British and Arabs then overran all Palestine, secured the country east of the Jordan, and advanced into Syria. At the beginning of October 1918 they captured Damascus, and by the end of the month they were in possession of Aleppo and prepared to effect a juncture at Mosul with the Anglo-Indian (and Arab) army in Mesopotamia.

British-
Arab
Triumph
in Near
East

Meanwhile, in September 1918 the composite Allied army at Salonica, newly reinforced and put under the command of General Franchet d'Espérey, struck out northward into the Balkan peninsula against the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian army no longer had the support of Austrian and German divisions, and its protracted inaction in Macedonia had lowered its morale. Consequently the vigorous Allied offensive from Salonica produced sudden and decisive results. Within two weeks, Macedonia and Serbia were recovered, and the Allies were ready to subjugate Bulgaria.

Allied
Triumph
in Mace-
donia

Almost simultaneously, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary collapsed. Encouraged by Allied victories in the Balkans and by German defeats in the West, the Czech and Yugoslav deputies in the Austrian parliament publicly proclaimed on October 1, 1918, the absolute right of their respective peoples to national self-determination. On October 18 the formal declaration of the independence of the "Czechoslovak Republic" was issued by a "provisional government" headed by Thomas Masaryk, an outstanding Czech scholar and patriot. Eleven days later the Croatian Diet voted to break its ties with Hungary and to join Serbia in creating a national union of all the Yugoslavs. Nor were the Austro-Hungarian armies in any position to oppose such revolts in Croatia and Bohemia. The victorious Allied army of General Franchet D'Espérey threatened Hungary from the south. The Rumanians, tearing up the humiliating treaty of Bucharest which they had signed with the Central Empires in March, resumed hostilities and invaded Hungary from the east. The Italians, under General Diaz, drove the Austrians in disorder from the Piave and pursued them into Istria.

The confederacy of the Central Empires, which had stood like a granite fortress for four years, was finally crumbling. Its armies were defeated and demoralized. Its generals were discredited. Its monarchs and statesmen were panic-stricken. Its peoples were clamoring for peace. Bulgaria, the last to join the confederacy, was the first to quit it. She surrendered unconditionally to the Allies on September 30, 1918. A month later, both the Ottoman Empire and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary followed suit. Germany was left to end the World War as best she could.

Already, in August 1918, General Ludendorff had told William II that the war was lost, and at the end of September, prostrated by the news of Bulgaria's surrender, he besought the Emperor to make peace immediately. The Emperor responded by appointing a new and liberal Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, and instructing him to negotiate with the Allies. Prince Maximilian appealed to the President of the United States to mediate, and Wilson, reiterating his contention that the imperial régime in Germany could not be trusted, practically called for an internal

**Collapse
of Habs-
burg
Empire**

**Revolt of
Czechs
and
Croats**

**Surrender
of Ger-
many's
Confeder-
ates**

**Peace
Counsels
in Ger-
many**

revolution. Ludendorff, outraged by the prospect of revolution more than by that of carnage at the battle front, then begged William II to dismiss Prince Maximilian and go on with the war. But the Emperor knew that to go on would mean certain revolution, and when he gave no heed to the General' impassioned pleas, Ludendorff angrily resigned and retired to Sweden. For once, Hindenburg, the nominal commander of the German armies, refused to follow his mentor, and remained at the front.

After a month's interchange of notes between Prince Maximilian and President Wilson, the Allies agreed to make peace on the basis of the "fourteen points," subject to reservations on the freedom of the seas and the fate of Austria-Hungary and to an explicit pledge of German reparation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies." On this basis an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, between Germany and the Allies, but by this time revolutionary agitation and naval and military mutinies within Germany had brought about the downfall of the imperial government of William II and Prince Maximilian and the succession of a republican and socialist government. It was consequently this latter government which signed the armistice of November 11.

Armistice
of Nov.
1918

In accordance with the armistice, the Allies occupied the left bank of the Rhine, the French establishing themselves in Alsace-Lorraine and at Mainz, the Americans at Coblenz, and the British and Belgians at Cologne. To the Allies, furthermore, Germany surrendered all her battleships and submarines and great numbers of guns, locomotives, motor lorries, and railway cars. The Mid-European Confederacy was broken and disarmed. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire lay prostrate at the feet of the triumphant Allies.

The armistice of November 11, 1918, brought an immediate sense of relief and exhilaration to the whole world. The horrible blood-letting of four years and more, with all its attendant havoc, suffering, and misery, was at last halted. Permanent peace might now be made, and the delayed millennium of optimistic progressives finally achieved.

Formal peace was made, but it ushered in no millennium. What the World War and the ensuing peace settlement actually did was to disillusion a vast number of Europeans and to stimulate pessimism rather than optimism. As we now look back on the first

two decades of the twentieth century, we perceive that the World War—its antecedents, its course, its immediate consequences—marked the end of one historic era and the beginning of another. It ushered in a different Europe, and a different world, politically, economically, and intellectually.

Emer-
gence of a
Different
Europe

It could hardly be otherwise. Continuity of thought and habit and of steady advance along rutted roads of past achievement could not be maintained in the midst of events as cataclysmic and universal as those of the World War. The World War was waged by thirty nations, including every one of the so-called Great Powers. Sixty-five million men bore arms in it. Eight and a half million men were killed. Twenty-nine million men were wounded, captured, or "missing." Every family in eastern and central Europe, every family in Italy, France, and the huge British Empire, and many families in America suffered loss of near relatives or close friends. The direct financial cost of the World War has been estimated at over two hundred billion dollars; its indirect cost, at over a hundred and fifty billion dollars more; and these figures do not include the additional billions in interest payments, veterans' care and pensions, and similar expenses with which the world was saddled after the war. Never had there been a struggle so gigantic, so deadly and costly.


Magni-
tude of
World
War



CHAPTER XXV

AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD WAR

I. THE REVOLUTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE



THE military disaster which befell the Mid-European Confederacy in the autumn of 1918 was the signal for immediate political revolutions within its members. The revolutions, though precipitated in several instances by Socialists, proved to be uniformly mild, and more conducive to democratic nationalism

than to any basic social change.

In Germany, Prince Maximilian, the Chancellor on whom the Emperor William II imposed the unpleasant task of opening peace negotiations with the Allies, sought to allay domestic unrest by promising in October a number of constitutional reforms. But the more he promised in the way of reform, the louder grew the demands for an overturn of the whole monarchical régime, and to such demands the counsel of the American President, Woodrow Wilson, gave point and cogency. On October 28 a naval mutiny occurred at Kiel, and on the next day the Emperor hurried from Berlin to military headquarters at Spa, imagining that the army would safeguard alike his person and his throne.

Revolu-
tion in
Germany

Within a week, almost every city in the German Empire witnessed Socialist rioting and the formation of revolutionary "workers' councils." On November 8, amid disorders at Munich, Bavaria was proclaimed a "democratic and socialist republic," with Kurt Eisner, a left-wing Socialist, as president. In vain Chancellor Maximilian begged William II to save the Hohenzollern dynasty by abdicating in favor of his infant grandson. The Emperor, relying on the army, was deaf to the Chancellor, and by the time the high military officers (including Hindenburg) reluctantly informed him that even the army was seething with sedition and could not be relied upon, there was no longer a

friendly Chancellor to advise him. In the night of November 9-10 William II ingloriously took flight across the frontier into the Netherlands. The history of the German Empire of the Hohenzollerns was thus almost exclusively the history of two reigns—that of William the First (1871-1888), under whom the Empire had been reared in might, and that of William the Last (1888-1918), under whom it fell with a fearful crash.

**Flight of
William
II, Nov.
1918**

Already, on November 9, 1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden had felt obliged to turn over the Chancellorship to a Socialist, Friedrich Ebert, and presently, under the latter's guidance, a "Council of People's Commissars" was installed at Berlin in imitation of the contemporary revolutionary administration in Russia. But though Ebert and his fellow Socialists in Germany were willing to borrow nomenclature from the Russian Bolsheviks, they had no serious thought of adopting their policies. Only a small group of German Socialists—the so-called "Spartacans"—were in full sympathy with the Russian Communists and eager to emulate them in a violent exercise of proletarian dictatorship. The major groups, on the other hand—those that shared in the provisional government—were too anxious for national regeneration to countenance civil war, and too devoted to democracy to favor any dictatorship, even of themselves.

**Socialists
in Charge**

The "moderation" of the Socialists was supported by the Catholic Centre party, led by Mathias Erzberger, and also by the German Progressives and left-wing National Liberals, newly fused into a Democratic party. It thus transpired that the three political organizations—Progressive, Centrist, and Social Democratic—which had repeatedly united in opposition to illiberal policies of the Hohenzollern Empire,¹ now joined anew to supplant the Empire with a liberal democratic republic. Against this republican *bloc* were arrayed a Royalist "Right" and a Communist "Left." The "Right" comprised the former Conservative and Free Conservative parties, now reorganized as the Nationalist party and intent upon the restoration of monarchy, and the more moderate group of right-wing National Liberals who, under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann, a wealthy industrialist, assumed the title of "Ger-

**German
Parties
and the
Revolution**

¹ See above, pp. 443-447, 455-456.

man People's party" and, while preferring monarchy, expressed a willingness to collaborate with republicans. The "Left" was composed of Liebknecht's Spartacans, who refused to participate with the "bourgeoisie" in the election of a Constituent Assembly and preached popular insurrection.

In January 1919, on the eve of the elections, the Spartacans staged a revolutionary demonstration at Berlin, but their leaders were more adept at talking than at acting and the attempted insurrection was sternly suppressed. In the following month the assassination of Kurt Eisner, the radical socialist president of Bavaria, gave rise to fresh disorders, which, however, were firmly dealt with by the central government.

Suppression of
Extremists

Meanwhile a Constituent Assembly was elected by secret ballot of all Germans over twenty years of age, men and women alike; and on February 6 it met at Weimar. Its overwhelming majority was composed of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, and these jointly directed its constructive work—its ratification of the peace treaty with the Allies in June 1919 and its adoption of a constitution at the end of July for the future government of the country.¹ Ebert was elected first constitutional president of the republic, and another Socialist, Scheidemann, was appointed its first chancellor.

Weimar
Assembly,
1919


By August 1919 it seemed as if the German revolution was successfully accomplished. The Hohenzollern Empire was ended and a democratic Republic inaugurated with comparatively little bloodshed and with the backing of a large majority of the popular electorate. There were many differences of aim and policy among the groups composing the victorious coalition. But for the time being, at any rate, democratic republicanism was allowed to function in Germany.

German
Republic

In the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the revolution of 1918-1919 was not only democratic but disruptive. In vain the Emperor-King Charles I published a conciliatory manifesto on October 16, 1918, promising to reorganize the monarchy on a federal basis so that each of its nationalities would possess democratic autonomy. By this time it was too late for compromise. Leaders of the subject nationalities were resolved on achieving a separation from the

Revolution in
Austria-
Hungary

¹ On the Weimar Constitution of 1919, see below, p. 655.



Habsburg Empire, and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian armies removed the one means which Charles might have employed to enforce obedience.

On October 18, a group of Czech patriots, including Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes, proclaimed at Paris the deposition of Charles of Habsburg as King of Bohemia and the independence of the "Czechoslovakian Republic." Czechoslovak Republic
Ten days later, a self-constituted Czech "national council" took over the government at Prague, and the next day a similar "national council" in the Slovak provinces of Hungary voted for a union of the Slovaks with the Czechs in a unified "Czechoslovakia." A national assembly was speedily convened at Prague. In November it ratified what had been done and chose Masaryk as president of the Republic, with Benes as foreign minister, and eventually in February 1920, after protracted debates, it adopted a democratic constitution.

The southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary revolted simultaneously with the Czechs and Slovaks in the north. On October 29, 1918, the Croatian Diet proclaimed the deposition of Charles of Habsburg and the separation of the "kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia" from Hungary. Yugoslav Union with Serbia
Authority was then transferred to a revolutionary Yugoslav Congress, to which representatives were admitted from Bosnia-Herzegovina and likewise from the Slovene province of Carniola; and on November 23, in accordance with the earlier Declaration of Corfu,¹ the Congress voted to incorporate all the Yugoslav territories of Austria-Hungary with the independent state of Serbia in a "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." Of the new kingdom—really a Greater Serbia—King Peter of Serbia assumed the kingship in December, with his son Alexander as regent and with a ministry headed by the veteran Serbian politician, Nicholas Pašič. Against the Yugoslav union, Austria-Hungary was powerless. Only King Nicholas of Montenegro attempted to oppose it. But his little country was quickly occupied by Serbian troops and subjected to the new régime.

The Poles of Austrian Galicia likewise seceded from the Habsburg Empire and joined the Poles of Prussia and Russia in establishing a national state. In this they were unexpectedly aided by the military reverses of all their "oppressors," not

¹ See above, p. 610.

only Austria and Germany but also Russia. In the early stages of the World War, Polish patriots had been divided on the question of tactics. One group, represented by the celebrated musician Ignace Paderewski, hoped for an Allied victory, imagining that the defeat of Austria and Germany would force them to surrender their respective Polish provinces and that victorious France and Britain would persuade their Russian ally to grant autonomy if not complete independence to reunited Poland. Another and larger group, taking their cue from a soldier and "radical," Joseph Pilsudski, were not so sanguine of Allied victory or of Russian altruism or Franco-British benevolence. Mindful that Austria had treated her Polish subjects better than Russia had treated hers, they thought that their immediate task was to assist the Central Powers in conquering Russian Poland and uniting it with Austrian Poland. Consequently, while Paderewski was issuing pro-Allied propaganda and currying favor with French and British statesmen, General Pilsudski had organized a Polish legion and fought on the side of the Central Powers.

Fortunately for the Polish nation, the conflicting efforts of Pilsudski and Paderewski were both crowned with success. Pilsudski had the satisfaction of witnessing the Russian military débâcle of 1915-1916 and of securing from the Austrian and German Emperors a joint pledge, on November 5, 1916, that they would create an "independent" kingdom of Poland, "a national state with an hereditary monarch and a constitutional government," in "intimate relations" with their own realms. Whereupon, a "regency" was set up at Warsaw, and by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in March 1918, Russia formally renounced all claim to Poland.

By this time, however, Pilsudski was becoming disillusioned about the magnanimity of the Central Powers. For it was quite clear that in their hour of triumph over Russia they had no intention of bestowing real independence on Russian Poland or of joining their Polish provinces to it. So Pilsudski turned against the Germans and was duly imprisoned by them, while Paderewski had the satisfaction of knowing that at last his own pro-Allied efforts would command the united support of the whole Polish people. During 1918 Austrian Galicia, as well as Prussian Posen, was rife with Polish sedition, and Polish volunteers joined the

Allied armies in increasing numbers. With the triumph of the Allies and the pledges of Woodrow Wilson, Poland's final deliverance was at hand.

The deliverance came in the midst of the revolution throughout central Europe. When the Dual Monarchy collapsed, Galicia naturally gravitated toward "independent" Poland; and when Germany surrendered, the Poles of Posen, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia moved in the same direction. Pilsudski, released from his German jail, arrived in Warsaw in November 1918 and took over from the Austro-German Regency the provisional government of the country. Then, in January 1919, with himself as president and Paderewski as premier and minister of foreign affairs, a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage.

Polish
Republic

The revolutionary emergence of a united and independent Poland thus synchronized with the attainment of political unity and freedom by Czechoslovakia and by Yugoslavia, and also with Rumania's forceful appropriation of Bessarabia from Russia, Transylvania from Hungary, and Bukovina from Austria. The national unification of the Rumanian-speaking peoples was an important phase of the general revolutionary movement and of the attendant disintegration of the Habsburg Empire.

Rumanian
Annexations

Simultaneously the two cores of the Dual Monarchy—Magyar Hungary and German Austria—were revolutionized. In Hungary, Count Michael Károlyi, who, despite aristocratic ancestry and great wealth, was a chronic critic of the existing illiberal and monarchist régime, put himself at the head of a "provisional government" on October 24-25, 1918. Two weeks later he proclaimed Hungary an independent republic, with himself as governor, pledged to democratize the country and to redress the grievances of its subject nationalities. Károlyi's government soon encountered extraordinary difficulties. The subject nationalities would not recognize it, and it was unable to prevent the secession of the Croats and Slovaks or to resist the occupation of Transylvania by a Rumanian army.

Károlyi's
Hungarian
Republic

In March 1919, when it became clear that the Allies meant to back the aggrandizement of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia at Hungary's expense, Károlyi resigned the government into the hands of a left-wing Socialist and Jewish journalist,

Béla Kun by name, who had recently returned from Russia where, as a prisoner of war, he had acquired a fanatical enthusiasm for Communism. Béla Kun at once proclaimed a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Hungary and feverishly proceeded to rain Communist decrees upon the Magyars and at the same time to employ force against the revolting nationalities. He organized a "red army" and despatched it in turn against the Slovaks and against the Rumanians. Against the former, he obtained a temporary success. But against the Rumanian army, the ragged and ill-equipped forces of Communist Hungary could not stand. As the Rumanians advanced on Budapest and domestic plots thickened against him, Béla Kun in terror fled on August 1, 1919, into Austria, where he found refuge in a mad-house. Budapest was occupied by Rumanian troops throughout the autumn of 1919, while control of the internal affairs of Hungary passed to a group of aristocrats, including Admiral Nicholas Horthy and Count Stephen Bethlen. Following the withdrawal of the Rumanian army, a general election was held in Hungary in January 1920, with results favorable to the reactionaries. Admiral Horthy was immediately made "Regent," and in April 1921 Count Bethlen began what proved to be a ten-year term as premier and practical dictator.

Meanwhile, Vienna was the scene of a revolution. Here, on October 30, 1918, in the midst of military collapse and governmental paralysis, and at the very time when the disintegration of the Empire was reducing "Austria" to its original German provinces, mobs of workingmen and students inaugurated a series of demonstrations which rapidly grew in size and in determination to have done with the Habsburgs. The Emperor Charles knew that he was powerless to stem the tide. He was ruined by the World War which he had not made and by circumstances over which he had little control. Young, well-intentioned, and amiable, his respectable personal qualities were no proof against the vast elemental forces which took his ancestral realm from him and left him the unenviable fame of being the last of the Habsburg Emperors. On November 11, 1918, Charles abdicated.¹

¹ In March 1919 he took up his abode in Switzerland. Subsequently, when pro-

The "provisional government" of the "national German state of Austria" was already constituted by mutual agreement among the leaders of the Social Democratic, Christian Socialist, and Nationalist parties, and on November 12 it proclaimed Austria a republic. In the following February a Constituent Assembly was elected by universal suffrage, and eventually it adopted a democratic constitution similar to the one prepared at Weimar for Germany.

Austrian
Republic

The World War had begun in July 1914 with the attack of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, then rated as a Great Power, upon the little Slav state of Serbia. Five years later, thanks to military fortunes and revolutionary upheavals, Serbia was free and amply revenged. Within the former confines of the Dual Monarchy were now the three independent states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and German Austria, while large portions of its erstwhile territories were appropriated by Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy.

Moreover, all those Powers which had taken their stand with the Dual Monarchy in the World War were undergoing revolution. Germany, as we have already indicated, was supplanting the Hohenzollern Empire with a democratic republic and relinquishing some of its territory to resurrected Poland. And political revolutions were simultaneously occurring in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.

In Bulgaria, the dynasty and the form of monarchy remained, thanks largely to the circumstances that King Ferdinand was canny enough to abdicate the crown and leave the country in October 1918 and that his youthful son and successor, Boris III, entrusted practically dictatorial power to a forceful and popular statesman, Alexander Stambulinsky. Stambulinsky, a peasant by birth and the leader of the Agrarian party in Bulgaria, had spent three years in jail for opposing King Ferdinand's juncture with the Central Empires in the World War. He could not be held responsible, therefore, for the resulting misfortunes, and his vigorous insistence upon internal reforms which would be beneficial to the peasantry fessed royalists had obtained the upper hand in Hungary, he made two unsuccessful attempts to regain the Hungarian crown—in March and in October 1921. After the second attempt, the Allies practically exiled him to Madeira, where he died in April 1922, leaving his claims to his young son, the Archduke Otto. See genealogical table at p. 94, above.

Revolu-
tion in
Bulgaria

tended during the critical post-war period to allay the outraged patriotic sentiment and to brighten the economic prospects of the Bulgarian masses.

In the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Mohammed V had died in July 1918, and in the ensuing October, when Allied armies and Arab forces were overrunning Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, his successor, Mohammed VI, accepted the resignation of Enver Pasha and the other "Young Turk" ministers whose alliance with Germany had brought the Turkish power to the brink of ruin. Against the pusillanimous conduct of the Sultan during the winter of 1918-1919, as well as against the seeming determination of the Allies to partition the Empire utterly, patriotic Turks found a capable and resourceful leader in Mustafa Kemal, who belonged to the left wing of the Young Turk movement but who had been notably critical of Enver Pasha's policies in the World War. While the Sultan Mohammed VI maintained only the form of an imperial Ottoman government at Constantinople, Mustafa Kemal began in the late spring of 1919 to establish a separate and strongly nationalist Turkish government in Anatolia. Gradually, through military prowess as well as organizing genius, Mustafa Kemal secured the unity and independence of the Turkish provinces of the Empire, until by 1923 he was able to appropriate Constantinople, depose Mohammed VI, and finally transform the Ottoman Empire into the national republic of "Turkey," with its capital at Angora.

Revolution in Ottoman Empire

Mustafa Kemal and Turkish Republic

2. THE PEACE OF PARIS

The revolutions in central Europe and the prompt establishment of democratic republics in Germany, Austria, and Hungary aroused popular hope in the defeated and disarmed countries that the victorious Allies in dictating the peace settlement would be exceptionally considerate. The President of the United States had declared that chastisement by the Allies would be directed not against peoples but against autocratic governments, and it was on the basis of his "fourteen points" that Germany had agreed on November 11, 1918, to lay down her arms and make peace.

The hope of the defeated peoples simply did not square with realities in the victorious countries. Allied statesmen had paid

Hope of Defeated Peoples

lip service to the "fourteen points," which at best were vague and susceptible of various interpretations, but they were much more definitely committed to the series of "secret treaties" which they had negotiated with one another during the war and which promised to this or that country, as the price for its services on the Allied side, specific aggrandizement at the expense of Germany or her confederates. Even if Allied statesmen had been minded to interpret the "fourteen points" in a conciliatory sense and to revise the secret treaties accordingly, they could hardly have commanded the support of their respective nations, now fired with a fierce hatred of the "enemy."

Commitments of Allied Statesmen

For four years and more, the popular psychology in Allied countries, especially in France, Great Britain, and Italy, had been keyed up to fever pitch, we must remember, by war propaganda and by personal experience of the horrors of death and destruction. The vast majority of people in every Allied country held Germany guilty of the war and responsible for its havoc. They were mindful, too, of the imperialist peace which Germany, as recently as March 1918, had dictated to Russia and Rumania, and they believed that if her armies on the Western Front had been successful in the summer of 1918, she would have shown no mercy to them. Now that their own armies were triumphant, why should they show mercy to Germany?

War Psychology of Victors

Clemenceau of France and Orlando of Italy, backed by their nations, demanded the dire punishment of the Central Empires. In Great Britain a general election of December 1918 registered a thumping majority for Lloyd George's slogan of "Hang the Kaiser and Make Germany Pay." In the United States, two ex-Presidents of the Republican party, Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, issued a joint pronouncement against any "parleying" by Wilson which might concede to Germany "a peace around a council-table instead of a sentence from a court," and the Republican party carried the Congressional elections of November 1918.

It had been decided to exclude the enemy states from the peace congress until the Allies should have agreed among themselves upon the terms of peace. It had also been decided that the negotiations should be conducted at Paris, the very centre of Allied hostility to Germany. Just as January 18 had been the date in 1871 when a Hohen-

Allied Peace Congress at Paris

zollern King of Prussia, in the midst of a successful war against France, and surrounded by his triumphant generals and statesmen, had stood in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace at Versailles and been proclaimed German Emperor, so now, precisely forty-eight years later, at the close of an overwhelmingly victorious war against Germany, statesmen and generals of the Allies assembled in the same hall to undo the work of Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns. On January 18, 1919, the peace congress held its inaugural session.

It was a brilliant assemblage of the foremost men of the Allied countries—except Russia. The Russian Empire of the Romanov Tsars, which had played a stellar rôle in bringing on the World War, had disappeared from the stage before the war was over, and the succeeding Russia of the revolutionary Communists was as much a pariah among the Allies as Germany or any other enemy state. The remaining “allied and associated” Powers—there were thirty-two of them¹—were eminently represented, however. There was Clemenceau, the old “tiger” of French politics, premier of his country and honorary president of the congress. There was Marshal Foch, the organizer and winner of military victory. There was President Wilson, who in coming to Europe for the congress had established a wholly new precedent for American executives. There was Lloyd George, who from being the most resolute social reformer in Great Britain had become the most conspicuous patriot in all the dominions of King George V. There was Orlando, the Italian premier; Marquis Saionji, twice prime minister of Japan; Venizelos, the chief statesman of Greece; Arthur Balfour, British foreign secretary, who had attended the Congress of Berlin in 1878; Generals Botha and Smuts, erstwhile Boer warriors against Great Britain, now stalwart champions of the British Union of South Africa; the

¹ The thirty-two did not include Russia or Montenegro (which was now incorporated with Serbia), but they did include, in addition to the other twenty-four Powers which had broken with Germany, the three newly formed states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hejaz and the five British “Dominions” of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India.

NOTE. The cartoon opposite, from *Punch*, is by Sir Bernard Partridge (born 1861). The “Big Four” here caricatured consist of the “Allied” Lloyd George, André Tardieu (substituting for Clemenceau), and Orlando, and the “Associated” Woodrow Wilson.

prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Newfoundland; princes from India and Arabia; the president-elect of Brazil; the premiers of Belgium, Portugal, and Rumania, and likewise of the new states of Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Attending these celebrities were a host of more obscure "experts"—geographers, historians, economists, lawyers, and secretaries—a host as necessary to the making of peace as privates had been to the waging of war. And waiting upon them, and seeking to influence them, were numerous "agents" from a great variety of national, racial, and religious groups—Irishmen, Koreans, Jews, Egyptians, Ethiopians, etc.

The Peace Congress, after its formal inauguration on January 18, 1919, met rarely, and then in manner ceremonious and perfunctory. The real work of the Congress was done by special committees of diplomats and "experts" selected as needs arose, and it was done in privacy, only such reports being passed on to the whole congress as met the approval of the spokesmen of the Allied Great Powers. For several months the principal decisions were made by the "Big Four"—Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, and Wilson.

"Big
Four"

It was no easy task to reconcile differences of opinion and policy among the thirty-two delegations and to preserve a united front on the part of all the "allied and associated" governments. Woodrow Wilson, who had set his heart upon fashioning a permanent League of Nations, felt obliged to make repeated concessions to his fellow negotiators in order to enlist their support for his pet project. The tragedy of the American President's position at Paris was that for the assurance of the "fourteenth point" of his peace program he had to surrender or compromise many of the other thirteen points. For example, Point One (open covenants openly arrived at) quickly evaporated in the atmosphere of the Congress. Also, Point Two (freedom of the seas), of which the President talked much before he went to Europe, was sacrificed to British susceptibilities. It was likewise a concession to British demands that Point Five was so interpreted as to admit of the transfer of the bulk of German colonies, under a so-called "mandatory" system, to the British Empire. Wilson, with the backing of Lloyd George,

Compromising the
Fourteen
Points

NOTE. The picture opposite is of the signing of the treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, from the official painting by Sir William Orpen (1878-1931).

did resist the French demand for the whole left bank of the Rhine, and he also held out so stubbornly against the Italian demand for the Adriatic port of Fiume, that the Italian delegates temporarily withdrew from the congress. Eventually, however, Italy got Fiume.

It was very difficult to satisfy the territorial demands of the lesser Powers—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Greece—without doing injustice to the principle of nationality. Nationalities were too intermingled in central and southeastern Europe to permit any hard-and-fast segregation of them within national frontiers. If, for example, all Poles were included in Poland, a considerable number of Germans would be included too; or, if all Czechs and Slovaks were incorporated in Czechoslovakia, a large number of Germans and Magyars would likewise be incorporated. In general, wherever the Allied diplomats had to choose between being unjust to enemy states and being unjust to pro-Ally states, they made the former choice. But in many instances, bitter boundary disputes raged between pro-Ally states themselves. Only the weariness of the several peoples concerned and the dictatorial attitude of the representatives of the Allied Great Powers enabled the peace congress to conclude its labors.

The draft of the proposed peace treaty with Germany, containing about 80,000 words, was agreed to by the "Big Four" and endorsed by the Congress in plenary session on May 6, 1919.¹ On the following day the German plenipotentiaries were admitted to the Congress and presented with the draft. They protested that it was intolerably severe and obviously contradictory of the "fourteen points," on the basis of which they had consented to the armistice. They pleaded for its radical amendment. To German entreaties, the Allies were deaf; and after demonstrations of protest throughout Germany, after threats of compulsion on the part of the Allies, after the resignation of the Scheidemann ministry at Berlin, after several days of awful suspense, the German Constituent Assembly at Weimar on June 23, 1919,

¹ This plenary session was secret, and the treaty draft was endorsed without its details being fully known. Only a 10,000-word digest was submitted to the session. Several Powers—Portugal, France, China, and Italy—agreed to it "with reservations."

the last day of grace, voted to accept unconditionally the Allied terms of peace.

On June 28, in the Hall of Mirrors in the stately old palace of Louis XIV, the treaty of Versailles was signed by representatives of Germany and of thirty-one nations leagued against her.¹ The scene was that in which in 1871 the German Hohenzollern Empire had been proclaimed, and the date was that on which in 1914 the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary had been assassinated. The World War was thus formally ended on the fifth anniversary of the immediate occasion of its beginning, and with deepest humiliation to Germany.

Treaty of
Versailles
with Ger-
many,
June 1919

Though President Wilson returned home soon after the conclusion of peace with Germany, many diplomats remained in Paris for another year, drafting treaties with the other enemy states and working out numerous details of the general settlement. Peace was formally concluded with Austria in September 1919; with Hungary in June 1920; and with the Ottoman Empire in August 1920. All these treaties, including the one of June 1919 with Germany, were negotiated at Paris and signed at various places in the vicinity of Paris. Together, therefore, they constituted what we may call the Peace of Paris.

Other
Treaties,
1919-1920

Into each of the four major treaties was written a "covenant," providing for the establishment of a League of Nations and of a Permanent Court of International Justice; and supplementing the treaties was a special "convention," designed to effect an international organization of labor. Of the Labor Convention and League Covenant, we shall treat in some detail in a later chapter.² Here we merely note that, while they were part and parcel of the Peace of Paris, they were incidental and secondary, in the minds of most of the negotiators, to the territorial and financial provisions of the several treaties. These we shall now outline.

League
Covenant
and Labor
Conven-
tion

The treaty of Versailles profoundly altered the position of Germany. Territorially, Germany ceded Alsace-Lorraine to France,

¹ One of the thirty-two delegations on the Allied side—China—refused to sign the treaty of Versailles, because of concessions to Japan. General Smuts, in attaching his signature on behalf of South Africa, protested against what he conceived to be the illiberality of the victors to the vanquished.

² See below, pp. 746-757.

the towns of Eupen and Malmédy to Belgium, the city of Memel to Lithuania,¹ and the province of Posen and a strip through West Prussia (the so-called "corridor") to Poland.² Furthermore, she consented to the holding of plebiscites, under international auspices, to determine whether Upper Silesia and the southern part of East Prussia should be annexed to Poland, and Schleswig to Denmark.³ Besides, she surrendered outright the important Baltic port of Danzig, which became an internationalized "free city," and for a period of fifteen years the valuable coal region of the Saar, which passed under the administration of the League of Nations and the economic control of France. In the case of the Saar, a plebiscite would determine at the end of fifteen years whether it would remain permanently under international government or revert to Germany or be annexed by France.⁴

In addition to territorial cessions in Europe, Germany parted with all her overseas imperial domain. Her lease of Kiaochow and privileged position in the Chinese province of Shantung, as well as her Pacific islands north of the equator, were transferred to Japan; her portion of Samoa, to New Zealand; her other Pacific possessions south of the equator, to Australia; German Southwest Africa, to the British Union of South Africa; German East Africa, to Great Britain, except a small section in the northwest, which went to Belgium; and Kamerun and Togoland were divided between Great Britain and France. In most cases the Powers receiving German colonies did so not as absolute sovereigns but as "mandatories" of the League of Nations, to which they promised to give periodic accounts of their stewardship.

Germany recognized, moreover, the independence of Belgium, and likewise of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and German Austria. She specifically denounced the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and

¹ The treaty merely provided for the cession of Memel to the Allies. Memel was "appropriated" by Lithuania in 1923 and retaken by Germany in 1939.

² The "corridor," which cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany, had belonged to Poland until 1772. See the maps, below, pp. 648-649.

³ As the outcome of these plebiscites, in 1919, the northern third of Schleswig joined Denmark and all East Prussia remained with Germany. In Upper Silesia, the plebiscite was delayed and interfered with by nationalistic fighting and disorder; when it was held, in 1921, it was generally favorable to Germany, though certain districts gave Polish majorities; and in 1922 the League of Nations arbitrarily partitioned Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland.

⁴ The plebiscite, held in 1935, was favorable to Germany. See below, p. 799.

Bucharest, which she had signed in March 1918 with Russia and Rumania respectively, and gave the Allies *carte blanche* to settle as they would the affairs of eastern Europe.

Militarily, Germany promised to reduce her army to 100,000 men; to abolish conscription; to raze all fortifications between her western frontier and a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine; to stop all importation, exportation, and nearly all production of war material; to reduce her navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats, without submarines; and to abandon military and naval aviation. She agreed, furthermore, to demolish fortifications at Heligoland, to open the Kiel Canal to all nations, to refrain from building forts on the Baltic, and to surrender her transoceanic cables. She expressly consented to the trial, by an international tribunal, of the Emperor William II for "supreme offense against international morality."¹

Germany was forced to acknowledge responsibility for the World War, and to promise that she would make financial reparation "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property." She was to make an initial payment of five billion dollars and such subsequent payments, up to "the utmost of her ability," as a special Reparations Commission of the Allies should direct. In the meantime she was to pay shipping damage on a ton-for-ton basis by cession of most of her existing merchant marine and by new construction; to devote her economic resources to the rebuilding of devastated areas in France; to supply France, Belgium, and Italy with coal; to return works of art taken from Belgium and France, and to deliver to Belgium manuscripts and books of equivalent value to those destroyed at Louvain.

Until the treaty of Versailles was fully executed, Allied armies should continue to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank of Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, with Germany footing the bills. The one concession was that if

¹ In accordance with this provision, Great Britain, France, and Italy, in 1920, requested the Netherlands to hand over William II for trial. Queen Wilhelmina's advisers declined on the ground that no existing international court possessed legal jurisdiction and that the Dutch people "could not betray the faith of anyone who has confided himself to their free institutions." Upon the promise of the Dutch government to take necessary precautions to prevent the ex-Emperor from endangering the world's peace, the Allies dropped the project of trying William II.

Germany should be duly fulfilling her obligations, Cologne would be evacuated at the end of five years, Coblenz at the end of ten, and Mainz at the end of fifteen.

Harsh indeed were the terms which the Peace of Paris imposed on Germany. Her domain in Europe was restricted; her overseas empire was destroyed; she was disarmed and mortgaged; for a long time, it seemed, she would be at the mercy of her conquerors. And hardly less harsh was the punishment which the Peace of Paris meted out to Germany's confederates.

Austria, by the treaty signed at St. Germain, near Paris, on September 10, 1919, was required to recognize the independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and to cede to them, and to Italy and Rumania, the bulk of the realm which previously, in union with herself, had composed the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Austria was left, thereby, a small independent German state, with an area and a population smaller than Portugal's. Part even of the German-speaking Tyrol was detached from her and added to Italy, and Austria had to promise that she would not unite in the future with Germany. She was deprived of sea-ports; her army was restricted to 30,000 men; and she was obligated, like Germany, to pay such indemnity as the Reparations Commission should determine.

From Bulgaria were taken, by the treaty signed at Neuilly, near Paris, on November 27, 1919, most of the land she had acquired in the Balkan War of 1912-1913 and all her conquests in the World War. Dobruja went to Rumania; the greater part of Macedonia, to Yugoslavia; and the Thracian coast, to Greece. Bulgaria promised to pay an indemnity of almost half a billion dollars and to reduce her army to 33,000 men.

Hungary, by the treaty of the Trianon signed on June 4, 1920, was stripped of non-Magyar subjects as completely as Austria had been shorn of non-Germans. The Slovak provinces went to Czechoslovakia. Transylvania and a strip of land to the west of it were ceded to Rumania. Croatia was yielded to Yugoslavia. The Banat was divided between Yugoslavia and Rumania. Hungary thus shrank from an imperial and maritime domain of 125,000 square miles, with twenty-two million inhabitants, into a landlocked Magyar

Treaty of
St. Ger-
main with
Austria

Treaty of
Neuilly
with
Bulgaria

Treaty of
Trianon
with
Hungary

state of 36,000 square miles with a population of eight million and with an army limited to 35,000 men.

Determination of the fate of the Ottoman Empire was delayed by the persistence of acute differences among the Allies—especially between France and Great Britain, and between Italy and Greece—about the distribution of the spoils, and also by the existence of rival Turkish governments, that of the Sultan at Constantinople and that of Mustafa Kemal at Angora. At length, on August 10, 1920, an agreement was reached among the Allies, and on the same day they signed at Sèvres, near Paris, a treaty of peace with the Sultan's government. Thereby, the Arab state of Hejaz, embracing the strip of territory east of the Red Sea, would be

Treaty of
Sèvres
with
Ottoman
Empire

independent; Armenia would be a free Christian republic under international guaranties; Palestine, Mesopotamia, the trans-Jordan area, and Syria would be detached from the Empire and the first three made "mandatories" of Great Britain, and the fourth, of France; Cilicia would be a "sphere of influence" for France, and southern Anatolia, including the port of Adalia, a "sphere of influence" for Italy; Smyrna and adjacent territory on the coast of Asia Minor, together with Thrace, Adrianople, the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the remaining Ægean islands would be surrendered to Greece. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would be internationalized, and the once mighty Ottoman Empire would be contracted into a petty Turkish state retaining only the city of Constantinople and the interior of Asia Minor and subjected to crushing debts and to foreign control of its finances.

The government of the Sultan Mohammed VI at Constantinople agreed to the treaty of Sèvres, but the Turkish National Assembly at Angora, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, refused to ratify it. Taking advantage of the demobilization of the Allied armies and of the war weariness of the Allied peoples, Mustafa Kemal, with his Turkish forces, obliterated the Armenian republic and obliged Italian troops to quit southern Anatolia and the French to desist from occupying Cilicia. The governments of France and Italy, thus discomfited by the Turkish military revival and already critical of the advantages conferred by the treaty of Sèvres on Great Britain and Greece, were favorable to a revision of the treaty.

Its Repu-
diation by
Turks

At the same time, at Moscow, the Communist government of Russia signed a treaty with the Turkish Nationalists, condemning the treaty of Sèvres, disavowing Russian ambitions in the Ottoman Empire, re-ceding Kars and Ardahan to Turkey, and proclaiming "the solidarity which unites Turkey and Russia in the struggle against imperialism."

In the meantime the British government, which had most to lose by the revival of Turkish power, was abetting the proposals of Venizelos and of the recently restored King Constantine that Greece should undertake the suppression of the militant Turkish Nationalists and the enforcement of the treaty of Sèvres.¹ Accordingly, in July 1921 a large Greek army, under Constantine, advanced from Smyrna against Mustafa Kemal. At first the Greeks gained some ground, but presently they were turned back and eventually overwhelmed and driven from Smyrna. They received no real aid from the British, who distrusted King Constantine and who had had enough fighting for the present, while, on the other hand, the Turks were supplied with arms and munitions by the French and the Italians. In triumph, therefore, the troops of Mustafa Kemal possessed themselves of the whole of Asia Minor and in November 1922 occupied Constantinople.

The victories of Mustafa Kemal and his Turkish Nationalists scrapped the treaty of Sèvres and called for a new peace settlement in the Near East. After another series of difficult and delicate negotiations, peace was finally concluded between Turkey and the Allies at Lausanne, in Switzerland, on July 24, 1923. By the terms of the treaty of Lausanne, Turkey definitely resigned all claims to Hejaz, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Mesopotamia, and Syria, but she retained the whole of Anatolia and likewise Cilicia, Adalia, Smyrna, Constantinople, and eastern Thrace. She consented to the freedom of the Straits and their demilitarization,

¹ Both Venizelos and Constantine favored war with Mustafa Kemal, but no love was lost between the two Greeks or between the republican and royalist factions which they respectively headed. Following the death of King Alexander I of Greece in 1920, Venizelos and his republicans were defeated in a general election by the royalists; Venizelos accordingly withdrew from the government, and Constantine was restored (November 1920). In September 1922, following the disastrous rout of his armies in Asia Minor, King Constantine again abdicated, this time in favor of his son, George II, and removed himself finally from Greece.

but she escaped most of the onerous foreign control of her internal affairs which the treaty of Sèvres had imposed upon her.¹

The Peace of Paris of 1919-1920 included not only the Turkish treaty of Sèvres (as subsequently revised by the treaty of Lausanne), the Hungarian treaty of the Trianon, the Bulgarian treaty of Neuilly, the Austrian treaty of St. Germain, and the German treaty of Versailles, but numerous supplementary conventions and agreements among the Allies.

To delimit the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia proved especially troublesome. Italy insistently demanded not only Istria, the Adriatic islands, and that part of Dalmatia pledged her by the secret treaties of wartime, but the important port of Fiume also. But counter-claims of Yugoslavia, particularly to Fiume, were stubbornly backed, as we have said, by President Woodrow Wilson and hardly less so by the French. In September 1919, Fiume was forcibly seized by a free-lance Italian expedition under Gabriele D'Annunzio, the ultra-patriotic litterateur, now turned soldier-adventurer. Eventually a settlement was reached by the treaty of Rapallo (November 1920): Fiume became a free neutralized city; a strip of Dalmatian coast extending southward from Istria as far as Fiume, and also the town of Zara, passed to Italy, and the remainder of Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. Still later, in accordance with the supplementary treaty of Rome (January 1924), the main part of Fiume was definitively annexed by Italy, and its chief suburb by Yugoslavia.


Italy and
Yugo-
slavia

Meanwhile a series of treaties was concluded by the Allied Great Powers with national states which had recently been created or much enlarged—Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc. These treaties related to boundaries, to the assumption of the public debts of annexed regions, and to commercial affairs. In most instances, moreover, they guaranteed certain rights and privileges to national, racial, or religious minorities within the several states. In the case of Poland, and in that of Rumania,

Treaties
with
"Minority
Rights"

¹ Greece lost most heavily by the treaty of Lausanne. She was compelled not only to surrender Smyrna, Gallipoli, and eastern Thrace to Turkey, but also to resign to Italy the Greek-speaking Ægean islands known as the Dodecanese. By a remarkable special arrangement between Greece and Turkey, the Christian Greek inhabitants of Asia Minor were transplanted to Greece and the Moslem Turkish residents of Greece were removed to Turkey.

"minority rights" were primarily intended for the benefit of Jews, while in the case of Yugoslavia and in that of Czechoslovakia they were in behalf of Germans and Magyars.¹



SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, 1923

Compare with maps above, pp. 180, 195, and 503.

¹ The chief proponents of the treaty rights of minorities were Jews, who were fearful of losing their identity or being discriminated against in the fiercely nationalistic countries of central Europe; and they gained the interested support of the

In the Peace of Paris and its manifold negotiations and treaties, Russia had no direct part. Indeed, at the very time when the Allies were making peace with Germany, they were encouraging military revolts against the Communist government in Russia.¹ Nevertheless, the Russian Communists gradually got the upper hand in their own country, and the series of separate treaties which they concluded in 1920-1921 with the non-Russian states that had emerged out of the old Russian Empire belonged, logically and chronologically, to the general peace settlement.

Russia
and the
Peace of
Paris

From its advent to power in November 1917 the Communist dictatorship of Russia had proclaimed its intention of abandoning the imperial policies of previous Russian governments and respecting the doctrine of national self-determination, and to this intention it adhered after Germany had been compelled by the Allies to renounce the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and after the peoples in the former western provinces of the Russian Empire had set up provisional governments of their own. Consequently, Russia negotiated treaties in 1920 with Finland, with Estonia, with Latvia (comprising the Letts of Livonia and Courland), and with Lithuania, recognizing the independence of each.

Inde-
pendence
of Baltic
States

Poland, egged on by the Allies, declined for a time to negotiate with the Russian dictatorship and actually made war against it. But when hostilities reached a deadlock, peace negotiations were opened in earnest; and on March 18, 1921, was signed the treaty of Riga. Russia recognized the independence of Poland, and each of the countries pledged itself not to participate in military activities against the other and not to interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the other. There still remained a serious dispute between Poland and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, which the former had taken by force in October 1920. Otherwise, however, the territorial

Russo-
Polish
War, and
Treaty of
1921

British and American governments. The British government had already committed itself, in 1917, to Zionist demands for a "Jewish home land" in Palestine. See below, pp. 775-776. National minorities, other than Jewish, were to share in the new treaty rights, partly because the Jews did not wish to be singled out by name and partly because the Allies felt apologetic about incorporating large numbers of Germans or Magyars with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.

¹ See below, pp. 672-674.

settlement appeared satisfactory both to Russia and to the new national states which had seceded from her. At a congress of their representatives in Warsaw in March 1922, Russia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland agreed to confirm the existing treaties with one another and in future to arbitrate all disputes.

The revolutions of 1918-1920 in central Europe and the international peace treaties of 1919-1923 were two phases of the aftermath of the World War. A third, the emergence of a more nationalistic state-system, we shall next discuss.

3. TRIUMPH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

Nationalism was greatly forwarded by the World War and its aftermath. The doctrine of national self-determination, the doctrine that people who speak a common language and cherish common historic traditions should live under a polity of their own making, was invoked during the World War by Tsarist Russia against the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, by Germany against Russia, by the Allies against the Mid-European Confederacy, and, most enthusiastically of all, by President Wilson. Aroused national sentiment proved a most efficacious stimulant of popular morale in waging the war, and hope of achieving national independence spurred on the various subject peoples in the empires of central and eastern Europe.

Back in 1815 the Congress of Vienna, in its territorial settlement of Europe, had almost wholly ignored the principle of nationality. The principle was then too novel and too closely identified with the vanquished France of the Revolution. By 1919, however, the principle could not be ignored. It had become enshrined in the historic "unifications" of Italy and Germany; and during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth it had been gaining devotees in an ever widening area. The World War began as a despairing effort of the imperial domain of Austria-Hungary to stay the disruptive process which the principle of nationality, as represented by Serbia, was fostering. Indeed, the World War, however much economic imperialism was associated with some of its participants, was basically and strikingly a nationalistic war. It was an extension, on a colossal scale, of the series of nationalistic wars of the third quarter of the nineteenth century. It was an herculean effort to complete or

World
War a
National-
istic War

restore the national unifications of France, Germany, and Italy, and to follow them up with national unifications of Rumanians, Greeks, and the several Slavic and Baltic peoples. In this respect the World War was eminently successful. The Congress of Paris of 1919-1920 recognized the principle of nationality and wrote it into the public law of Europe. At last, the political map of the Continent was radically revised and re-drawn. Big imperial domains and fragmentary nations were wiped out, and in their place appeared an emphatically nationalistic—and novel—state-system.

Followed
by Na-
tionalistic
Peace


Four great imperial domains were dismembered—the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the German Empire. Moreover, certain small states or provinces whose inhabitants comprised but a part of a given nationality lost their historic identity—for example, Montenegro, Croatia, Bohemia, Transylvania, Galicia, Livonia, Courland, Schleswig. From the welding together of disjointed members of the same linguistic nationality and from the partition of multi-national empires, six national states were newly created—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland; six existing national states were enlarged and consolidated—Serbia (Yugoslavia), Rumania, Greece, Italy, France (by recovering Alsace-Lorraine), and Denmark (by obtaining northern Schleswig); and five states which had previously been imperial were compressed within national limits—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Russia. Altogether, where there had been twenty-one sovereign states in 1914, there were twenty-seven in 1920, and almost all the twenty-seven were national.


Destruc-
tion of
Empires

Construc-
tion of
National
States

The Communists in Russia were as ready to recognize the principle of nationality as was the peace congress at Paris. Not only did they consent, as we have seen, to the break-up of the historic Russian Empire and the secession of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, but they acquiesced in the incorporation of Bessarabia with Rumania and they reorganized what remained of the Empire on a federal basis. Much the greater part of it—the part peopled by Great Russians—became the “Russian Soviet Socialist Republic,” with its capital at Moscow. But federated with this Great Russian state, and accorded some degree of cul-

Communist Rus-
sia's Con-
cessions
to Na-
tionalism





tural nationalism and local autonomy, were "Soviet Socialist Republics" for Ukrainians, White Russians, etc.¹

To re-cast the political map of eastern and central Europe on a strictly national basis was extraordinarily difficult. To bring together all Poles, for example, in a single Polish state, involved the inclusion of a considerable number of Germans, as well as Jews. In general, as we know, the new boundaries were drawn by the peacemakers at Paris in such a way as to reward the nations which had favored the Allies in the World War and to penalize those which had opposed them. Thus it befell that whereas the Italians gained all of "Italia irredenta," new "irre-

**New Ir-
redentas
in Europe**

dentas" were created for Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. Sizable German minorities passed under the sway of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Italy; Magyar minorities, under the rule of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; and Bulgarian minorities, under the dominion of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece. And, contrary to the principle of nationality, German Austria was prohibited from uniting with Germany. Besides, the arbitrariness with which frontiers were delimited between some of the Allied national states—for example, between Italy and Yugoslavia, and between Poland and Lithuania—tended to accentuate, rather than to allay, nationalistic rivalry. To the same end operated the compulsion which the Allies exerted on newly founded or enlarged states, such as Poland and Rumania, to get them to accord special rights to national minorities within their respective territories.

Nationalism could not be so aroused in belligerent countries during the World War or so applied to the post-war territorial

**National-
ism in
Belgium**

settlement in eastern and central Europe, without affecting the whole world. In Belgium; the Flemish- or Netherlandish-speaking population grew embittered against their French-speaking countrymen, some going so far as to demand political autonomy or even independence; and after the war, the Belgian government felt obliged to make several significant concessions to the Flemish national movement, such as emphasizing the equality of the Flemish language with French

In Spain

and transforming the University of Ghent into a purely Flemish institution. In Spain, simultaneously, there was a marked recrudescence of autonomous agitation among

¹ See below pp 675-676.

Catalans and Basques. In Iceland, nationalism reached such a threatening stage that Denmark agreed in 1918 to recognize her ancient colony as a sovereign state; henceforth the only bond between Iceland and Denmark was a common king.

In Ireland, too, separatist nationalism produced a veritable revolution. At the beginning of the World War the Irish masses (outside Ulster) had seemed content to follow John Redmond and his parliamentary Nationalist party. But the Home Rule Bill, already passed,¹ was not applied, while, on the other hand, the British government inflicted the direst punishment on the handful of Irishmen who participated in the Easter rebellion of 1916 at Dublin² and likewise proposed to enforce military conscription on all Irishmen. In the circumstances, the relatively mild home-rule nationalism of John Redmond lost popular support in Ireland, and the more uncompromising nationalism of the Sinn Fein party gained ground.

The Sinn Feiners were not at all content with mere home rule; they would have a fully self-governing Ireland. Nor would they await any concessions from the British Parliament at Westminster; they would act independently. They possessed, moreover, several resourceful leaders, including Arthur Griffith,³ the real founder of this new type of Irish nationalism, and, quite as notably, Eamon De Valera and Michael Collins. De Valera, born in New York in 1882 of a Spanish father and an Irish mother, had been educated at Dublin and had developed into a strenuous advocate of national independence for Ireland; he participated in the armed insurrection of 1916, and escaping from a British prison in 1919 he toured the United States and collected funds for the Sinn Fein organization. Collins, born of a peasant family near Cork in 1890, resigned a position in the British civil service at London to join the "Irish Volunteers" and engage in the 1916 rebellion; managing to get out of jail and thereafter to elude arrest, he soon became a guiding spirit of the Sinn Fein movement.

In the general elections to the British Parliament in December 1918, three-fourths of all the Irish constituencies—which formerly had elected Nationalists of the Redmond party—returned

¹ See above, pp. 363-365.

² See above, p. 600.

³ On Griffith and the origins of Sinn Fein, see above, pp. 362-363.

**Sinn Fein
and Its
Leaders**

Sinn Fein candidates. As many of these as were not in jail, acting on the principles enunciated by Griffith, promptly met at Dublin (instead of taking seats in the British Parliament at Westminster), and proclaimed themselves the legal Parliament (or Dail) of the "Irish Republic," with De Valera as president and Griffith as vice-president.

A desperate struggle ensued between the nationalist "Irish Republic," on one hand, and the British government and Ulster Unionists, on the other. There were frequent skirmishes between Republican riflemen and British troops, many assassinations, and much destruction of property. For three years matters went steadily from bad to worse.

In 1920 David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, with Unionist support, attempted to solve the problem by putting through the British Parliament a new Home Rule Act, providing for two separate and partially autonomous governments in Ireland, one for the six counties in Ulster and the other for the twenty-six counties in the rest of the country. The Unionists in Ulster accepted the Act as a satisfactory compromise and accordingly instituted at Belfast a local government of their own, the government of "Northern Ireland." But the Act was bitterly opposed by the Republicans of the south, as sanctioning the division of Ireland and as conferring little power on the proposed Irish Parliament at Dublin.

Finally, when no other solution seemed possible, Lloyd George invited the "Irish Republic" to send delegates to London to negotiate terms of peace with Great Britain. The outcome was the treaty of London, signed in December 1921, which provided for the establishment of an "Irish Free State" as a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, similar in status to Canada; Ulster could join the Free State if it so determined by plebiscite, or it might continue under the separate government provided by the Home Rule Act of 1920. The treaty was speedily ratified by the British Parliament, and, despite the impassioned opposition of De Valera, by the Irish Dail also. Of the new Irish Free State Griffith became provisional president and Collins prime minister.

The Irish Free State began its career in most difficult circumstances. Ulster voted to stay out. Republican followers of De Valera terrorized southern Ireland. Griffith soon died, and Collins

was assassinated. Nevertheless, the "provisional government," guided by Collins's successor, William Cosgrave, slowly but surely gained strength and stability. The British military forces duly evacuated Ireland. A working agreement was reached between the Free State and the Government of Northern Ireland. A democratic constitution was adopted by the Dail and ratified by the British Parliament. The greater part of Ireland, under the inspiration of Sinn Fein nationalism, had thus definitely joined Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa as a self-governing Dominion.

The triumph of nationalism in Ireland synchronized with special manifestations of nationalism in other parts of the British Empire. Each of the self-governing Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—experienced special pride in its military exploits during the World War, faith in its increasing importance in the future, and determination to have its voice heard in the councils of the world, not indirectly through London, but directly from its own national capital. Each of these Dominions signed the peace treaties of Paris as a sovereign Power, and each was admitted to separate membership in the League of Nations. Three of them—South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—acquired individual "mandates" for German colonies.

National-
ism in
British
Domin-
ions

The nationalism implicit in these developments was affirmed as a principle in the so-called "Balfour Report," which was adopted by an Imperial Conference of the statesmen of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions in 1926: "They [Great Britain and the several Dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It remained to have this principle enacted into imperial law, and this was accomplished in December 1931, with the passage of the "Statute of Westminster" by the British Parliament.

Balfour
Report,
and
Statute of
West-
minster

The Statute recognized the legal equality of the Dominions with the mother-country and their practical independence of one another. It provided that no law of the British Parliament might be applied to any Dominion without the latter's express consent,

that no law of a Dominion parliament might be "disallowed" by the British government, and that no alteration in the laws concerning the royal succession or titles might be made without the assent of all the Dominion parliaments as well as the British. Implicitly, at least, each Dominion was to be free to direct its foreign affairs as it would. Thereby, an important part of the British Empire—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and likewise the Irish Free State—was legally transformed into a merely sentimental alliance of independent nations, officially styled the "British Commonwealth of Nations."

Rising nationalism was indeed a characteristic and almost universal phenomenon of the post-war years. It manifested itself, among all the victorious European Powers and in the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire, and likewise throughout Asia and Africa, and most intensely, as time would show, in that country which had suffered the most humiliating defeat and loss of prestige—Germany. Particular features of the peace-settlement of 1919-1920 and other consequences of the World War would shortly be altered or mitigated, but the nationalism which both the war and the peace had quickened would be an enduring and very troublesome legacy. To it we must repeatedly refer in the remaining pages of this book.¹

4. TEMPORARY VOGUE OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICANISM

The immediate aftermath of the World War seemed to confirm Woodrow Wilson's contention that the war had been waged "to make the world safe for democracy." For, with the exception of Russia, where the Tsarist régime was supplanted by a Communist dictatorship,² all the Great Powers and most of the lesser ones adopted or elaborated democratic forms of government. And with the extension of democracy was associated a vogue of republicanism.

In 1914, six of the Great Powers were monarchical. In 1919, only three remained such, and these three—Great Britain, Italy,

¹ On post-war nationalism in general, see below, pp. 767-795, and on its aggressive and totalitarian developments in Europe, especially in Italy and Germany, see below, pp. 686-696, 710-734.

² See above, pp. 607-608, 611-613, and below, pp. 669-686.

and Japan—had reconsecrated their political institutions by military victory. The three most famous European dynasties—the Habsburg, the Romanov, and the Hohenzollern—had ceased to reign, and lesser princely families had been expelled from the several German states. All the newly created states of central Europe were republics—Poland and Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Finland. Not only were the American continents almost wholly republican, but Europe was now predominantly so, and even in Asia the vast and populous country of China was at least nominally republican, while from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire was rising a Turkish Republic.

Advance
of Repub-
licanism

Moreover, democracy seemed triumphant. Thoroughly democratic constitutions were evolved by popularly elected assemblies in the revolutionized Central Empires and in the newly founded or newly unified states of central and eastern Europe. The German constitution, adopted by the Weimar Assembly in 1919, retained the federal organization of the German Empire while lessening the powers of the several states and broadening those of the central government. For the exercise of the latter, it entrusted authority jointly to the Reichstag, representing the people, and to a Reichsrat, representing the states, and executive authority to a president, elected by the people for seven years, and to a chancellor and his associate ministers, responsible to the Reichstag. The suffrage was accorded to all German citizens, male and female, over twenty years of age; a detailed bill of rights was included; and provision was made for the initiative, referendum, and recall, and for proportional and professional representation. Contemporaneous changes in the state constitutions of Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, and all the others guaranteed the democratic character of the whole German Republic.

Advance
of Democ-
racy

In Ger-
many

The Austrian constitution of 1920 established a federal republic of eight diminutive states, with a legislature similar to Germany's, and an executive like the French—a titular president elected by the legislature (for four years instead of seven, however) and a directing ministry responsible to the legislature. The Czechoslovak constitution of 1920 and the Polish constitution of 1921 were alike modelled on that of the French Republic. Each provided for a

In Austria
and
Czecho-
slovakia

bicameral parliament—a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies—which should choose the president, enact the laws, and control the ministry. Both constitutions—and the Austrian likewise—were more democratic than the French, in that they enfranchised women as well as men.

Yugoslavia and Rumania retained the institution of monarchy, but adopted constitutions, the one in 1921 and the other in 1923, which resembled the democratic constitution of the Italian kingdom. Both guaranteed individual liberties, parliamentary government, and ministerial responsibility. Both, despite provincial opposition, affirmed the unitary, rather than the federal, character of the state, and provided for local administration under prefects appointed by the central government. Both granted universal manhood suffrage.

Simultaneously, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted constitutions at once republican and democratic. Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland, though remaining nominally monarchical, removed all property qualifications for the exercise of the suffrage and enfranchised women.

In Great Britain, the earlier electoral reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1884-1885¹ were consolidated and supplemented by an important democratic Act of 1918, enfranchising all men who were over twenty years of age and had maintained a residence or place of business for six months, and all women who were over twenty-nine years of age and had owned or tenanted premises for six months or were married to men who owned or tenanted premises. Voting in a general election would take place on one and the same day. No person could vote in more than two constituencies. Parliamentary seats were redistributed so that each would represent approximately 70,000 of the population. Subsequently, in 1928, the British Parliament took an additional step toward the democratic goal and granted the suffrage to women as freely as to men.

Meanwhile, the constitution of Northern Ireland, embodied in an act of the British Parliament of 1920, conformed in democratic tenor with the British reform of 1918, while the constitution of the Irish Free State, as adopted in 1923, went farther. It enfranchised all citizens over twenty years of age and elaborated a system of proportional representation.

¹ See above, pp. 53-54, 199-200.

In Belgium, an electoral reform of 1919 abolished the existing system of plural voting and substituted for it the system of one-man-one-vote, and a further reform of 1921 partially enfranchised women. In the Dutch Netherlands, democratic government was attained in 1917 by the extension of the suffrage to all men and women and the establishment of proportional representation.

In Bel-
gium and
Holland

In general it may be said of all the newer constitutions and electoral reforms of the years from 1917 to 1923 that special emphasis was put on representative, democratic government, on ministerial responsibility, and on guaranties of individual liberty. In most of the changes, the enfranchisement of women stood out conspicuously; it seemed an appropriate recognition of the significant rôle which women had played in the World War and were playing in industrialized society, as well as a logical application of the principle of political democracy. Full suffrage was accorded to women, on the same basis as to men, in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic and Scandinavian states, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Great Britain, and the Irish Free State. In the United States, moreover, a constitutional amendment providing for universal woman suffrage was approved by the Congress, ratified by the federated states, and formally proclaimed in 1920. Japan, too, felt the surge of the democratic movement in Europe and America; she did not enfranchise women, but in 1925 she put an end to property qualifications and extended the parliamentary suffrage equally to all adult male citizens.

Woman
Suffrage

Demo-
cratic
Reform in
Japan

All this radical democratizing of political institutions was hailed as a world-wide fruition of the seed which had been planted in France and the United States in the eighteenth century, which had germinated and sprouted in western and central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, which in the first decade of the twentieth, on the eve of the World War, had pushed its shoots upward through the unpromising soil of the Russian, Ottoman, and Chinese Empires, and which now, in the aftermath of the World War, seemed unmistakably to assure to the whole world a common type of political aspiration and achievement. The world, it was boasted, was at last safe for democracy, and politi-

Seeming
Final
Triumph
of Democ-
racy

cal democracy would amply justify itself in its rapid amelioration of social conditions and international relations. There was still, during the immediate aftermath of the World War, a remarkable note of optimism in European thought and word.

Yet the seemingly all-but-universal triumph of democracy came at the moment when international relations were embittered by the World War and the Peace of Paris, when the gravest problems of economic reconstruction were confronting statesmen and peoples, and when nationalism, rather than democracy, was commanding the deepest affections of the masses of mankind.

In the circumstances, the triumph of democracy, at least of the traditionally liberal type, was more apparent than real. It proved but a passing phase of the immediate aftermath of the war. Already, in fact, it was menaced by the rise of Communist dictatorship in Russia and by vigorous widespread agitation for like dictatorship elsewhere. Presently, it would be menaced and largely undone by forceful establishment of a startling array of other dictatorships.

To understand such an outcome, we must bear in mind that the post-war years were characterized not only by democratic experimentation and an intensified nationalism, but also by a most distressing economic instability. The nature of this instability and some of its significant aspects, we shall now discuss, leaving to another chapter the treatment of the several dictatorships which eventuated.

5. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The economic situation in Europe during the post-war years was extremely difficult. The war had been terribly expensive and destructive, and its conclusion was attended by grievous handicaps to economic and social reconstruction. The governments of the several belligerent nations found themselves saddled with huge war debts, and, in addition, with extraordinary obligations for the rehabilitation of wounded men and devastated areas. Then, too, the demobilization of the gigantic armies, the release of millions of men from trench and camp and their return to rural field or urban factory glutted the labor market at the very time when the special de-

NOTE. The picture opposite, suggestive of "post-war leisure," is from a painting by a French "modernist," Théophile Robert (born 1879).

mand of the preceding years for munitions and foodstuffs sharply declined. Furthermore, the scrapping of numerous war industries involved a stoppage of the abnormal profits and wages which had been accruing therefrom to capitalists and workingmen respectively; and the prospect of reaping comparable returns from the resumption of ordinary industrial and commercial enterprise was dimmed alike by renewal and intensification of international competition and by sharp diminution of the purchasing power of the general public. Besides, the intense nationalism which was developed by the war and the peace settlement militated against normal economic recovery, for this nationalism, being economic as well as political, led not only to an increase in the number of states in Europe but also to the adoption by each of high protective tariffs which seriously checked international trade and hence domestic production.

**Economic
National-
ism**

Immensely aggravating the situation was the expectation of the victorious European nations that reparation payments could and would be made by Germany (and the other vanquished countries) sufficient in amount to cover their own expenditures on reconstruction of devastated areas and rehabilitation of soldiers and also to enable them to discharge the debts which they owed to one another and most largely to the United States.¹ Germany and her confederates were compelled by the peace treaties, as we know, to promise large reparation payments, and through subsequent negotiations the European Allies agreed to a schedule of debt payments to the United States. But it was one thing to promise and quite another thing to keep the promises.

**Repara-
tions and
Inter-
Allied
Debts**

Relatively little in the way of reparations was actually forthcoming from Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria. These states were so reduced in area and resources, and so hemmed in by tariff barriers which their neighbors erected against them, that, if they were to escape internal bankruptcy, they would have to receive, rather than give, financial assistance abroad. Bulgaria was a

¹ These so-called "inter-allied debts" included large loans which Great Britain made to her Continental Allies during the first three years of the World War and still larger loans which the United States made to Great Britain, France, and Italy (and other Allies) during the last year of the war and just after the armistice. The American loans totalled over eleven billion dollars.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "From an Office Window," is from a post-war painting by a British "modernist," C. R. W. Nevinson (born 1889).

very poor country anyway, and Austria and Hungary were no longer the hubs of an extensive and fairly prosperous imperial domain. Hungary was now a petty agricultural country without ports or markets, while Austria lacked means of sustaining her overgrown urban population at Vienna. Very soon the finances of both Austria and Hungary were so wrecked by inflation that the League of Nations felt obliged to arrange for foreign loans to them.

**Insolv-
ency of
Austria,
Hungary**

In the case of Germany, from which the creditor nations naturally expected most, the payment of reparations involved manifold difficulties. The German people were not minded to pay reparations at all. They felt that the promise to pay had been extorted from them under duress and they resented its coupling with the allegation that they were "guilty" of the war. They and their government would pay only what they were compelled to pay. And in compelling Germany to pay, the Reparations Commission which represented the several creditor nations had its hands full.

**Problem
of Making
Germany
Pay**

The Allies—and the Reparations Commission—took the stand immediately after the war that Germany must be made to pay the most that she could pay, and yet nobody knew just how much that might be; the estimates of economists were far more modest than those of statesmen, especially of French statesmen. No precise amount had been fixed by the peace treaty, and the resulting uncertainty was troublesome and exasperating. It sharpened the rivalry among the Allies for preferential treatment of their respective claims, and at the same time it retarded Germany's economic recovery and lessened her ability to pay. In 1920, after much haggling, the Allies agreed, at an international conference at Spa, upon a percentage division of whatever reparation payments Germany could be compelled to make.¹ Then, in 1921, after more haggling, the Reparations Commission fixed the total German indemnity at thirty-two billion dollars.

There remained no little doubt as to whether Germany really could pay this staggering sum, and no little perplexity as to how she would pay it if she could. It was argued at first that she would pay a considerable part of it in kind, that is, by giving her creditors coal, locomotives, textile machinery, and other products of

¹ According to the agreement at Spa, France would have 52 per cent, Great Britain 22, Italy 10, Belgium 8, and the others 8.

her mines and factories; and in fact she did make some payments in kind. The more she thus paid, however, the louder grew the complaints in Allied countries that they were being deprived of markets for their own goods; and presently the Allied governments called a halt on payments in kind from Germany.

Money payments were supposed to constitute the major part of the indemnity, but they could be made by Germany only if she enjoyed a favorable balance of trade, that is, if her exports exceeded her imports. But this condition was very difficult of attainment. Russia, which had formerly provided a valuable market for German manufactures, was now in chaos and virtually closed to economic penetration from the outside world. Germany no longer possessed overseas colonies or "spheres of influence" where her goods might receive preferential treatment. Moreover, neighboring Poland was entering into economic competition with Germany, levying high tariffs against German imports and diverting her own exports from customary German routes to a newly established route across the Polish "corridor." For a brief time, such handicaps to German enterprise were partially offset by currency inflation, which artificially stimulated Germany's production and enabled her to undersell her chief competitors—Britain, France, and the United States—even in their home markets. But these countries soon erected additional tariff walls against the flood of "cheap" German goods, while within Germany inflation reached such a stage that the currency became practically worthless.

Already, in the latter part of 1922, Germany had declared her inability to meet her financial obligations to the Allies and had requested a two-year moratorium. The British government, anxious to expedite the resumption of normal commercial relationships, gave favorable ear to the request, but the French government, then presided over by Raymond Poincaré, resolved to apply force. Wherefore, in January 1923, a French army crossed the Rhine and took possession of the rich mining region of the Ruhr, the very nerve-centre of Germany's industrial life. The event proved sorry for all concerned. The Germans, outraged by the hostile incursion and yet unable to oppose it by force of arms, were welded together in patriotic fervor and in stubborn determination to pursue a policy of passive resistance

German
Default
and
French
Occupation
of
Ruhr,
1923

to French demands, even if such a policy meant the economic ruin of their own country. The French, on the other hand, were scandalized by the general strike which almost completely paralyzed industry in the Ruhr and indicated Germany's purpose to prevent the collection of reparations, and they were still more scandalized by the eventual discovery that their expedition into the Ruhr cost them more money than they got out of it. By the autumn of 1923, it was obvious, even to the French, that Germany's economic life was in dissolution and that the reparation arrangements would have to be revised.

In 1924, therefore, as a result of international negotiations and of deliberations by a commission of economic experts headed by an American banker, Charles Dawes, new arrangements were agreed to by the Allies on one side and by Germany on the other. There was no change in the total amount of the German indemnity, but it was made payable over a long period of time in annual installments and in accordance with special regulations to be administered by a neutral "agent-general for reparation payments." Simultaneously Germany cancelled her inflated currency and, at great cost to a large part of her population, restored the pre-war mark and instituted new taxes, while France withdrew her armed forces from the Ruhr and awaited the flow of money from Germany.

For a time the "Dawes Plan" gave promise of working well. German industry quickened, and reparation payments were made promptly. But the plan was admittedly only a temporary expedient, and there were serious flaws in it.

**Dawes
Plan, 1924**

Germans were impatient with the close regulation of their domestic affairs by foreigners, a regulation which threatened to be interminable, and they insisted that the total amount of the indemnity was beyond all reason and must be pared down. With this latter contention there was considerable sympathy in most Allied countries, especially in Great Britain and the United States, but all the European Allies and particularly France were anxious to couple with any reduction of the debt which Germany owed them a corresponding reduction of the debts which they owed to the United States. In the United States, however, the government and the weight of public opinion opposed any cancellation of the inter-allied debts and supported a tariff protectionism which further handicapped the debtor nations.

In 1929 a second commission of economic experts, under the chairmanship of another American financier, Owen Young, met at Paris and recommended a radical revision of the "Dawes Plan" of reparation payments. The total amount of such payments would be reduced by three-fourths—from thirty-two billion dollars to eight billion—and the payments would be made by Germany during a term of fifty-eight years without direct foreign supervision. These recommendations, together with a provision for complete and immediate Allied evacuation of the Rhineland, were embodied in an international agreement signed at The Hague early in 1930.

Young
Plan, 1929

By this time, however, a world-wide economic depression of the most serious kind had set in, and German national sentiment was solidly inimical to further payment of reparations. In 1931, the creditors of Germany felt obliged to grant her a moratorium, and in 1932, through an international conference at Lausanne, they finally expressed their willingness to fix the remaining German indemnity at the modest figure of 700 million dollars if the United States would agree to a corresponding slashing of the inter-allied debts. The United States would not agree, but in the industrial paralysis of the time the Allies ceased paying anything to the United States or receiving anything from Germany. Practically, both reparations and inter-allied debts were thus wiped off the slate of international accounting, but only after they had grievously impaired the economic stability of the world.

Collapse
of Repara-
tions and
Inter-
Allied
Debts

Complicating the situation was the continuing heavy expenditure of most governments not only on industrial and agricultural reconstruction but also on armaments. Instability and uncertainty in national finance combined with fierce and distrustful nationalism to foster governmental fear and popular alarm in respect of foreign nations and hence to sustain and even intensify the international rivalry in armaments. Naval rivalry was accentuated between the United States and Japan, between the United States and Great Britain, and likewise between France and Italy. Moreover, big armies were maintained by France and Italy, and relatively big ones were built up by the newly created or unified states of central and eastern Europe. Even in Germany, where, in accordance with the treaty of Versailles, the regular army was

Heavy
Expendi-
ture on
Arma-
ments

greatly restricted, a rapidly growing number of men received military training in national militia or in semi-private organizations. All this cost money. And the cost, in turn, contributed still more to economic instability within nations as well as to ill-feeling among nations. It was all a vicious circle.

Certain social consequences of the general economic developments of the post-war decade should be remarked. The traditional titled aristocracy, as a class, suffered serious losses. Throughout eastern Europe, they were shorn of much of their landed wealth and political influence. In Russia they were dispossessed altogether of their property and either put to death or driven into more or less penurious exile. In Germany and Austria they were stripped of special privileges and largely supplanted in public office by commoners. In Rumania, Poland, and other states of east-central Europe, they bowed to the threat of popular revolution and acquiesced in a series of land-reforms which transferred large portions of their ancestral estates into peasant farms.

The peasantry, speaking generally, profited—at any rate temporarily. The war increased the demand for farm products, and the economic instability succeeding the war proved less disturbing to agriculture than to manufacturing. In particular, the depreciated currency of most European countries enabled peasants to pay off mortgages on their holdings at the very time when in several countries new land legislation was enabling them to add to their holdings. For some years after the war it seemed as though the greater part of continental Europe was undergoing a social transformation in the direction of peasant proprietorship of land and as though the newly emancipated farmers, by means of coöperative enterprise, would make significant contributions to the stability and conservatism of European society and perhaps in the long run to the orderly economic reconstruction of the world. Yet there were many gradations in European “peasantry.” Some peasants were mere agricultural laborers without land of their own and utterly dependent on a highly disorganized and uncertain labor market. Others had holdings too small to be of profit to themselves under the most auspicious circumstances. Those who were the best off were handicapped by increasing burdens of taxation, direct or in-

European
Social
Classes in
Post-War
Era:
Landed
Aristoc-
racy

Peasantry

direct, and by decreasing stability in finance, trade, and industry.

Among the middle classes—or bourgeoisie—a distinction must be made. A group of financiers and investors, together with captains of certain key industries—collectively the *haute bourgeoisie*—amassed handsome personal fortunes, in part from war-time “profiteering” and in part from post-war speculation. On the other hand, the lower middle class—professional men and salaried employes and many shopkeepers—suffered greatly from the general economic instability and especially, just after the war, from depreciated currency and resulting inflation. In Germany, inflation reached such an extreme in 1923 as to render valueless the bonds which had been issued during the war and which were held principally by the middle-class. In France, inflation was not quite so drastic in effect, but it sufficed by 1926 to reduce by four-fifths the principal and income of domestic stocks and bonds. And Russia’s repudiation of all her foreign indebtedness added to the difficulties. Altogether, throughout the greater part of continental Europe, the lower middle class saw its savings wiped out and its pensions and insurance reduced to zero. The economic instability of this class promoted its political instability and tended to make the class as a whole impatient with democratic government and receptive to dictatorship.

Post-war developments were beneficial to some of the industrial proletariat and injurious to others. In Russia the entire class was peculiarly favored by the Communist revolution; its major efforts were directed in their behalf. In Germany, at least for a time, the artificial stimulation of industrial enterprise by reparation payment and inflation assured full employment to urban workers, while Socialist participation in the country’s government guaranteed the maintenance of favorable labor-legislation. In France and Belgium, too, the rebuilding of devastated areas provided gainful employment for workingmen. On the other hand, the unsettled conditions in commerce and manufacturing reacted unfavorably upon workingmen almost everywhere. Feverish activity quickly alternated with depression and unemployment, and increase of wages hardly kept pace with increasing cost of living. In Austria, the peace treaties deprived industrialized Vienna of usual markets, with terrible economic consequences to proletariat as well as to bour-

Bour-
geoisie

Industrial
Prole-
tariat

geoisie. In Italy, proletarian distress was evidenced immediately after the war by an epidemic of strikes and a contagion of Communist agitation. In Great Britain, an army of unemployed men, aggregating two million in 1921, was being supported by government doles and public taxation.

Economic instability, with its fateful effects on the traditional social classes of Europe, made for political instability. The democratic governments which had been strengthened or newly established in 1919-1920, when relief from the bloodletting of the World War brought on a brief reign of optimism, encountered a rising tide of criticism and popular disfavor as the stern realities of economic reconstruction gave rise to a new sense of pessimism.

In the circumstances, Marxian socialism appeared to numerous Europeans to promise the most practical way of escape. It had been growing and spreading its influence before the war. It had taken possession of Russia during the war. It now had larger followings than ever before in Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Great Britain. It might soon, some hoped and others feared, replace everywhere merely democratic governments with socialist governments. Yet, Marxian socialism after the World War was no longer the single well-knit international movement which it had been before the war.

One large fraction of Socialists was now thoroughly committed to "reformist" tactics—emphasis on political democracy and the evolutionary character of social change, willingness to collaborate with bourgeois reformers, and recognition of the special claims of national patriotism. The other large fraction was now quite devoted to "direct-action" (or syndicalist) tactics—revolutionary seizure of power by industrial workers, forceful socialization of industry through a "proletarian dictatorship," uncompromising opposition to the bourgeoisie, and minimizing of political (though not necessarily cultural) nationalism.¹ The former comprised the "regular" majority parties of Social Democrats in most countries of central and western Europe. These had much to do with guiding the democratic revolutions of 1919-1920 and with operating the resultant governments, and for mutual coöperation in forwarding

¹ On differences between right-wing "Reformists" and left-wing "Syndicalists" before the World War, see above, pp. 272-274.

their program of radical but hardly revolutionary social reform they reconstituted the international organization—the “Second International”—which the war had disrupted. The “direct-action” Socialists, on the other hand, comprised the successfully revolutionary (Bolshevik or Communist) party in Russia and imitative minority parties which sprang up in other countries and took the title of Communist to distinguish themselves from the “Social Democrats.” In 1919 they formed at Moscow a world organization of their own, in open rivalry with the “Second International,” and known therefore as the “Third (or Communist) International.”

Social
Demo-
crats vs.
Communi-
sts


Rival efforts of “Communists” and “Social Democrats” to capture the urban proletariat were attended by mutual recriminations. Communists accused Social Democrats of condoning the exploitation of the masses. Social Democrats accused Communists of sabotaging efforts at general amelioration. There was undoubtedly a drift after 1920, wherever economic instability was most pronounced, from Social Democracy to Communism.

Nevertheless, it was not Marxian Communism which eventually, outside Russia, made for dictatorship. Rather, it was nationalism, which gathered together under its banners critics of democracy, foes of Marxism, and victims of economic insecurity. How actually the advance of political democracy was halted and turned back by the development of nationalist dictatorships in central Europe, as well as of Communist dictatorship in Russia, we shall discuss in the following chapter.



CHAPTER XXVI

DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS



EUROPE, at the close of the World War, seemed to be committed to political democracy. Twenty years afterwards, the situation was obviously different.

Democratic government, to be sure, still subsisted in a fringe of countries on the Atlantic seaboard—Great Britain, France, Scandinavia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. It was still flourishing in Switzerland and overseas in the United States and the British Dominions. But most of central and eastern Europe, and much of the outside world had already repudiated liberal democracy in favor of some novel kind of dictatorship. In Russia and the lands attached to her, the dictatorship was Communist. In Italy, Germany, and the lesser countries of central Europe, and likewise in Turkey, Persia, and Japan, the dictatorship was Nationalist.

In some quarters, the rapid rise and spread of dictatorship was interpreted as a temporary result of economic crisis and social unrest following the World War, a result which would gradually pass with the inevitable return to "normalcy." In other quarters it was interpreted as a "realistic" demand for the accomplishment of reforms which "romantic" democracy had proved itself unable to achieve, and therefore as ushering in a new and enduring kind of political action. Without endorsing either interpretation, let us survey European politics during the post-war period, treating of the new dictatorships, the surviving democracies, and the waverings, in certain countries, between the two.

The first of the dictatorships in point of time, and the one which has gone farthest in socialist experimentation is the Russian "dictatorship of the proletariat." To it we devote the first section of the present chapter.

I. COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN RUSSIA

From March to November 1917, Russia was presided over, as we have elsewhere explained,¹ by a revolutionary "provisional government," desirous of establishing political democracy as well as of prosecuting the World War, but quite unable to agree upon any effective program of internal social reform. Indeed, by November 1917 this provisional government was so divided in its counsels, so uncertain as to what it should or could do, and so devoid of any large popular support that it was at the mercy of a mere handful of resolute persons well organized and fearlessly led. Which explains why it was then actually overthrown by the Bolshevik faction of Marxian Socialists.²

Marxian Socialists comprised a very small part of the vast Russian population, and of that part the Bolshevik faction was hardly a half.³ Yet what the Bolsheviks lacked in numbers they compensated for in leadership, in definiteness of purpose, and in tactical resourcefulness.

**Bolshevik
Leaders**

The outstanding leader of the Bolsheviks was Vladimir Ulyanov (1870-1924), popularly known by his pen-name of N. Lenin. He belonged to a middle-class family, and as a law student at the University of Kazan he had become an ardent disciple of Karl Marx—a discipleship in which he was confirmed by the execution of his older brother for complicity in a plot against the Tsar Alexander III (1891). In 1894, the year of the accession of the Tsar Nicholas II, young Ulyanov—or Lenin—undertook Marxian propaganda in St. Petersburg, for which he was imprisoned and then exiled for three years to Siberia. This exile he utilized to write a book on Russian capitalism, which subsequently attracted considerable attention in Socialist circles. From 1900 to 1917 Lenin made his headquarters in Switzerland, with the exception of the two years (1905-1907) when revolutionary disturbances in Russia invited and enabled him to return home. Wherever he was, he directed a tireless agitation in behalf of Marxian socialism and (after 1903) of its Bolshevik wing. Lenin was undersized, with a wide forehead and piercing eyes. He had great driving force, and, with an iron will

Lenin

¹ See above, pp. 607-608.

² See above, pp. 611-613.

³ On the two factions of Marxian Socialists in Russia before 1917—the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks—and on the rival "Social Revolutionaries," see above, p. 479.

and a fanaticism about the ends he sought, he combined a keen sense of political expediency. It was this man who returned finally to Russia in April 1917 and who, by converting the St. Petersburg "soviet of workers and soldiers" to his views, managed to precipitate the revolution of November 1917 and to inaugurate a dictatorship of his own.

Lenin had several capable lieutenants, of whom two merit special mention. Levi Bronstein (or Leon Trotsky as he called himself) was a flaming person who came of a middle-class Jewish family and was educated at the University of Odessa. Arrested as a revolutionary and exiled to Siberia, he had escaped in 1902 to western Europe where he made the acquaintance of Lenin, though he then sympathized more with the Menshevik Socialists than with the Bolsheviks. Trotsky returned to Russia in 1905 and took an active part in the St. Petersburg soviet of that period. Then, after a second arrest and exile to Siberia, he escaped again and led a roving existence. From Paris he was expelled for pacifist agitation in 1916, and from New York, where he briefly found refuge, he sailed in March 1917 for Russia, arriving at St. Petersburg shortly after Lenin. Here, during the ensuing summer, he definitely cast his lot with the Bolsheviks and played a rôle hardly second to Lenin's in preparing the way for the November revolution.

Joseph Stalin, the son of a Georgian peasant shoemaker in the Caucasus, was no such theorist as the middle-class Trotsky or Lenin, but he was a sturdy and persistent propagandist of the latter's doctrines. Dismissed from an Orthodox seminary in 1896, when he was seventeen years of age, for "unreliability and lack of religious vocation," he joined the extremist Socialist group, and thenceforth until 1917 he waged implacable warfare with the Tsarist régime, suffering frequent arrests, imprisonments, and Siberian exiles, but never seeking escape abroad and always fomenting Bolshevik agitation within Russia.

Lenin's party of professed Bolsheviks was small when he seized power in November 1917, but his program was calculated to enlist popular support. He proclaimed that his dictatorship was a "dictatorship of the proletariat," including workers, peasants, and soldiers; and upon each of these numerous classes he proposed to confer immediate benefits. In behalf of the industrial workers, he decreed the con-

Trotsky

Stalin

Bolshevik
Program,
1917-1918

fiscation of private factories and their transformation into government institutions, with shop committees of workers in control of production, purchase, and sale. In behalf of the peasants, he decreed the expropriation of landlords and the nationalization of the land, with peasant-communities in charge of its partition and use. In behalf of the war-weary soldiers, he took Russia out of the World War and concluded with the Central Powers the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918).¹ He also issued, in November 1917, a "Declaration of the Rights of Peoples," recognizing the principle of cultural nationalism and promising to accord to subject peoples in Russia the right of national self-determination.

This program appealed to numerous soviets which had been set up all over Russia during 1917, and through them Lenin extended Bolshevik sway beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow to the country at large. At first there was a good deal of opposition, not merely from habitual supporters of the Tsardom—bureaucrats, army officers, nobles, and Orthodox clergymen—but also from many Constitutional Democrats ("Cadets") among the bourgeoisie and from the radical parties of Social Revolutionaries and Menshevik Socialists. Indeed, anti-Bolsheviks obtained a majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly which had been provided for in 1917 (prior to Lenin's seizure of power),² and which met at Moscow in January 1918. The Bolshevik central government, however, denounced the democratically elected Assembly as an agency of "reaction," and Bolshevik soldiers broke it up, while Bolshevik soviets throughout the country, representing at the time only a minority of the population, albeit a determined minority, terrorized the majority.

The Bolsheviks were resolved to achieve a thorough social revolution, and against "reaction" of any sort they struck hard. "Direct action" was employed against recalcitrant nobles and capitalists and against army officers and bureaucrats of the old régime; such as could not flee were put to death. Energetic measures were taken, in accordance with a decree of January 1918, to disestablish the Orthodox Church in Russia and to silence all Christian clergymen. In July 1918 the Tsar Nicholas II, his wife, and children, who had been held under guard at Ekaterinburg (near the Urals), were slaugh-

Rejection
of Demo-
cratic
Assembly,
1918

Execution
of Tsar,
1918

¹ See above, p. 613.

² See above, p. 608.

tered by order of the local soviet. And against all dissident political groups, even that of the Menshevik Socialists, Bolshevik soldiers and revolutionary tribunals conducted a veritable reign of terror. A considerable part of the opposition was won over, or at any rate was frightened into passivity, but thousands were killed and other thousands escaped death only by flight abroad.

The terrorism was aggravated by the hostility with which most of the outside world viewed the Bolshevik dictatorship in Russia.

German Interference, 1918 During and immediately after the negotiations for the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), the Germans interfered most actively in Russia. Their purpose was to strengthen their own military position and to prevent the spread of Communism in central Europe. They extracted from the Bolshevik government a formal promise not to countenance subversive propaganda in the Central Powers. They encouraged leaders of the "liberated" border countries to set up anti-Bolshevik governments quite free of Russia and dependent on Germany. Not until the final military collapse of the Central Powers in November 1918 were the Russian Bolsheviks relieved of the menace of German intervention.

But already the Allies were intervening. Statesmen and leading citizens of France, Great Britain, Japan, and the United

Allied Intervention, 1918-1919 States were infuriated by the actions of the Bolshevik dictatorship in withdrawing from the war, in making a separate peace, in repudiating Russia's foreign debts, and in preaching a world-wide social revolution. Allied

intervention in Russia began in March 1918 as a war measure against Germany. Refusing to acknowledge the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Allies declined to recognize the government which agreed to it, and enforced an economic blockade against Russia. Moreover, they landed "expeditionary forces" at Murmansk, the single ice-free port of Russia on the Arctic Ocean, at Vladivostok in eastern Siberia, and at Odessa on the Black Sea.

Under protection of the Allied expeditions, various Russian generals of the old régime collected against the "red" armies of the Bolsheviks several "white" armies of the opposition and precipitated civil war within Russia. Thus Allied intervention, beginning as a war measure against Germany, speedily assumed the character of a domestic and

Domestic Revolt

foreign crusade of the forces of capitalism (and perhaps democracy) against the forces of socialism (and revolutionary dictatorship). For a time, toward the close of 1918 and throughout 1919, it seemed as if Lenin's government would be unable to cope with foreign intervention and domestic revolt. Allied troops, reënforced by Russian malcontents, captured Archangel in the north, occupied the Crimean peninsula in the south, and overran the greater part of Siberia from the east. From the Crimea, General Denikin, perhaps the ablest of the anti-Bolshevik leaders, advanced in the direction of Moscow; while at Omsk, in western Siberia, members of the dissolved Constituent Assembly set up an anti-Bolshevik government as the legal successor to Kerensky's "provisional government" of 1917, and this was supported by forces under the command of Admiral Kolchak.

Gradually, however, the Bolsheviks got the upper hand. They were favored by the personal ambition and rivalry of the opposing generals and by the chronic dissensions between such of their followers as advocated the establishment of a democratic republic and such as wanted a restoration of the Tsardom. There was no like uncertainty among the Bolsheviks as to what they expected to do, and with singleness of purpose they combined a fanaticism, a ruthlessness, and withal an adroitness of popular appeal and an adeptness at military organization which were of inestimable advantage to them. Leon Trotsky, as Lenin's Commissar of War, proved himself the man of the hour. He enflamed the masses of Russian peasants and workers with hatred of the "whites" as agents of "reaction," and though the "red" soldiers whom he rallied to the defense of the Bolshevik dictatorship were often ragged and poorly armed, they were much more numerous by the end of 1919, and far more enthusiastic, than their foes.

The Bolsheviks were also favored by the fact that foreign governments, no matter how much they might detest Lenin's Socialist régime, were in no position at the close of the World War to conduct extensive military operations in Russia. Germany certainly was impotent. France, which had most at stake in the way of financial investments, was too war-weary and too occupied with penalizing Germany to undertake forceful debt collection in Russia. Great Britain was restrained by a multiplicity of other imperial concerns and by the

**Bolshevik
Resist-
ance**

**Foreign
Impotence**

attitude of the rapidly growing Labor party at home. Japan was more interested in obtaining privileges in nearby China than in overthrowing a government in faraway European Russia.

The result was the withdrawal of Allied expeditionary forces, from northern Russia in the autumn of 1919, and from Siberia in the spring of 1920. Then, with the loss of active Allied support, the anti-Bolshevik rebellions in Russia collapsed or were suppressed. Admiral Kolchak had to surrender Omsk in November 1919, and in the following February he was captured and shot at Irkutsk. As for General Denikin, his early successes were followed by reverses, and by his flight to Constantinople.

For a while longer, France sought to incite peoples on the Russian border to fight the Bolsheviks. In 1920 she encouraged the desire of Poland for territorial expansion eastward and egged her on to attack Russia. At the same time France enabled a Russian émigré, Baron Wrangel by name, to raise another "white" army and renew General Denikin's attempt to invade southern Russia. And some nationalistic Ukrainians took the field in alliance with Wrangel and the Poles.

At first the Franco-Polish effort promised success, but in July 1920 the "red" armies of Bolshevik Russia defeated the Poles and drove them back to the very gates of Warsaw. Here the Poles rallied and defeated the Russians, but they were no longer sanguine of ultimate victory. So Poland agreed to an armistice, and later, in March 1921 at Riga, concluded a peace treaty with Russia. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1920, "red" armies overwhelmed the "white" forces in the Crimea and obliged General Wrangel to follow General Denikin into exile at Constantinople, while other "red" armies, in conjunction with Bolshevik Ukrainians, put an end to the "independence" of Ukraina.

By 1921 the authority of the Bolshevik government was not seriously disputed in Russia. Domestic opposition was suppressed and foreign intervention stopped. In 1922, moreover, Germany formally recognized the Bolshevik dictatorship, and presently the Allies followed suit: Great Britain, France, and Italy in 1924; the United States ultimately in 1934.

But if foreign countries failed to destroy Marxian socialism in Russia, the Russian Bolsheviks failed to revolutionize the world

Polish
Effort and
Failure,
1920

Bolshevik
Mastery
of Russia,
1921

at large. They continued to preach Communism abroad and to intrigue through the international federation (the "Third International," or "Komintern") which they had formed at Moscow in 1919 of the several Communist parties in Europe and overseas. Nevertheless, outside the confines of the former Russian Empire, only Hungary experienced an actual Bolshevik dictatorship, and then very briefly.¹ Communist minorities were vocal and active elsewhere, but the most threatening ones were circumvented and silenced, as we shall presently see in the cases of Italy and Spain.

The principle of nationality was respected by the Russian Bolsheviks. They sanctioned the right of national self-determination, and accordingly agreed, as we have already pointed out,² to a shrinkage of Russia's territorial dominion. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland were recognized by a series of peace treaties, in 1921-1922, as independent nations with non-Bolshevik governments of their own choosing. Bessarabia was suffered, with only formal protests from Russia, to unite with Rumania. "Spheres of influence" and special privileges which the Tsar's government had obtained in Turkey and Persia, were renounced. To cap the climax, the constitution of Bolshevik Russia was based on a "Treaty of Union" concluded in July 1923 by representatives of the major nationalities in what remained of the former Russian Empire.

**Territorial
Losses**

By this treaty, the "Russian Empire" was supplanted by a "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," comprising (at first) four and subsequently (in 1936) eleven states: (1) the Russian (that is, Great Russian), with its capital at Moscow; (2) the White Russian, with its capital at Minsk, (3) the Ukrainian (or Little Russian), with its capital at Kiev; (4) the Armenian, (5) the Georgian, (6) the Azerbaijan, these three being in Transcaucasia; (7) the Turcoman, (8) the Uzbek, (9) the Tajik, these three being in southern Turkestan; (10) the Khirgiz, in eastern Turkestan; and (11) the Kazak, covering a large expanse of northern Turkestan and southwestern Siberia from the Caspian Sea to Mongolia. The Russian was, of course, the largest and most important of these states; it contained nearly two-thirds of the population and three-fourths of the area of the entire Union. Regardless of size, nevertheless, each state was

**Soviet
Union,
1923**

¹ On the Bolshevik dictatorship of Bela Kun in Hungary, see above, pp. 629-630.

² See above, pp. 645-646.

treated as a national entity and pledged to accord cultural rights to still smaller nationalities within its borders. Altogether, by 1936, some thirty-three groups were officially recognized as "nations" within the Union and encouraged to foster their several national cultures.

The Treaty of Union of 1923 also prescribed the form of government which should obtain both in the federal state and in its constituent parts. Nominally, it was democratic. Local soviets chose deputies to regional soviets, and these were represented in Congresses of Soviets for the several federated states and also in the All-Union Congress of Soviets for the entire federation. The All-Union Congress, which in theory was the supreme governing body of Communist Russia, comprised about two thousand delegates thus indirectly chosen by the majority of the people. The All-Union Congress, however, was too large and unwieldy to exercise real power. Its actual functions were to assemble once in two years, to listen to reports, to ratify acts of government, and to elect a Central Executive Committee to which the cabinet—the Council of People's Commissars—was supposedly responsible.

The government of the several states was modelled after the Union's, with local and regional soviets, with central Congress, Executive Committee, and Council. Each state might enact laws concerning matters of local justice, health, and education, but the Union might annul any state legislation at variance with its own.

In practice, the democracy of Communist government, whether of the Union or of its federated states, was largely nullified. Certain categories of citizens were expressly disfranchised; and for the rest the indirect and highly complex system of voting was so arranged as to discriminate against the peasant majority of the country and in favor of the working-class minority of the cities. There was also the all-important rôle of the Communist party.

No political party other than the Communist might exist in Russia, and no person might belong to the Communist party unless he avowed an unquestioning faith in the principles of Marx and Lenin, promised strict obedience to the party discipline, and proved his sincerity and zeal

NOTE. The picture of Maxim Gorky, opposite, is by a French artist, Théophile Alexandre Steinlen (1859-1923). Gorky was one of the Russian intellectuals who espoused the cause of Communism. Concerning him, see above, p. 281.

during a probationary period. Numerically the party was small. At first it was almost infinitesimal, and though it grew as success attended Lenin's policies, it embraced as late as 1935 only two and a half million persons, a slight fraction of the whole Russian population. Of its membership, over two-thirds were urban workingmen. Peasants (still the vast majority of the nation) constituted less than a fifth of the Communist party, and professional men less than a seventh.

The organization of the Communist party resembled that of the Union. Party "cells," in factories, offices, and villages, were represented in regional committees, which sent deputies to an All-Union Party Congress, which in turn elected a Central Committee, with its supreme "political bureau" of nine members. This "political bureau" proposed the major policies of Communist Russia, and after securing their endorsement by the Party Congress it utilized the party machinery to ensure their adoption and enforcement by the government. In practice, slight distinction prevailed between the party and the government.

The Communist party was the only organized group which could put up candidates for government office. It alone had the means of enforcing its will and of silencing opposition. It controlled the "red army." It directed a drastic censorship of the press and of public meetings. It dominated an extraordinary tribunal for the summary trial and execution of its opponents.

The Cheka, as this revolutionary tribunal was originally styled, was formally abolished in 1922. But the next year it was revived, under the initials OGPU, as a "third section of the police," with a staff of 45,000 agents. Under either Cheka
and
OGPU title, it might arbitrarily seize, imprison, exile, or sentence to death any persons suspected of "counter-revolutionary" (that is, anti-Communist) tendencies in politics or economics. "Shooting," said one of the party leaders, "is the highest measure of social defense." And year after year, not only during the period of uncertainty from 1918 to 1921 but also afterwards when the Communist régime seemed to be firmly established in Russia, thousands were imprisoned without any hearing and other thousands were shot without any public trial. Tsarist

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Russian Peasant," is from the painting by a Russian artist, Abram E. Arkhipov (1862-1933).

methods of repression were improved upon by the Communists. Persons too tepid in their devotion to the new dictatorship as well as persons too heated in their opposition to it were mercilessly put to death.

Within the Communist party and therefore within the Soviet government was a supreme dictator—the man who, through his personal influence and with the aid of revolutionary Dictator tribunal, red army, censorship, and party discipline, could actually rule as few despots in history have been able to rule. He had to have the wholehearted support of a compact group, such as the core of the Communist party provided, but, once assured of this, he was in a position to make his will prevail throughout the huge Russian domain.

First the dictator was Lenin, who held the two posts of President of the Council of Commissars in the government and President of the Political Bureau in the party. By Lenin, then Stalin 1922, however, Lenin was suffering grievously from overwork; he was partially paralyzed and beginning to lose the power of speech. Whereupon ensued a bitter rivalry for the succession between Trotsky, the Commissar of War in the government, and Stalin, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Gradually the latter gained the support of the party, which meant the favor of the government, so that when Lenin died, in 1924, Stalin became the acknowledged dictator. Trotsky was immediately dismissed from the Commissariat of War; in 1927 he was expelled from the Communist party; in 1928 he was banished to Turkestan; and in 1929, in danger of his life, he fled abroad. Stalin did not directly preside over the government. He was content to remain as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist party and chief member of its Political Bureau, and from these party-posts to exercise his virtual dictatorship over the government.

The central purpose of the Communist dictatorship, whether of Lenin or of Stalin, was to realize in Russia the material and economic millennium promised to the "toiling masses" by Karl Marx. Capitalism would be destroyed. The profit-making motive would be removed. Russian Communist Goal society, instead of comprising a minority of wealthy idlers and a majority of poverty-stricken workers, would consist of a single class, all of whose members would enjoy the fruits of their labor.

Simultaneously, under social ownership and control, the latest and best machinery would be introduced into Russian factories and onto Russian farms, increasing their yield, raising the general standard of living, and endowing all the masses with ever multiplying material comforts.

The first few years of the Communist dictatorship seemed to indicate that no such social millennium would eventuate and that the Russian people at large would actually be in a worse economic plight than they had been under the reign of capitalism and the Tsar. A part of the difficulty was obviously attributable to the fact that the Communists began their experiments when most of Europe, and Russia in particular, was reeling from the effects of the World War. Russia had suffered more from the war than any other country, and her economic life was already seriously disordered before Lenin executed his *coup d'état*. Then, too, we should remember that from 1918 to 1920 Lenin had to devote major energy to fighting off foreign foes and putting down domestic revolts, and that this protracted twofold struggle aggravated the economic distress within Russia. But aside from the handicaps resulting directly from the war and its aftermath, the Russian Communists were confronted with grave obstacles in the conditions and habits of Russian life. The masses of the population were illiterate, ignorant, and quite inexperienced in the technics required to give effect to the elaborate socializing program of the Communists.

Practical
Difficult-
ties

The Communist dictatorship decreed at the outset the confiscation of private property and the repudiation of debts (domestic and foreign). It was one thing, however, to expropriate and expel noble landlords and bourgeois capitalists, and quite another thing to procure the competent proletarian bureaucracy and the needful public funds for maintaining and developing socialized industry, trade, and agriculture. The peasants were glad to get rid of landlords, but they wanted to appropriate the confiscated lands for themselves rather than for the state. Only a small portion of the land actually came under the direct control of the government; most of it was parcelled out among the peasants as if it were their private property.¹ And the peasant-farmers gave little evidence of

Social-
izing the
Land

¹ In 1914 there had been sixteen million farms in Russia. In 1929 there were over twenty-five million.

abandoning the profit motive of capitalism or of acting at the mere behest of governmental authorities at Moscow.

Large industrial plants were socialized. But the workers in charge of them were more prone to engage in political discussion than in hard labor, and they were neglectful of repairs to machinery. The government attempted to remedy the evil by employing technical experts, even those who were known to be critical of Communism. For some time, nevertheless, the government was unable to maintain industrial production at pre-war levels. Trade with the outside world was cut off. Trade within the country was paralyzed. No adequate funds were available, either from internal taxes or from foreign loans, to replace worn-out machinery in the factories or rolling stock on the railways. With the breakdown of the railways, the diminishing production of farms and mills, and the rapidly swelling number of migratory persons, practically homeless and penniless, a scourge of famine visited Russia in 1921-

**Famine of
1921-1922**

1922. The grain harvest of 1921 was only two-fifths of the harvest of 1913, and what there was of it could not be expeditiously distributed. The results were frightful in city and countryside. Forty million persons suffered from malnutrition and five million starved to death. Millions more might have perished but for the arrival of foreign relief expeditions.

In 1921, on the eve of the great famine and just when civil and internal disturbances were ceasing, Lenin and his Communist colleagues proclaimed a "new economic policy," essentially a compromise between socialism and capitalism. On one hand, socialization would be pressed in respect of big industry and public utilities. On the other hand, foreign as well as Russian engineers would be encouraged by liberal financial rewards to oversee and develop industrial production, private business would be tolerated on a small scale, and the peasants would be permitted to rent land, hire labor, and sell grain to private traders.

The New Economic Policy (or NEP, as it was styled) did not prevent the famine, but it undoubtedly contributed to the steady economic rehabilitation which characterized Russia after the famine. The production of pig iron increased from a paltry 115,000 tons in 1920 to 4 million tons in 1928, and in the same period the production of coal increased from 10 million tons to

42 million and that of petroleum from 25 million barrels to 88 million. By 1928, Russia's foreign trade, which had been negligible in 1920, was valued at 867 million dollars, about two-thirds of its value in 1913. Simultaneously, there was notable improvement in the lot of a considerable number of peasants, though "socialized agriculture" made comparatively little headway. By 1928 a million peasants were organized in "collectivist coöperatives," and another million worked on "state farms." Yet state and collective farms together produced less than 2 per cent of the country's grain. That profits were accruing to Russian farmers was evidenced by the growing class of "kulaks," or "rich peasants."¹

The NEP, in the minds of the Communist leaders, was only a temporary makeshift. They had no intention of establishing a peasant proprietorship in Russia or of favoring agriculture at the expense of industry. They had a predilection for mass production of goods and a fondness, almost a veneration, for the latest mechanical devices. Their fundamental ambition was to transform Russia from an economically "backward" and predominantly agricultural country into a "progressive" and predominantly industrial country. This they would do by means of a "planned economy," a systematic collectivist development of basic industries and an industrialization of agriculture.

Accordingly, and in the light of their experience with the NEP, Stalin and his lieutenants worked out a "Five-Year Plan" and put it into effect from 1928 to 1933. The production of coal was increased from 42 million tons to 77 million; pig iron, from 4 million tons to 7 million; petroleum, from 88 million barrels to 150 million.² Besides, new blast furnaces, automobile and tractor plants, and machine-shops were erected, and the supply of electric power was almost tripled. Much progress was made, moreover, in socializing and mechanizing agriculture. More than 200,000 "collective farms" were

First
Five-Year
Plan,
1928-1933

¹ It was over the kulaks that Trotsky and Stalin quarreled after the death of Lenin. Trotsky demanded an immediate "drive" against the kulaks and an intensive socialization of the land. Stalin, fearful of precipitating a class war among the peasants, contended that the kulaks should be tolerated for a time.

² In 1928 the Soviet Union stood sixth among the nations of the world in coal production, sixth in pig-iron production, and third in petroleum production. In 1933 it had advanced to fourth in coal production (after the United States, Great Britain, and Germany), third in pig-iron production (after the United States and France), and second in petroleum production (after the United States).

organized and over 800 million dollars were invested in farm machinery. The share of the country's grain production which "socialized" farming furnished was raised much above the 2 per cent of 1928, though it fell considerably short of the 40 per cent contemplated by the Five-Year Plan.

From 1933 to 1938 a Second Five-Year Plan still further increased the output of coal, iron, petroleum, electric power, and the socialization of agriculture. It also put new emphasis on the improvement of internal transportation and on the manufacture of goods for popular consumption. There followed a Third Five-Year Plan.

The progressive gains in socializing and mechanizing Russia under the "New Economic Policy" and the "Five-Year Plans"

Later Five-Year Plans were aided and fortified by attendant educational and propagandist activities of the Communist dictatorship. Lenin and Stalin and their chief associates in the Communist party understood perfectly well that unless the masses were inspired with an enthusiastic, even fanatical, attachment to the new order, mere decrees of the Soviet government would be without lasting effect. A socialistically trained citizenship was as necessary as economic planning.

From the outset, the Communist dictatorship had banned any education or propaganda in Russia which might have purposes at variance with its own. Dissident political groups were dissolved, and the dissemination of their ideas was prohibited and rigorously penalized. Newspapers multiplied in Russia under the Soviet régime, but only orthodox Communist opinions might be expressed in them. Radios and cinemas spread rapidly, but they too might not be agencies of "reaction." The universities and learned societies of Tsarist times were retained and enlarged, but they were purged of scholars unsympathetic with Communism and newly staffed with persons willing to interpret their subjects according to Marxian principles. Museums and art galleries and theatres were kept open, and the common people were encouraged to attend them; so as not to cripple them, they were permitted to retain many of their former officials and actors but these were scrupulously watched for any overt hostility to the new order.

The Communist dictatorship was particularly determined to counteract religious influence. The Communist leaders, being

Marxian in philosophy and therefore dogmatically materialist, were not merely indifferent but actively antagonistic to all supernatural religion. To them, historic Christianity of every form was superstitious and worse: it was an instrument of reaction, an opiate of the people, a means of obscuring the realities of this world in a dream

Repress-
ing
Chris-
tianity

of another world. As early as January 1918 the Communist dictatorship decreed the separation of church and state in Russia, the confiscation of all church property, and the suppression of all church schools. Clergymen were disfranchised, and during the ensuing years, as the dictatorship strengthened its hold on the country, the Orthodox Church and all the other Christian bodies—and Judaism and Islam likewise—were reduced to the status of barely tolerated private cults. Many clergymen were exiled or put to death. Many church edifices were transformed into national museums or recreational centres. Public teaching of religion was forbidden. While “groups of believers” were empowered in 1929 to contract with the government for the use of church buildings for exclusive purposes of worship, they were estopped from any other religious activity.

The government, while curbing Christianity, gave free rein and active encouragement to atheistic propaganda. A militant “Society of the Godless” arose and thrived, establishing permanent exhibitions of anti-religious paintings and cartoons, holding frequent demonstrations, and

Encour-
aging
Atheism

conducting a systematic campaign of vituperation against priests and of jeering at religious rites and beliefs. To the younger generation of the Russian masses, the so-called “anti-religious front” of the Communist party and the Society of the Godless mainly addressed themselves, and with much success. The older generation was less affected; many of them persevered in their habitual Christian worship. But with the younger generation cut off from Christian religious instruction and simultaneously exposed to the unrestrained counter-propaganda of atheism, the Communist dictatorship had reason for being optimistic about the outcome. It would be miraculous if in the long run historic religion could impede the fulfillment of the Soviet program, and the only miracles in which the Communist put much stock were those of modern technology.

Communism was a kind of religion itself. It was not purely

an economic program or a set of political principles. It had a dogmatic philosophy. It promised a millennium—one, to be sure, that was material and secular, but one that was as emotionally attractive as it was problematical. And it inspired its devotees with a faith and an ardor transcending ordinary human experience. Not since the Jacobinism of the French Revolution had there been such an all-compelling non-supernatural religion as was this Russian Communism of the twentieth century. Like the French Jacobins, the Russian Communists evinced the faith within them by a wealth of symbolism and a fever of missionary zeal. They paraded red flags, sang proletarian anthems, addressed one another as comrade, and raised Marx and Lenin to the stature of divinities. The great city of St. Petersburg, which had been patriotically rechristened during the World War as Petrograd, was renamed Leningrad. In the central "Red Square" of the capital city of Moscow was enshrined in 1924 the embalmed body of Lenin as a perpetual object of public worship. In workmen's tenements and peasants' cottages, lithographs of Lenin and Marx were hung, like icons, in the midst of customary candles. The religion of Communism was formal, but it was also very serious and sincere, and, as we have said, very intolerant.

If Communism was a substitute for other religions, its "church" was the Communist party. The party was indeed the organized and eager preacher of the new dispensation throughout Russia. For its importance lay not only in its control of the Soviet government and its direction of public policies but also in its missionary labors among the masses, getting them to accept and to coöperate in the achievement of Communist aims. To this end, the party strove especially to convert the youth of the land. It organized as a feeder and auxiliary to itself a "Communist League of Youth" (the so-called "Komsomol"), and for younger children an association of "Communist Pioneers."

For the conversion of the rising generation to Communism, as well as for the assurance of needful literacy to the whole nation, the Communist party and the Soviet government introduced far-reaching educational reforms. Elementary schools were rapidly multiplied in town and country, always under strict governmental control and always with teachers and textbooks of Communist sympathies. In 1931

Commun-
ism as
Religion

Educating
the
Masses

the central government decreed that every child within the Soviet Union must attend a primary Communist school for at least four years, and in 1933 a supplementary decree lengthened the period of compulsory attendance to seven years. For the maintenance and extension of such schools, ever heavier charges were made on the budgets of localities as well as on that of the state. By 1935 Soviet Russia was expending a great deal more on public education than the Tsarist régime had spent.

Another agency of Communist propaganda, as well as of national defense, was the Red Army. This had originally been recruited by Trotsky and had been greatly enlarged by him during the trying days of 1918-1920. After the overthrow of the "white armies" and the failure of foreign intervention, the Red Army had been largely demobilized, and Trotsky's scheme for a well-organized professional army, with a territorial militia, was not immediately realized because of shortage of funds. Under Trotsky's successor, however, a decree of 1925 provided for a permanent Red Army on the theoretical basis of compulsory military training for all able-bodied men between the ages of nineteen and forty. Practically, a selection was made from those liable to serve in the army, both in order to save expense and in order to assure a preponderance of confirmed Communists. By 1935 the Red Army of Soviet Russia was larger than the army of pre-war Germany. About half of the rank-and-file and three-fourths of the officers were full-fledged members of the Communist party or of its affiliated "Communist League of Youth." And the Soviet government's expenditure on army surpassed its expenditure on education.

There can be no doubt that under the Communist dictatorship much was done to better the economic condition of the Russian masses, to make them literate, and to elevate their standard of living. There can also be no doubt that the Russian standard of living was still relatively low and that any advance of literacy or improvement of economic condition was attended by most drastic restrictions of the freedom of individual intelligence, initiative, and personality. The Communists promised that these qualities would come to the fore and be amply respected when economic and social equality was fully attained, but there was no little uncertainty outside Communist circles as to whether such equality

The Red
Army

Experi-
mental
Character
of Com-
munism

would ever be attained. Disparities of station and of opportunity continued to exist in Soviet Russia between leaders and followers, between party comrades and ordinary citizens, between urban proletariat and rural peasantry, between "rich" peasants and extremely poor peasants, between the cunning and the stupid, the thrifty and the shiftless.

A new constitution, adopted at the end of 1936, was widely advertised as strengthening political democracy and broadening personal liberty within the Soviet Union. It did provide for a bicameral parliament (or Council)—one chamber popularly elective, and the other representing the several nationalities—but it left intact the unique position and practical domination of the small Communist party; and its pledges of personal liberty were purely verbal. Not only did the Communist dictatorship continue ruthlessly to repress any opposition or dissent, but it carried on during 1937–1939 a veritable reign of terror against "foreign" influence and a systematic purge of the Communist party itself, executing hundreds of members, including many in high office, on charges ranging from sabotage to treason. Stalin appeared to be guided less by faith in the emancipating principles of Communism than by fear for his own despotic power.

Constitution of 1936

Renewed Terrorism

2. FASCIST DICTATORSHIP IN ITALY

At the close of the World War, Italy seemed to be committed, in common with all other nations of central and western Europe, to the perfecting of democratic institutions. In fact, however, Italy was sorely beset with post-war difficulties, more so than any of the other Allies (except Russia). Economic conditions were bad. The country was relatively poor, its industry and trade were disorganized, its agriculture was stagnant, and in the cities unemployment was rife. Public indebtedness had been vastly increased by the war, and post-war budgets showed ever bigger deficits.

Such conditions invited a resurgence of Marxian socialism, with its left wing of revolutionary syndicalism. It was newly inspired and rendered more extreme by the apparent success of Lenin and his "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Russia; and the plight of urban workingmen in Italy, particularly in the north, afforded to its

Italy Liberal and Democratic in 1918

Resurgence of Marxian Socialism

apostles a favorable seed-ground for their propaganda. Italian Socialists, in the general election of November 1919, secured 156 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (out of a total of 574), and, while they demonstrated in the Chamber against the existing government, they took "direct action" outside parliament against the existing economic and social order. They conducted strikes. They committed sabotage. In some instances they appropriated industrial plants and attempted to operate them.

Another movement, not at all revolutionary in purpose but very troublesome to the government, gathered headway at the same time. This was the rise of a Catholic political party, the so-called Popular party, headed by a Sicilian priest, Luigi Sturzo, and supported by Catholic intellectuals who wished to counteract the traditional hostility of the Liberal régime and by Catholic peasants who were sympathetic with the party's program of democratic social reform, especially with its project of distributing large landed estates among peasant proprietors. In the election of November 1919, the Popular party secured 101 seats in the Chamber.

Against the Socialists on one side and the Popularists on the other, both with fairly well-defined purposes, the middle-class Liberal majority in the Italian parliament could present no united front. Indeed, the factionalism which had characterized Liberal groups in Italy before the war reappeared in an acute form just at the time when unity and firmness were most needed. In June 1920 the veteran Liberal politician Giolitti contrived to form his fourth ministry.¹ He was an old man, however, and either unable or unwilling to press for any real social reform or to employ armed force against lawlessness and disorder. Internal troubles reached a zenith in the winter of 1920-1921. While Communists kidnapped capitalists, set up "revolutionary tribunals," and armed themselves as "red guards," while strikes paralyzed the metal industries, the railways, and even agriculture, the government remained irresolute and supine.

In April 1921 Giolitti dissolved parliament and appealed to the country. The ensuing elections only emphasized the radical differences of purpose and method among Italians. The Socialist representation in the Chamber was cut from 156 to 122, but

¹ On Giolitti and his earlier ministries, see above, pp. 422, 426, 427.

alongside the Socialists appeared a definitely Communist party with 16 representatives. The Popularists increased their representation to 107, but a new nationalist group, the Fascist, obtained 35 seats. Liberals were now a quarrelsome minority. In June 1921 Giolitti resigned, but the premiers who succeeded him were mediocre and apparently impotent to halt the growing violence of Communists and Fascists.

The Fascists had abler leadership and larger popular following than the Communists. The latter were becoming too extreme for the majority of Socialists, and they had no leaders of outstanding ability or determination. The Fascists, on the other hand, appeared to a rapidly growing number of Italians as the one bulwark against national disintegration and social chaos, and in Mussolini they possessed a leader both resourceful and resolute.

Advent of Fascism Benito Mussolini (born in 1883) had been identified during most of his life with left-wing Marxian socialism. His father, a blacksmith, had been a vehement revolutionary and anti-Catholic before him, and he himself had joined the Socialist party in his late teens while he was studying in a normal school. For a time he lived in Switzerland, engaging in Socialist journalism, and organizing Socialist trade unions. Expelled from one canton after another and eventually from the Swiss Confederation, he was patriotic enough to return to Italy for required military training, but his subsequent participation in Socialist agitation cost him an imprisonment in 1908. Shortly afterwards, he betook himself to Trent (then in Austria), where he edited a newspaper in support both of revolutionary Socialism and of Italian irredentism, until the Austrian government suppressed the paper and expelled the editor. Returning to Italy once more, Mussolini espoused revolutionary syndicalism, denounced parliamentary government, and lauded Sorel's advocacy of violence and Nietzsche's plea for the "superman."¹ For opposing the Tripolitan War of 1911-1912, he was imprisoned for five months. This made him a hero in Socialist circles all over Italy, and at the end of 1912 he became editor of the official organ of the Italian Socialist party.

Mussolini's break with the Socialist party began over the question of participation in the World War. The majority of the

¹ On Sorel, see above, pp. 273-274, and on Nietzsche, see above, pp. 262-263.

party leaders opposed participation, while Mussolini favored it. He argued that Italy was a "proletarian nation," committed by the doctrine of class-conflict to war against the "capitalist nation" of Austria-Hungary, and that the surest way of converting the Italian masses to Socialism was to identify it with a national cause.

**His Break
with
Marxian
Socialism**

Forced out of the editorship of the official Socialist newspaper, he established at Milan a "National Socialist" journal of his own, through whose pages he conducted a strenuous campaign first for Italy's participation in the war and then for working-class coöperation in winning the war. In 1915 he joined the army and served in the trenches as private and corporal until wounded in 1917. Then, back on his newspaper, he zealously combated pacifism, and commenced to inveigh against the "menace" of Russian Bolshevism.

Gradually the personal following of Mussolini swelled. At first it embraced only a small minority of Socialist workingmen, but, with the termination of the war and the demobilization of the Italian army, it gained the adherence of a large number of ex-soldiers and youthful intellectuals, and then, when the existing government seemed unable to cope with economic unrest and Communist violence or to satisfy popular demands for the annexation of Fiume, it enlisted the support of numerous property-holders and patriots. These gave willing ear to Mussolini's plea for transforming Italy from a "liberal" to a "fascist" state.

**His Per-
sonal Fol-
lowing**

The words "Fascist" and "Fascism" were derived from the "fascio" (or "club") which Mussolini organized among his followers at Milan in March 1919 for the general purpose of propagating his brand of national socialism and for the specific purpose of fighting Marxian Communists and Socialists. During the next two years, a network of similar "clubs" (or "fasci") was spread over the industrial towns of Italy, and the members indulged in constant counter-violence against the strikes and other activities of the "reds." In April 1921 some 35 Fascists (together with 10 Nationalist disciples of D'Annunzio) were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and in November of the same year the Fascist political party was definitively constituted with a graded hierarchy (headed, of course, by Mussolini), with a rigid discipline, and

**His Ex-
panding
Organiza-
tion**

with a wealth of symbolism and ceremonial. As Garibaldi's volunteers had worn red shirts, so Mussolini's distinguished themselves with black shirts, and as the word Fascist suggested not only the "fasci" (or "clubs") of modern Italy but also the "fasces" which officials of the ancient Roman Republic had borne, so Fascism was symbolized by a bundle of rods enclosing a battle axe, and Fascists saluted their chief—Il Duce ("The Leader")—with the outstretched hand of the old Roman salute.

With mounting enthusiasm (and violence) and with perfecting organization and resolution, the Fascist movement gathered momentum rapidly during 1921-1922. Simultaneously, the opposing groups in Italy weakened. Giolitti, the most famous of the Liberal leaders, was in his eighties and widely distrusted. The Socialist party lacked competent leadership and at its congress in 1922 it split on the question of coöperation with the Communists. The Communists were a sect, rather than a national party, and they too lacked resourceful leadership. The Popular (or Catholic) party, despite the endeavors of its chief, Sturzo, was also disintegrating: its left wing was too revolutionary to collaborate successfully with the Liberals; its right wing was drawn toward Fascism; and the Pope was becoming sceptical of the official participation of Catholics in Italian politics and distrustful of Sturzo.

In October 1922 the Fascists held a congress at Naples. Forty thousand of them paraded the streets in military formation, and Mussolini, in a grandiloquent speech, declared that "either the government will be given to us or we shall march on Rome." On October 27 the Liberal premier resigned, and the Fascist "army" at Naples moved on Rome. The regular army stood aside, and King Victor Emmanuel III, without a government and with Fascist fighting men pouring into the capital, sent for Mussolini and asked him to form a ministry.

Thus, at the end of October 1922, Mussolini became prime minister of Italy. From the terrified parliament he at once obtained a grant of dictatorial powers for a year, and then proceeded, on the one hand, to extend and consolidate the Fascist organization throughout the country, and, on the other, to conduct and reform the public administration. With his harsh voice and short crisp sentences,

**Weaken-
ing Oppo-
sition to
Fascism**

**Fascist
March on
Rome,
1922**

**Musso-
lini, Prime
Minister**

with his flashing black eyes and magnificent scowl, with his Napoleonic bearing, he mightily impressed the nation, as well as king and parliament; and his great energy and exacting attention to details soon produced effects. Order was restored throughout the country. Strikes were suppressed and Socialist agitators punished. Economies were introduced into government. Public works were undertaken and unemployment relieved.

In November 1923, Mussolini persuaded parliament, despite opposition from Socialist and Popularist members and from some Liberals, to enact an essentially revolutionary electoral law. Thereby, in the future, the political party securing a plurality of votes in the general election would be entitled to two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while the remaining third would be distributed among the other parties on a proportional basis. The first election under the new arrangement was held in April 1924. The Fascists, better organized than their rivals and freer to exercise compulsion, obtained four and a half million votes out of a total of seven and a half million and therefore appropriated two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber, leaving the combined Socialists, Popularists, and Liberals in a helpless minority.

The kidnapping and murder of a Socialist leader by Fascists just after the assembling of the new Chamber, temporarily filled many Italians with mingled fear and indignation, and for a time in 1924 the anti-Fascist minority in the Chamber threatened to form a compact group and make some trouble for the Fascist government. Mussolini, however, disclaimed any responsibility for the crime, and by strict censorship of the press and forceful police measures he managed to weather the storm. A reign of terror ensued. Political opponents were imprisoned or intimidated, and critics were silenced. Sturzo escaped into exile, together with some Socialist leaders and a number of Liberals. Others, especially those most nationally inclined, espoused Fascism, and still others merely retired into private life and set a seal on their lips. By the end of 1924 Italy was definitely resigned to a dictatorship of Mussolini and the Fascists.

By enactments from 1925 to 1928 the Fascist majority in parliament empowered the government to dismiss "disloyal" officials, to dissolve all political parties except the Fascist, to

Fascist
Electoral
Triumph

Suppress-
ing
Dissent

abolish Freemasonry and all other secret societies, to set up a tribunal of summary justice for the trial of political offenders, to confiscate the property of "seditious" persons, to suppress seditious newspapers, and to centralize the administration. Mussolini, as prime minister, was authorized to initiate all legislation, and offenses against his person were made direfully punishable. The local prefects, whose powers were strengthened, were to be directly responsible to him, and he would appoint governors (or *podestàs*) of cities and villages. To cap the climax, the popular election of members of parliament was transformed, by a law of 1928, into a mere plebiscite; henceforth, the electorate would simply vote yes or no on a list of candidates approved by the Fascist party. Political democracy, as previously practiced in Italy, was at an end, and liberty was sharply abridged.

Formally, the central Italian government continued to be "constitutional." The King was still the nominal sovereign. The Parliament, composed of Senate and Chamber of Deputies, was still the legal law-making body; and to it was still responsible the ministry (or cabinet). Actually, however, the whole government was dominated by the party organization of the Fascists, just as the contemporary Soviet government of Russia was controlled by a single Communist party. And in Italy, as in Russia, the dictatorial party comprised a relatively small minority of the population.

In 1932—ten years after the "March on Rome"—the Fascist party numbered about a million and a quarter. No person was admitted to it unless he had demonstrated his loyalty to its principles and undergone preliminary training. In 1933, out of 600,000 applicants for membership in the party, 200,000 were accepted. The members of the party were distributed among some 10,000 local "fasci" (or "clubs"), which were federated by provinces, and ultimately directed by the Party's Grand Council. This Council, as reconstituted in 1928, included the leaders of the "March on Rome," the general secretary and certain other officials of the party, and representatives of Fascist corporations, about twenty persons in all.

The chairman of the Grand Council of the Fascist party was prime minister of the country. The Council not only ruled the party and shaped its policies, but also nominated candidates for

parliament, and inasmuch as no other party existed after 1928 to make nominations or to conduct organized campaigns against Fascist nominees, all the members of parliament were practically certain to be members of the Fascist party, quite obedient to the dictates of the Grand Council. To make doubly sure of the supremacy of the party's council over the state parliament, it was further provided in 1928 that the Council must be consulted on all matters affecting the constitution, the royal succession, the powers of the prime minister, the relations between church and state, and the ratification of treaties involving territorial changes. And to enforce its will throughout the country, the Grand Council had at its disposal a special body of Fascist militia and a special tribunal of Fascist magistrates.

The machinery of the Fascist party and that of the Italian state were thus closely interlocked, and the supreme manipulator of both was Mussolini, "Il Duce." He was chairman of the Grand Council and through its discipline, its militia, and its tribunal he was master of parliament and the country at large. He was also prime minister of the state, initiating legislation, appointing officials, advising the king, and directing the whole national administration. No statesman since Napoleon (except Lenin and his successor in Russia) had exercised such wide and dictatorial powers.

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists in Italy sought to gain the support of the working classes by undertaking social reform and substituting a "corporate state" for the previous "liberal state." Individualism would be frowned upon, and the differences between capital and labor minimized. With these ends in view, an enactment of 1926 abolished non-Fascist trade unions, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and at the same time legalized thirteen "syndicates" (six of employers, six of employees, and one of professional men), under whose joint auspices special tribunals should be established for the settlement of labor disputes. In 1927 a "charter of labor" was promulgated: while guarantying private property and encouraging private initiative, it forbade employers to work their men more than eight hours a day or six days a week or to discharge them on the score of illness or military service; it obliged employers to contribute to the insurance of their men against illness, accidents, old age, and unemployment; and it

Musso-
lini,
Dictator

Social
Reform
and
Corporate
State

empowered the labor corporations to train apprentices and maintain employment bureaus. In 1928 the electoral law entrusted the thirteen syndicates with political functions; each would nominate parliamentary candidates to be passed upon and approved by the Grand Council of the Fascist party before a general election. In 1930 the thirteen syndicates were reformed and coördinated as "corporations" under a general Fascist Confederation of Industry, headed by a state Minister of Corporations. In 1934 a National Council was created of deputies from the various corporations in order immediately to advise parliament on economic and social legislation and eventually to supplant parliament as the law-making body of the realm.

Mussolini and his fellow Fascists sought also to secure the support of the Catholic masses by reversing the anti-clerical policies which liberal governments had pursued since the time of Cavour and reaching a friendly agreement with the papacy on the "Roman question." To Mussolini's overtures, Pope Pius XI responded sympathetically; he was no advocate of Fascism but he perceived an advantage to the church in ending the conflict which since 1870 had forced Italians to choose between loyalty to their national state and obedience to their religious head.¹ Consequently, the treaty of the Lateran was concluded in 1929. Italy agreed to the sovereignty of the Pope within a small but independent Papal State, embracing the Vatican and St. Peter's (the so-called Vatican City) and also the estate of Castel Gandolfo outside Rome. In return the Pope recognized the Kingdom of Italy, surrendered his claims to the greater part of Rome, and promised to "remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international congresses convoked for the settlement of such disputes unless the contending parties make a joint appeal to his mission of peace."

Simultaneously with the signing of the Lateran Treaty, a financial agreement and a concordat were concluded between the papacy and the Italian government. The financial agreement provided for the payment to the Pope of a sum of about 100 million dollars in lieu of the annual appropriations which Italy had been making as indemnity for

¹ On the conflict between Papacy and Italian government, see above, pp. 177-178, 420-422.

Religious
Concilia-
tion and
Lateran
Treaty,
1929

Concordat
with
Church

the seizure of Rome in 1870 but which the papacy had hitherto refused to accept. The concordat, on the other hand, provided for the future relations of church and state in Italy. The Pope would appoint all bishops in Italy, but before doing so he would communicate each nomination to the Italian government "in order to be sure that the latter has no objection from a political standpoint." The state would continue to pay the salaries of bishops and priests, and bishops, before taking office, must swear loyalty to the state, the king, and the government. Religious instruction would be given in the state schools by persons approved by the church. The church might engage in popular propaganda of a religious nature but not in political activity, and no ecclesiastic might belong to any political party.

This sensational termination of the long feud between the Italian state and the Catholic Church was acclaimed alike by devout Catholics and by enthusiastic Fascists. Some friction continued, nevertheless. In 1931 the dissolution of Catholic clubs by the Fascist dictatorship, and in 1938 its promulgation of anti-Semitic decrees, evoked vigorous protests from the Pope.

The Fascist régime devoted much attention to popular education. The number of schools was increased, and the laws providing for compulsory attendance were more rigorously enforced. In 1921, just before Mussolini took office, some three million children were attending elementary schools in Italy; in 1935, there were four and a half million. In 1921 the percentage of illiteracy in the country as a whole was over a fourth; in 1935 it was less than a fifth, and in northern Italy it was fast reaching zero. The great stress in the schools was on training for Fascist citizenship. The teachers were Fascist in sympathy; and Fascist in principle and aim were the curricula and textbooks. For many children, moreover, Fascist training in the schools was supplemented by similar training in the party's auxiliary organization of youth. For all young men, furthermore, it was supplemented by intensive training in the army, which of course was Fascist in its command and conduct. The Fascist party might be relatively small, but the younger generation of the whole Italian nation was being educated in Fascism.

Nationalism was emphasized and extolled by Mussolini and his fellow Fascists. Italians were ceaselessly reminded of their past greatness and future destiny as a nation. For patriotic

reasons as well as to provide work for men otherwise unemployed, the government fostered a great variety of public works.

National-ism Pride in the past was stimulated by repairing ancient monuments, unearthing and reconstructing the old

Roman forum, and erecting memorials to Julius Cæsar and Augustus. Faith in the future was aroused and confirmed by a host of "modern improvements." The railways were refurbished. Palatial steamships were built for transoceanic service, and the Italian merchant marine, which in 1913 had been hardly a fourth as large as Germany's or a half of France's, reached in 1935 a tonnage almost equal to either the French or the German. New cable lines were laid. The radio industry was fostered. Air-planes were manufactured and increasingly utilized for passenger and mail service throughout the country. Agricultural works were also undertaken, involving extensive reforestation and the reclamation of swamp lands. Industrially, Italy's lack of coal and iron was partially compensated for by a remarkable development of hydro-electric power, which by 1935 represented a horsepower of almost five million, more than twice the developed water power of any other country.

As far as might be, economic self-sufficiency (or, in other words, economic nationalism) was a Fascist policy and goal. In

Economic Nationalism keeping with it were the hydro-electric developments, the agricultural works, and the national merchant marine. In keeping with it, likewise, were the new national syndicates, the heightening of previous protective tariffs, and the drastic regulation of banking and currency.

Militarism was another conspicuous feature of Fascist Italy.

Militarism Not only was the army kept on the basis of universal compulsory service, but it was better equipped and rendered more efficient, and it was paraded much more frequently in public view and lauded by Mussolini more often and more ostentatiously. The Italian navy was increased, and the air service of both army and navy was perfected. In 1934 some military training was definitely prescribed for all Italian boys from the age of eight.

Imperialism was another aspect of Fascist thought and ambition. The Italian population was growing faster than that of most other European countries. Already it was surpassing the French, and to Mussolini and other patriots it required a com-

mensurate colonial expansion. Hence Mussolini, who as a Socialist had decried the seizure of African territory in 1911, now as a Fascist loudly championed a greater imperial domain for Italy. In 1935-1936 he subjugated Ethiopia and made King Victor Emmanuel III its Emperor.¹ In 1939 he annexed Albania.²

Imperial-
ism

For all the enterprises of the Fascist government in Italy—military, naval, and imperial, economic, educational, and ecclesiastical—expenditure was immensely increased. Yet, despite general post-war depression and special economic difficulties in Italy, the increase of expenditure was made without serious popular murmuring. Italian finances continued to be perilous, but the Fascist government was more rigorous and probably more honest than its predecessors in spending money, and it had the help of able financiers.

Financial
Strain

To all appearances, at any rate, the Fascist dictatorship was becoming solidly entrenched and popular in Italy. In the general election of 1929—essentially a plebiscite on the Fascist list of candidates for parliament—eight and a half million electors voted “yes” and 140,000 voted “no.” In the general election of 1934, ten million voted “yes” and only 15,000 voted “no.” In both elections, about 90 per cent of the electorate went to the polls.

Popular
Support

3. DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE

While a Communist dictatorship was being established in Russia, and a Fascist dictatorship in Italy, most of the countries of western Europe (and the British Dominions) clung to the principle of the “liberal state” and to the practices of political democracy. In these countries, to be sure, the difficulties of operating democratic government were more obvious than formerly. Parliaments and their responsible ministers had now to cope with intricate post-war problems of economic reconstruction.

Personal liberty and parliamentary government were traditions of long standing and great weight in Britain, and hardly less so in France, Belgium, and Switzerland; and they had long been the goal of political aspiration in the Netherlands and Scandinavia. Moreover, the economic conditions within Britain, France, and Belgium

Strength
of Democ-
racy in
West

¹ See below, p. 803.

² See below, pp. 738, 808

after the war, though serious enough, were certainly better than in Russia or Italy, while those in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Scandinavia (which had been neutral during the World War) were much better. Furthermore, the peoples of Britain, France, and Belgium were more loyally attached to an existing régime which had "won the war" and dictated a peace satisfying to national prestige than were either the Russians who had suffered crushing defeat or the Italians who were keenly disappointed with the peace.

In Great Britain, the outstanding problems of the post-war years were economic. The difficulty of resuming normal peace-

1. Great Britain

time production in the face of increasing foreign competition and of diminishing foreign markets jeopardized Britain's century-old position as "the banker and workshop of the world." Her production of coal and iron, of cotton and certain other basic industries, was still impressive, but it showed a decline from pre-war standards both in absolute amount and in relation to the production of other industrial nations, most notably the United States and France. Hence, there was a shortage of jobs in mines and factories for the masses of British industrial workers, and unemployment promised to become chronic and acutely troublesome. The number of registered adult workers who could not obtain work was over two million in 1921 (out of a total of about twelve million); and around that figure it subsequently hovered.

This standing army of unemployed persons and the still larger host of their dependent families had to be provided for in some way. But the national debt had been so enormously increased by the war that the interest charges alone amounted to 360 million pounds sterling in 1921-1922 as over against 22 million ten years previously. To meet those charges and at the same time to defray current expenses of army, navy, and civil administration and extraordinary expenses of unemployment relief meant national taxation so heavy as to threaten the capitalistic system on which Britain's industrial supremacy had been built.

Lloyd George's National Ministry, 1916-1922

The British government which first had to face these economic problems was that coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, headed by Lloyd George, which had been formed in 1916 and which had received a thumping vote of confidence from the country at large in

the "khaki election" of December 1918.¹ It negotiated the peace treaties of 1919-1920, and effected the peaceful demobilization of the conscript war armies. It opposed the republican movement in Ireland, but finally, though reluctantly, agreed to the treaty of 1921 establishing the Irish Free State. It extended the insurance of workingmen against illness and unemployment and greatly increased the governmental subsidies (or "doles," as they were called) to the unemployed. It also managed, by introducing many economies and by imposing very heavy income taxes, to balance the budget. In 1921, with the purpose of arresting the industrial decline, it departed from the long-established policy of free trade and imposed tariff duties on the importation of certain foreign manufactures which were underselling British key industries in the home market.

Following a repudiation of the coalition government by a Conservative caucus in October 1922, Lloyd George resigned, and King George V entrusted the premiership to Bonar Law, the nominal leader of the Conservative party. The ensuing general election returned a clear Conservative majority, though the Laborites, under the guidance of Ramsay MacDonald,² secured a larger representation than they had ever had before and in excess of the Liberal party's. It was obvious that liberalism of the pre-war kind was being ground between the upper and nether millstones of conservatism and labor.

Conservative
Ministry,
1922-1924

The Conservative victory proved abortive. Bonar Law, on account of illness, soon retired from the premiership in favor of Stanley Baldwin, a business man who had occupied several important financial offices since 1917. Baldwin's announcement

¹ On the pre-war career of Lloyd George, see above, pp. 343-353; on the formation of his Coalition ministry in 1916 and his war-activities, see above, p. 615; and on the parliamentary election of 1918, see above, p. 633.

² Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937), the son of a Scottish workingman and largely self-taught, had been conspicuous in the Labor party from its origin, serving as secretary until 1912 and then as leader until 1914. He professed a kind of right-wing Socialism, and for his pacifism during the World War he suffered political ostracism and temporary imprisonment. His marriage in 1896 to a niece of Lord Kelvin, the famous scientist (see above, p. 237), had brought him considerable wealth and strengthened his desire to ally intellectuals and "respectable" middle-class reformers, as well as trade unionists, with the Labor party. Such a desire he largely realized after the war, and this, along with popular reaction against the horrors of war and the sorry economic conditions of the time, helps to explain why the Labor party expanded rapidly after 1918.

that tariff protectionism was the remedy for the country's economic ills evoked dissension among Conservatives as well as strenuous opposition from Laborites and Liberals. On the tariff issue, Parliament was dissolved and new elections held in December 1923. This time the Conservatives were reduced to a minority, while both the Laborites and the Liberals gained ground. Early in 1924 the new parliamentary majority voted Baldwin out of office and permitted Ramsay MacDonald to form a Labor government.

But the Labor government was short-lived, too. It could last only as long as the Liberals were willing to support it, and the "moderation" which they insisted upon was likely to alienate the extremist element among the Laborites. Before coming into office, MacDonald had advocated a capital levy and other drastic socialist measures for dealing with the domestic situation. Once in office, however, he dropped all such proposals and contented himself with obtaining from Parliament the repeal of some of the existing tariff duties and an authorization for the construction of workers' dwellings. Presently, while a section of his own party grumbled at his "moderation," the Liberals took alarm at his "extravagance" and the mounting cost of unemployment relief; and when he finally decided to recognize the Communist dictatorship in Russia, the Liberals repudiated him. In vain he appealed to the British electorate in October 1924. Though the popular vote for Labor candidates went up by a million, the Conservative party, on a platform of opposition to the "Red Peril," secured an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons. MacDonald's Labor ministry was succeeded by a Conservative ministry under Baldwin.

The second Baldwin ministry lasted almost five years, from November 1924 to May 1929. It sponsored several important measures. One was the definitive adoption of tariff protectionism. Another was the enfranchisement of women on the same basis as men. A "general strike" of British workingmen in May 1926, the climax of protracted and bitter labor troubles in the coal mines, created grave apprehension and led to the enactment of a Trades Dispute bill, outlawing general strikes and imposing restrictions on trade union activity.

At the regular general election in 1929, the Conservatives met defeat. The Labor party obtained a plurality of seats in the

House of Commons, and, though still dependent for an absolute majority upon the remnant of Liberals headed by Lloyd George, there was no question about its assuming the conduct of government. Accordingly, Baldwin resigned and Ramsay MacDonald formed his second Labor cabinet, including for the first time in English history a woman member—Margaret Bondfield as Minister of Labor. At the outset of his second ministry MacDonald appeared to be less “compromising” than he had been during his first ministry, but fundamentally he was more intent upon a pacific foreign policy than upon domestic social reform and temperamentally he was more susceptible to the appeals of persons of birth and substance than to the urgings of lower-class extremists in his own party. As economic conditions grew rapidly worse in Britain, reflecting in an acute form the world-wide depression which set in seriously in 1930, MacDonald abandoned any idea which he may previously have had of resorting to radical socialistic expedients. In 1931, against the counsel of the majority of his cabinet, he endorsed the proposals of his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, to reduce governmental expenses and to effect drastic economies in unemployment relief. This split the Labor party. A minority stuck by MacDonald and Snowden and took the title of “National Laborites.” The majority repudiated the prime minister.

Second
Mac-
Donald
Ministry,
1929

Split in
Labor
Party,
1931

Whereupon MacDonald invited the Conservatives and the Liberals to unite with him in backing a “national” government. The Conservatives responded with alacrity, and so did a fraction of the Liberals, with the result that the new ministry, as formed in August 1931 under MacDonald’s titular headship, comprised two or three “National Laborites,” two or three “National Liberals,” and a majority of Conservatives (including Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain). In the ensuing elections, the Coalition won eight-ninths of all the seats in the House. To be sure, the opposing Labor party polled a popular vote of six and a half million and elected four times as many members as did the National Labor party of MacDonald; but the parliamentary representation of the Laborites as a whole was sharply cut, and against 68 National Liberals who supported the Coalition, only Lloyd George and three other Liberals remained in opposition.

National
Coalition

Thus, the British government was essentially conservative and nationalist during the crisis of economic depression from 1931 to 1939, as it had been in the crisis of peace-making and post-war readjustment from 1918 to 1922. In name, it was a coalition government. In fact, it was a government of the Conservative party; and just as formerly the Conservatives had taken Lloyd George, a radical Liberal, in tow, so now they had captured MacDonald, the Labor leader. Under MacDonald until 1935, under Baldwin until 1937, and then under Neville Chamberlain, the government pursued policies at once conservative and patriotic. Tariff protectionism was elaborated by an act of 1932, and certain features of the old Corn Laws were revived.¹ British imperialism was given a new slant by the Statute of Westminster (1931), in accordance with which the self-governing Dominions were recognized as "nations" and grouped together as a "Commonwealth."² National appropriations for army and navy were maintained at a relatively high level (averaging 115 million pounds sterling annually during the decade from 1925 to 1935 as compared with 64 million in 1910), and rising in 1939 to dizzy heights. At the same time, national expenditure for unemployment-relief remained large; and only by withholding debt payments to the United States and abandoning the gold standard did the government appreciably lighten its grievous financial load.

During most of the post-war period, and in its most critical years, the Conservative party was dominant in Great Britain. The Liberals, who had been in power for almost ten years immediately preceding the World War, were now rent by internal dissension and deprived of any large popular following. Principal opposition to the Conservative party had definitely passed from the Liberals to the Laborites, and, though the latter suffered a set-back through the secession of Ramsay MacDonald and his fellow "National Laborites" in 1931, there was evidence aplenty that the set-back was only temporary and that a new political (and social) alignment was becoming ever more sharply defined between Conservatism and Labor. This did not signify, however, that Britain was necessarily headed toward revolution or dictatorship.

**Labor
Opposi-
tion**

¹ On the Corn Laws, see Vol. I, pp. 462, 759, and above, pp. 59-60.

² See above, pp. 653-654.

It is true that there was an unusual amount of criticism of parliamentary government in post-war Britain. At one extreme, some workingmen and some intellectuals espoused Communism of the Russian variety. At the other extreme, Sir Oswald Mosley, a volatile aristocrat, who had been in turn a Conservative and a Radical Laborite and was always something of a poseur, underwent a sudden conversion to Fascism of the Italian (and German) kind and began to inveigh against Parliament and the Jews and to organize a band of "black-shirts." Nevertheless, the confessed Communists in Britain, though noisy, were not numerous, and Sir Oswald's Fascists were an object of popular derision.

Few Communists
and
Fascists

The vast majority of Britishers continued to support the parliamentary party of the Conservatives or that of the Laborites, and both parties were seemingly as desirous as the dwindling Liberal party to retain the characteristic political institutions of modern England. The strength of monarchical tradition was vividly illustrated by the popular enthusiasm which greeted the accession of Edward VIII on the death of his father, George V, in 1936; and less than a year later, when the new king abdicated rather than give up a divorced woman with whom he was infatuated, by the even greater enthusiasm attending the succession of his more prosaic brother, George VI.

Two democratic governments were maintained in Ireland from 1922 onwards. One was the government of Northern Ireland, which functioned at Belfast under the premiership of Sir James Craig (Viscount Craigavon), with a parliamentary majority of Unionists and in subordination to the British government at Westminster.¹

2. British
Common-
wealth:
Ireland

The other was the government of the Irish Free State, which exercised sway at Dublin over the greater part of Ireland in accordance with the written constitution which it adopted (with the sanction of Great Britain) in 1922. This government was directed for ten years, from 1922 to 1932, by William Cosgrave with the backing of moderate Sinn Feiners. Internal order was

¹ Northern Ireland, though accorded a local parliament of its own in 1921 (see above, p. 652), continued to be represented in the British Parliament. It is interesting to note that the title of "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," which had been the official designation of the British monarchy since the Union of 1801, was changed, after the creation of the Irish Free State, to "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland."

restored, religious and other individual liberties were respected, the Irish (Gaelic) language was given an equal legal status with English, and much was done to promote Irish agriculture, industry, and public works. Following the electoral success of extreme Sinn Feiners in 1932, Eamon De Valera became premier and under his guidance a more intensely nationalist policy was pursued. The oath of allegiance to the King was abolished. Appeals to British courts were forbidden. By a new constitution of 1938, the state was re-named "Eire," and the British governor was replaced by a "President."¹ In the same year a favorable trade agreement was negotiated with Great Britain.

Not only Ireland but all the other and older self-governing Dominions of the British Empire stuck to political democracy.²

Canada In Canada, the government was directed from 1917 to 1921 by a coalition of Conservatives and Liberals, then almost continuously for nine years by a Liberal ministry headed by Mackenzie King, then for five years by a Conservative ministry under Richard Bennett, and from 1935 by another Liberal ministry under King. In Australia, the government

Australia was in the hands of a patriotic coalition during the war and throughout the post-war period, except for two years (1929-1931) when the Labor party was in power. In New Zealand, the ministry of William Massey, which had originally been formed in 1912, lasted until his death in 1925, and the same moderate and conservative elements which had supported him retained control of the government until 1935, when the Labor party won the general election and formed a

South Africa ministry. In South Africa, General Smuts, with the joint backing of moderate Boer nationalists and British unionists, was prime minister from the death of General Botha in 1919 until 1924, when he was succeeded by General Hertzog, who had the support of extreme Boer nationalists and also of labor. Hertzog was a democrat as well as a nationalist, and under his leadership the franchise was extended

¹ The first President of "Eire" was Douglas Hyde (see above, pp. 361, 362).

² On the previous history of these self-governing Dominions, see above, pp. 367-376.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Leading the Life in the West End of London," is from a post-war painting by the Anglo-Irish artist Sir William Orpen (1878-1931). The original is in the Metropolitan Museum, New York. On Orpen, see p. 838.

to all men and women of white extraction, while immigration was restricted to persons coming from "Nordic" nations. In the elections of 1933, Smuts joined forces with Hertzog, and the coalition triumphed.

In all the English-speaking countries (including the United States), there was more concern with radical movements after the war than previously, more talk about Socialism and even Communism, and at the same time more manifest nationalism. But in all of them, democratic traditions were still cherished and democratic usages observed.

It was likewise in France. Here, the democratic and parliamentary institutions of the Third Republic continued to function in much the same way as they had functioned before the war. True, extremes of "Left" and "Right" were more vocal with subversive propaganda and more active with hostile demonstrations. On the one hand, a Communist party arose and flourished, denouncing the "bourgeois" Republic and demanding a "dictatorship of the proletariat." On the other hand, the royalist and ultra-patriotic Action Française,¹ intensifying its campaign against the existing régime, gained the allegiance of many youths, especially at Paris, and contributed to the growth of a Fascist movement. Yet the agitation of one extreme tended to counteract the other's, and between the two extremes stood the vast majority of Frenchmen.

From 1919 to 1924 the French government was controlled by the "National Bloc," in which the conservative and very patriotic groups of the Centre and Right were particularly influential, though Socialist Radicals of the Left continued to man the strategic departments of education and the interior. Clemenceau, prime minister during the latter part of the war and during the peace negotiations, retired from office in 1920, following his defeat for the presidency of the Republic in succession to Poincaré. Millerand, once a Socialist and now a conservative and nationalist, became prime minister and shortly afterwards was elevated to the presidency.²

3. France

National
Bloc,
1919-1924

¹ See above, p. 416, note.

² Poincaré had been succeeded as President in 1920 by Paul Deschanel, but later in the year Deschanel resigned and was succeeded by Millerand.

NOTE. The picture opposite, a street scene in Paris near the Eiffel Tower, is from a painting by a "modernist" French artist, Maurice Utrillo (born 1883).

The successive Bloc ministries labored with remarkable success to reconstruct the war-devastated areas of northern France and to restore economic prosperity. Factories were rebuilt and equipped with the most up-to-date machinery. The output of mines and foundries was greatly increased and hydro-electric power was highly developed. Indeed, French machine-industries—both textile and metal—advanced, rather suddenly, into a class with those of Germany and Britain. This industrial advance, coupled with the maintenance of normal agricultural production and the persistence of peasant proprietorship, helps to explain why there was no such pressing problem of unemployment in France as in Great Britain, and why there was no such social disturbance or political revolution as in central or eastern Europe. To be sure, the public debt of France was prodigiously swelled by the war and by post-war reconstruction, and the Bloc ministries, counting upon reparation payments from Germany, failed to balance the budget.

The "National Bloc" was less anti-clerical than the pre-war Radical governments of France had been. It resumed diplomatic relations with the papacy and left the relations of church and state in the recovered provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to be regulated by the concordat of 1801 rather than by the "laic laws."¹ Throughout France, moreover, it eased the enforcement of the Associations Act of 1901 and tolerated the revival of Catholic religious communities.

In the elections of 1924 the Socialist Radicals deserted the "National Bloc" and re-created with the Socialists a "Cartel of the Left," which, profiting from popular disappointment at the failure to make Germany pay, won a majority of seats in Parliament. Whereupon Millerand, who had openly opposed the Cartel in the elections, was forced out of the presidency of the Republic, and under his less assertive successor, Gaston Doumergue, a Radical ministry was installed with Edouard Herriot as premier.

Herriot's Radical ministry lasted barely a year. It withdrew French armed forces from the Ruhr and otherwise evinced a willingness to compromise with Germany. At the same time it undertook an anti-clerical campaign, breaking off diplomatic

¹ On the "laic laws" and French anti-clericalism in general, see above, pp. 404-406, 413-416.

relations with the papacy and threatening to denounce the concordat in Alsace-Lorraine and to stiffen and enforce the "laic laws" throughout France. The result was an alienation of moderates, and their counter-campaign against the Cartel was seconded by many patriots who thought Herriot too conciliatory toward Germany and not conciliatory enough toward Alsace-Lorraine. But what chiefly brought about Herriot's downfall was the sorry state of public finance, and the differences within the Cartel over the means of remedying it. Inflation and a capital levy, advocated by Socialists and extreme Radicals, were repugnant to moderate Radicals, while the former were most reluctant to seek a balancing of the budget through drastic economies and ordinary taxation, which the latter favored. In 1925, with financial affairs reaching a critical stage and the government seemingly powerless to handle them, Herriot resigned. For a year longer his Radical supporters composed ministries which succeeded one another in kaleidoscopic fashion, until at length in 1926, following an alarming decline of the franc and a riotous demonstration at Paris, Herriot and his Radicals on the Left broke with the Socialists and joined the groups of the Centre and Right in constituting a ministry of "national union" under Poincaré's premiership.

Poincaré's "national" ministry rehabilitated French finances. It stabilized the currency, with the franc at about a fifth of its pre-war value. It increased taxes and introduced many economies. It gave France a businesslike administration, completed the reconstruction of the country, and fostered production alike of fields and of factories. Simultaneously, it appeased the Catholics by restoring diplomatic relations with the papacy and by reversing the anti-clerical policies of the Herriot ministry. In 1928, for the benefit of workingmen, it sponsored the enactment of a comprehensive social-insurance law.

Poincaré's
National
Coalition,
1926-1932

The general election of 1928 was a decisive victory for Poincaré and his ministry of National Union, but he was already in bad health and the next year he felt obliged to retire from public life.¹ His immediate successors, however, relied upon the same backing and pursued similar policies, until 1932, when new elections again brought forward a "Left Cartel" and enabled Herriot to form another Radical cabinet.

¹ Poincaré died in 1934. Briand predeceased him in 1932.

The Cartel, this time, was very precarious. The Socialists at the Left were more disposed to fraternize with the Communists at the extreme Left, and the Radicals could not quite make up their minds whether they should go with the Socialists or break with them and join the Centre.

Left
Cartel
Again,
1932-1934

Besides, a most unedifying scandal came to light concerning a financial promoter by the name of Stavinsky and involving a number of republican politicians, especially in the Radical camp. Herriot's ministry, which had been formed in June 1932, was forced to resign in December, and during the next fourteen months five other Radical ministries rose and fell. In February 1934 popular resentment against the Radicals was utilized by extremists, both Royalist and Communist, to precipitate at Paris a series of street riots, in which several persons were killed. Whereupon, to allay the resentment and prevent civil strife, the Radicals united with groups of Centre and

Dou-
mergue's
National
Union,
1934-1936

Right to constitute the "national union." Gaston Doumergue, whose term as President of the Republic had expired the previous year,¹ headed the new coalition ministry. He conducted affairs much as previously, in similar circumstances, Poincaré had conducted them. He was not quite so forceful, and he did not have quite as much personal prestige. And, failing to get Radical support for a constitutional law which would enable the ministry to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and hold new elections, he resigned in 1935.

In 1936 the Socialists and even the Communists formed with the Socialist Radicals a coalition—the so-called Popular Front—

Popular
Front,
1936-1938

on a platform of defending democracy, resisting Fascist tendencies, and effecting social reform. Following the victory of the coalition at the polls in June, the Socialist leader, Leon Blum, headed a Popular Front ministry which lasted a full year and carried out a large measure of its electoral promises. Fascist organizations were dissolved and a good deal of radical labor legislation was enacted.

By the middle of 1937, however, the Popular Front government was encountering serious dissension within its own ranks as well as embittered criticism from without. On the one hand, the Communists were dissatisfied with its compromising mod-

¹ Doumergue's successor in the presidency was Paul Doumer, who was assassinated in 1932. Albert Lebrun was then elected President, and reelected in 1939.

eration and its failure to intervene actively in Spain, while, on the other hand, many Radicals were alarmed by the epidemic of strikes and labor troubles which its policies seemed to invite and by the rapidly growing financial deficit which its prodigal expenditures appeared to entail. For a time after Blum's resignation the coalition troublously continued under a succession of Radical premiers, but eventually in 1938, as public finances went from bad to worse, the Socialist Radicals again broke with the extreme Left and, under the leadership of Edouard Daladier, formed a coalition with the Centre and Right. To Daladier the Parliament at once entrusted limited dictatorial powers in order to introduce needful economies and to restore public confidence.

Daladier's
National
Ministry,
1938

Democratic institutions were also maintained and respected throughout the post-war period by the peoples of Belgium, the Dutch Netherlands, and Switzerland. In each of these countries there were grave economic and financial problems and in Belgium a special cultural problem arising from differences between Flemings and Walloons,¹ but all such problems were dealt with in orderly democratic fashion and with considerable success. In all three countries, there was a weakening of the middle-class Liberal parties and a corresponding access of strength for the more democratic parties of Socialists and Catholics. Communist groups arose and obtained some representation in the several parliaments, but their popular following was relatively small and unimportant.

4. Other
Demo-
cratic
Countries

In the Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and likewise in the neighboring republic of Finland, political democracy was firmly established and popularly supported. In the kingdoms, Socialists or Laborites comprised nearly half of the membership of the several parliaments and frequently presided over the responsible ministries, but the large majority of Scandinavian Socialists were democratic social reformers, willing to coöperate with liberals and even with agrarians, and not disposed to champion a social revolution or a political dictatorship. Under Socialist premiers, Denmark banned strikes and lockouts in 1933 and Sweden enacted an unemployment-insurance law in 1934. Finland, under a democratic government of conservative leanings, outlawed Communist

¹ See above, pp. 435, 436-437, 650.

The Cartel, this time, was very precarious. The Socialists at the Left were more disposed to fraternize with the Communists at the extreme Left, and the Radicals could not quite make up their minds whether they should go with the Socialists or break with them and join the Centre. Again, 1932-1934 Besides, a most unedifying scandal came to light concerning a financial promoter by the name of Stavinsky and involving a number of republican politicians, especially in the Radical camp. Herriot's ministry, which had been formed in June 1932, was forced to resign in December, and during the next fourteen months five other Radical ministries rose and fell. In February 1934 popular resentment against the Radicals was utilized by extremists, both Royalist and Communist, to precipitate at Paris a series of street riots, in which several persons were killed. Whereupon, to allay the resentment and prevent civil strife, the Radicals united with groups of Centre and Right to constitute the "national union." Gaston Doumergue's National Union, 1934-1936 Doumergue, whose term as President of the Republic had expired the previous year,¹ headed the new coalition ministry. He conducted affairs much as previously, in similar circumstances, Poincaré had conducted them. He was not quite so forceful, and he did not have quite as much personal prestige. And, failing to get Radical support for a constitutional law which would enable the ministry to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and hold new elections, he resigned in 1935.

In 1936 the Socialists and even the Communists formed with the Socialist Radicals a coalition—the so-called Popular Front—on a platform of defending democracy, resisting Fascist tendencies, and effecting social reform. Following the victory of the coalition at the polls in June, the Socialist leader, Leon Blum, headed a Popular Front ministry which lasted a full year and carried out a large measure of its electoral promises. Fascist organizations were dissolved and a good deal of radical labor legislation was enacted.

By the middle of 1937, however, the Popular Front government was encountering serious dissension within its own ranks as well as embittered criticism from without. On the one hand, the Communists were dissatisfied with its compromising mod-

¹ Doumergue's successor in the presidency was Paul Doumer, who was assassinated in 1932. Albert Lebrun was then elected President, and reelected in 1939.

eration and its failure to intervene actively in Spain, while, on the other hand, many Radicals were alarmed by the epidemic of strikes and labor troubles which its policies seemed to invite and by the rapidly growing financial deficit which its prodigal expenditures appeared to entail. For a time after Blum's resignation the coalition troublously continued under a succession of Radical premiers, but eventually in 1938, as public finances went from bad to worse, the Socialist Radicals again broke with the extreme Left and, under the leadership of Edouard Daladier, formed a coalition with the Centre and Right. To Daladier the Parliament at once entrusted limited dictatorial powers in order to introduce needful economies and to restore public confidence.

Daladier's
National
Ministry,
1938

Democratic institutions were also maintained and respected throughout the post-war period by the peoples of Belgium, the Dutch Netherlands, and Switzerland. In each of these countries there were grave economic and financial problems and in Belgium a special cultural problem arising from differences between Flemings and Walloons,¹ but all such problems were dealt with in orderly democratic fashion and with considerable success. In all three countries, there was a weakening of the middle-class Liberal parties and a corresponding access of strength for the more democratic parties of Socialists and Catholics. Communist groups arose and obtained some representation in the several parliaments, but their popular following was relatively small and unimportant.

4. Other
Demo-
cratic
Countries

In the Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and likewise in the neighboring republic of Finland, political democracy was firmly established and popularly supported. In the kingdoms, Socialists or Laborites comprised nearly half of the membership of the several parliaments and frequently presided over the responsible ministries, but the large majority of Scandinavian Socialists were democratic social reformers, willing to coöperate with liberals and even with agrarians, and not disposed to champion a social revolution or a political dictatorship. Under Socialist premiers, Denmark banned strikes and lockouts in 1933 and Sweden enacted an unemployment-insurance law in 1934. Finland, under a democratic government of conservative leanings, outlawed Communist

¹ See above, pp. 435, 436-437, 650.

propaganda in 1930, suppressed a Fascist movement in 1932, and in 1933 forbade the preaching of direct action and the maintaining of armed forces by any political group.

4. FROM DEMOCRACY TO DICTATORSHIP IN GERMANY

The German Republic, which had been proclaimed at the time of the collapse of the Hohenzollern Empire in November 1918 and provided with a democratic constitution by the German Republic, Weimar Assembly in 1919,¹ was gravely handicapped 1918-1933 by the post-war requirement of making vast yet indefinite reparation payments to the Allies. The story of what this involved—currency inflation, cancellation of internal indebtedness, drastic taxation at home and big borrowings abroad—we have elsewhere related.²

Yet, bad as were the economic circumstances of post-war Germany, it is very doubtful whether they were essentially worse than those of post-war Britain or even post-war France. Britain's burden of taxation was considerably heavier, her industrial recovery much slower, and the number of her unemployed much larger. France's war debt was staggering, and unlike Germany (or Britain), she had to rebuild an extensive war-devastated area. Nevertheless, in grappling with their economic problems, both the British and the French possessed governments which were of long standing, which had been newly consecrated in popular esteem by the seemingly victorious war they had waged, and which therefore were not readily subject to subversion.

The Germans, on the other hand, were undertaking a novel experiment in self-government; and a people who had thought of the Hohenzollern Empire as a Great Power, occupying a preëminent position in arms and diplomacy, in science and industry, in world prestige, were naturally prone to abuse the Republic which had begun its career by accepting the treaty of Versailles with all its humiliations for Germany.

Nor could the Republican government obtain from the Allies such timely modification of the treaty of Versailles or of the reparation arrangements as might have served to disarm its critics and strengthen its hold upon the German masses. The concessions which it did obtain—the paring down of reparations and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Ruhr and

¹ See above, pp. 623-625, 655.

² See above, pp. 658-663.

the Rhineland—were made too haltingly and with too poor grace.

Despite all these unfavorable circumstances, the German Republic managed to survive under its democratic constitution for fourteen years—from 1919 to 1933. At first, while popular reaction against the war was still potent, the republican parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats commanded a large majority of the German electorate and hence of the Reichstag, and through close coöperation these parties constituted the ministries and directed the policies of the state.¹ As domestic and foreign difficulties multiplied, there were frequent changes of ministry, but every ministry comprised Centrists and Democrats and everyone was supported, if not directly participated in, by Socialists. From 1923, moreover, when French occupation of the Ruhr called forth a united German resistance, the People's party (formerly the National Liberal party) was induced by its leader, Gustav Stresemann, a prominent industrialist and perhaps the most statesmanlike of all post-war Germans, to abandon its opposition to the republican form of government. Stresemann himself headed a coalition ministry in 1923, and though he soon resigned the chancellorship he retained the post of foreign minister under successive Chancellors until his death in 1929.

From 1923 to 1929, indeed, the German Republic seemed to be gathering strength and securing stability. There was some improvement, through the "Dawes plan" and the "Young plan," in the arrangements about reparation payments. There was a marked revival of business. There was some balm to national pride in certain successes which attended Stresemann's diplomacy: he negotiated the "Locarno Pact"² to lessen the danger of another war between France and Germany; and he gained the admission of Germany to the League of Nations and to a place, as a Great Power, on its Council. At the general elections of 1924, the republican coalition polled eighteen million votes out of a total of twenty-nine million. At the general elections of 1928, it polled almost twenty-three million out of a total of thirty-one million.

Republican
Government
Coalition

Its Seem-
ing
Strength

¹ On these parties of Socialists, Centrists, and Democrats, and also on the People's party, see above, pp. 623-625.

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Its Seem-
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The Republic seemed to be more solid than it really was. The governing coalition as a whole might win elections and might collaborate in maintaining the democratic constitution, in distributing offices, and in sustaining Stresemann's conduct of foreign relations, but its elements were too diverse to enable it to adopt and pursue any consistent policy in respect of internal reforms, which were popularly demanded, or in respect of the opposition which beset it from the Nationalist Right and the Communist Left.

Communism of the Russian variety had been preached in Germany during the republican revolution of 1918-1919, but its apostles were then few and ineffectual, and the riots which they precipitated were fairly easily put down. Presently a leader emerged in the person of Ernst Thälmann, a mechanic of Hamburg; and a definitely Communist party was organized with local "cells" and regional "soviets" and in intimate relationship with Moscow. Its popular vote increased from half a million in 1920 to nearly six million in 1932, the increase being almost entirely at the expense of the Socialist vote. Thälmann had no such organizing or managing ability as Lenin or Stalin; and his lieutenants were second-rate, lacking in personal initiative and repeating the phrases rather than emulating the deeds of the Russian Communist leaders. Yet the growing membership of the Communist party in Germany and its intransigent attitude toward the existing order served to stimulate and intensify extremist counter-propaganda.

Subversive propaganda from the extreme Left was troublesome enough to the German Republic, but more disturbing and eventually more fateful was subversive activity by the extreme Right. Here, the original core of the opposition was the landed Prussian aristocracy, long identified with the monarchy and with high office in its army and civil service, and now organized in an anti-republican and anti-democratic Nationalist party. At first the popular following of the Nationalist party was not impressively large. In the election of the Weimar Assembly in 1919, the party polled only three million votes out of a total of thirty million, and for some time afterwards it seemed to be powerless, despite constant vehemence and occasional violence,¹ to arrest the democratic movement and

¹ Erzberger, a Catholic Centrist leader, was assassinated by fanatical National-

restore the old order. In vain one of its leaders, Wolfgang Kapp by name, with the assistance of General von Lüttwitz, executed a *coup d'état* at Berlin in 1920 and put the Republican government to flight; a strike of Socialist workingmen promptly turned the tables, so that Kapp and Lüttwitz ran away and the Republican officials returned. In vain an odd team of nationalistic fanatics, the renowned elderly General Ludendorff and a hitherto inconspicuous young man by the name of Hitler, attempted another *coup* at Munich in 1923; they were arrested and Hitler was jailed.

If Nationalists were as yet unable to overthrow the Republic, they at least could rejoice by 1924 that their cause was gaining ground. For the prevalent financial disorder and economic insecurity of the preceding four years, which was swelling the ranks of the revolutionary Communist party, was operating also, along with widespread popular hatred of foreign tutelage and growing impatience at the seeming ineffectualness of the Republican government, to reënforce the reactionary Right. In the regular election of 1924 the Nationalists polled over five and a half million votes.

Early in 1925 the Nationalists, by clever manœuvring, obtained an even more ominous success. The death of Friedrich Ebert, the Socialist who had been president of the Republic since 1919, necessitated the popular election of a successor; and against the candidate of the Republican coalition, Wilhelm Marx (a leader of the Centre party), the Nationalists put forward Field-Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, Prussian squire and national hero of the battle of Tannenberg.¹ Thanks to Hindenburg's personal fame and thanks to the fact that Thälmann, the Communist leader, entered the campaign as a third candidate, the Nationalists secured a plurality (though not a majority) of the votes cast and thus elected Hindenburg to the presidency. Hindenburg was an old and doubtless overrated man, but he had a venerable appearance and great prestige. It was well known where his basic loyalties were—to Empire, to army, to landed nobility, to the Protestant state-church of Prussia; and it was the hope of reactionary Nationalists, as it was the fear of democratic Republicans, that

Hinden-
burg,
President,
1925

ists in 1921, and Walter Rathenau, a leader of the Democratic party and an outstanding Jewish capitalist, suffered a like fate in 1922.

¹ See above, pp. 584-585.

he would employ his new key-position to forward attempts at restoring the Hohenzollern Empire.

Hindenburg did nothing of the sort, however. Instead, throughout the seven years of his full presidential term, from 1925 to 1932, he coöperated with the Republican majority in the Reichstag and with the Republican chancellors and ministries. It was a source of disappointment to the Nationalists, as it was of satisfaction to the Republicans.

What eventually created havoc for Republicans was the economic depression which began in 1929. Business "prosperity," which had been artificially stimulated for several years by foreign loans and which had been accompanied by industrial overproduction and financial speculation, came to an abrupt halt. There was disappearance or diminution of profits for middle-class persons as well as for landlords and peasants. For workingmen there was decline of wages and rise of unemployment. Desperately but unavailingly the government sought financial relief. Foreign loans could no longer be negotiated, and yet the Allies were exasperatingly dilatory about lightening the load of reparation payments which Germany was expected to carry. Economies in internal administration only swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Heavier taxation only impeded the recovery of business. And the death of Stresemann in the fateful year of 1929 cost the government a remarkably capable foreign minister and a statesman who had linked the industrialists with the cause of the Republic. In the circumstances, the moderate democratic majority in Germany was rapidly whittled away.

It was not that the conservative Nationalist party was making gains; it was scarcely holding its traditional followers. It was rather that a much more popular and militant nationalist party—that of the National Socialists, or "Nazis" as they were commonly styled—was being built up by a plebeian (and magnetic) person. This person was Adolf Hitler, the very one who had been jailed in 1923 for an attempted *coup d'état* against the Republic. He was not widely known at that time, and there was little in his previous career to indicate that he would ever emerge from obscure mediocrity. He had been born in Austria

in 1889 of a family of the lower middle class and had grown up with only ordinary schooling and with only frustrated ambitions. As a youth he had failed to gain admission to the Austrian Academy of Painting and had eked out a meagre livelihood by working long hours in an architect's office at Vienna and, from 1912, as a free-lance illustrator at Munich, solacing himself meanwhile with enthusiastic appreciation of Wagner's operas, Nietzsche's philosophy of the superman, and the anti-Semitic writings of Stewart Chamberlain.¹ Influenced by these sources, he had already become an ardent German nationalist when the World War broke out. Though still an Austrian citizen, he enlisted in the German army, and in it he served throughout the war. He was awarded an iron cross for his valor, but he was never promoted beyond the rank of corporal; and his cup of bitterness was filled to overflowing when the victory of the Allies was followed by the republican revolution within Germany. "My brow burned with shame," he wrote, "and my hatred against the man who had brought about this crime grew and grew; I decided to become a politician."

In 1919, therefore, Hitler had joined with a handful of his youthful army acquaintances in forming a political organization—the National Socialist (or Nazi) party. In 1920 the group adopted an "unalterable program." It was ^{His} ^{Program} certainly radical. It denounced the entire Peace of Paris and demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany, the restoration of the German colonies, and the full rearming of Germany. It assailed Jews within Germany as "aliens," denied them German citizenship, and threatened them with exile. It proposed to prohibit foreign immigration, to ban all "unpatriotic" newspapers or associations, and to "nationalize" popular education. It called for the adoption of economic reforms in harmony with the principle of national, rather than Marxian, socialism. It condemned the "corrupting parliamentary system" and championed professional representation directed by "a strong central authority."

Almost simultaneously with the adoption of this program,

¹ See above, on Wagner, pp. 121-122; on Nietzsche, pp. 262-263. Chamberlain, a Teutonized Britisher, was the son-in-law of Richard Wagner and the author of a ponderous tome, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, in support of the thesis that virtue and civilization are the product of the "Aryan race" and are endangered by the "Semitic race."

Hitler made the significant discovery that he had oratorical ability, that by "letting himself go" in frenzied exposition of woes and wrongs of Germany and in fierce denunciation of Jews and foreigners he could attract and hold large audiences. To a person who had been thwarted all his life, it was gratifying to know that he had at least one talent which he could put to effective use. So, with zest, Hitler took to spellbinding; and in a country where political oratory was relatively rare and customarily restrained, and where of course the general economic and psychological conditions were especially propitious, Hitler's spellbinding drew circus-crowds.

The attempted *coup* of Hitler in 1923 was premature. As yet he was a local rather than a national figure, and his convinced disciples were few. The ensuing year, however, was helpful to him and to his cause. The notoriety which he gained from his arrest, trial, and imprisonment served to arouse widespread interest in him and in National Socialism, at the very time when French occupation of the Ruhr was producing financial chaos and an outraged state of mind all over Germany. Furthermore, Hitler utilized the enforced leisure of a year in jail to write *Mein Kampf*, a sensational account of his life and ideas, a kind of Nazi bible, which soon became a "best seller."

During the next four or five years, Hitler and his lieutenants perfected the party organization and staged ever bigger demonstrations against the Republic. In general, the organization of the National Socialist party in Germany was similar to that of the Communists in Russia or of the Fascists in Italy. Under the dictatorial party headquarters (at Munich) were local "cells" of regular dues-paying members, affiliated societies for youths and children, and also, most important of all, what amounted to a private army consisting of a special police force (the so-called S. S.) and a brigade of "storm troops" (the so-called S. A.). The storm troops, including veterans of the World War as well as many more youthful adventurers, were clad in the party uniform—a brown shirt with the "Aryan" emblem of the Swastika in black on a red arm-band—and were expected to protect party meetings and to break up the meetings of other parties. The special police were a smaller and more select body, wearing the distinctive uniform of a black shirt with a skull as a badge, and acting

His
Oratory

Nazi
Propa-
ganda and
Organiza-
tion

as personal guards for the party leaders and as executioners of their behests. The Nazis were prepared to supplement Hitler's oratory with acts of violence.

The real opportunity for Hitler and the National Socialist party was provided by the serious economic depression which began in 1929. By this time the organization and methods of the party were highly efficient, and the very violence which it preached (and practiced) in behalf of "national regeneration" attracted to it a multitude. Emotional youths flocked to it in crowds. The lower middle class rallied almost solidly to it. Landed aristocrats of the conservative Nationalist party, though still prone to regard Hitler as a vulgar upstart, were quite willing to climb on his band-wagon, which they fondly thought they could subsequently steer. Even industrial magnates commenced to contribute money and votes to the Nazis.

Early in 1930, in a desperate attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the Republic, Heinrich Brüning, a Centrist and one of the ablest men in the Reichstag, was entrusted with the chancellorship. Brüning was sincere and courageous, and he succeeded in bringing about a drastic revision of the reparation arrangements and the final withdrawal of foreign troops from the Rhineland. Nevertheless, neither his achievements nor his abilities availed in the internal situation. The Communists assailed him and the "bourgeois" Republic, while from the opposite extreme the Nazis denounced him and the "traitorous" Republic. Nor could he take energetic measures against the extremes. He was himself a liberally minded person, conscientiously opposed to meeting violence with violence; Socialists on whom he had to rely were tender of the Communists; his more moderate supporters were tender of Nationalists; and both extremes were making dangerous inroads into the electoral strength of democratic republicanism. In vain Brüning appealed to the country in a special election of September 1930. The Communists gained over a million votes and the Nazis almost six million.

Brüning's
Effort to
Save
Republic

The upshot was that the republican coalition no longer had a dependable majority in the Reichstag. The Socialists, who held a balance of power, remained aloof from Brüning's ministry, and whenever they threatened to withhold parliamentary support he had recourse to the article in the constitution which empowered

the President to govern by decree. It thus transpired that for two years, from 1930 to 1932, the government of the German Republic was perilously carried on by Brüning with the apparently loyal coöperation of President von Hindenburg.

So convincing was Hindenburg's loyalty and so strong was his hold on the country at large that Brüning and the Republican coalition labored manfully in the spring of 1932 to ensure his reelection to the presidency of the Republic for another term of seven years. Against him, Hitler was the candidate of the National Socialists, and Thälmann, of the Communists. The results seemed reassuring. Hindenburg was reelected.

Hindenburg's reelection was hailed alike by Centrists, Socialists, and Democrats as a victory for the Republic. It turned out to be nothing of the kind, for Hindenburg proceeded to disappoint his republican supporters in 1932, just as back in 1925 he had disappointed his monarchical supporters, only now more quickly and more utterly. There is little doubt that at heart the Marshal had always been unsympathetic with the republican régime which he headed, and now that he had received a supreme vote of popular confidence in himself, he felt free to heed the more congenial advice of aristocrats and conservatives like himself. These, as we know, were chiefly identified with the Nationalist party, and they sedulously instilled in the old man—now a very old man—a fear that Brüning was much too radical and the hope that a Nationalist government might utilize the numerous Nazis in order to get rid of radicals and to restore things as they had been in the "good old days." At any rate, a month after his reelection, Hindenburg took sudden fright at proposals for breaking up the large landed estates in his native East Prussia and peremptorily dismissed Brüning from the chancellorship.

In Brüning's place Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen, an aristocrat who had once been a member of the Centre party but who had quarreled with its democratic leaders and had left it to ally himself with the Nationalists; and with Papen was associated a ministry of ultra-conservatives, including General Kurt von Schleicher. The new government, though enjoying the confidence of Hindenburg and clothed by him with practically

Hindenburg's Re-election, as President, 1932

His Dismissal of Brüning

Reactionary Ministries of Papen and Schleicher, 1932-1933

dictatorial powers, was confronted with a hostile majority in the Reichstag and with a threatening situation in the key state of Prussia, where Socialists held the premiership and commanded the police. Furthermore, it had to rely upon the backing of Hitler and the National Socialists as well as upon that of the conservative Nationalists, and between the two groups were notable differences of size and divergencies of aim. The Nationalists, who constituted the government, wanted to use the Nazis for their own conservative ends, but the Nazis, whose following was far more numerous, would tolerate the new government only as a means of enabling themselves to get into power.

In the meantime Papen and Schleicher, with the help of Nazi fury and violence, sought to remove the handicaps which beset the reactionary government. In July 1932, they executed a military *coup* against the Socialist premier and police officials in Prussia. The latter refrained from calling a general strike, such as had defeated Kapp's monarchical *coup* ten years earlier, and meekly surrendered their posts, alleging in justification of their pusillanimous behavior that resistance would have aided the Communists. This collapse of the Socialists overjoyed Papen and his Nationalists, and the Nazis likewise. Then, eleven days after the *coup*, a general election was held in an effort to secure an amenable Reichstag. This effort was not so successful. Papen's party lost seats in the Reichstag, and in carrying on the administration he was more than ever dependent on the friendship of Hindenburg and the favor of Hitler.

Collapse
of Social-
ist Resist-
ance

In November 1932 Papen had Hindenburg dissolve the Reichstag again, and once more he appealed to the verdict of a general election. This time the conservative Nationalists made some gains, but they were more than offset by gains of the Communists. Disappointed, Papen resigned; and Hindenburg, still averse from turning over the government to the plebeian Hitler, appointed General von Schleicher as Chancellor. For two months longer Schleicher carried on without a Reichstag majority, in the face of open opposition from Hitler, and in the midst of secret intrigues on the part of Papen and influential landlords and business men who were now convinced that the conservative cause could best be served through outright collaboration with the National Socialists.

This conviction was finally implanted in Hindenburg, and in January 1933 the senile president dismissed Schleicher and appointed Hitler to the chancellorship, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor. "And now, gentlemen," declared Marshal von Hindenburg, "forward with God!"

It was really "Forward with Hitler." For Hitler was at last in power, and to the discomfiture of his opponents he was in power in accordance with the letter of the constitution.¹ His government, to be sure, was not yet a unit; it represented a coalition of National Socialists with conservative Nationalists. But the latter were a convenient link with Hindenburg and "respectability," and in view of their relatively small popular following they were less likely to oppose the Nazi phalanx than to be absorbed by it. The important thing was that Nazi members of the government commanded the public police as well as the private "storm troops," and thereby Hitler was enabled to suppress opposition and overawe the country. Moreover, a timely burning of the Reichstag building in Berlin was blamed upon Communists and utilized both to justify strong measures against them and to increase the popular following of the Nazis. Amidst excitement and terrorism, new elections, in March 1933, resulted quite favorably to the latter. Their popular vote went up to seventeen and a quarter million while that of the conservative Nationalists remained at three million. Of the other parties, only the Centrist held its own; the Socialist and the Communist both lost ground, and the Democratic and People's parties almost completely disappeared.

President von Hindenburg at once decreed that the Republican flag of black, red, and gold should be hauled down and replaced by two flags: the black, white, and red of the old Empire, and the swastika of the new nationalism. And on April 1 the Reichstag voted to delegate its powers, for a term of four years, to the Hitler government. Thus the democratic German Republic formally passed away and was succeeded by what was styled the "Third German Empire"²

¹ Both the Socialists and the Centrists and also organized labor protested otherwise, but their protests were platonic. Schleicher at first was minded to defy the President, but he hesitated and presently acquiesced. Communist demonstrations against Hitler were suppressed by Nazi storm troops.

² The "First" had been the Holy Roman Empire, from 962 to 1806, and the "Second," the Hohenzollern Empire, from 1871 to 1918.

and what was essentially a National Socialist dictatorship.

The change was not merely one of name. It was a real break with Germany's past, not only with the liberal and democratic traditions of the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848 and the Weimar Assembly of 1919, but also with the conservative traditions of the Hohenzollern Empire from 1871 to 1918. Conservatives who helped Hitler to bring about the change hoped no doubt that it would be but a prelude to the restoration of the former Empire, but in this they were disappointed. Hitler's main backing was popular and radical rather than aristocratic and reactionary, and by means of it he was enabled not only to overthrow the democratic Republic but to hold conservatives in check and forestall any restoration of constitutional monarchy. The Third Empire was something new: a dictatorship, less evolutionary than revolutionary.

The revolution which inaugurated the Third Empire was attended by intense popular enthusiasm, skillfully worked up and exploited by propagandists of the new régime. Press, radio, and cinema were alike utilized to stir patriotic emotions and to direct them into National Socialist channels. For the same purpose was staged a rapid succession of imposing public demonstrations: brown-shirted storm troopers parading and saluting, young people singing and cheering, multitudes listening to inflammatory speeches and waving swastika flags. Such methods were usual with the Nazis, and they were developed to the full and employed with overwhelming effect under the guidance of one of Hitler's chief lieutenants, Joseph Goebbels,¹ who had a genius for showmanship and was given an official post as "Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment." Like a whirlwind the hysteria swept the country. On all sides the new order was hailed as "restoring the self-respect of the nation," and any doubt about it on the part of individuals or groups had to be dissembled.

¹ Goebbels was born in the Rhineland in 1897 of peasant and artisan stock. Undersized and afflicted from infancy with a club foot, he was rejected for army service in the World War. Endowed with a good mind and aided by scholarships, he attended several universities, eventually obtaining the Ph. D. degree from Heidelberg in 1921. He joined the National Socialist party in 1924, becoming the editor of its Berlin newspaper in 1926 and a member of the Reichstag in 1928. In 1929, as director of the party's propaganda, he found a most congenial field for his talents: his vituperative fanaticism, his fondness for the spectacular, his great organizing abilities.

"Third
Empire"

Popular
Enthusi-
asm

The hysteria of the Nazi revolution was heightened and extended by spectacular "drives" of Hitler and his aides against certain groups—notably Jews and Marxists—who were made scapegoats for Germany's misfortunes during and since the World War. On April 1, 1933, the very day on which the dictatorship was formally established, the government sponsored a nation-wide boycott against Jewish shopkeepers and professional men, and shortly afterwards it decreed that only "Aryans" (that is, German citizens who were not Jews and whose parents and grandparents were not Jews) might occupy civil or military posts or serve as judges, policemen, school teachers, or university professors. There followed a wholesale dismissal of Jews (and Christians with Jewish blood) from state institutions and public offices, an active discrimination against them in the learned professions and in business, and spasmodic assaults upon them individually and collectively. Thousands of German Jews fled abroad, and the much larger number who could not or would not flee suffered grievously in mind and estate. Such rabid anti-Semitism evoked indignation in foreign countries, but in Germany it was excused and gloried in as making for national unity and patriotic regeneration.

On May Day 1933, while the anti-Jewish "drive" was still in full vigor, Hitler's government climaxed its parallel campaign against Marxists by staging at Berlin a monster counter-demonstration of "German labor." Hundreds of thousands of Nazi workingmen paraded and saluted, sang and cheered, while Nazi storm troops cowed Communist and Socialist workingmen into silence. So utterly cowed, indeed, were the latter that the government proceeded promptly and without trouble to ban all Marxian propaganda in the country, to abolish all Socialist as well as Communist trade unions and confiscate their funds, and to substitute a single labor organization, the "German Labor Front," directed and controlled by the National Socialist party.

Taking advantage of the rising popular enthusiasm for the "new Germany" and of the swift and spectacular suppression of Jews and Marxists, Hitler and his Nazi lieutenants moved next to rid themselves of possible political opposition. In May 1933 the parliament of the key state of Prussia was obliged to confer on the local premier dicta-

Anti-Semitism

Anti-Marxism

Suppression of Dissent

torial powers similar to those which the Reichstag had already conferred on the Imperial Chancellor, and to the new dictatorship in Prussia Hitler at once appointed his close friend and associate, Hermann Göring.¹ Simultaneously the other German states were subjected to "governors" named by Hitler and responsible to him. Moreover, leaders of the conservative Nationalist party, and likewise of the People's party, perceiving at last that they were but tails to the Nazi dog (and powerless to wag the dog), were induced to break up their respective political organizations and to accept "guest membership" in the National Socialist party. In June 1933, furthermore, the government decreed the destruction of the Socialist and Democratic parties, and early in July, through a concordat which Papen in Hitler's behalf negotiated with the Vatican, Pope Pius XI agreed to the dissolution of the Catholic Centre party in return for a pledge that the Catholic Church would continue to enjoy full religious freedom in Germany. Whereupon Hitler decreed that in the Third Empire there should be but a single political party, and that the National Socialist party.

Thus, within six months of Hitler's advent to the chancellorship, he was the practical dictator of Germany. Hindenburg still remained titular "President of the Republic," but the Republic was dead and Hindenburg was dying. The living state was now the highly centralized Third Empire, and the real power in it was Hitler's. To Hitler, at once Chancellor of the Empire and leader of the sole remaining political party in Germany, had been subjected the central Reichstag, the several state governments, the entire civil and military bureaucracy, the press, the radio, the schools, and all individual liberties. A clean sweep was made of all elements who had opposed the Nazis during recent years. Not only Jews and Marxists suffered, but a large number of other German citizens. Open dissenters who were not hounded into exile were herded in "concentration camps." The masses seemed acquiescent and even enthusiastic.

¹ Göring, who shared with Goebbels the special confidence of Hitler, was born in Bavaria in 1893, the son of a Prussian army officer and colonial administrator. He himself had a brilliant record as an aviator during the World War, and his disappointment with the outcome of the war made him a temporary drug-addict and a permanent convert to National Socialism. Göring was wealthy and resourceful, and with energy and ruthlessness he combined a fondness for art and show.

By the autumn of 1933 Hitler was ready to seek a national endorsement of the Nazi revolution which he had effected, and in order to obtain the greatest possible endorsement he cleverly availed himself of an international issue which would appeal to German patriots. At an international conference then pending at Geneva on the limitation of armaments and sponsored by the League of Nations, Hitler's representatives had proclaimed the right of Germany, under the Versailles treaty, to rearm herself fully unless the other Powers should straightway reduce their armaments to a level with hers. In October, when the conference failed to reach any agreement about mutual disarmament or to sanction any rearmament of Germany, Hitler withdrew his delegates from the conference and announced Germany's secession from the League. If foreign nations would not recognize Germany as an equal, he said, Germany should go her own way without them. This was the issue which he presented to the German electorate. He called for popular ratification of his action in breaking with the League of Nations and simultaneously he called for the election of a new and "loyal" Reichstag.

The plebiscite and the election of the new Reichstag were held in November 1933. In the former, forty and a half million Germans voted "yes" and two million voted "no." In the latter, thirty-nine and a half million cast their ballots for the list of candidates nominated by the National Socialist party—the only party which could nominate candidates—while three and a half million ballots were "blank" or "spoiled." Despite the fact that the opposition was minimized by the electoral system and methods, there could be no doubt that Hitler and his Third Empire had received an overwhelming popular endorsement.

With a Reichstag unanimously devoted to him, Hitler buttressed the new régime with two important constitutional laws.

Popular Endorsement The first, adopted in December 1933, provided that the National Socialist party "is inseparably united with the state," and that "its regulations are determined by the Leader" (that is, by Hitler personally). The second, ratified by the Reichstag in January 1934 on the anniversary of Hitler's accession to the chancellorship, formally abolished the state parliaments and transformed the several states (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc.) into mere administrative districts of the

Centralizing Government

Empire, and at the same time empowered the central government to alter the imperial constitution at will.

The Third Empire, then, emerged as a National Socialist dictatorship. It was highly centralized and emphatically national. What neither the Hohenzollern Empire nor the Weimar Republic had ventured to undertake—the destruction of local autonomy and the complete submerging of Prussia and the other historic German states—was now finally achieved.

As there was only one government in the Third Empire, so there was only one party, the National Socialist. This was splendidly organized, with headquarters at Munich in a famous "brown house" (reconstructed and enlarged in 1934), with an intricate hierarchy of departments, vocational, educational, and recreational, with a Political Bureau, with a Labor Front, with a Youth Movement, with an extraordinarily adept Propaganda Agency, with disciplinary courts of its own, and with armed forces of its own—the picked party police (the S. S.) and the more numerous storm troops (the S. A.). The enrolled membership of the party was relatively small; it was kept down by a system of careful selection and probation, and comprised, in the autumn of 1933, fewer than two million. Nevertheless, it was a militant membership, in close and manifold touch with the masses all over Germany, and disciplined and directed from above.

Single
National
Socialist
(Nazi)
Party

The dictator of the Third Empire, of course, was Adolf Hitler. This he was in virtue of his leadership of the National Socialist party, of his official position as Chancellor, and of his own personal qualities. Before his advent to public office there had been a tendency to regard him either as an ignoramus incompetent to rule or as a demagogue whose vogue would be fleeting. After his advent, however, it became apparent, even to his bitterest foes and detractors, that he possessed remarkable qualifications for dictatorship: not only oratory and histrionics, but insight into popular psychology, quickness in making decisions and energy in carrying them into effect, adroitness in managing men and inspiring their confidence, and untiring application to the details of administration.

There was some danger of conflict within the National Socialist party. It had a "left" wing and a "right" wing, disposed respectively to stress or to belittle the "socialism" in the party's

name and platform, and some of its leading men had rival personal ambitions. To Hitler the danger seemed acute in the spring of 1934, when the ambitious commander of the storm troops, Ernst Röhm by name, growing critical of the government's economic "conservatism" and indignant at its talk of reducing and reforming his command, was suspected of conspiring with the ex-Chancellor, General Kurt von Schleicher, to overthrow Hitler. At any rate, Hitler, in conjunction with Goebbels, Göring, and the secret police, took drastic action at the end of June 1934 to nip any such conspiracy in the bud and to terrorize the National Socialist party into unity and the country at large into obedience. Röhm with several of his aides was murdered at Munich in Hitler's presence. General von Schleicher was dragged from his home at Berlin and slain. Simultaneously, some of Papen's associates were slaughtered, and so too were certain Catholic and labor leaders. Altogether, in the "purge of 1934," several hundred persons were murdered. "Reasons of state" and of "morality" were all that Hitler would advance, and the unquestioning acceptance of his explanation clearly demonstrated the strength of the dictatorship he exercised over the party and over the country.

Purge of
1934

Death of
Hinden-
burg,
1934;
Hitler as
Reichs-
führer

About a month after the "purge," President and Marshal Paul von Hindenburg died on his estate in East Prussia. Then, following grandiose funeral rites on the battlefield of Tannenberg, at which Hitler was chief mourner and orator, Hitler decreed that, subject to ratification by popular vote, Hitler should be President as well as Chancellor under the new official title of Imperial Leader (Reichsführer). Ratification was given in a plebiscite in August 1934. Although four and a quarter million Germans voted "no," thirty-eight and a quarter million voted "yes." At last, by popular will as well as by his own, Adolf Hitler was sole Leader of Germany, real successor of the Hohenzollerns and of Hindenburg and with far more authority than any of them.

Reënforcing the dictatorship was incessant preaching of the philosophy—one might say the religion—of National Socialism. This philosophy was essentially Fascist but more extreme (in certain ways) and more devotional. Like Italian Fascism, it taught that people exist for the state, not the state for its people,

and that the state must be national and imperial, military and expansive. Like Italian Fascism, too, its ideal was the "totalitarian state," a state which should embrace an entire nationality and should regulate all the activities of its members, political, economic, and cultural. Likewise, after the manner of Italian Fascism, its program called for an "authoritarian state," in which a single select political party would rule and from which personal dissent and class conflict would be banished, and for a "corporate state," which, while retaining private property and class distinctions, would subordinate them to national welfare and would make occupational groups, rather than individuals, the units of economic and political life. Thus, like Italian Fascism, German National Socialism was the implacable foe of liberalism, democracy, Marxian socialism, and also of pacifism and internationalism and of what were deemed the traditional Christian virtues of humility, meekness, and charity. Beyond Italian Fascism went German National Socialism in respect of its distinctive doctrine of racial superiority—that the Germans, being "pure Aryans," are inherently superior in moral virtue and military prowess not only to all their "Slavic" and "Latin" neighbors but also to the alien and contaminating "Semitic" Jews in their midst. Fiercer and more evangelical, too, was the ardor with which National Socialism inflamed its votaries. Mussolini had a sense of humor, but not Hitler. Fascism was ceremonial and even theatrical, but the rites of National Socialism were performed with deadly earnestness.

Totalitarian State

"Aryan" State

The inculcation of Nazi doctrine was masterfully directed by Joseph Goebbels, "imperial minister of propaganda and public enlightenment," and by Alfred Rosenberg, "supervisor of the party's educational and spiritual work."¹ The latter was the theorist, expounding the "gospel" and detecting "heretics" among writers, artists, university pro-

"Coördination"

¹ So designated by Hitler in January 1934. Rosenberg, born in 1893 at Reval (then in Russia and now in Estonia) and educated as an engineer in Russia, migrated to Germany after the war and joined the National Socialist party in 1919. A prolific writer of brochures and books, and from 1921 the editor of the principal Nazi newspaper, he made amends for his Jewish name and his Russian background by becoming the most rabid anti-Russian leader of the party. A big book of his, published in 1930, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, is the most ambitious exposition of the philosophy of the Nazi movement.

fessors, and intellectuals generally. The former was the executive, responsible for the staging of public demonstrations and for the even more important work of "coördination." This meant the bringing of all cultural agencies into harmony with National Socialism and their utilization for its promotion. All the press throughout Germany was thus "coördinated." So were the radios and the cinemas and the theatres. So was the entire school system—the teachers and the textbooks in all educational institutions from kindergarten to university.

Some difficulty was experienced in "coördinating" the Christian churches. Prior to Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship, the bishops of the Catholic Church in Germany had forbidden the faithful to join or support his party on the ground that its incitements to hatred, war, and racial intolerance were basically anti-Christian.¹ Then, following Hitler's establishment in office and his apparently conciliatory negotiation of a concordat with the Vatican, promising religious freedom to the church, the bishops acquiesced in the dissolution of the Centre party and withdrew their formal condemnation of National Socialism. The concordat, however, brought about a restless truce rather than real peace between the Catholic Church and the Third Empire. Hitler and his associates, regarding the concordat as a first step in "coördinating" the church, interfered with Catholic societies and publications of all kinds, compelling them to serve Nazi ends or else suppressing them. Moreover, appropriations for Catholic worship were decreased and a campaign was waged against Catholic schools and religious orders. All this was interpreted in Catholic circles as willful violation of the concordat, and many bishops and priests protested against the "tyranny" and "paganism" of the Nazi régime. Nevertheless, neither church nor government was anxious to engage openly in another Kulturkampf.² The government preferred a gradual undermining of the church, and Catholic leaders were apprehensive about losing popular support if an out-and-out conflict was joined with the nationalist government. The uncertainty on both sides made for caution but not for harmony.

¹ Hitler in childhood had been baptized and reared a Catholic, but in manhood he was hardly a practicing one. He sometimes styled himself a Catholic; but National Socialism, rather than Christianity, was his real religion.

² On the Kulturkampf of Bismarck's time, see above, pp. 304, 307.

German Protestantism had been always allied with secular government and usually quite subservient to it. But there were several different Protestant churches in Germany, not only the Lutheran and the Calvinist, but the separate state churches of Prussia, Saxony, etc., and in each were different shades of individual opinion. The problem here, then, for Hitler and his colleagues was twofold: first, to combine all the Protestant churches into one, as the Catholic Church was one; and second, to co-ordinate the unified church with the Empire. They did succeed in effecting a corporate union—in name—under an "Imperial Bishop" warmly sympathetic with National Socialism, but they failed to "coördinate" the whole union or even to hold it together. Before long it was apparent that many Protestants as well as Catholics, though willing to coöperate politically with National Socialism, would resist dictation in the field of religion.

On the other hand, extremists among the Nazis pressed for a national repudiation of Christianity altogether and a revival of the pre-Christian tribal and pagan religion of the ancient Germans, with at least symbolical worship of Thor and Woden and veneration of the warrior-heroes of Valhalla. Prominent among such extremists was Alfred Rosenberg, "the philosopher" of National Socialism.

Accompanying the Nazis' forceful campaign to establish uniformity of thought and action in Germany was a remarkable emigration of intellectuals—scholars, scientists, publicists, professors—who would not or could not be "coördinated." Some of these were Jews, but many were non-Jews. Though the government tried to arrest the emigration, thousands managed to get away to foreign parts, spreading hatred of the Nazi régime and incidentally depleting Germany of independent men of genius and reputation.


The chief reason why Hitler kept his hold upon the German masses was the striking success which attended his foreign policy. For a decade before his advent to power he had been an impassioned and much publicized champion of Germany's tearing up the treaty of Versailles, rearming herself, and recapturing all "German" lands; and during the first five years of his dictatorship he actually achieved an impressive part of this very program—to the delight of Germans and the chagrin of foreigners. How he was enabled to do

Nazi
"Pagans"

Flight of
Intellectuals

Militarism and
Forceful
Expansion

it, we shall explain in the next chapter. Here it suffices to point out that in 1935 he repudiated the treaty restrictions on Germany's military and naval forces and proceeded to create an army comparable with that of the Hohenzollern Empire; that in 1936 he remilitarized the Rhineland in flat violation of the treaty



GERMANY (HOHENZOLLERN EMPIRE), 1871-1918


NOTE. This is after Bismarck's partition of the German Confederation and his enlargement of Prussia. The numerals refer to provinces of Prussia: (1) East Prussia; (2) West Prussia; (3) Pomerania; (4) Brandenburg; (5) Posen; (6) Silesia; (7) Saxony; (8) Hanover; (9) Schleswig-Holstein; (10) Westphalia; (11) Hesse-Nassau; (12) Rhineland.

of Versailles and retracted the German signature to the war-guilt charges in the same document; that in 1938 he seized Austria by force and began the partition of Czechoslovakia; that in 1939 he completed the destruction of this state, and extorted Memel from Lithuania.

Austria, which the peace treaties of 1919 had reduced to narrowly German confines, managed to preserve its independence

for nineteen years—from 1919 to 1938. At the outset its government was carried on by a coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Socialists,¹ but presently the latter gained a predominance under the leadership of a distinguished priest and statesman, Ignatius Seipel, who was Chancellor

Austria,
1919-1938



GERMANY (THIRD EMPIRE) IN 1939

NOTE. This shows the single centralized state with which Hitler superseded the Federal Republic of 1919-1933, including Austria and the German regions of Czechoslovakia which he annexed in 1938, and (with different markings) the Czech and Slovak "protectorates" which he created in 1939.

of the Republic from 1922 to 1924 and again from 1926 to 1929.

The majority of both Christian Socialists and Social Democrats were loyal to the Republic, but it was difficult for them to coöperate. The former were Catholic and chiefly rural and agrarian; the latter were Marxian and almost wholly urban and

¹ On the democratic constitution of the Austrian Republic, and on the parties of Christian Socialists and Social Democrats, see above, pp. 630-631, 655.

wage-earning. The former were jealous of provincial autonomy; the latter were eager to subordinate the countryside to the capital city of Vienna. To complicate matters, the Social Democrats had a left wing which, under the stress of sorry economic conditions at Vienna, grew more numerous and more inimical to collaboration with any "bourgeois" government,¹ while a right wing of the Christian Socialists was so antagonistic to Marxian Socialists that it stood ready to make common cause against them with extreme Nationalists.

There were two types of Nationalist in Austria. The first, corresponding to the Conservative in Germany, was aristocratic, aiming at a repudiation, so far as possible, of individualism and democracy, a restoration of the Habsburg dynasty, and an alliance or federation with Germany. The second type was more plebeian; it was embodied in a National Socialist (Nazi) party, which, imported from Germany, availed itself of the desperate economic conditions prevalent from 1929 to win converts, especially from the restless youth and the impoverished middle class, to the entire program of Hitler, including the submergence of Austria in a militant German Empire.

When Seipel retired from politics on account of ill health, another Christian Socialist leader, Engelbert Dollfuss, came to the fore. Dollfuss was of peasant stock, young in years and diminutive in stature, but full of energy. For a time he sought collaboration of the Social Democrats with his Christian Socialists, but it was difficult to obtain, and, as the menace of National Socialism rapidly increased in Austria after its triumph in Germany, he gradually reached the conclusion that democracy must be sacrificed for a dictatorship of his own party. This was accomplished by a new constitution which he put into effect in April 1934, and which described the new régime as "a Christian Corporate State."

To the Christian Socialist dictatorship both Social Democrats and National Socialists were violently opposed, and against both the government directed repressive measures. In February 1934, on the eve of the adoption of the new constitution, the proclama-

¹ Social Democrats controlled the municipal government of Vienna, which sponsored expensive public works, including noteworthy construction of model tenements. In July 1927 they organized against the national government a monster demonstration at Vienna, which was terminated by state police and militia.

tion of a general strike by Socialist leaders was answered by an attack of government troops on Socialist strongholds in Vienna, resulting in four days' street fighting, the outlawing of the Social Democratic party, and the merging of all trade unions in a national union under governmental guidance and control.

Then, in July 1934, National Socialists attempted a *coup* against the government. Dollfuss was assassinated at Vienna and widespread rioting occurred in the provinces. In the face of threats from Mussolini, however, Hitler did not venture to intervene; and under the leadership of Kurt Schuschnigg, who succeeded Dollfuss in the chancellorship, order was restored and the peculiar Austrian dictatorship continued on its difficult course for four years more.

By 1938 Schuschnigg was in a desperate situation. His dictatorship had only minority support. The Nazis were multiplying and becoming more unruly. The Socialists were still numerous and sullen. Hitler was constantly threatening, and Mussolini was no longer minded to halt him. Economic conditions were growing steadily worse. In vain Schuschnigg made direct overtures to Hitler for an understanding; Hitler was patently hostile to him. Then in March 1938 Schuschnigg suddenly called for a plebiscite of the Austrian people to decide on the future of the country and appealed especially to the Socialists to back him in a supreme effort to preserve Austrian independence. The response would probably have been favorable, but before it could be given Hitler intervened; and against the overwhelming force and great speed of the German army, Austria was helpless. As German troops poured across the borders, Schuschnigg resigned (and was imprisoned) and the Nazis took possession of the country. Ruthlessly they silenced dissent and extracted from the masses an almost unanimous assent to the union of Austria with the German Empire under its militant dictatorship.

Schuschnigg
and
Austria's
End

5. TREND TOWARD DICTATORSHIP ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE

All the lesser national states in east-central and southeastern Europe issued from the World War as democracies, and most of them as republics.¹ Within them, however, the operation of democratic government soon proved difficult. They were newly created or newly unified states, confronted with the task either of

¹ See above, pp. 654-658.

getting people to govern themselves who had never done so before or of welding together hitherto disparate populations. They were handicapped, too, by social and economic conditions of the utmost gravity—by losses and costs of the war, by staggering public and private indebtedness, by urgent requirements of reparation or reconstruction, by ruinous inflation, and simultaneously by pressing popular demands for agrarian and other social reform. Moreover, to surmount their handicaps and perform their tasks, the new democracies had to rely upon parliaments whose members were generally inexperienced in the practical conduct of public affairs and split up among a large number of mutually antagonistic political parties representing many varieties of opinion from the extreme of feudalism to that of communism.

**Obstacles
to Democ-
racy**

Czechoslovakia had in some degree the same difficulties as its neighbors and certain grave difficulties peculiar to itself. It was an artificial state, geographically misshapen and ethnically incongruous. Czechs and Slovaks comprised a scant majority of its total population, and between these two peoples, despite a similarity of language, were significant differences of tradition and ambition. The Czechs, concentrated in the western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (which had long been associated with Austria), were inclined to look down upon the Slovaks of the eastern provinces (which had been connected for a longer time with Hungary) and to deny them the autonomy to which they aspired. Moreover, in the western provinces the Czechs were disliked by a large minority of Germans, while in the east the Slovaks were despised by a large minority of Hungarians. To add to the ethnic confusion, the city of Teschen was Polish and the mountainous region in the far east was almost entirely Ruthenian (Ukrainian).

**Czecho-
slovakia**

Nevertheless, the great prestige of Thomas Masaryk, who in a very real sense had been the "father of his country" and who was its first President, enabled Czechoslovakia to hold together under its centralized democratic government for eighteen years. There were spasmodic conflicts between Socialists and Catholics and between Czechs and Slovaks, and much grumbling by the minor-

NOTE. The portrait bust, opposite, is of President Masaryk of the Czechoslovakian Republic, by the Yugoslav sculptor, Ivan Meštrović (born 1883). On Meštrović, see below, p. 842.

ities. Yet noteworthy progress was made in army, education, and transportation, and at least until 1930 in economic and financial rehabilitation.

From 1935, when Masaryk retired on account of age and infirmity, the situation grew gradually worse. The large German element in Bohemia and Moravia, egged on by Nazi propaganda from Germany, became more united in opposition to the Czech government and more insistent on political as well as cultural autonomy. Germany's annexation of Austria in March 1938 served not only to encircle the main part of Czechoslovakia with a formidable foreign Power but also to embolden her own German inhabitants in their subversive efforts; and to these was now added a big wave of disaffection among the other national minorities. At length in September 1938, following an acute international crisis,¹ Czechoslovakia was partially dismembered, the German districts of Bohemia and Moravia being appropriated by Germany, the city of Teschen by Poland, and the Magyar regions of Slovakia by Hungary. At the same time, Masaryk's successor, Edward Beneš, resigned as President and fled the country; semi-autonomous governments were set up for Slovaks and Ruthenians, and the Czech government at Prague became quasi-dictatorial.

Its Partition, 1938-1939

The final partition of Czechoslovakia occurred in March 1939. The Czech prime minister tried to depose the head of the separatist Slovak cabinet, whose reply was a prompt appeal to Hitler for German "protection." Whereupon, Hitler forced the Czech government not only to accede to Slovak demands but to place itself under his domination. German troops poured into Prague, Bohemia and Moravia were made a dependency of the German Empire, and Slovakia was transformed into a German protectorate. Simultaneously Hungary invaded and conquered the Ruthenian province of Carpatho-Ukraine. Czechoslovakia thus disappeared, and its democracy was replaced by dictatorship.

Yugoslavia was troubled by somewhat similar differences in culture and political ambition between the Serbs and the Croats. The former were Orthodox and "backward"; the latter were

¹ See below, p. 807.

NOTE. The picture opposite is from a sculptured memorial by Ivan Meštrović of King Peter I, the first sovereign of united Yugoslavia. See the genealogical table facing p. 494; and on King Peter, see above, p. 498.

Catholic and "progressive." Furthermore, though both were devoted to the "greater Yugoslavia" which the World War had brought into existence, the former regarded it as a mere expansion of Serbia and insisted therefore upon manning the whole centralized administration of the realm, while the latter strove for a federal state with "home rule" for Croatia. Frequent fights between Serb and Croatian deputies in the Chamber at Belgrade reached a climax in June 1928 with the killing of Stefan Radič, the Croatian leader, and several of his lieutenants. Whereupon, early in 1929, King Alexander, with the support of the army, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution, and proclaimed himself dictator. He personally appointed the ministers and all local officials. He exercised a rigorous press censorship and directed a ruthless suppression of dissent. In 1931 the royal dictatorship was formally ended by the promulgation of a new constitution. Practically, however, the dictatorship continued, for the new constitution was issued by the King and enabled him to control both the military and the civil service, to name half the Senate, and indirectly to dominate the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. As was expected, "government candidates" carried the ensuing general election, and for the next three years the ministry was solidly Serbian with no Croatian representation. In 1934 King Alexander, on a trip to France, was assassinated at Marseilles. His son, a boy of eleven years, succeeded as Peter II with a regency which pursued a more conciliatory policy.

Rumania managed under parliamentary auspices to unify, politically and administratively, the newly acquired provinces of Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and also to effect an important land reform throughout the kingdom, involving the expropriation of 13,000 landlords and the partition of their combined estates of fourteen and a half million acres among a million peasants. Nevertheless, the agencies of democratic government—elections, parliament, and ministries—continued to be manipulated by cliques of professional politicians, some of whom were notoriously corrupt and all of whom were inclined to be arbitrary if not dictatorial. On the death of the war-king, Ferdinand I, in 1927, his infant grandson, Prince Michael, succeeded to the throne under a regency, but by a *coup d'état* in 1930 Michael's father, who had been

legally debarred from the succession on account of his infatuation with a woman of unsavory reputation, deposed the child-king and crowned himself as Charles (Carol) II. Charles II, in a somewhat mercurial manner, exercised practically dictatorial power, at one time banning a Nazi party known as the "Iron Guard" and at another time entrusting the premiership to a fanatical anti-Semite.

Poland, the largest and most populous of the new states of central Europe, achieved a remarkable amount of consolidation and reconstruction, administrative, financial, and educational, but she did so at the expense of liberal Poland parliamentary democracy. From the outset, the Polish electorate, and consequently the Polish parliament, was split into an extraordinarily large number of political factions, the chronic rivalries and intrigues of whose leaders made the successful operation of constitutional government almost impossible. At length in 1926 Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the Polish hero of the World War, executed a military *coup d'état*, overturning the cabinet of the day, assuming the premiership of a "nationalist" ministry, and becoming virtual dictator. Pilsudski refused to be called a dictator and showed notable reluctance to appear as one. He declined to accept the presidency of the republic, and in 1930 he relinquished the premiership. Nevertheless, with the army in back of him, he tolerated in the presidency and in the ministry only such persons as would do his will, and shortly before his death in 1935 he compelled a reluctant parliamentary majority to accept a new constitution under which the powers of the president were enhanced and those of parliament curtailed.

In Lithuania, similar political turbulence prevailed, until a similar *coup d'état*, likewise in the year 1926, put General Anton Smetona, an ardent nationalist, into the presidency. Lithuania Then, in 1928, the adoption of a new constitution provided Smetona with legal basis for his dictatorship.

In the other Baltic states, Latvia and Estonia, the radically democratic constitutions which had been adopted just after the World War were discredited by the free scope which they gave to conflicting and paralyzing agitation of Communist and Fascist extremists. A dictatorship was maintained in Estonia from 1934 to 1936, and another was established in Latvia in May 1935. In both countries Communist Latvia and Estonia propaganda was outlawed.

Hungary, of all the states of central Europe, was least affected by the wave of liberal democracy which had followed in the wake of the World War. The Magyars, long accustomed to government by the land-owning families of the old aristocracy, looked all the more readily to them for guidance after the partition and humiliation of the country by foreigners and the failure of Béla Kun's Communist efforts.¹ From 1920 onwards, Hungary was nominally a "constitutional monarchy," but really an aristocratic and semi-Fascist state, much as it had been before the World War and with no partition of the large landed estates. Its head or "Regent," Admiral Horthy, and its successive prime ministers directed public affairs in quite arbitrary fashion, and were sustained in parliament and in the country at large by a well-organized patriotic party—the National Unity party. Not only was revolutionary radicalism suppressed, but agitation of "legitimists" in behalf of a Habsburg restoration was discouraged.

In Bulgaria, under King Boris III, the post-war years were marked by intense party strife and frequent crimes of political violence. In 1923 the able Agrarian premier, Stamboulski,² was deposed by a *coup d'état* and murdered, and during the next three years a nominally "democratic" but essentially reactionary ministry conducted a campaign of terrorism against "radicals" whether of town or of countryside. A more truly democratic government was installed in 1926, but before long it felt obliged to manipulate elections and to stamp out a growing Communist party; and in May 1934 it in turn was forcefully overthrown by a group of army officers intent upon transforming Bulgaria into a Fascist state. For a year these Fascists ruled, only to be supplanted in 1935 by still another *coup d'état*, engineered this time by the King.

In Albania, the attempt of an Orthodox bishop who had been educated in the United States, Fan Noli by name, to create an enduring democratic republic was brought to naught by a young Moslem army officer, Ahmed Zogu, who, becoming president in 1925, had himself proclaimed King as Zog I in 1928. Then in 1939 Italy seized the country, supplanting King Zog with her own Fascist rule.

As Albania relapsed from republic to dictatorship, so Greece

¹ See above, pp. 629–630.

² See above, pp. 631–632.

wavered between monarchy and republic. The Greek parliament compelled King George II to quit the country in December 1923, and in March 1925 it voted the de-
Greece
 thronelement of the dynasty and the establishment of a republic, which was promptly endorsed by popular plebiscite. The change, however, was only one of name; and under the republic, as under the monarchy, Greek politics continued turbulent and at times bloody. Venizelos, the country's veteran statesman, contrived to return to office in 1928, but his enemies, of whom he had many, combined against him, and in 1933 an acknowledged Royalist became premier. In 1935 Venizelos inspired a revolt, which was put down with considerable bloodshed, and Venizelos fled abroad. There followed immediately a military and royalist *coup d'état*, and after the formality of a plebiscite, the restoration of King George II to the Greek throne. In 1936 the King sanctioned a dictatorship by an army officer, General John Mataxas.

From what we have already said in the present section, it must be apparent that throughout east-central Europe the post-war political trend was toward dictatorship, while retaining some parliamentary forms. This was one lesson
East-Central Europe Generally
 of the dismembered Czechoslovakia. It was true, likewise, of the remaining larger states: the republic of Poland and the kingdoms of Rumania and Yugoslavia. It was true, too, of the small republics on the Baltic: Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was true, also, of the small states on the Danube and in the Balkan peninsula: the nominal kingdom of Hungary, the actual kingdom of Bulgaria, Greece which was royalist and then republican and then royalist again, and Albania which was republican and then royalist and finally Fascist.

It was similar in the southwestern peninsula of Europe—in Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, the nominally democratic republic which had been fashioned back in 1910, continued after the World War, as before, to be the play-
South-western Europe: Portugal
 thing of a swift succession of professional politicians and army officers until, in 1926, one of the latter, General Antonio Carmona, inaugurated a practical dictatorship of more enduring and constructive character. He appropriated the office of president by military *coup d'état*. In 1928 he secured election to the office for a regular term of four years, and this term, by decree in 1932, he lengthened to six years. Then, in

accordance with a new constitution which was drafted by the dictator and approved by general plebiscite in 1933, he was confirmed as president for an additional term of seven years. Under General Carmona's "democratic" dictatorship, public administration was reformed, national finances were improved, and revolutionary agitation was sternly suppressed. Strikes and lockouts were prohibited, and provision was made for the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes.

Spain, at the close of the World War, was still nominally a constitutional monarchy, with a parliament elected by universal manhood suffrage and with a ministry appointed by the king but responsible to the parliament. Actually, however, the Spanish government was still manipulated in part by the king and in part by professional politicians and ambitious army officers, with the masses largely indifferent and with irreconcilable factions of "revolution" and "reaction" indulging in chronic criticism. The royal government had momentarily profited in popular esteem from the economic advantages which accrued to Spain as a neutral in the World War, but with the cessation of the war Spain was deprived of exceptional markets for her products, the financial returns to her farming class diminished, unemployment increased among her laboring class, and fault-finding with the existing political and social order became more pronounced. Republicans, Socialists, and Anarchists intensified their subversive propaganda and multiplied their ranks. A Communist party was organized. An epidemic of strikes paralyzed industry and threatened revolution.

Aggravating the situation were the protracted and apparently disastrous efforts of the royal government to put down native uprisings in the northern part of Morocco which had been allotted to Spain before the World War. For years the fighting in Morocco had taken a heavy toll of Spanish soldiery and Spanish treasure, without achieving its objective, and in July 1921 it reached a sorry climax in an utter rout and almost complete extinction of a Spanish army. This ultimate disaster outraged patriotic sentiment in Spain and turned it against King Alphonso XIII, to whose personal interference with the military command in Morocco the disaster was chiefly attributed.

In a desperate attempt to save his throne and silence his critics, Alphonso XIII connived at the forceful establishment of

a dictatorship, in September 1923, by Primo de Rivera, a nobleman and army officer who had served with distinction in the Spanish-American War and in Morocco. He suspended the constitution, exercised a rigid censorship of the press, and for seven years (from 1923 to 1930) maintained a kind of Fascist dictatorship with the motto, "country, monarchy, religion." He infused new energy into the Moroccan enterprise, and in coöperation with French arms he finally brought it to a successful issue in 1926.¹ Within Spain, Rivera aimed at a "corporate state," directed by a single Nationalist party. To this end, he set up in 1928 a state department of national economy and prescribed the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, and in the same year he convoked an advisory assembly to draft a new national constitution.

Primo de
Rivera,
Dictator,
1923-1930

Primo de Rivera was an honest man and not without personal ability. But he had no such popular following in Spain as Mussolini had in Italy, and he was not forceful (or unscrupulous) enough to overcome opposition. He failed to build up a strong supporting party or to allay popular discontent, which continued to express itself in strikes, riots, and occasional mutinies, and he was handicapped by interference and intrigues of the King. Eventually, disillusioned and broken in health, Rivera resigned and retired to private life in January 1930 as suddenly and unexpectedly as he had seized power. His successor at once yielded to public clamor and restored the democratic constitution.

In the ensuing local elections of April 1931 the Republicans won an overwhelming victory, and their leader, Niceto Zamora, threatened a general insurrection unless the King should immediately abdicate. Alphonso XIII replied by flight. He did not formally abdicate, but merely "suspended the exercise of the royal power." At once, Zamora proclaimed Spain a republic, and putting himself at the head of the "provisional government" of this Second Spanish Republic,² called for a parliamentary election—the first in eight years. The election held in June 1931, in the midst of great excitement and of coercion by revolutionaries, returned a large

Republi-
can Revo-
lution of
1931

¹ The Moroccan War cost Spain some 800 million dollars and an average of over 13,000 lives a year during the decade 1916-1926.

² On the First Spanish Republic, see above, p. 201.

majority favorable to a republican form of government and to drastic social and religious changes.

The parliament adopted in December 1931 a republican constitution, containing guaranties of personal liberty, prescriptions for the separation of church and state and the nationalizing of church property, and provisions for democratic government. Zamora was elected first president of the Spanish Republic, and Manuel Azaña became its first constitutional premier with a coalition ministry of Radical Republicans and Socialists.

In 1932 the parliament, in response to demands of the Catalan regionalists, enacted a home-rule law for Catalonia, delegating certain powers to a local legislature and a local president of its own choice and putting the Catalan language on an equal footing with Castilian. Similar measures of local autonomy were proposed for the Basques and for the province of Galicia. In the same year, moreover, the central parliament authorized the expropriation of all lands owned by the nobility.

Also, with its strongly anti-clerical majority, the parliament took severe measures against the Catholic Church. In 1932 the Jesuits were banned and their schools and other property confiscated for "social welfare," and every Catholic clergyman in Spain, whether regular or secular, was deprived of governmental salary or subsidy. A law in 1933 transferred all ecclesiastical property, valued at half a billion dollars, to the state, and another law of the same year required all Catholic congregations to pay taxes and to report regularly to the government and forbade them to engage in industry, commerce, or education. The Pope protested against these measures as "infringements on the liberty of the church," and Catholics in Spain began to organize an electoral resistance.

Local elections in the early autumn of 1933 showed a strong popular reaction against the radical, particularly the anti-clerical, policies of the government. Azaña resigned the premiership, and, following the failure of the Moderate Republican leader, Alejandro Lerroux, to command a majority of the deputies, President Zamora dissolved the parliament and ordered the election of a new one. In this general election, in November 1933, the first under universal suffrage, the masses of the population participated—of twelve and a half million electors, at least 80 per cent voted. It confirmed the conservative trend evident

in the preceding local elections. The coalition of Radical Republicans and Socialists was decisively defeated, the representation of the latter being cut in half and the Radical coalition as a whole being outnumbered three to one. The new majority comprised groups of Moderate Republicans, among whom the balance of power was held by the Catholic Popular Action Party, organized and led by the wealthy José Gil Robles.

With the defeat of the Radicals and Socialists, and with the support of Gil Robles, Lerroux was enabled to form a fairly stable ministry of Moderate Republicans and to hold in abeyance the execution of the land laws and some of the anti-clerical measures previously enacted. But this aroused the active hostility of the revolutionary minority. Terrorism by Communists and an attempted general strike were overcome by the government in December 1933, and in October 1934 a more serious insurrection, in which Socialists and Catalan Regionalists and even the Radical ex-premier, Azaña, participated, and which involved considerable loss of life and destruction of property, was crushed by government troops.

The rigorous repressive measures taken by the government served to alienate some of its supporters and at the same time to unite opposing Radicals, Socialists, and Communists in a so-called "Popular Front." Consequently, in the general election which President Zamora ordered in February 1936, though Moderates obtained a popular majority, the Popular Front secured a majority of seats for the new parliament. Zamora was forced out of the presidency as being too moderate, and was succeeded by Manuel Azaña; and the new Radical government, while announcing its intention to execute earlier social and ecclesiastical enactments, seemed unwilling or unable to prevent its Communist and Anarchist allies from burning churches and monasteries and terrorizing priests and anyone suspected of reactionary sentiments. Spain appeared in the early summer of 1936 to be drifting into anarchy.

Then, suddenly, on July 19, 1936, General Francisco Franco, commander in Spanish Morocco, landed at Cadiz with his Moorish troops and called for a rising of the Right against the Popular Front government of the Leftists. About three-fourths of the regular army and half of the navy joined the revolt, which spread quickly throughout southwestern Spain. In September

General Franco established a provisional Nationalist government at Salamanca with himself as military and civil dictator. It was promptly accorded recognition, and supplied with men and munitions, by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany and was supported within Spain by the factions of Constitutional Monarchists, by Carlists,¹ by the majority of Catholics, and by a newly created Fascist organization, the Spanish Phalanx.

The Popular Front—or Loyalist—government was at first staggered by the suddenness of the revolt and sorely weakened by the desertion of the bulk of trained soldiery. In September, however, its resistance stiffened under the leadership of a Socialist premier, Francisco Caballero, who utilized officers and supplies from Soviet Russia and volunteers from France and other countries to transform levies of Spanish radicals and of Basque and Catalan regionalists into disciplined fighting forces. Subsequently, in May 1937, Caballero, who was deemed too tender of the Anarchist element in Catalonia, was replaced in the premiership by another Socialist, Juan Negrin; but the latter's Loyalist government remained adamant against any compromise with Franco's Nationalist government.


Meanwhile the revolt had become a fierce and protracted civil war, with international complications.² Franco's repeated assaults on Madrid long met with failure, but in 1937 he accomplished the piecemeal conquest of the Basque provinces and Galicia in the mountainous north, and in March 1938 he turned east and drove a wedge between Loyalist armies in Catalonia and those in the Valencia-Madrid zone. The struggle was terrific and was accompanied on both sides by wanton destruction and shocking outrages against civilians.

At length, early in 1939, Franco conquered the whole of Catalonia, including the key city of Barcelona, and Loyalist resistance to him all but ceased. Azafia resigned the presidency, and General Miaja, assuming charge of the Loyalists, prepared for final surrender. In vain, Negrin and groups of extremists urged continuing resistance. Miaja obliged Negrin to flee and the extremists to disarm. At the end of March, Madrid, Valencia, and the other places still in Loyalist hands capitulated unconditionally to General Franco and the Spanish Nationalists.

¹ See above, pp. 429, 431.

² On these, see below, p. 804.

The Spanish Civil War was often represented by persons sympathetic with the Loyalists as a contest between fascism and democracy, and by persons favorable to the Nationalists as a combat between democracy and communism. It was really far more complex than either of these easy generalizations. Whatever democracy there may have been in the Spanish Republic, it was clearly superseded, under the exigencies of the Civil War, by dictatorship no less on the Loyalist than on the Nationalist side; and whatever the final issue of the Civil War, it could hardly be liberal democracy. Spain was no exception in the general trend of the 1930's from democracy to dictatorship.



CHAPTER XXVII

INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DISORDER



VOICING the aspirations of large sections of mankind, Woodrow Wilson had proclaimed a twofold purpose of American intervention in the World War—"to make the world safe for democracy" and "to end war"; and at the close of the World War the wide vogue of political democracy was accompanied by popular demand for a new international order.

Nevertheless, just as disillusionment about political democracy grew, and one nation after another reacted against it during the post-war era, so in the same period difficulties about operating the League of Nations and achieving the new international order became ever more manifest, with similar disillusionment.

I. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Prior to the World War, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had been hailed as foreshadowing a new order in international affairs, and propaganda in behalf of a permanent league of nations had been conducted by numerous individuals and organizations in Europe and America.¹ To such propaganda, the World War gave impetus. It was eloquently argued that the catastrophe could have been prevented if a league had been in existence in 1914. It was argued, likewise, that if half the nations of the world could pool their resources of men and money and coöperate as allies in a protracted war, then it should be as possible as it was desirable for all of them to form an enduring alliance in the common cause of peace. To these arguments, statesmen paid respectful attention, and the President of the United States appended to his famous peace program as its fourteenth and last point: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose

¹ See above, pp. 543-548.

of affording guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity."

In Woodrow Wilson's program this point might be last but it was not least. It would be, he reiterated, "the most essential part of the peace settlement." He insisted upon its unqualified acceptance by the Allies and by Germany as a condition of the armistice, and in the peace negotiations at Paris he labored most assiduously for a league of nations.

Concerning just what the league should be there were wide differences of opinion, ranging from the hope of Lansing, the American Secretary of State, that it should be no more than an improved Hague Court for international arbitration, to the desire of Clemenceau, the French premier, that it should be a military alliance for the enforcement of peace. The compromise eventually agreed to was embodied in a "Covenant," and this was incorporated with the major treaties signed in 1919-1920 by the Allies and the enemy-states.

League
Covenant,
1919

The Covenant, in establishing the League of Nations, provided for an international body of two houses: (1) an Assembly, consisting of delegates from the several members of the League (each member having one vote and not more than three delegates), and meeting at Geneva in neutral Switzerland; and (2) a Council, a smaller body, holding more frequent sessions and composed of representatives of permanently designated Great Powers and of a few lesser Powers selected from time to time by the Assembly.¹ In addition, it provided for a Secretariat, responsible to the Assembly and Council, and served by a staff of officials with headquarters at Geneva. In close association with the League, furthermore, provision was made for a permanent Court of International Justice and for an International Labor Office.

Structure
of League

The purposes of the League, as stated or implied in the Covenant, were four: to prevent war, to organize peace, to discharge certain special duties imposed by the peace treaties of 1919-1920, and to promote international coöperation in that undefined field where the interests of nations

Purposes
of League

¹ At first, the permanent seats on the Council were assigned to Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, and the temporary seats to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece. Subsequently Germany and Russia were given permanent seats, and the number of temporary seats was raised.

are common or subject to amicable adjustment. Of these purposes, the main one, at least the one uppermost in the minds of the framers of the Covenant, was the first—to prevent war.

Article 10 obligated members of the League “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence” of one another.

1. To Prevent War

Article 11 empowered the League to “take action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations” and authorized any member to bring to the attention of either Council or Assembly “any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace.” Article 12 required the members to submit disputes either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council and “in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.” Article 13 bound the members to “carry out in good faith” any arbitral award and not to resort to war against “any member of the League that complies therewith.” Article 15 prescribed that any dispute which could not be settled by arbitration must be submitted to the Council and it prohibited any resort to war in contravention of a unanimous decision of the Council (exclusive of the parties to the dispute). Article 16 ordained, in summary, that a member which should resort to war in disregard of these provisions of the Covenant, should “*ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all members of the League.” Finally, in respect of any dispute between a member and a non-member, Article 17 declared that if the non-member “refuses to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the state taking such action.”

War was not altogether forbidden by the Covenant. Armed rebellion and civil war were plainly excluded from the League’s jurisdiction by a stipulation in Article 15. Even international war might legally be waged if the parties to it had previously submitted their dispute to mediation and the Council had failed to reach an unanimous decision. Even to prevent “illegal” war, the League, having no armed force of its own, could rely only upon the “moral obligations” which its members assumed.

The Covenant did specify "sanctions" to be taken by the League against recalcitrant members (and non-members). If any state resorted to war in disregard of the Covenant, Article 16 required the other members of the League "immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations," to prohibit "all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking state," and to prevent "all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any state, whether a member of the League or not." In such a case, furthermore, it would become the duty of the Council to recommend "what effective military, naval, or air force" the members of the League should severally use to uphold the Covenant.

In such fashion the League of Nations would attempt to prevent international war. But the League was not to confine itself to a merely negative rôle of prohibiting war and recommending "sanctions" against nations which engaged in it. The League was expected to do more—to act positively and constructively to uproot underlying causes of war and to organize peace. The central agencies of the League—Secretariat, Council, and Assembly—were designed for this long-range purpose as well as for the immediate purpose of preventing war, and so was the permanent Court of International Justice, which, authorized by the Covenant, was duly founded in 1921. This Court was similar in certain respects to The Hague Tribunal which had been established by the Peace Conference of 1899; it had its seat at The Hague (rather than at Geneva), and it was a judicial rather than a diplomatic or political body. But whereas The Hague Tribunal was not a permanent organic institution but only a panel of judges from which arbitrators might be selected for a particular dispute, the Court of International Justice was a continuously functioning bench of fifteen judges, appointed for a term of nine years by joint action of the League's Council and Assembly, and empowered "to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it" and to "give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly."

"Sanctions"

2. To Organize Peace

International Court

In the belief that secret treaties had contributed to bringing

on the World War, the framers of the Covenant sought to outlaw them. Provision was accordingly made that treaties should be published and that none would be binding unless registered with the Secretariat. Besides, a pledge was exacted from every League member that it would abrogate all existing "obligations or understandings" inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant and would not enter into any new ones, though a special proviso was inserted—at American request—that "nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

The Covenant recognized, moreover, the peril, in a changing world, of too rigid insistence on a *status quo* consecrated by treaties of the past. It expressly enabled the Assembly to "advise the reconsideration, by members of the League, of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

Furthermore, the Covenant aimed at doing away with big competitive armaments, which were generally regarded as a major cause of past war. It therefore obliged the members of the League to "recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and also that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections," and it instructed the Council to formulate definite plans alike for the limitation of armaments and for the prevention of "the evil effects" attendant upon their private manufacture.

In addition to preventing war and organizing peace, the League of Nations was to perform certain tasks bequeathed to it by the peace treaties of 1919-1920. It was to supervise the plebiscites in Schleswig, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia. It was to administer the Free City of Danzig. It was to govern the Saar for fifteen years and then hold a plebiscite there to determine whether the district should revert to Germany or pass to France or remain under the League.¹ It was to oversee the enforcement of the special treaty provisions

Publica-
tion of
Treaties

Treaty
Revision

Limita-
tion of
Arma-
ments

3. To
Execute
Peace of
Paris

¹ See above, p. 638.

concerning "minority rights."¹ Besides, the League of Nations was to possess at least a nominal suzerainty over the former German colonies and Ottoman territories which were "mandated" to other Powers, and the League Council was to receive annual reports from the Mandatories and to seek the advice of a permanent commission of the League "on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates."

Minority
Rights
and Mandated
Territories

Finally, the League was charged with promoting coöperation in matters of general humanitarian concern. To this end, all previously established international bureaus and commissions were placed under the League's direction, and to it were entrusted the making and oversight of international agreements to secure "fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children," "just treatment of native inhabitants" of colonies belonging to members of the League, "freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League," and regulation of "the traffic in women and children," "the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs," and "the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest." To the same end, the League was "to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease" and "to encourage and promote the establishment and coöperation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations" for "the mitigation of suffering throughout the world."

4. To
Promote
Humanitarian
Cooperation

In intimate association with the League, and serving as its instrument in the labor field was a special international organization, separately provided for by the "Labor Convention" adopted at Paris in 1919 and, like the Covenant of the League of Nations, incorporated in the several peace treaties. The Labor Convention recognized "relations between capital and labor" to be "matters of international concern," and for their regulation created an International Labor Conference and an International Labor Office.

Labor
Convention

From what we have now said, it must be obvious that under the Covenant the League was expected to be the cornerstone of a new world-order of pacific coöperation and general security.

¹ See above, pp. 643-644.

It must also be obvious that, if the League was to fulfill this expectation, its membership should embrace almost if not quite all of the sovereign states of the world. The Covenant, **League Membership** in fact, invited all the Allies and almost all neutral nations to accede to it "immediately" and "without reservation," and thus to become initial members of the League. Further, it provided for the subsequent admission of any "fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony" by two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and, membership being voluntary, for the withdrawal of any member on two years' notice.

In January 1920, pursuant to the call of President Wilson of the United States, the League of Nations was formally inaugurated at Paris with an initial meeting of the Council, **Inauguration of League, 1920** and the first Assembly convened at Geneva in the following November. By this time all the Allies in the World War save one and nearly all the invited neutrals had ratified the Covenant and joined the League—a total of forty-two members.¹ In time, the former enemy states and the Russian Soviet Union joined it, and by 1935 the number of countries which had adhered to the League reached the impressive total of sixty-two—twenty-eight in Europe, twenty-one in America, eight in Asia, three in Africa, and two in Australasia.

From the outset, a very serious handicap to the League of Nations was the abstention of the United States. It meant the withholding of the moral support and active coöperation of a Great Power which had taken a decisive part in the World War and whose President had been chiefly responsible for creating the League. How the **Abstention of United States** United States came to adopt an attitude of such grave import to post-war international relations calls for special explanation.

While fighting went on, most Americans had been proud of the diplomatic leadership which the Allies accorded to the President of the United States, and few raised serious or sustained

¹ The "Allied and Associated" Powers which promptly joined the League numbered twenty-nine: Great Britain and her five "Dominions" of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, China, Siam, Liberia, Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Thirteen neutral Powers similarly adhered: Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Persia, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Salvador.

protest against President Wilson's statement of war aims or his championship of a league of nations. But with the defeat of Germany, acute political partisanship was resumed in the United States, and Wilson as the leader of the Democratic party became the target of the rival Republican party, which carried the Congressional elections of November 1918 and obtained a majority in the Senate (whose consent was necessary for the ratification of treaties). Then the President, hoping no doubt that the peace settlement would redound to the political advantage of himself and his party, widened the breach with the Senate majority by taking Democrats but no prominent Republican with him to the Peace Congress at Paris. In the circumstances the Republican party sought especially to discredit him and his work. At first he was assailed because he seemed too conciliatory toward Germany. Later, when the terms of the peace settlement were disclosed, he was accused of fatally compromising his own principles, of agreeing to a peace of vengeance rather than of justice, of sacrificing American interests, and of ensnaring the United States in European quarrels.

When President Wilson returned to America in July 1919 and sought the necessary ratification of the League Covenant and the treaty of Versailles, he encountered widespread popular opposition and stubborn hostility from the Senate majority. Among his adversaries were those who objected to the League of Nations as tending to impair American sovereignty and vitiate certain constitutional powers of the American Congress, or as tending, in disregard of the admonitions of George Washington, to entangle the United States still more in the meshes of Old World diplomacy. There were others who objected to the treaty of Versailles: idealists who contrasted it with the "Fourteen Points"; patriots who denounced its concessions to Japan and Great Britain; German Americans who resented the degradation of the Fatherland; Italian Americans who thought it unfair to Italy; Irish Americans who thought it too fair to Great Britain. All these insisted that the United States should not underwrite a "vicious" and "unjust" peace.

For almost two years a deadlock ensued between President Wilson and the Senate majority, the latter stubbornly refusing to ratify the League Covenant except with "reservations" which the President quite as stubbornly declined to accept. In Septem-

ber 1919 Wilson undertook a tour of the country in order to reënlist popular support, but he was stricken with a paralysis from which he never fully recovered. Henceforth a broken and almost helpless man, he faced death and, what undoubtedly seemed worse to him, the defection of his own country from that League of Nations upon which he had set his mind and heart. The longer the deadlock continued, the higher mounted the wave of Senatorial hostility to the President's peace program. In November 1919 and again in March 1920 the Senate adopted by majority vote some fourteen drastic reservations to the League Covenant, but the minority, faithful to the President's injunctions, blocked ratification with these reservations.

The dispute was settled and the deadlock broken by the verdict of the American people in the presidential election of November 1920. At that time the candidate of the Democratic party, a supporter of the policies of President Wilson, was overwhelmingly defeated, and Warren Harding, a Republican Senator, was elected to the presidency. The new President, addressing the Congress shortly after his inauguration, in March 1921, declared that "in the existing League of Nations, world governing with its super-powers, this Republic will have no part."

After concluding separate peace treaties in 1922 with Germany, Austria, and Hungary, the United States persistently held aloof from the League of Nations. Eventually, some partial and halting coöperation was achieved through the presence of American "observers" at Geneva, through American representation on certain League commissions, through American participation in special conferences (such as those on disarmament) called by the League, and, in 1934, through America's acceptance of membership in the League's Labor Organization.

The abstention and critical attitude of the United States undoubtedly injured the League of Nations. But there were other
Other
Abstentions or
Withdrawals
and hardly less grave gaps in the League's membership. For fourteen years after the establishment of the League, the Russian Soviet Union was not a member, partly because its Communist dictatorship regarded the League as an international agency for preserving capitalism and hence either feared or despised it, and partly because most Powers in the League were hostile to the Russian dictatorship and sceptical of its willingness or ability to coöperate with them.

For six years, moreover, Germany was excluded from membership; and afterwards in 1933 both she and Japan withdrew, and in 1936 Italy also. Thereafter, only three Great Powers remained in the League—Britain, France, and Russia.

Nevertheless, despite weaknesses in its membership and growing doubt about its ability to perform the primary task for which it had been organized—the prevention of international war,—the League demonstrated that in other respects it was effectual and serviceable. Its Secretariat gathered and published much useful data about world conditions, political, economic, social, and cultural. Through its agencies, it did much to check the spread of typhus and the international traffic in opium. Through its associated Labor Office and Labor Conferences, it prompted a good deal of international collaboration in dealing with problems of industrial labor. Through its Court of International Justice, a considerable number of controversial matters were successfully adjudicated; and through special committees which it sponsored, a start was made toward a codification of international law.

League
Services

In the adjustment of disputes between nations and in the prevention of war, the League was least successful. It undoubtedly helped in these respects with its convenient agencies, with its painstaking investigations and reports, and with its less tangible but still important contributions to the formation of pacific public opinion. And in disputes between lesser Powers, it actually mediated with some success. For example, a dispute between Finland and Sweden in 1920 over the ownership of the Aland Islands in the Baltic was referred to the League, and the Council, after investigation by a special commission, awarded the islands to Finland. Again, a dispute between Poland and Germany over the boundary line which should be drawn in Upper Silesia following the confused plebiscite there, was referred to the League in 1921, and the Council adjusted it by a compromise. Then, too, in 1925 a Greek attack upon Bulgaria in retaliation for frontier incidents was stopped by remonstrances of the League Council and the threat of an economic boycott against Greece. Similarly, hostilities between Colombia and Peru resulting from the seizure in 1932 of a town in the former's border province of Leticia by armed forces of the latter, were averted by a League commission, which took

League
Media-
tion in
Minor
Disputes

charge of Leticia in June 1933 and brought about a year later an amicable agreement between the two countries whereby Peru tendered apologies and Colombia regained the province.

League mediation usually failed in disputes to which Great Powers were party. True, the good offices of the League were utilized to settle in 1926 a protracted dispute over the ownership of the rich oil fields of Mosul between Great Britain as mandatory for Iraq on the one side and the weaker state of Turkey on the other, but this case was not a conclusive test of the League's strength. For, inasmuch as the settlement was favorable to Great Britain (and Iraq), the Great Power gladly accepted it, and the lesser Power was induced, by minor British concessions, to acquiesce.

In a dispute of 1923 between Poland (backed by France) and Lithuania over the city of Vilna, attempted League mediation was pushed aside and Poland's armed seizure of Vilna was upheld by an independent accord between France and the other Great Powers of Britain and Italy. In another dispute of the same year between Italy and Greece, arising from the murder, presumably by Greek bandits, of several Italian members of an Albanian boundary commission, Italy without recourse to the League demanded of Greece an apology and heavy indemnities and, to enforce quick compliance with her demands, bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu. In vain Greece appealed to the League. Italy flouted it, maintaining that its intervention would be an infringement of her own national dignity and sovereign rights, and only consenting to evacuate Corfu through the friendly mediation of her "equals"—Britain and France—and on terms necessitating Greek acceptance of her major demands.


The League could not prevent Japan from forcibly appropriating Manchuria and conducting military operations against China. China besought the League to interfere, but the only tangible results were a paper report from a League commission and the withdrawal of Japan from the League. Nor could the League stop a war which broke out in 1928 between two of its South American members, Bolivia and Paraguay, over the long-disputed intermediate territory known as the Gran Chaco. When Paraguay was called to account by the League in 1934, she simply followed Japan's example and withdrew from the League.

Failure of
Mediation
in Major
Disputes

Flouting
League



MOSCOW



In 1935, too, the League failed to prevent Italy from undertaking the conquest of Ethiopia. After Italian troops had actually invaded the African state (a fellow member of the League), the League Assembly vainly authorized the application of economic "sanctions" against the aggressor. These could not be made effective. Ethiopia was practically abandoned to her fate, and Italy withdrew from the League.

Meanwhile, the succession of League failures to bring about any limitation of armaments, concerning which we shall say more in the next section, not only occasioned Germany's secession in 1933 and her repudiation of the restrictions of the treaty of Versailles on her own armaments, but spread and intensified distrust of the League as a guarantor of national security and international peace. The League of Nations, serviceable as it was in non-controversial matters, was apparently ineffectual in disputes vitally affecting the political prestige of a strong and self-willed nation. It sufficed neither for ambition nor for security. By 1938 it was thoroughly impotent. It not even took note of the extinction of Austria or the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Break-
down of
League,
1938

2. THE QUEST FOR SECURITY

Endangering the new international order envisaged by Wilson and other champions of the League of Nations were basic differences among the Powers about the "security" which they all anxiously sought during the post-war period. The nations did not want another big war. But how to forestall it? How to secure themselves? Unfortunately, what was "security" for one nation might be a threat against the "security" of another. A victor nation, such as France, would interpret "security" and seek its attainment in a different way from a vanquished nation, such as Germany.

Problem
of Se-
curity

France utilized the prestige which she gained from the World War and the military superiority which she retained after 1918, just as Germany had done after 1871, to exercise for several years a kind of premiership in international affairs and to advance plans for her own "security." Not all of these plans could be realized, however, in the face of determined opposition from other Great Powers, and consequently the history of French diplomacy during the period

French
Foreign
Policy,
1919-1931

is the story of a perpetual search for new devices whereby France could be secured against any new aggression by Germany.

At first, while the Paris Peace Congress was in progress, the French government and Marshal Foch pleaded earnestly that the future security of their country, and therefore the peace of Europe, depended upon the severance of the whole left bank of the Rhine from Germany. Then, when President Wilson pressed for a League of Nations, the French negotiators pleaded that the League be furnished with "teeth," that it be provided with a strong international army to enforce strict observance of the treaties of peace. Neither President Wilson nor Lloyd George (on behalf of the British government) would assent to the League's being made a hard-and-fast military alliance or to the extension of French frontiers to the Rhine, and eventually France agreed, though reluctantly, to an alternative plan for her special

**Projected
Triple
Alliance
with
Britain
and
America**

security. This was to be a defensive triple alliance by the terms of which the United States and Great Britain would jointly guaranty the territorial integrity of France and would come to her military assistance if she should be attacked by Germany. The treaties of alliance were duly signed at Paris, and on the strength of them France abandoned her claims to German lands (except Alsace-Lorraine) and accepted an innocuous League of Nations. But the refusal of America to accept President Wilson's advice and to endorse the Franco-American treaty rendered the alliance inoperative for Great Britain as well as for the United States, and left France to seek security by other means.

One obvious means was to tie in defensive alliance with France the lesser states of Europe which had a common interest with her in supporting the peace settlement and opposing treaty revision, and this means she exploited to the full. She contracted a formal military alliance with Belgium in 1920; with Poland in 1921; and with Czechoslovakia in 1924. The last-named country had already formed, in 1920-1921, a "Little Entente" with Rumania and Yugoslavia to safeguard territories which they had severally appropriated from Hungary, and this arrangement helped France to draw into her own circle of alliance Rumania in 1926 and Yugoslavia in 1927.

There were drawbacks about these French alliances. They

**Alliance
with
Belgium,
Poland,
and Little
Entente**

were expensive, because they had to be buttressed by fairly frequent loans. They were none too reliable, because the parties to them, other than France, were minor Powers, widely scattered, whose fighting abilities, if not patently slight, were unproved. Besides, the alliances involved France in all the controversies of eastern, as well as western, Europe, and they especially aroused the distrust of Italy. Indeed, Italy, in furtherance of her own ambitions and as a counterpoise to the French alliances, wooed Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria, and encouraged them to hope for treaty revision.

Wherefore, France sought additional means of security in a strengthening of the Covenant of the League of Nations. From her point of view, there were two fatal weaknesses in the Covenant: (1) it did not define "aggression"; and (2) it did not specify with sufficient exactitude the action to be taken against an "aggressor." To remedy these weaknesses, she sponsored the drafting by an international commission, in 1923, of a "treaty of mutual assistance," which, as revised in 1924 under the title of "Geneva Protocol," was submitted to the members of the League for ratification. It prescribed the settlement of every international dispute by arbitration or by conciliation. A state which refused to accept the award, or which in any way prejudiced the peaceful solution of a dispute, was *ipso facto* the "aggressor." Against such an aggressor, each signatory of the Protocol would undertake to act "in the degree which its geographical situation, and its particular situation as regards armaments, allows."

Projected
Geneva
Protocol,
1924

Practically, what France wanted from the Protocol was a more effectual underwriting of the peace settlement by the whole League, and particularly by Great Britain as its most puissant member. Britain was very chary of the Protocol, however. In general, she disliked the idea of obligating herself either to obey or to enforce each and every decision of an international body in which France and the Continental satellites of France would probably have a preponderant voice. And, backed by public opinion at home and in her self-governing Dominions, she advanced two specific objections to the Protocol. First, it might involve her in war with the United States, which, being outside the League and spurning its agencies of arbitration and conciliation, might be deemed an "aggressor" in any serious

Blocked
by Britain

dispute with a League member. Second, it would almost certainly require her to serve as a police officer all over the world, including regions, such as eastern Europe, where she was not directly interested. The first objection France could have overcome by exempting American cases from the scope of the Protocol, but the second was insurmountable. So Great Britain withheld ratification, and the Protocol of Geneva collapsed.

In 1925 Franco-German relations underwent some improvement, thanks to the temporarily successful operation of the Dawes Plan for reparation payments,¹ and thanks also to the mutually conciliatory attitude of the foreign ministers of the two countries, Briand in France and Stresemann in Germany. Both of these statesmen had come to believe that they could promote the security of their respective nations by direct agreements, and as this belief was consonant with British interests, Britain's foreign minister, Sir Austen Chamberlain, encouraged the negotiations and persuaded the Italian government to do likewise.

The outcome was a group of treaties, drafted in October 1925 in idyllic surroundings at the Swiss health resort of Locarno on Lake Maggiore, and collectively styled the Pact of Locarno. Germany would enter the League of Nations and receive a permanent place, as a Great Power, on its Council. Simultaneously, Germany would definitely desist from seeking treaty revision by force of arms and would settle by arbitration or conciliation every dispute which might arise between her and France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, or Poland. Germany would reserve the right to seek a peaceful modification of her eastern frontiers but she would expressly recognize the permanence of her new western borders. Wherefore, as the most significant feature of the Pact, Germany and France and Belgium would forever respect their mutual frontiers and refrain from war with each other except in self-defense or in accordance with the stipulations of the League Covenant; and Great Britain and Italy would guaranty this feature of the Pact by giving armed assistance to any of the three Powers if it should be faced with a violation of the Pact by any other of the three.

The Pact of Locarno, though assailed by extremists in both Germany and France, was generally hailed at the time as an epochal event: as marking a final reconciliation between victors

¹ See above, p. 662.

and vanquished and constituting a big step forward toward world peace. In the afterglow of optimism thus engendered, the American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, acting on a suggestion of Briand (who in turn derived the suggestion from an American scholar¹), proposed to all the nations of the world that they pledge themselves by a solemn pact "to outlaw war," that is, "to renounce the use of war as an instrument of national policy." Briand was not completely satisfied with the form which Kellogg gave to his suggestion. The American Secretary was insistent, however, that the pact should embody only a principle and that its enforcement should rest solely upon the "good faith" of the several signatories. Regretfully, and perhaps a little cynically, Briand finally acquiesced in this interpretation; and with a great flourish was signed at Paris in August 1928 the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. Being but a pious declaration, it was speedily adhered to by almost every nation. What it really amounted to was indicated by the ironic fact that its ratification by the United States Senate was accompanied by the enactment of a bill materially increasing the strength of the American navy.

Kellogg-
Briand
Pact, 1928

Not the Kellogg-Briand Pact and not even the Locarno Pact actually solved the problem of security. On the Locarno Pact, France and Germany put very different interpretations. France imagined it meant German acceptance of the treaty of Versailles. Germany expected that it would be followed by a revision of the treaty of Versailles. Both were mistaken. Germany pressed the harder for annulment or amendment of those clauses in the treaty charging her with war-guilt, imposing heavy financial burdens on her, limiting her armaments, and contracting her historic eastern borders. Against such pressure, France was adamant. She would make no further concessions; and now that she was assured of British and Italian assistance in preserving the territorial arrangements of the treaty of Versailles concerning the West, she felt all the freer to oppose any alteration of those affecting the East. Consequently, France renewed and strengthened her military alliances with Poland and Czechoslovakia; and in the spring of 1931, in concert with Italy, she estopped Germany from forming a close tariff-union (Zollverein) with Austria. This

Franco-
German
Impasse
over
Treaty
Revision

¹ Professor James T. Shotwell.

last action brought out in bold relief the widely divergent goals of German and French foreign policy and the illusory nature of the "security" which the Pact of Locarno had aimed at achieving. Henceforth the spirit if not the letter of Locarno was dead, and apparently the only remaining way of seeking security was through some delicate balancing of national armaments.

There had been no general disarmament after the World War. France, it is true, cut her standing army in half by reducing the

**Problem
of Arma-
ments** term of service from three years to eighteen months; Italy called fewer men to the colors; and, in accordance with the peace treaties, the armies of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria were drastically curtailed. Yet the principle of universal military service was in effect not only in most countries which had adopted it prior to 1914 but also in all the newly created or newly unified states. Russia, too, gradually built up a larger, and probably more efficient, army than she had had before the war. Moreover, while the British navy was smaller than it had previously been, it was still a superior fighting force; and the navies of the United States and Japan were considerably stronger than they had been. Altogether there was a vast deal of continuing "preparedness." It was costly. It consumed a large part of the financial resources of the several governments and gravely embarrassed their post-war efforts at economic reconstruction. It was dangerous. It kept up and even exaggerated the rivalry, the sudden alarums, and the chronic sense of danger, which had attended the "armed truce" of Europe from 1871 to 1914.

Statesmen understood the perils of continuing international competition in armaments, and the delegates to the Paris Peace Congress of 1919-1920 had given three pledges of a determination to put a stop to it. First, they severely restricted the armaments of Germany and her European allies in the World War. Second, they declared in the peace treaties that they imposed these restrictions on the vanquished nations "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." Third, they recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety" and provided that the League Council "shall formulate plans."

Yet, despite these pledges, no general limitation of armaments

was achieved. Each nation wanted some other nation to take the initiative in the matter, and no nation would take it. Every state was convinced that the armaments of other states, but not its own, were inconsistent with "national safety." The United States and Great Britain continually found fault with France and Poland for not reducing their armies and applying the sums of money thus saved to the discharge of their foreign debts. But France and Poland both retorted that they would gladly reduce their armies if they could definitely count on assistance from the United States and Great Britain in protecting them against possible German aggression and that in the meantime the English-speaking Powers should evidence their sincerity by reducing their navies.

The basic difficulty, indeed, was one of security. National armaments might be dangerous in the future, just as they had been before the World War, but to get rid of them would be still more dangerous. If France and Poland, for example, should reduce theirs to a level with Germany's, what would prevent Germany from tearing up the treaty of Versailles and renewing the World War? But if France and Poland would not reduce their armaments, why should Germany be expected to keep hers reduced at the sacrifice of her security?

With every nation in quest of security through armaments, it proved quite impossible to bring about general disarmament. All that was practically possible was to try to keep down the armaments of those nations which had been vanquished in the World War, and among other Powers to arrange such balancing of existing armaments as would temporarily serve to uphold the *status quo* and to prevent the actual increase of national armies and navies from becoming madly competitive.

An international conference on the limitation of naval armaments was held at Washington in 1921-1922 and attended by representatives of all the naval Powers, not only the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, but France and Italy.¹ The outcome was an agreement to retain for ten years approximately the existing ratio among

Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922

¹ The Washington Conference, being called to consider general international questions in the Pacific and the Far East as well as the specific question of naval armaments, included representatives also of China, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium. On the resulting agreements which dealt with matters other than naval limitation, see below, p. 795.

battleship tonnages of the several Powers: Great Britain 5, the United States 5, Japan 3, France 1.67, Italy 1.67. In vain the United States sought to include a limitation of light cruisers; Great Britain successfully opposed it. In vain Great Britain sought to include a prohibition on any use of submarines in war; France refused to agree to it. The Washington Conference did halt—for ten years—the highly provocative and expensive building of so-called “capital ships.” But its failure to agree upon a similar check for other naval craft meant that in this respect naval rivalry continued, and the sense of security, instead of growing, actually lessened. Britain complained about the submarines which France proceeded to build, and the United States, about Britain’s excess of cruisers.

Another conference was held at Geneva in 1927, but no agreement could be reached about cruisers. In 1930 still another conference was held at London. This was hardly more successful than the earlier ones in effecting a general limitation of naval armaments. Assent was given, it is true, to a prolongation of the Washington agreement to 1937; and the United States and Great Britain managed to supplement it with an arrangement between themselves whereby Britain would be allowed a superiority in light cruisers and America a corresponding superiority in large cruisers. In this arrangement Japan acquiesced, though very reluctantly and only on condition that she be accorded parity with the others in the matter of submarines and some increase of her ratio for cruisers. But neither France nor Italy would adhere to it. Consequently the London agreement bound only three of the five naval Powers, and its binding of the three was weakened by a provision (the “escalator clause”) that any of them was free to exceed the specified tonnage totals if it should deem its “national security” to be “materially affected” by naval increases of another Power.

The London agreement, and the Washington agreement too, proved short-lived. In 1934 Japan served notice that she would not consent to a renewal of either unless she was accorded full naval parity with the United States and Great Britain, and on the refusal of these Powers to meet her demands, she formally resumed complete freedom of action in 1937. By this date a fearful race in naval armaments was plainly developing. There was now far more naval “prepared-

Geneva
and Lon-
don Con-
ferences,
1927, 1930

Failure of
Naval
Limitation

ness," and far more naval expenditure, than ever before in the world's history. Naval agreements, promising though they had been, had failed to provide security.

Attempts to negotiate a general limitation of land armaments were even less successful. In 1925 the League of Nations created a special commission to study the problem and draft recommendations preparatory to the calling of a "disarmament conference." The Commission soon discovered that both technically and politically the problem

League
Commission
on
Armies,
1925

was well-nigh insoluble. Technically, the chief difficulty was in distinguishing between what was strictly and immediately military and therefore to be limited and what was only incidentally military and hardly susceptible of limitation. An actual standing army and its actual arms and equipment could be recognized and perhaps dealt with, but what about a potential army and its potential resources? What about army reserves, militias, and police forces? What about ordinary mail and passenger airplanes which could easily be converted into military planes? What about a nation's wealth and man-power and industrial production, employed in peaceful pursuits today but employable for military purposes tomorrow? If answers could be found to these and similar technical questions, a supreme political question would remain. How to reconcile the military needs of a nation intent upon preserving the *status quo* with the military demands of a nation zealous to change it?

For five years the Commission toiled at the problem, and eventually, like the proverbial mountain, it brought forth a mouse. It took the form of a "draft treaty," providing for a limitation, "in principle," of the number of men in active service in land, naval, and air forces, of governmental expenditure on army material, and of military (but not commercial) aircraft; a condemnation of the use of poisonous gases and "all bacteriological methods of warfare"; and a permanent commission to collect information and report periodically on the progress of "disarmament." As if to prove that the "draft treaty" should not be taken too seriously, it contained a special "escape clause," proposed by the United States and providing that if a "change of circumstances constitutes, in the opinion of any high contracting party, a menace to its national security, such high contracting party may suspend temporarily, in so far as concerns itself, any provision or

provisions of the present convention other than those expressly designed to apply in the event of war."

In the hope that by some miracle a large diplomatic congress might succeed where a small expert commission had failed, the long-promised Conference on Disarmament was convoked at Geneva in February 1932. It was attended by official representatives of all the members of the League of Nations and, in addition, by delegates of the United States and the Russian Soviet Union. Its task was not only to debate and if possible to agree upon the "draft treaty" as submitted by the Commission, but also to supply its most glaring omission—the exact specification of the future size of each nation's army and of the future expenditure of each nation on war material. The task was humanly impossible in existing circumstances, and no miracle occurred. From the beginning the viewpoints of France and Germany were diametrically opposite. France would be insecure if she reduced her army to a level with Germany's, and Germany would be insecure if France didn't. Utterly unable to find a way out of this impasse, and yet reluctant to admit failure, the Conference floundered about in a bog of irrelevant discussion. In October 1933 Germany, by this time dominated by Hitler, impatiently quit the Conference and proclaimed her purpose of rearming without regard for the restrictions of the treaty of Versailles.

For several months longer the Conference continued, but with Germany gone, its discussions grew ever more futile. Finally, in the summer of 1934, Great Britain, the Power most interested in limiting armies (if not navies), acknowledged that the failure of the Conference was definitive and that therefore she would proceed to enlarge her own armaments, particularly her air forces. The Conference then faded away, and in 1935 Germany independently reestablished the kind of army which she had had before the World War.

The collapse of protracted efforts at Geneva in behalf of a general limitation of armaments thus nicely synchronized with the breakdown of the Washington and London naval agreements. Obviously, security was not obtainable through an international balancing of national armaments. This method was a failure, and

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Football," an example of post-war art trends, is from a painting by André L'Hôte (born 1885).

indeed worse than a failure. For, instead of leading to even a slight reduction of armed forces, it led to Germany's getting rid of the reduction previously imposed upon her and to an increase of armaments, both military and naval, of all Great Powers and of almost all lesser Powers.

Every nation was left to seek security by the supposedly discredited pre-war methods of arming itself to the teeth and negotiating special alliances and ententes to overawe and hold in check the military might of possible foes. It meant a return to international anarchy, and to a balance of power peculiarly shifting and precarious.

International
Anarchy

Before taking up the precarious international situation in the late 1930's, let us consider another complicating factor during the post-war period—the intensification of nationalism throughout the whole Europeanized world.

3. INTENSIFICATION OF NATIONALISM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

It must be apparent from what we have said in the preceding sections, that efforts without precedent were made during the fifteen years from 1920 to 1935 to establish a new world-order of national security and international peace. Never before had there been such an array of peace machinery—League of Nations, World Court, mutual security pacts, international conventions and commissions and conferences galore. Nevertheless, it must be equally apparent that all this machinery did not create a sense of security, and that at the end of the fifteen years the new world-order was but a dissolving dream.

Peace machinery existed, but its successful operation required a public opinion within every nation favorable to the subordination of national interest and policy to international adjustment. This, however, was significantly lacking. On the contrary, the bulk of public opinion in every country, instead of keeping pace with the development of peace machinery and becoming more internationalist, grew ever more nationalist, more devoted to the concept of national honor, the defense of national rights, and the unrestrained pursuit of national interests.

Public
Opinion
Preponderantly
Nationalist

NOTE. The picture opposite, "Jazz," another example of post-war art trends, is from a sculpture by Voros.

Elsewhere we have explained how nationalism was quickened in Europe (and the British Dominions) by the World War and the Peace of Paris.¹ Here we must remark its progressive intensification and spread during the post-war period. Indeed, it was more ubiquitous than either democracy or dictatorship, and more universally compelling than pacifism, communism, or supernatural religion. It affected men's minds and hearts as the Industrial Revolution affected their bodies, only faster and more completely. If the Industrial Revolution promised to draw peoples together in a common material civilization, nationalism actually wrought a psychological and spiritual separation of peoples resembling primitive tribalism.

Everywhere, nationalism was intensified. It was extolled as a philosophy of life for all men, as a veritable religion. And its most conspicuous spokesmen no longer represented it as the "liberal" nationalism which had been influential in Europe back in the mid-nineteenth century, but rather as a much more exclusive and intolerant kind—a "totalitarian" nationalism. Like the liberal variety, it would base the state system of Europe, and the world, on the principle of nationality and the practice of national self-determination. But unlike the liberal variety, it would exalt the national state above humanity and above the individual. Each nationality, and consequently each national state, would be an end in itself, a consummation of all virtue and an object of supreme adoration. It would emphasize its peculiar culture, its own past greatness, its own future "mission," and, in extreme instances, its own "racial" purity and superiority. It would pursue exclusively national interests, and it would pursue them militantly. At home, it would suppress individual dissent and dominate every group activity, economic, social, religious, and educational. Abroad, it would stand ready to avenge its honor and extend its power. For, according to a famous exponent of the new nationalism, "a nation declines when it loses military might."

Everywhere, moreover, this creed of "totalitarian" nationalism was spread among the masses with astounding rapidity and success. The technique of mass propaganda was much more highly developed after the war than before, and the masses of mankind were much more responsive to it. Compulsory public

¹ See above, pp. 646-654.

schooling was finally enabling almost everyone to read and write, at least a little, and thus to give eye or ear (if not critical reflection) to the cheap newspapers, the cinemas, radios, and amplifiers, which modern technology was simultaneously perfecting. With these helps, it was comparatively easy for demagogues to sway entire nations; and in view of the intense emotions aroused by the World War and of the widespread economic instability and political unrest which ensued, it was easy for apostles of violent nationalism to obtain numerous and fanatical disciples.

There were different degrees of patriotic fever in different countries. Everywhere, however, it was rising, and in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany it approached the boiling point. For here a thoroughly totalitarian nationalism was at once the basis and the object of all political and social activity. The preaching of it had enabled a Mussolini and a Hitler to become dictators, and once they were dictators they permitted the preaching of nothing else. Of course, such dictators were apt to be less reckless in deed than in speech, less bellicose abroad than at home. They felt the responsibility and feared the consequences of carrying their nationalism to its logical conclusion and precipitating international war. Yet, having gotten into power by inflaming their respective nations, they had to employ the same method to keep themselves in power.

National-
ism and
Dictator-
ship

Popular nationalism was sharpest and most rampant in countries which passed under dictatorships, and the number of such countries notably increased from 1922 onwards. But in countries which remained democratic, preponderant public opinion was only a degree less nationalist. If dictators pursued exclusively national policies as a matter of principle, democratic leaders pursued them out of deference to electoral majorities. The outcome was much the same all over Europe and in the United States: the pursuit by every nation of policies which either its dictatorial faction or its democratic majority thought conducive to its particular interests—commercial and military, territorial and imperial. If the pursuit of any such national interest could obviously be forwarded by an international pact or conference or by some device of the League of Nations, the government concerned was ready, with popular support at home, to act accordingly, and thus to appear as a champion of international coöperation and peace,

National-
ism and
Democ-
racy

while actually serving its own ends. But if its ends could not easily be served thereby, if its pursuit of national interests seemed to be impeded, then, with noisier and more heartfelt support at home, it would sacrifice internationalism to nationalism and go its own way.

Nor was this supreme pursuit of national interests confined to Europe and the United States. It was world-wide. Indeed, fully as significant as the intensification of nationalism in Europe during the post-war era, was the simultaneous appearance of the same phenomenon outside Europe: in parts of Africa and all over Asia, both in the Near East and in the Far East, and throughout the American continents. In all these extensive areas, "Europeanization" went on apace,¹ but in its latest phase it involved not merely the introduction of material aspects of European civilization but also a general acceptance of its latest cultural fashion—the fashion of nationalism, of nationalist dictatorship, of strenuous pursuit of narrowly national interests.

The Moslem Near East became belligerently nationalist. It had started in this direction before the World War, but the war and its immediate aftermath were decisive in clarifying the goal and hastening its attainment. The traditional religious unity of the "Moslem world" and the age-long political comprehensiveness of the Ottoman Empire went down in ruins together, and in their stead emerged the separate nationalisms of Turk, Arab, Egyptian, and Persian.

In a previous chapter we have related how, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War, a forceful and very patriotic Turkish army officer, Mustafa Kemal, established the national republic of Turkey, with its capital at Angora and with himself as its president, and how, by fighting and diplomacy, he wrung from Greece and the Allied Great Powers a revision of the peace settlement (in the treaty of Lausanne of 1923) assuring to his state possession of all ethnically Turkish lands—the whole of Anatolia and Asia Minor and the European district of Constantinople.²

¹ On the "Europeanization" of the world during the preceding era, from 1870 to 1914, see above, pp. 510-543.

² See above, pp. 641-643. To emphasize the nationalist character of the new Turkey, the Greek name of "Constantinople" was supplanted by the Turkish, "Istanbul."

Turkey, as thus constituted, was only a portion of the former Ottoman Empire, but it was an important portion and it was a strictly national state.

Nominally the new Turkey was republican and democratic. A "fundamental law" of 1921 proclaimed the doctrine of popular sovereignty and vested supreme authority in a National Assembly; and an elaborated constitution of 1925 provided for the election of the Assembly by universal suffrage of the Turkish people every four years and for the choice by the Assembly every fourth year of a President of the Republic. Actually, however, the new Turkey was conducted by Mustafa Kemal as a nationalist dictatorship. This he was enabled to do by reason of the personal fame which attended his military successes and which earned him the popular title of "Ghazi" ("The Victorious"), and by reason likewise of his continuing leadership of the army and the single well-organized political party in the country, the People's party. As chief of the People's party, he controlled the Assembly, dictated its policies, and ensured his election to the presidency. As President of the Republic, he appointed the officials. As commander of the army, he enforced obedience to his Assembly, his agents, and himself.

Under Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship, Turkey was rapidly nationalized. Not only was the old imperial Ottoman tradition destroyed by the overthrow of the Sultanate and the expulsion of Mohammed VI in 1922, but, what was even more fundamental, Turkish institutions were pried loose from their historic Moslem setting and endowed with a purely secular and national character. Mohammed VI and his Ottoman predecessors had been not merely Sultans of an Empire but Caliphs of all orthodox Moslems, and their authority resided as much in the Caliphate as in the Sultanate. With the deposition of Mohammed VI in 1922, his cousin, Abdul Medjid II, was suffered to succeed him as Caliph though not as Sultan. This proved but a makeshift, for Mustafa Kemal soon took steps to destroy the religious as well as the political influence of the imperial family and to undermine the hold of Islam on the country. In 1924 Abdul Mejid II was expelled from Turkish soil and the Caliphate was abolished; and in the same year, governmental appropriations for religion were suppressed and religious schools were transformed into state schools. Then in 1926 the old legal system, which had been based

on prescriptions of the Koran and decisions of Moslem judges, was superseded by a modern national system. Polygamy was prohibited, and marriage, to be binding, must be performed by civil rather than religious officials. The Gregorian calendar was substituted for the Moslem, and the Roman alphabet for the Arabic. The metric system of weights and measures was adopted. The fez and turban were outlawed in favor of hats and caps; women were forbidden to wear veils; and the Turkish people were told to take surnames.¹ By government decree, the Moslem holy day was changed from Friday to Sunday. In 1928, by a constitutional amendment, the Turkish Republic was expressly declared to be independent of Islam.

Of course, most Turks continued to be Moslems, but their religion was henceforth a private and not a public concern; and the dictatorship which wrought this astounding change was fully determined not to grant to Christianity or other supernatural religion any favor which it denied to Islam. Christian missions in Turkey were regulated by Mustafa Kemal's government more rigorously than they had been by any Ottoman Sultan.

Many Moslem clergymen were aggrieved by Mustafa Kemal's religious policy, and in 1924-1925 the fanatically Moslem Kurds rose in revolt. At the same time, leaders of the Union and Progress party,² which had guided Turkish affairs during and just before the World War, reëmerged from obscurity and began to form a "Republican Progressive" party in opposition to the new régime. Kemal hit back promptly and with vigor. He put down the Kurdish revolt, and against political adversaries he conducted a reign of terror, exiling some and executing others.

Simultaneously, in order to arouse the patriotism of the Turkish masses and make it a prop for his own party and policies, he inaugurated an extensive program of education and propaganda. He equipped every sizable town with a public school for children and with a reading and radio centre for adults. Into all the radio centres was poured a stream of nationalistic speeches and news bulletins from Angora, and into all the schools were put uniform nationalistic textbooks prepared under Kemal's personal auspices and expounded by teachers of his own selection. Everybody was pressed to become literate, adults as well as children.

¹ Kemal took for himself the name of "Ataturk" ("Chief Turk").

² See above, pp. 491-493.

One result of these educational endeavors was to reduce Turkish illiteracy, which had long been notoriously high. From 95 per cent in 1920, it was brought down in the next fifteen years to 65 per cent. Another and still more significant result was to enlarge the scope and increase the effectiveness of governmental propaganda. The Turks were learning to read, as well as being accustomed to hear, that they were a pure and superior "race," descended from the highly civilized ancient Hittites, that throughout the ages they had had a "mission," that now, under the mighty and benign guidance of the "Ghazi," they were again fulfilling their destiny, and that in the future they would be a truly great people if only they would be intensely loyal to their race and nation and to the People's party.

The nationalist dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal gave much attention to Turkey's economic betterment. A twelve-year public works plan was launched in 1929, providing for railway extension, harbor construction, and a large number of irrigation and reclamation projects. In 1933 a five-year industrial plan was adopted, calling for the development of hydro-electric power, the exploitation of coal, copper, and oil deposits, and the erection of state factories in Anatolia. All these undertakings were to be national, with minimum financial borrowing from foreign countries and without any onerous concessions to them.

Turkey under Mustafa Kemal was proudly self-reliant. She would pursue her own interests and tolerate no external interference. By force of her own arms she had torn up the treaty of Sèvres and imposed on unwilling foreigners the treaty of Lausanne. Thereby she had rid herself of political and economic tutelage to other Powers, and in particular had secured the abolition of the so-called "capitulations" which in Ottoman days had deprived the government of jurisdiction over foreign residents in Turkey. For the retention of these gains she would rely above all on her own efforts. Mustafa Kemal was a military man, and as such, and as an ardent nationalist too, he kept the Turkish army strong and ready for any emergency.

In foreign affairs, once he had secured Turkey's independence and "national" frontiers, Kemal was generally conciliatory. It was the best way, he believed, of serving national interests, of upholding the *status quo* established by the treaty of Lausanne and assuring an uninterrupted development of nationalist reform

within Turkey. With the Russian Soviet Union he concluded a treaty of mutual guaranty and neutrality in 1925. He cultivated friendly relations with Greece and arranged an entente with the Greek government in 1930. He brought Turkey into the League of Nations in 1932, and in 1934 he made Turkey a party to a Balkan Pact with Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In 1936 he regained for Turkey the right to fortify the approaches to Constantinople, and in 1938, by an agreement with France, he was enabled to garrison Alexandretta. Kemal died in 1938, but the Turkish nationalist dictatorship continued.

Nationalism was also rife during the post-war period among the Arabs, though these, unlike the Turks, possessed no comprehensive state and no leader whom they would all follow. Arabs comprised the large majority of the population in all the former Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire which were not included in the new Turkey, but the peace settlement of 1919-1920 partitioned them among various sovereignties: the nominally independent kingdom of Hejaz; the British mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia; and the French mandate of Syria. This partition and especially its attendant subjection of the major parts to European Powers served to accentuate and give direction to Arab nationalism. In all Arab lands, agitation was ceaselessly vocal and sometimes violent; it would create as much trouble as possible for British or French rule. In other words, Arab patriots were less immediately concerned with building a unified national state than with opposing alien imperialism in the several existing states.

Shortly after assuming her mandates, Great Britain thought to conciliate the Arabs by entrusting Mesopotamia to Prince Feisal, a son of King Hussein of Hejaz, with the title of King of Iraq, and the trans-Jordan part of Palestine to another son, Abdullah by name. The appetite of Arab nationalists was only whetted thereby. Especially in Iraq, the agitation for self-government and complete independence, adroitly guided by King Feisal, gathered strength and momentum. Bit by bit the British High Commissioner gave way, making one concession after another. At length, after protracted negotiations, Great Britain concluded a treaty at Bagdad in 1930, recognizing the independence of Iraq, promising to sponsor its admission to the League of Nations, and agreeing,

Arab
National-
ism

Iraq and
King
Feisal

when this was brought about, to renounce all mandatory rights over the country and within five years to withdraw all troops. In accordance with the treaty of Bagdad, Iraq was admitted to the League in 1932 and the last of the British garrison was evacuated in 1935. Britain retained a defensive alliance with the country and some economic privileges in it. In the meantime, in 1933, King Feisal died and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, but Iraq was already a practically independent Arab state, with rich natural resources, a fairly strong army, a form of parliamentary government, and a resolute national spirit.

Trans-Jordania was not so successful in achieving independence. Its population of 300,000, though solidly Arab, was largely nomadic and much more backward than the comparatively settled population of Iraq, and Abdullah was less forceful than his brother Feisal and more dependent on British financial and military assistance. Hence, while Great Britain agreed in 1928 to a measure of self-government for the region, confirming Abdullah as Emir and authorizing him to create a Council and an elective Assembly for the enactment of local laws, actual British control continued. British armed forces might be sent into the country at any time, and acts of the Emir or of the Assembly might be disallowed by a resident agent of the British High Commissioner of Palestine.

In Palestine proper—that is, the portion of the British mandate west of the Jordan—the situation was complicated by the promise which the British government had made, in the “Balfour Declaration,”¹ to respect the national aspirations of Jews as well as Arabs. Palestine had long been an Arab country—largely Moslem, though in part Christian—but as soon as a British administration was installed after the war a tide of Jewish immigration set in, rapidly increasing the Jewish minority from barely 70,000 in 1920 to over half a million in 1938. The Jewish newcomers, with superior

Trans-
Jordania

Palestine:
Arab vs.
Jewish
National-
ism

¹ This Declaration had been made by Arthur Balfour, British foreign minister, in response to pressure from Jewish Zionists (on Zionism, see above, pp. 320-321) in November 1917, while the World War was in a critical stage and just before General Allenby had captured Jerusalem (see above, p. 619). It stated: “His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

technical skill and with financial subsidies from Zionist organizations in the West, undoubtedly contributed to an economic and industrial renaissance in Palestine, but in doing so they displaced many Arabs in gainful occupations and thus added to the grievances and the nationalistic agitation of the latter.

The British administration did its best to soften the conflict between Arabs and Jews. It tried to respect equally the cultural traditions of both groups, religious, linguistic, and educational. While assuming a paternal attitude toward Jewish undertakings and encouraging their colonizing projects, it sought to reassure the Arabs by withholding special political privileges from the Jews and discouraging their indiscriminate immigration. Above all, it endeavored to dispense even-handed justice and to enlist the coöperation of both groups in matters of common interest and advantage—in modernizing Jerusalem, in promoting public health, in improving transportation, in increasing the yield of farm and factory. Yet the nationalism of neither Arab nor Jew was thereby mitigated. The Jews were eager to make Palestine theirs; the Arabs, to keep it theirs. The former wanted immigration to proceed without restriction; the latter demanded that it stop altogether. Neither would agree to schemes for a Palestinian parliament which the British put forward in 1922 and again in 1936, each fearing it would but serve the purposes of the other.

In the circumstances there was frequent incitement to acts of violence, and repeatedly there were bloody riots at Jerusalem and in the countryside. Serious Arab outbreaks against the Jews occurred in 1929 and 1933, and from 1936 disorders and outrages were chronic. The British government replied by reënforcing its garrison, by expelling Arab leaders, and by proposing in 1937 a partition of Palestine. To this proposal both Arabs and Jews objected and in 1939 the British tried in vain, through direct conferences at London, to induce the leaders of the two groups to coöperate in creating a single semi-autonomous state with minority rights for the Jews.

It was likewise with the French in Syria. Here the Arab population was large and relatively progressive, and its leaders were as eager for national independence as were those of Iraq. In order to lighten their task, the French, soon after assuming the mandate, cut off from Syria the region around Beirut, which was predominantly Christian and more

kindly disposed to a French protectorate, and constituted it the autonomous "Republic of the Lebanon," with a native President and an elective Assembly. The rest of the mandate—the main part of it—was then consolidated into the "State of Syria," with its capital at Damascus and under the direct rule of the French High Commissioner. Despite the fact that most of the occupants of this post were tactful administrators as well as able soldiers and that they did a good deal to develop the country, there was constant protest from Arab nationalists and on occasion serious rioting at Damascus. The worst rioting occurred in 1925, when a new and exceptionally untactful Commissioner appeared in the person of General Sarrail, and it was rendered more serious by a simultaneous revolt of the Druses, a peculiar Moslem sect of warlike mountaineers. Sarrail's failure to suppress the Druse revolt and his attempt to stop the rioting at Damascus by subjecting the city to a deadly forty-eight-hour bombardment created the gravest kind of unrest all over Syria and provoked a general insurrection. Hastily Sarrail was recalled to France, and a new High Commissioner sent out with military reinforcements. He restored order in 1927.

Whereupon the French High Commissioner authorized the popular election of an Assembly to draft a constitution for Syria. The result was a sweeping victory for Arab Nationalists and a consequent impasse between the Assembly, which demanded complete independence, and the French officials, who would admit only a qualified autonomy. In 1930 the High Commissioner dissolved the Assembly and decreed a constitution, providing for a Syrian Republic in subordinate alliance with France, though with a parliament of its own and a native president. The Syrian parliament, however, was as insistently nationalist as the Assembly had been, and after an unsatisfactory attempt to rule without it, France finally gave way and in 1936 signed a treaty with Syria, promising the gradual withdrawal of foreign troops and the eventual admission of Syria, as a fully independent state, to the League of Nations.

In the Arab state of Hejaz (lying along the coast of the Red Sea and embracing the Moslem "holy cities" of Mecca and Medina), King Hussein aroused patriotic opposition by his subservience to Great Britain and Moslem op-
Hejaz
position by his pretensions to the Caliphate in succession to the

Ottoman Sultans. Both kinds of opposition were exploited by an ambitious Arab chieftain, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, Sultan of Nejd (a primitive principality in the Arabian desert) and leader of the austere Moslem zealots known as Wahabis. After extending his sway over the nomadic tribes of the desert, Abdul Aziz invaded Hejaz in force in 1925. Hussein abdicated, his son Ali was defeated and expelled, and Mecca was captured. Early in 1926 Abdul Aziz took the title of "King of Hejaz and Nejd," and then subjugated almost all the semi-independent chieftains of the Arabian peninsula. In 1932 he changed the name of his enlarged realm from "Hejaz and Nejd" to "Saudi Arabia." Abdul Aziz ibn Saud


**Saudi
Arabia**

gave Arabia a respite from tribal feuds and raids and a novel political unity. He promoted motor transportation throughout the country. He annulled foreign concessions, and in the interest of Arab solidarity, he made friendly overtures to the sons of King Hussein whom he had overthrown, and concluded treaties of alliance and arbitration with King Feisal of Iraq and Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan.

Egypt was likewise Arab in speech. But its historical traditions, as well as its geographical situation, predisposed it less to any Pan-Arab nationalism than to a separate nationalism of its own. Though most Egyptians welcomed the final extinction of Ottoman suzerainty in 1914 and the accompanying change in the title of their immediate ruler from "Khedive" to "Sultan," many did not take kindly to the continuing and apparently strengthened British protectorate.¹ Especially after the accession of the Sultan Fuad in 1917, the native Nationalist party increased its popular following and its demands for national independence. The leader of this party, Saad Zaghlul, a lawyer of peasant stock, was insistent on Egypt's being represented at the Paris Peace Congress as a sovereign Power; and his arrest and deportation to Malta by the British authorities precipitated an insurrection which was put down in 1919 only by the energetic campaigning of General Allenby at the head of a British army of 60,000 men. Lord Milner was then sent out from London to "conciliate" the Egyptians, and in accordance with his recommendations a treaty was signed in 1921 between Great Britain and the Sultan Fuad, whereby Egypt would

¹ On these events of 1914, see above, p. 601. On the previous history of Egypt, see above, pp. 377-379.





be nominally independent—the Sultan assuming the title of King—though still subject to “supervision” and “advice” of a British High Commissioner. The treaty was rejected by the Nationalist followers of Zaghlul, and, after more rioting and more military suppression, it was put into force by a unilateral proclamation of the British government in 1922.

In the Egyptian parliament which was created by a constitution of 1923, the Nationalists speedily got the upper hand, so that Zaghlul was recalled from exile to head a native ministry and, following his death in 1927, others of like mind held the premiership until after the death of King Fuad nine years later. Step by step the Nationalist régime wrung concessions from Great Britain, which ultimately agreed by a new treaty in 1936 to accept the status of “ally” instead of “protector,” to recognize the independence of Egypt, to abolish the office of High Commissioner, and to withdraw all troops except a guard for the Suez Canal. In the next year Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations, and an international conference at Montreux (in Switzerland) consented to the eventual abrogation of foreign law courts and other “extraterritorial rights” in Egypt.

The mass of natives backed and applauded the Nationalist government in its successful struggle for Egyptian independence and also in its promotion of elementary schooling, but dissatisfaction developed with its failure to accomplish any important economic or financial reform. In 1938 King Faruk, the youthful son and successor of Fuad, abruptly dismissed the Nationalists from office, and his action received popular endorsement at the polls.

Persia, during the post-war years, underwent a revolution akin to Turkey's. The Persian counterpart to Mustafa Kemal was Reza Pahlavi, who, born in 1878 of a poor family near the Caspian Sea, had been a soldier since youth, serving under Russian officers before the World War and rising to chief command in northern Persia with the withdrawal of the Russians during the war. In 1921 Reza suddenly appeared at Teheran, the Persian capital, at the head of a disciplined fighting force, and with its loyal backing he set up a Nationalist government with himself as Minister of War. This post he utilized to reorganize the whole Persian army and bring it under his personal control, just at the time when Russia and Great Britain were ceasing their chronic interference in Persian

Persia:
Dictator-
ship of
Reza
Shah

affairs. The result was that Reza could act freely without the risk of foreign intervention and that he could take advantage of the patriotic fervor which overspread the country with the removal of the long-standing threat of its partition by foreign Powers. Likewise, he was in a position to dominate, and if necessary to defy, the youthful and capricious weakling, Ahmed, who was nominal Shah of Persia.

Friction soon developed between Ahmed Shah and Reza Pahlavi. In 1923 the latter assumed the premiership, and, availing himself of the former's absence on a pleasure jaunt in Europe, called together the Persian Parliament, or Mejliss, and induced it to grant him wide powers independent of the Shah. Then in 1925 he caused the Mejliss to depose the still absent Shah Ahmed and to convoke a special National Assembly. This Assembly, late in 1925, elected Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Persia, with right of succession to his heirs. He was now titular as well as actual head of the state, and its military dictator.

Reza Shah was a warm admirer, and almost slavish imitator, of Mustafa Kemal. Following the example of the Turkish dictator, he abrogated the "capitulations" and banned all alien checks on national sovereignty. Moreover, he bodily introduced into Persia most of the novel laws and decrees which Kemal was issuing in Turkey, especially the laws directed against the influence and privileged status of the Moslem religion and the decrees looking toward a "modern" secularized nation, with European dress, calendar, weights and measures, legal codes, and social usages. Like Mustafa Kemal, too, Reza Shah sought to intensify the national patriotism of the Persian people by teaching them, in army and public school and by aid of all the technical devices of propaganda, to cherish their distinctive language, their glorious history, and their still more glorious "mission." In line with this purpose, he announced in 1934 that the nation would no longer be officially designated by the corrupt and unnational name of "Persia," but by the ancient and racial name of "Iran." The Persians, he explained, were the true "Iranians," the pure and aboriginal "Aryans." Also, like Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah evolved schemes for the economic betterment of his country.

National dictatorship was confronted with greater obstacles in Iran (Persia) than in Turkey. The country was more rugged and less productive. Its people were more primitive and more

fanatically Moslem, and they were less disposed to subordinate their customary tribal life and their traditional religious habits to the exigencies of new secular nationalism. There were spasmodic revolts of tribesmen and steady resistance on the part of leading Moslem clergymen. Yet Reza Shah persevered, confident that the reformed army would sustain him in the near future, and that in the more distant future time itself was on his side.

The huge Empire of India seethed with nationalist agitation throughout the post-war period. A governmental reform which the British Parliament enacted in 1919,¹ setting up native provincial councils and giving them some supervision of education, agriculture, and public health, failed to offset the effects of repressive military measures² and only stimulated and spread the agitation. In 1920 control of the native "All-India Congress"³ passed from "moderates" to "extremists," and these elected to its presidency Lajpat Rai, a Hindu lawyer and patriot, who had been deported in 1907 for advocating Dominion status for India, and who, after spending the war years in America, had returned home and become editor of an influential Nationalist newspaper at Lahore. Through his journalism and through his following in the Congress, Lajpat Rai spread his conviction, especially among Hindu intellectuals and among the masses in the Punjab, that India must have the same national status as that enjoyed by Canada or South Africa. But of even greater effectiveness in consolidating Hindu nationalism throughout India was another native lawyer, Mohandas Gandhi.

Gandhi came from a traditionally pro-British and devoutly Hindu family. After studying at the University of London, he had begun the practice of law at Bombay in 1892, but, called to South Africa the next year on professional business, he had remained there for twenty-one years, concerning himself with the sorry plight of lower-class Hindu immigrants and carrying on a tireless struggle in their behalf. On his return to India in 1914 he applied the methods which he had developed in South Africa to the home-rule movement and began to preach

¹ The "Montagu-Chelmsford reform," so called from its authors, respectively British Secretary for India and British Viceroy.

² These reached a climax in the "massacre of Amritsar," in the spring of 1919, when several hundred natives who had assembled to protest against the government were attacked and killed by British troops under the command of General Dyer.

³ See above, p. 382.

resistance to the British by "soul force" and "non-coöperation." From 1919 his counsels grew more urgent and more widely influential. In 1920 he proclaimed a general campaign of "civil disobedience," that is, of "non-violent non-coöperation." As long as British rule continued in India, natives should refrain from supporting or participating in it. They should accept no public office. They should withdraw their children from government schools. They should not appear in law courts. They should not buy foreign commodities. They should boycott British machinery and restore the domestic spinning-wheel. Gandhi was earnest and ascetic, and quite opposed to the use of force, and he soon acquired an immense personal influence over the Hindu masses, who acclaimed him with the honorary title of "Mahatma" or "Great Soul." In 1921 Lajpat Rai joined Gandhi, and the All-India Congress voted to follow unquestioningly the dictates of the latter and of any successor he might designate. Gandhi sought, at first with some success, to make his movement truly All-Indian, to include in it not only the higher-caste Hindus but the lowest caste, the so-called "untouchables," and also the Moslems.

Eventually, however, Gandhi could not overcome Hindu intolerance of Moslems or Moslem contempt and distrust of Hindus. Nor could he restrain hotheads from committing acts of violence which indirectly embarrassed him and directly profited the British. In 1922 the British officials felt solid enough to arrest and jail him for sedition, and though they released him early in 1924 when he went on a hunger-strike, they no longer feared him. The Moslems were deserting him, and he himself was becoming ever more mystical and impractical. Nevertheless, if Gandhi failed to unite all India in a common nationalism, he at least performed a signal and lasting work by giving point and inspiration to the nationalism of the Hindu majority.

The British régime continued to function in India under a succession of able Viceroys. Important labor laws were enacted by the Legislative Council in 1922-1924: a factory act restricting the employment of children, a mines act, and a workmen's compensation act. Agricultural production was increased by extensive irrigation works. Simultaneously, the output of mines and factories (especially cotton factories) forged steadily ahead. Though the number of schools was added

British
Rule in
India

to, the government continued to spend much larger sums on army and police than on education, and in 1938 only 8 per cent of the 350 million natives could read or write. In 1931 splendid new government buildings were opened with pomp at Delhi, the capital of Britain's Indian Empire.

Meanwhile, Hindu Nationalists were pressing hard for self-government. In 1928, when the British cabinet in London sent out a special commission, headed by Sir John Simon, to study the political situation in India and to recommend what if any change should be made in the Act of 1919, the Nationalists held a convention and drafted a set of "minimum demands," according to which India as a whole should enjoy Dominion status within the British Empire and under a written constitution of her own. Such a constitution, the Nationalists proposed, should guaranty individual rights and provide for a federal system of government, with a central parliament at Delhi and with provincial parliaments in the several states, all to be elected by universal suffrage (both male and female) without any favor to minorities. This last proposal antagonized the mass of Indian Moslems and cemented their alliance with other opponents of Hindu "radicalism": Indian princes, who were fearful of democracy and anxious to preserve the *status quo*; "moderate" Hindus who stood to profit from the existing régime; and Britishers who desired, whether for selfish or for altruistic motives, to retain as much political and economic control of India as possible. Gandhi labored tirelessly to counteract these divisive developments and to promote harmony and concord within India, but he was only partially successful.

As an outcome of the recommendations of the Simon Commission and of a series of "round-table" conferences at London, the British government endorsed in 1933 the project for an Indian Constitution submitted by the Marquess of Linlithgow, a Conservative statesman and the official reporter for the round-table conferences. According to the proposed Constitution, all India directly under British rule, excepting Burma, would be divided into eleven states¹ and these would be federated with the states under native princes

Indian
Constitu-
tion of
1933

¹ The eleven would be: Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Madras, Bombay, the Central Provinces (centring in Nagpur), the United Provinces (centring in Lucknow), Sind, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province. Burma was to be excluded from the Indian Federation and provided with a separate government.

to form the United States of India. Each state would have a large measure of local autonomy, exercising it through a native prince or an elective native legislature, as the case might be; and for general legislation there would be a federal parliament, comprising appointed representatives of the princely states and elected representatives of the others, with a ministry responsible to it. Elections, both federal and state, would be restricted by qualifications of religion, property, and literacy to about 10 per cent of the men and about half of 1 per cent of the women in India. At the head of the whole Indian government would be a British Governor-General (subject only to the cabinet at London) who would direct foreign relations and military affairs quite independently of the Indian parliament and who might similarly employ "emergency powers" in crises involving religion, minorities, currency, and justice to Europeans.

This Constitution, after strenuous opposition to it on the part of extreme British Imperialists, was enacted by the British Parliament in 1935, and the Marquess of Linlithgow was appointed Viceroy of India and charged with the difficult tasks of obtaining the necessary ratification of it by the various native princes and of overcoming the hostility and securing the coöperation of the Hindu Nationalists.

Japan had become, before the World War, a Europeanized Power not only, but a Great Power. She already ranked with the leading nations of Europe and America in industrial and commercial development and in military strength and prestige, and her position was enhanced by the war and its aftermath. The defeat of Germany, the revolution within Russia, the depression in Britain, the absorption of France in problems of domestic reconstruction and security, all contributed to freeing Japan from checks upon the extension of her trade and sway in the Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland. And the industriousness and intense patriotism of the whole Japanese nation amply seconded the determination of its business men and statesmen to take full advantage of the opportunities thus offered.¹

During and just after the war the Japanese government was controlled by the conservative party—the Seiyukai. Then, following a terrible earthquake which in 1923 wrecked the cities of

¹ The "divine" objects of national Japanese patriotism during the period were the Emperors Yoshihito (1912-1926) and Hirohito (1926-).

Tokio and Yokohama and united the urban electorate in demands for speedy and businesslike reconstruction, the liberal party—the Menseito—got the upper hand. It carried the general election of 1924, and, under one of its most eminent leaders, Viscount Kato, a wealthy industrialist who was premier until his death in 1926, it pushed forward the reconstruction of the devastated centres, pursued a conciliatory foreign policy, and in 1925 established universal manhood suffrage. After Kato's death, the Seiyukai contrived to man a ministry from 1927 to 1929, but a sweeping victory of the Menseito in the general election of 1930, the first under universal suffrage, seemed to promise to this party a long period of predominance and to Japan a continuing evolution towards national democracy and international peace.

Party
Politics,
1920-1930

The promise was soon belied, however. The Menseito was not truly a popular party. It had gained its electoral victory by usual methods of political corruption, and the attitude of its leaders toward difficult national problems which were then becoming acute aroused the active hostility of large sections of the population. For example, the Finance Minister and party chairman, Junnosuke Inouye, seeking to overcome the economic depression which beset Japan in common with all other industrial nations, urged a drastic curtailment of governmental expenditure and a general policy of financial deflation (instead of inflation), which was strenuously opposed by governmental officials, both civil and military, by agricultural interests, and by organized labor. Again, the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, in his desire to promote peace and lighten the burden of armaments, consented to the London naval agreement of 1930 and sought an amicable adjustment of Japan's differences with China, which outraged Japanese nationalists, particularly officers in army and navy. In the circumstances, nationalist propaganda against the government made rapid headway. While a cabal of army officers took it upon themselves to open hostilities against the Chinese in Manchuria, thereby nullifying the peace efforts of Shidehara, Fascist organizations sprang up in Japan, applauding the strong action of the military, demanding the overthrow of parliamentary government, and insisting that the only cure for domestic economic ills was a forceful extension of the Japanese Empire. Faced with a rising tide of

Military
and
Fascist
Disturb-
ances

popular conversion to militarist and Fascist propaganda, and unable to prevent attendant acts of terrorism, the Menseito ministry resigned in December 1931.


For a time a Seiyukai premier attempted to carry on. He dissolved the parliament and so manipulated the ensuing general election as to ensure the return of a large majority of his party. Yet he soon discovered, when he tried to assert the supremacy of civilian authorities, that the militant and Fascist groups were no more respectful of a Seiyukai ministry than of a Menseito government. There was a steady increase of insubordination and terrorism in the winter and spring of 1932, beginning with the assassination of Inouye, the leader and ex-minister of the Menseito, and culminating in the murder of the Seiyukai premier himself.


Following this murder, an extra-parliamentary ministry was set up, headed by Viscount Saito, elderly ranking officer of the Japanese navy and for several years strong-arm governor of Korea. Counter-demonstrations were repressed, a rigid censorship enforced, and steps taken to emphasize nationalism at home, in press, schools, and religion, and to promote imperialism abroad. Hostilities against China were vigorously pushed, and when the League of Nations ventured to protest, Saito's government announced the withdrawal of Japan from the League. Presently, too, announcement was made of Japan's purpose to terminate the existing naval agreements with the United States and Great Britain.

Reserving to the next section an account of the virtual war which nationalistic Japan waged against China, and its international complications, we may remark here that militaristic and Fascist groups continued to dominate the Japanese government. Viscount Saito was succeeded in 1934 by a nationalistic naval officer, Admiral Keisuki Okada, but neither was nationalistic enough to satisfy the hotbloods in the Japanese army. They mutinied in 1936, killing Saito and several of Okada's colleagues and indirectly compelling the formation of a new and most nationalistic ministry. Japan still retained the form of parliamentary government but it was at the mercy of a jingoistic and imperialistic military group.

Japan's swiftly growing power in the Far East was at the expense of China, whose affairs, after the death in 1916 of the nominal president and actual dictator, Yüan Shih-kai, went from bad

National-
ist Ré-
gime in
Japan,
1932





to worse.¹ A form of republican government continued, but for at least a decade it was the plaything of greedy and unscrupulous provincial governors, who, with the aid of mercenary troops, wrung all the money they could from the people within their jurisdiction and intrigued and fought with one another for supreme control. One such "war-lord" might get the upper hand for a moment and install a "president" who would do his bidding, but he would soon fall prey to other "war-lords" and his puppet president would be replaced by another. The civil government of the Chinese Republic was not only kaleidoscopic but corrupt, and quite unable to command the united loyalty of the nation or to preserve its territorial integrity. Whole provinces and even larger areas were practically detached from any central authority. Then, too, as early as 1917, the central government at Peking was defied by a rival "nationalist" government which Sun Yat-sen established at Canton (in southern China). And while Russian agents were spreading Communist propaganda widely in southern China, Japanese agents were obtaining favors from the government in northern China.

Post-War
Chaos in
China

At first the nationalist efforts of Sun Yat-sen seemed as ineffectual as the more conservative régime at Peking. He had in back of him a party of intellectuals, the so-called Kuomintang, who helped him to organize his government at Canton in 1917 and formally conferred upon him in 1921 the title of "President of the Chinese Republic." But he was preacher and visionary rather than organizer, and for several years the Kuomintang lacked competent generals and was torn by internal dissensions. The best that Sun Yat-sen could do was to retain a precarious foothold in the city of Canton and the adjacent province of Kwantung and to welcome overtures from the government at Peking for a conference looking to the reestablishment of national unity. He was participating in such a conference when he died at Peking in 1925.

Sun
Yat-sen

With the death of Sun Yat-sen, he was extolled all over China as a national hero and his ideas became the inspiration for a revival and rapid extension of the Kuomintang. China, the party declared, must possess a democratic government, a higher standard of living for the masses, and an intensity of national feeling that would preserve her historic territory and distinctive culture

¹ See above, pp. 532-533.

and tolerate no foreign interference or tutelage; and, pending the achievement of these ultimate goals, China must submit to a dictatorship. Such was the program, and for its execution emerged an extraordinary leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

Born in 1886, Chiang had joined the Kuomintang in his youth and been entrusted in 1920 with the command of a military training school at Canton. In 1925 he was appointed chief of the Kuomintang forces; and during the next year, with military genius of his own and with no less helpful popular propaganda on the part of Communist advisers from Russia, he overcame opposition in southern China and advanced northward to the Yangtze River. In 1927 he occupied Nanking in force, and there installed the Nationalist government. In vain the remaining war-lords of the North put themselves under the direction of the governor of Manchuria and attempted to stem the tide. Their armies melted away; the remnant was overwhelmed; and the commander, retreating into Manchuria, was killed. In 1928 Chiang Kai-shek entered Peking in triumph.

Peking was renamed Peiping ("Northern Peace") and the capital of the Chinese Republic was transferred thence to Nanking. In October 1928, on the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the Revolution,¹ Chiang Kai-shek was inaugurated as President of the Republic. He thus combined in his own person the headship of the civil government, the chairmanship of the Kuomintang, and the command of the army. He reaffirmed his devotion to the program of Sun Yat-sen, save for its Communist tendencies, which he now expressly repudiated. He chose his chief advisers and lieutenants from the Kuomintang. He married the sister-in-law of Sun Yat-sen. In 1931 he convoked at Nanking a National Convention, which drafted a "provisional constitution" and elected a civilian as titular head of the government, though it confirmed the existing dictatorship by making the Kuomintang the only legal party in the state and by empowering Chiang Kai-shek to appoint the ministers and to direct military affairs.

The Nationalist dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek fostered popular patriotic education, multiplying elementary schools and supplying them with textbooks in the simplified vernacular writing which had recently been devised by James Yen, a social worker

¹ See above, p. 532.

and a graduate of Yale University. By 1930 millions of farmers and day laborers were learning to read and write, although 60 per cent of the vast Chinese population were still illiterate. Above all, the government was intensifying the nationalism of those who could read. Foreign investors and traders and foreign missionaries were regarded with increasing suspicion and put under closer surveillance. Boycotting of foreign goods for political reasons was invoked more frequently and obeyed more generally.

Yet the task confronting the Nationalist dictatorship in China was herculean. The country was so big and its population so numerous. Banditry was so usual, corruption so habitual, and the opportunities for ambitious and grasping officials so great and alluring. The government of Chiang Kai-shek did better than its immediate predecessors in grappling with internal difficulties, but it possessed neither the financial resources nor the military strength to overcome all of these and at the same time to withstand, unaided and successfully, the forceful aggression of disciplined foreign Powers. It could hardly maintain its authority in China proper. It could not recover Tibet from the virtual protectorate of Great Britain or narrow the "sphere of influence" which France continued to exploit north of Indo-China. It could not prevent the Moslems in the extensive western territory of Sinkiang from revolting in 1928 and setting up a practically independent government. It could not control the tribesmen in Mongolia and keep those in outer Mongolia from falling under the domination of Soviet Russia. To cap the climax, it had to suffer Japanese conquest of Manchuria and other northern provinces and ultimately the horrors of a general war with Japan. How this occurred, we shall indicate in the following section.

Here it remains to sketch post-war political developments among major Latin nations on the American continents.¹ These reflected prevalent currents in Europe. There was similar dissatisfaction with traditional government, similar popular unrest, similar intensification of nationalism, a similar trend toward dictatorship, and in one significant instance a similar resort to war.

In Mexico, the revolutionary movement, which had begun in 1910, took on a much more radical complexion as its original

¹ For an outline of the pre-war history of these nations, see above, pp. 513-518; and for a map of Latin America, see above, pp. 516-517.

leaders were supplanted in turn by Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Mexico and Its Nationalist Dictatorship Elias Calles. Both these men were natives of the northern state of Sonora, the former a planter and the latter a school-teacher. Both had become "intellectual radicals" in their youth and voluble advocates of land reform in behalf of the native Indian population. Both had recruited Indian troops and risen to the rank of general in the revolutionary armies which put Madero into the presidency in 1911 and Carranza in 1914. Obregon was at first the more influential of the two. As acknowledged leader of the radical wing of Carranza's followers and as commander-in-chief of the army, he forced into the Constitution of 1917, against Carranza's wishes, some of its most revolutionary provisions, notably those promising the partition of large landed estates and vesting in the government the ownership of all mineral and petroleum resources. In 1920 an open break occurred between Carranza and Obregon: the former, seeking reelection in violation of the Constitution, ordered the latter's arrest; and the latter, commanding superior forces, headed a revolt against the former. Carranza was deposed and murdered, and Obregon was elevated to the presidency, with Calles as his Minister of the Interior. Then, on the expiration of his term of office in 1924, he secured the election of Calles as President, with himself as Minister of War. Obregon planned to resume the presidency again in 1928, but after his election and before his inauguration he was assassinated. It was left for Calles to continue and develop the dictatorship, and this he did through the National Revolutionary party which he organized and led and which dominated the army and the parliament.

Both Obregon and Calles championed an intense Mexican nationalism and directed it against every "alien" influence. They catered to the native Indian element, numerically large but long neglected. They sponsored a considerable amount of land reform and labor legislation. They prompted a campaign of popular education, establishing public schools in rural villages as well as in urban centres, and supplying them with nationalist teachers and textbooks. They extolled and encouraged native Indian art.

They were especially jealous of foreign influence or tutelage. They induced the parliament to impose severe limitations on foreign economic enterprise in Mexico, agricultural, industrial, mining, and commercial. Though they welcomed the recognition

which the United States accorded to their revolutionary dictatorship in 1923 and utilized it to strengthen their own position, they were careful not to make any exceptional concessions to the United States, and until 1931 they held aloof from the League of Nations. Moreover, it was to oppose "alien" influences, as well as to weaken the chief traditional prop of "reaction" within Mexico, that Obregon and Calles and their supporters waged war against the Catholic Church.

Controversy between church and state in Mexico was no novelty, but it was greatly embittered by the drastic ecclesiastical restrictions which were written into the Constitution of 1917, and it reached an acute stage during the presidency of Calles. In 1926 Calles had his subservient parliament enact a series of laws, applying and supplementing the constitutional provisions: the church might own no property, maintain no monastic establishment, conduct no school, and carry on no propaganda; the government might permit the use of church buildings for strictly religious purposes, but ecclesiastics would be subject to special regulation and close surveillance; no foreign priest might function or reside in Mexico; native priests must register with the government and assure it of their "good behavior"; and laymen as well as clergymen were forbidden to urge any alteration of these repressive measures. Even further went some of the local state governments, which, at the dictation of fanatical allies of Calles, closed churches altogether. Against all this legislation, and specifically against the requirement of registration, the Mexican clergy, with papal approval, went on "strike"; and for three years bishops and priests conducted no religious services in Mexico. In 1929 the government consented to a truce with the Catholic hierarchy, whereby assurances were given that the anti-clerical laws, without being repealed, would be leniently enforced, and religious services were therefore resumed. In 1931, however, a new tide of governmental activity set in against the church and indeed against all religion. In vain the clergy and the Pope protested. The papal delegate—a native Mexican—was expelled as a "pernicious foreigner"; and religious persecution became general.

The Mexican government was essentially a dictatorship, analogous to that of Russia or Germany. Only one political party was allowed to exist and engage in propaganda—the National Revolutionary party—and this, through its control of the army and the

civil administration, held every seat in the Mexican parliament, every ministerial post, and the presidency of the republic. The masses were largely indifferent to politics, and dissent or opposition among the classes was ruthlessly suppressed. There were, of course, some differences of opinion and some personal rivalries within the National Revolutionary party. Though solidly nationalist, it represented various degrees of devotion to socialism and to anti-clericalism, and gradually the preëminence of Calles in it was undermined by one of his lieutenants and protégés, General Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas, born in 1895 of a family part Spanish and part Indian, had risen under Calles's auspices to be secretary of the National Revolutionary party and Minister of War, and these strategic positions secured his election to the presidency in 1934 for a six-year term. He was younger and more vigorous than Calles, less concerned with the somewhat stale issue of anti-clericalism, and more eager to forward economic policies of a socialistic character. He threw himself with energy into the prosecution of a "six-year plan" for the "Mexicanizing" of industry, the development of public works, the construction of model dwellings for urban workingmen, and the distribution of communal lands among agricultural villages. He also halted the religious persecution and tolerated resumption of church services.

If in Mexico nationalism was stressed by the protracted revolutionary movement and given an anti-religious and eventually socialistic slant, it was emphasized in two major countries of South America—Argentina and Brazil—by a sudden break in the orderly functioning of government which had long prevailed and a forceful seizure of power by conservative groups. In Argentina, the Radical government of Hipolito Irigoyen, who had been Presi-

Argentina dent from 1916 to 1922 and again from 1928, was overthrown in September 1930 by a *coup d'état* of General José Uriburu, who assumed a temporary dictatorship and utilized it to assure the election a year later of another Conservative officer as constitutional President of the Republic. In Brazil, a similar revolt in October 1930, led by Veturio Vargas and supported by army officers and by popular sentiment against the existing hegemony of the state of São Paulo in national politics, drove the President and President-elect into exile and installed Vargas as dictator. Vargas suppressed a counter-revolt in São Paulo in 1932 and then decreed the election of a

National Assembly by universal suffrage (including women). The new constitution which issued from the Assembly in 1934, while retaining the federal character of the Brazilian state, enlarged the powers of the central government; and while prescribing that four-fifths of the Chamber of Deputies should be democratically elected by universal suffrage, it recognized the principle of the "corporate state" by providing that the remaining fifth of the Chamber should be chosen by professional and trade associations. The Constitution also granted nationalist demands by limiting foreign immigration and foreign investment. Likewise it favored the Catholic Church by permitting religious instruction in the schools, guarantying the freedom of religious congregations, and authorizing the substitution of religious for civil marriage. In 1934 the National Assembly formally elected Vargas as constitutional President, and in 1938 he suppressed a Fascist revolt.

The upheavals of 1930 in Brazil and Argentina were attributable in considerable part to the economic depression and financial instability then current throughout the world, and this factor was certainly important in the epidemic of revolutions which affected most other Latin American countries from 1930 and established dictatorships in most of them.

For several years after the World War, the countries of Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua were occupied and governed, directly or indirectly, by armed forces of the United States. Gradually, however, the United States reconsidered and revised its imperialist policy, partly because of nationalist pressure from the natives, partly because of waxing hostility to the United States all over Latin America with attendant discrimination against traders and investors from the United States, and partly because of a growing concern of the American people with domestic and narrowly national problems. In 1924 American armed forces were withdrawn from Santo Domingo, and in 1933 they finally quitted Nicaragua. In 1930 the native Haitian parliament was permitted to assemble for the first time in seventeen years and to elect a native president, and in 1934 American troops evacuated the country.

United
States and
the Carib-
bean

It is also noteworthy, in this connection, that in 1934 the United States Congress, taking account of vigorous nationalist sentiment in the Philippine Islands, enacted a law, which was speedily ratified by the Philippine legislature, providing for the

transformation of the dependency into an autonomous Commonwealth, with power to devise its own constitution (subject to approval by the President of the United States), to elect a native Chief Executive and a native Congress, and to make and execute its own laws, and providing further for a gradual withdrawal of American troops and, if the experiment in self-government should prove successful at the end of ten years, for the formal recognition by the United States at that time of the complete independence of the Philippines. The Philippine Commonwealth was inaugurated in 1935.

In the Philippines, then, and in the "backward" countries of the Caribbean and Central America, nationalism was coming to the fore. The same phenomenon was all the more in evidence in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, in Japan and China, in India and Egypt, in Persia and Turkey: indeed, in all the would-be "progressive" nations of America, Asia, and Africa, as of Europe also. In the circumstances, the pursuit of national interests was world-wide and ever more intolerant of restraints. Once a policy or an action appeared to serve national interest, the statesman who was loudest in urging it and most forceful in forwarding it was almost certain to be stalwartly backed, if not relentlessly pushed on, by the large majority of his fellow nationals. If such policy or action involved a violation of international engagements and a resort to arms, as it occasionally did, other nations might express regret, but hardly the nation immediately concerned. Its government and its people alike believed that in an emergency the strict observance of treaty obligations and the preservation of international peace had to be subordinated to the safeguarding of national interests. It was for each nation to decide, of course, what its interests were.

Such was the explanation for example, of the long and deadly war which the two South American states of Bolivia and Paraguay waged against each other almost continuously from 1928 to 1935. To both, the acquisition of the swamp-land of the Gran Chaco was a national interest so vital that they could not afford to negotiate any compromise between themselves or acquiesce in any arbitration by outsiders; they simply had to fight it out. One attempt after another was made to restore peace between the belligerents—by neighboring Powers jointly and singly, by the League of Nations,

And the
Philip-
pines

Universal
Pursuit of
National
Interests

Chaco
War,
1928-
1935, a
Symptom

by Pan-American Conferences at Washington in 1928 and at Montevideo in 1934—all in vain. Only utter exhaustion of Bolivia and Paraguay stayed the fighting and eventually brought about a settlement in 1938. The Chaco War was a conflict between third-rate Powers, but it was symptomatic of a breakdown of international law and order, which by 1935 was becoming manifest in many parts of the world and, most menacingly, in the relations among European Great Powers.

4. SCRAPPING OF TREATIES AND RESORT TO VIOLENCE

The Paris treaties of 1919-1920, with the League Covenant which they enshrined, lasted as the public law of Europe and the guaranty of a pacific world order barely fifteen years. By 1935, with impunity and abandon, Germany was repudiating the peace settlement to which previously she had pledged herself, and Japan and Italy were waging wars against fellow members of the League of Nations. Thenceforth, matters went from bad to worse, and violence or the threat of violence loomed as the sole remaining recourse for Europe and the world.

The sequence of these sorry events was initiated by Japan in 1931. Ten years before, at the Washington Conference,¹ she had signed treaties with Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, and China, affirming the independence and territorial integrity of China and prohibiting special arrangements "designed to create spheres of influence . . . in Chinese territories." Despite these "nine-Power treaties," and despite her adherence to the League Covenant and to the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the outlawry of war, Japan was ambitious to dominate China² and particularly Manchuria. This large and potentially rich province, in which Japan already had important investments and some soldiers, could be more fully and profitably exploited if it were separated altogether from China and brought under Japanese tutelage. But as such an outcome could not be secured by diplomatic negotiation with the Chinese Nationalist government

Japan's
Ambition
in China

¹ On the naval agreement of this same Conference, see above, pp. 763-764.

² Back in 1915, in the midst of the World War, Japan had presented to China "twenty-one demands," calculated to transform the whole country into a Japanese protectorate, and though she receded from some of them, under pressure from the United States and other Powers, she had compelled the Chinese government to accord her special economic concessions and police rights in southern Manchuria.

of Chiang Kai-shek, which naturally invoked the "nine-Power treaties," Japan felt impelled to obtain it by force.

Hostilities were opened in Manchuria by Japanese troops in September 1931, not on the authority of the civil government at Tokio but on that of military commanders, who insisted that forceful action was necessary to protect Japanese property (notably railway property) in the province, to repress banditry, and to restore order. Presently the Japanese government acquiesced in what it could not, and doubtless would not, prevent; and the dictatorship which issued from the *coup d'état* at Tokio in May 1932 committed itself completely to the Manchurian adventure and heavily reënforced the troops in charge of it. Japanese armies soon overran the entire province of Manchuria, dispersing the forces of the Chinese governor and putting him to flight. China appealed to the League of Nations, and a League commission, after six months' investigation, recommended that Japan be censured and Manchuria be given an autonomous government under Chinese sovereignty. Japan ignored the recommendations, withdrew from the League, and proceeded with her own plans for Manchuria. The League, unable to agree upon any joint "sanctions" against Japan, contented itself with expressing regret. Unavailing, too, was China's protest to the United States and other signatories of the nine-Power treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. None was minded to go to war with Japan or even to take economic measures against her. China, left alone, was powerless.

Already, in February 1932, the Japanese military authorities had installed at Mukden a native but sympathetic "provisional government" and inspired it to proclaim Manchuria an independent state with the name of Manchukuo.

Then in March the ex-Emperor of China, Henry Pu-yi, who had been a pensioner of Japan since boyhood,¹ was placed in nominal charge of the new state; and with him Japan concluded in September 1932 a treaty, formally recognizing the independence of Manchukuo. In vain, patriotic Chinese attempted a boycott against the Japanese. A Japanese expeditionary force landed at Shanghai, and Japanese troops occupied the Inner Mongolian province of Jehol (south of Manchuria). At length in May 1933 the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek consented to a

¹ See above, p. 532.

truce with Japan, leaving Jehol to Manchukuo, and providing for a demilitarized zone between it and China.

Within Manchukuo, Japanese arms dictated a political arrangement embodied in a constitution of March 1934. Henry Pu-yi was enthroned as the Emperor Kang Teh, with a native ministry, but with Japanese officers in command of the army and with Japanese advisers for foreign affairs, for financial and economic matters, and indeed for the whole central and local administration. Manchukuo was independent in name. In fact it was a Japanese dependency. All that the United States and the League of Nations did was to withhold official recognition.

Sure now that she would not be held to treaty obligations by other Great Powers and that through her own might she could realize further imperialistic ambitions, Japan in December 1934 denounced the Washington and London naval agreements. Then, in 1935, Japanese troops, on the pretext of safeguarding Jehol against Chinese bandits, crossed the Great Wall north of Peiping, invaded the provinces of Chahar and Hopei, and compelled the Chinese government to replace its officials in these provinces and in Peiping and Tientsin with new men acceptable to Japan.

Occupation of North China, 1935

Presently Japan extended on a wider front her forceful drive against China. To this she was induced not only by a tightening hold of militarists on the government at Tokio, but also by signs in 1936-1937 that China was at last achieving political unity and becoming correspondingly less yielding to Japanese demands. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek put an end to civil war in Kwantung in the summer of 1936, and in the spring of 1937 entered into an agreement with Communist forces in the northwestern provinces for a "united front" against Japanese aggression. Already in December 1936 it rejected new Japanese demands and broke off diplomatic negotiations. Whereupon, in July 1937, some fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops in the vicinity of Peiping and Tientsin was the signal for the delivery of a Japanese ultimatum to China, and, on its rejection, for the launching of actual, if undeclared, war. In vain the League of Nations, and the United States also, condemned Japan for violating treaties and committing aggression against China. Japan went ahead without compunction or fear of consequences, and very soon the war in China

War with China, 1937-1939

reached colossal proportions. Japan was resolved, it appeared, to fight it out until the government of Chiang Kai-shek was overthrown and the whole of China was subjected to a régime which would do Japan's bidding.

The Japanese, with superior discipline and instruments of war, won a series of striking successes. They overran northern China, drove the Chinese government from its capital city of Nanking, shelled and seized Shanghai, conquered a large district along the lower Yangtze, and in October 1938 captured both Canton, the great port in the South, and Hankow, the principal city in central China. The Chinese put up all the resistance they could, but the destruction of life was appalling both of soldiers on battlefields and of civilians from bombing and famine, flood and pestilence. There was no halting of Japan's subjugation of China. Attention of other Great Powers was concentrated elsewhere.

For meanwhile, in January 1933, Hitler with his rabid nationalist following, had come to power in Germany, pledged to

free the Fatherland from restrictions imposed upon it by the treaty of Versailles and to regain for it the full independence and superior strength which it had possessed before the World War; and the shocking violence by which he achieved his ends inside Germany was ominous of the means he might employ outside. His first significant step in international relations was to cut through the impasse which had developed in the protracted Disarmament Conference, to seal its doom by withdrawing the German delegates, and at the same time, in the autumn of 1933, to denounce the League of Nations

Nazi Germany's Foreign Policy

Repudiation of the League, 1933

in scathing terms and to proclaim Germany's secession from it. Which, as we know, met with the approval of the German masses and enabled the Nazi dictatorship to clinch its hold on the country.¹

Then, to the surprise of Europe and the discomfiture of France, Hitler made friendly and reassuring overtures to Poland and persuaded her to accept in January 1934 a non-aggression pact, guarantying for ten years the ex-

Pact with Poland, 1934

¹ See above, p. 724. The obvious grave weakening of the League of Nations by Japan's secession in 1932 and Germany's in 1933 contributed, at least indirectly, to an epidemic of regional agreements for mutual help among the lesser Powers in 1934. The Little Entente of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania was confirmed. A new Balkan League was created by Turkey, Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. A Baltic Entente was formed by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

isting boundaries between them. Poland thus eased a tension which had troubled her since the Peace of Paris and gained at least a respite for internal consolidation, while Hitler weaned away an ally of France and removed a serious obstacle to his plans for annexing Austria and rearming Germany.

The prohibition, in the treaty of Versailles, of Austrian union with Germany was no bar to Hitler. He actively encouraged Nazi agitation within Austria and connived at the attempted *coup d'état* there in July 1934 which was attended by the murder of Dollfuss. The *coup* failed of its primary purpose, however, partly because Hitler and the Nazi cause had as yet too slight a popular backing in Austria and partly because the Italian government of Mussolini threatened war if Germany should appropriate Austria; and Italy's strong stand was seconded by Czechoslovakia and France. Germany was not prepared for war with all these Powers, and so Hitler backed down, disavowing any complicity in the disturbances within Austria and any intention of seizing Austria.

Attempt
to Annex
Austria,
1934

To hold Hitler to his disavowals and to keep him out of Austria was, at the time, a cardinal point in Italian foreign policy. Mussolini adopted a new attitude of benevolence toward France, and the French government was quite responsive to his overtures. Accordingly, in January 1935 a Franco-Italian pact was signed at Rome. Not only did the two Latin Powers mutually pledge themselves to support the independence of Austria, but in return for French concessions to Italy in northern Africa, including secret arrangements about Ethiopia,¹ Italy promised to join France in opposing unilateral treaty revision in Europe.

Blocked
by Italy
and
France

Simultaneously, in January 1935, the plebiscite in the Saar, provided for by the treaty of Versailles,² was held to determine whether the district should revert to Germany, be annexed by France, or remain under the League of Nations. The outcome was convincing proof of German patriotic sentiment in the Saar. Ninety per cent of the votes

Recovery
of Saar,
1935

¹ France granted special privileges to Italy in Tunis and ceded her besides some 44,500 square miles bordering on Libya, a strip of French Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden, and a share in the ownership of the railway connecting the Gulf with Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. By the secret arrangements, Italy would have a "free hand" in Ethiopia, so far as France was concerned.

² See above, p. 638.

avored reunion with Germany, and on March 1 the district was formally turned over to the Nazi Empire.

Elated and emboldened by its success in the Saar—a legitimate success—Nazi Germany strove the harder to “Nazify” other separated districts, preparatory to their annexation, legitimate or otherwise, by the Empire. In the free city of Danzig, Nazi sympathizers gained control of the local parliament. In Memel, they created grave difficulties for the Lithuanian government. Moreover, Nazi leaders in Germany made no bones about their ultimate intention of appropriating Austria, of “redeeming” the large German minority in Czechoslovakia, and even of detaching the Ukraine from Soviet Russia. As if to give speedy effect to this ambitious program

Propa-
ganda
against
Neighbors

Rearma-
ment,
1935

Efforts to
Restrain
Germany:
Stresa
Agree-
ment, and
Franco-
Russian
Alliance,
1935

Hitler dramatically announced on March 16, 1935, Germany's repudiation of all treaty limitations on her armaments and the reestablishment of universal military service in the Empire, with a standing army of 550,000 men and an air-craft strength equal to the British or French.

Hitler's militant policies elicited loud popular applause in Germany, but abroad they aroused resentment and fear. In April 1935 at a conference at Stresa (in Italy), Mussolini joined the premiers of France and Great Britain in proclaiming that “the three Powers, the object of whose policy is collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all practicable means, any unilateral treaty repudiation which may endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial collaboration for this purpose.” Then, in May, scarcely a month later, France concluded a defensive military alliance with Soviet Russia, and Russia concluded a like alliance with Czechoslovakia. It appeared as though these agreements and alliances would henceforth do what the League of Nations had failed to do and would effectually restrain Germany.

Appearances were deceiving, nevertheless. Great Britain, jealous of the enhanced position of France and fearful of the effects of the Franco-Italian combination on her own naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, deemed it advantageous to herself to make a concession to Germany. Wherefore, in June 1935—only two months

British
Naval
Conces-
sion to
Germany

after the Stresa Conference—she independently sanctioned German repudiation of the naval clauses in the treaty of Versailles in return for a pledge that the German navy should not exceed 35 per cent of the British. This alarmed and angered France, and impeded coöperation between the two countries, while diminishing the sense of security in each.

But more serious in ultimate effects was Italy's imperial ambition in Ethiopia, and its forceful realization. Ever since Mussolini had established his Fascist dictatorship he had been anxious to win for Italy a commanding position in the Mediterranean and particularly to bring the big and backward East African country of Ethiopia under Italian sway. Thereby, painful memories of the disaster inflicted on Italian arms at Adowa in 1896¹ would be wiped out, and a promising region obtained for Italian colonization and exploitation. For several years Italy sought such imperial sway through diplomatic negotiation. In 1925 an agreement between Italy and Great Britain, while granting to the latter free water-rights in northern Ethiopia for the benefit of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, promised to the former a free hand in seeking concessions in the rest of the country. Ethiopia promptly protested to the League of Nations (of which she had been a member since 1923) against this foreign partitioning of "spheres of influence" within her territory and against the affront to her sovereignty which it implied, but the League contented itself with recording "explanations" from Italy and Britain which really did not explain. Then Italy attempted to ingratiate herself with the native rulers of Ethiopia—the usurping Empress Zauditu, daughter of Menelek II,² and her husband, Haile Selassie—and in 1928 agreed to a treaty with them, pledging "perpetual friendship" and arbitration of all disputes. But Haile Selassie, especially after the death of Zauditu in 1930 and his own accession as Emperor, doggedly refused the requests of his "friend" for exceptional concessions and favors, and gradually Mussolini reached the conclusion that Italy must use force against Ethiopia, even if it involved violation of existing treaties and a flouting of the League of Nations. He had no con-

Italy's
Ambition
in Ethi-
opia

¹ See above, p. 424.

² On Menelek II, see above, p. 542. He died in 1913 and was succeeded by his grandson, the Emperor Lej Yasu, a weak youth, who was deposed and imprisoned in 1916 by his aunt, Zauditu, and her ambitious husband, Haile Selassie. There was a good deal of tribal disaffection within Ethiopia.

scientious scruples himself, and that Italy could proceed with impunity was evidenced by what both Japan and Germany had recently done. To make doubly sure of success, he got France to agree in January 1935, as we have seen, to a "free hand" for Italy.

Alleging the necessity of suppressing disorder along the undefined Ethiopian border of her colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland, Italy despatched large forces to East Africa. Against the threatened aggression, Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations, and the appeal won popular sympathy and presently governmental support in Great Britain, who now perceived in Italy's African ambitions a menace to her own imperial interests (and to the cause of "collective security") which she had not perceived (or at any rate acted upon) in the case of Japan's aggression in Manchuria or of Germany's rearmament. Britain mobilized her fleet in the Mediterranean and besought the League to take a strong stand. In vain France tried to effect a compromise acceptable to

Italy at War with Ethiopia, 1935-1936 Italy and Britain (if not wholly so to Ethiopia). Italy went relentlessly ahead with military preparations, and in October 1935, disregarding alike the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, Italian troops invaded Ethiopia, captured Adowa, and pushed into the interior. Italy and Ethiopia were actually, if not legally, at war.

The military preoccupation of Italy in Africa and the accompanying embitterment of Anglo-Italian relations practically extinguished the hope which the Stresa Conference had given France of united European action against further treaty violations by Germany. France was left an uncomfortable choice: either to continue to support Italy, which would completely discredit the League and probably impel Britain to an accord with Germany; or to stick by the League and effect a rapprochement with Britain, which would undoubtedly antagonize Italy and might lead to a Fascist-Nazi entente. France chose the latter

League Sanctions against Italy alternative. She joined Britain in backing action by the League of Nations. And most of the other League members fell in line behind Britain and France. Consequently in October 1935 the League formally adjudged Italy an "aggressor" and in November applied economic "sanctions" against her.

Again, success attended the scrapping of treaties and resort to violence. Economic sanctions, though causing some distress in

Italy, failed of their purpose. They solidified the Italian nation in support of its Fascist government and in opposition to the League. Moreover, they were imperfectly applied; requisite war-materials which Italy could not import from League members she freely obtained from non-members, most notably from Germany. Besides, the war in East Africa did not last as long as had been anticipated. Italian armies made surprisingly quick work of Ethiopia. Their airplanes and motor trucks surmounted the country's physical difficulties, and they had munitions and supplies, competent generalship, and withal discipline and morale, which the native tribesmen lacked. Organized resistance was largely overcome by March 1936. Early in May the Emperor Haile Selassie fled abroad and Italian troops occupied the capital city of Addis Ababa. On May 9 Mussolini proclaimed the annexation of the whole country to Italy and King Victor Emmanuel III took the additional title of Emperor of Ethiopia.

Italian
Success
and
League
Failure

The results, in international relations, were sorry and far-reaching. Not only had the League of Nations flagrantly failed to preserve the integrity and very existence of one of its members, but the public law of Europe and any effective coöperation among the Great Powers had been dealt a body-blow. Italy had proved that might made right and that any determined Power could exercise its might without let or hindrance on the part of the League. To Italy, therefore, as to Japan and Germany, the League of Nations became a nonentity and its Covenant a garb of hypocrisy. Italy withdrew her representation from the League in May 1936 and in July the League publicly confessed its impotence by rescinding the economic sanctions against Italy.

The attempted utilization of the League of Nations by Great Britain and France to restrain Italy proved worse than a failure. It aroused bitter enmity of Italy toward France and Britain and thereby provided Germany with new and favorable opportunity for unilateral denunciation of treaty obligations. Already in March 1936, just when the Italo-Ethiopian War was reaching its climax, German troops marched into the demilitarized zones of the Rhineland which had been provided for by the treaty of Versailles and guaranteed by the Locarno Pact. Although the Council of the League of Nations obligingly adopted a resolution that Germany

German
Militariz-
ing of
Rhone-
land, 1936

had thus violated treaties,¹ France and Belgium were the only Powers at all minded to penalize Germany, and they dared not attempt it unaided. Russia was too disinterested, Italy too hostile to France, and Britain too absorbed with Italy. The sole tangible result, aside from Germany's remilitarized western frontier, was Belgium's severance of her military alliance with France in October 1936 and the resumption of her "neutrality."²

By October 1936, too, Germany had entered into an open accord with Italy—the so-called "Rome-Berlin axis." It was a natural consequence of the close commercial relations between them during the Ethiopian War, of their common disdain of the League of Nations, and of their common repugnance to Britain and France. The first fruit of the accord was the recognition extended by Italy and Germany jointly in November 1936 to the rebel Nationalist government of Franco in Spain³ and the military aid in men and munitions which in contravention of international law they immediately gave it. In this they were actuated no doubt by a desire to gain prestige (and political and economic concessions within a Nationalist Spain) at the expense of Communist Russia and democratic France and Britain, which directly or indirectly were supporting the Loyalist government in Spain. In this way the Spanish Civil War became, somewhat dubiously, a foreign issue between ideologies of "dictatorship" and "democracy" and, more practically and dangerously, a potential source of general European war.

Almost simultaneously, in November 1936, Germany concluded a pact with Japan. It was expressly directed against "Russian Communism" and was obviously intended to serve Japanese purposes in the Far East and German ambitions in Europe. In November 1937, following a state visit of Mussolini to Berlin, Italy acceded to the German-Japanese pact. A new balance of power was thus set up between Germany, Italy, and Japan, on the one side, and France, Russia, and Great Britain, on the other. It was a precarious balance, however, and one that the latter three Powers could hardly maintain. The Conservative government of Great Britain was much less dis-

Accord
with Italy
and Joint
Interfer-
ence in
Spain,
1936-1939

Anti-
Communist
Pact

¹ See above, pp. 760-762.

² See above, p. 758.

³ On Franco and the Spanish Civil War, see above, pp. 743-745.

posed than the Popular Front government of France¹ to co-operate with the Communist dictatorship of Russia, and yet France was anxious not to alienate Britain. In the embarrassing circumstances, one effort after another to reach an international agreement that would effectually close Spain to foreign soldiers and munitions proved abortive, and short of precipitating another World War, which neither Britain nor France would risk, these Powers had to resign themselves to watching the gradual conquest of Spain by Franco's forces and the bombing of their own ships in Spanish waters by Italian and German aircraft.

Meanwhile Germany continued to tear up the treaty of Versailles with impunity. In November 1936 she repudiated its provisions for international control of her waterways. In January 1937 she denounced the clauses charging her with war-guilt. Then in March 1938, she invaded Austria in force and incorporated it as a mere province in the Nazi Empire.² Other Powers might protest, but Italy, which in 1934 had threatened war to prevent Germany's seizure of Austria, was now so distracted by Ethiopian and Spanish adventures and so entangled with Germany that Mussolini pretended to approve the destruction of an independent Austria and the extension of the German Empire to the borders of his own country; and with Italy acquiescent, the protests of other Powers were purely platonic. Incidentally, Poland utilized the occasion to oblige Lithuania, on threat of war, to recognize the Polish annexation of Vilna³ and to promise in future to live on "good neighborly terms" with her.

Germany quickly followed up her success in Austria with virulent propaganda against Czechoslovakia and ostentatious preparations for going to the "assistance" of its German minority, which was thereby inspired, under a local Nazi leader, to demand of the Czechoslovak government full political autonomy. In this instance German ambition was aided by a change in British foreign policy.

From 1935 to 1938, while Sir Anthony Eden was foreign secretary, Britain had drawn ever closer to France and Russia and ever more hostile to Italy, whether in the Ethiopian or in the Spanish imbroglio. The result had been, as we know, to throw Italy into the arms of Germany and Japan and to array the Great

¹ See above, p. 708.

² See above, p. 733.

³ See above, p. 645.

Powers dominated by Nationalist dictators against the others.

**British
Policy of
Appease-
ment**

Moreover, Eden's policy had not arrested, but perhaps even expedited, Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, Germany's seizure of Austria, and Franco's successes in Spain. If the policy were maintained, argued the British premier, Neville Chamberlain, it would lead to still worse humiliations for Britain or else to another and most terrifying World War.

In the spring of 1938, therefore, Eden was deposed amid bitter outcries by the Laborite and Liberal minority in Great Britain, and a new policy was inaugurated. Chamberlain, while retaining ties with France, would loosen those with Russia and would strive for an understanding with both Italy and Germany. With Italy he at once negotiated a set of treaties which were signed at Rome

**British-
Italian
Accord**

in April. In return for Italy's promise to withdraw from Spain "as soon as practicable" and to stop anti-British propaganda in Palestine and Egypt, Britain promised to use her influence with the League of Nations to secure general recognition of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia. Accordingly, Great Britain obtained from the League, amid many re-creminations and against the despairing protests of the Emperor Haile Selassie, an authorization for its individual members to recognize, as they pleased, the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia. It was an humiliating desertion of the League in behalf of a hoped-for Concert of Great Powers.

But even more humiliating was the general capitulation to Germany in September 1938. By this time the German minority in

**Czecho-
slovakia
and Crisis
of Sept.
1938**

Czechoslovakia, roused to fever pitch by Nazi agents and by speeches of Hitler himself, were demanding not mere autonomy but outright annexation to the Empire, and the government at Berlin openly declared its resolve to partition Czechoslovakia immediately by force if peaceful means lacked. The Czechs mobilized in defense and called upon France and Russia and the Little Entente for their promised assistance. On the other side, Italy and Hungary and Poland joined in Germany's truculent attitude toward Czechoslovakia. For a few days the crisis was severe and popular emotion was intense. Dramatically Chamberlain flew back and forth between England and Germany, begging Hitler not to precipitate war, while Daladier, the French premier, flew back and forth between Paris and London. It was perfectly obvious that neither France

nor Britain wanted to fight, and that Germany was as ready as Russia was unready for immediate hostilities.

The crisis was suddenly and sensationally ended by an accord signed at Munich on September 29, 1938, by Chamberlain, Daladier, Mussolini, and Hitler, by which peace was maintained but Germany received *carte blanche* to occupy and annex the preponderantly German regions of Czechoslovakia. It was another striking victory for Nazi Germany in tearing up the treaty of Versailles and expanding her territory and resources, and it was followed forthwith by Poland's appropriation of Teschen and Hungary's regaining of part of Slovakia. Czechoslovakia, in the circumstances, could do nought but submit to the loss of a third of her territory and trust that the integrity and independence of the remainder would be preserved through the joint guaranty which the four Powers attached to the Munich Pact.

Accord of
Munich
and Parti-
tion of
Czecho-
slovakia

In fact, however, Great Britain and France were in no position to enforce any such guaranty. They were not ready for war and they lacked allies. Russia was alienated; the lesser Powers in eastern Europe were disillusioned; and Italy, in hostile mood, utilized the opportunity to demand territorial "concessions" from France. On the other hand, Germany emerged the strongest Power in Europe, more eager than ever to take "direct action" and less deterred by any moral scruple. In March 1939, only six months after the Munich Pact and precisely a year after Austria's destruction, Germany, without even consulting the other Powers, completed the destruction of Czechoslovakia.¹ The Czech regions were occupied in force and incorporated into the German Empire; Slovakia was made a German "protectorate"; and Hungary was allowed to seize and annex Carpatho-Ukraine. German nationalism was producing German imperialism.

With whetted appetite, Germany almost immediately bullied Lithuania into surrendering Memel to her.² Next, while Mussolini scowled at France and prepared to invade and appropriate Albania, Hitler pressed Poland to agree to German annexation of Danzig and "rectification" of the Corridor.³ This was too much and too hasty for Poland and also for the British prime minister, Neville

Memel,
and Polish
Question

¹ See above, p. 735.

³ Poland's outlet to the sea. See above, pp. 616, 638.

² See above, p. 730.

Chamberlain. The latter, in April 1939, suddenly and radically recast the foreign policy of Great Britain. Britain entered into a formal alliance with both France and Poland to guaranty one another's independence and territorial integrity, by war if necessary, against any aggression or threats; and Chamberlain proclaimed Britain's readiness to afford like assistance to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey.

On the heels of this British attempt to halt the scrapping of treaties and resort to violence, came Italy's violent seizure of Albania. Neither Italy nor Germany nor Japan had been stayed by League of Nations, Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, or any scheme of collective security. The new British policy might stop them, but perhaps only if it eventuated in another World War.



CHAPTER XXVIII

COSMOS AND CHAOS

I. THE DISILLUSIONMENT



LOYALTY to ideals which had characterized the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries¹ was rapidly waning in the second third of the twentieth century. A novel "Disillusionment" appeared.

There was reaction against individualism.

As big machines multiplied and were mag-

nified, the individual was swallowed up in society. He was no longer a separate entity, no longer an autonomous unit. He was merely a cog in mechanized industry or agriculture. He merely performed a function, usually an extremely minor one, in mass production. More and more it was with crowds of fellows that he worked, lived, and travelled about; and, what was especially destructive of individualism, he was intellectually a ready-made product of mass education, of mass journalism, of mass sport and recreation.

Decline of
individualism

There was reaction against political democracy of the individualistic sort, with its universal equal suffrage, its representative parliaments, and its ministerial responsibility. All over central and eastern Europe and throughout the progressively "Europeanized" world, dictatorship was the new political order of the day. It might be Communist, as in Russia, or it might be nominally Corporate, as in Italy or Germany; it was clearly not Democratic in the conventional meaning of the word. It was more akin to the Cæsarism of the ancient Roman Empire or to the "benevolent despotism" which had immediately preceded the advent of modern democracy,² although

Ebbing of
Democracy

¹ On the "Enlightenment" of the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 506-555; and on its continuation in the nineteenth century, see above, pp. 507-510.

² On "benevolent" or "enlightened" despotism of the eighteenth century, see Vol. I, pp. 346-356, 388.

it was much more intensive and efficient, and, unlike the earlier "benevolent despotism," it was almost never associated with titled aristocracy and only exceptionally with royalty.

There was reaction, too, against those individual liberties which had been struggled for and largely attained during the previous age. Economic liberalism, already weakened by the rise of tariff protectionism and governmental regulation of capital and labor, hardly survived the World War and its aftermath. Not only did the war necessitate a temporary conscription of industry and agriculture by every belligerent nation, but it left a legacy of financial disorder and social unrest highly favorable to economic nationalism.

The denial of economic liberty was attended, in Communist and Fascist countries, by drastic abridgment of personal liberty. There was increasing resort to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, closer police surveillance of citizens, more restrictive regulation of immigration and emigration, mounting intolerance of internal dissent, a new and fiercer wave of anti-Semitism, and a new and ever more strenuous attempt to direct individual behavior and to control individual conscience. To the Age of Enlightenment, in which it had been fondly believed that liberty would continue slowly but surely to broaden out from generation to generation, was succeeding an age in which liberty was actually and obviously undergoing contraction.

The latest age likewise belied the confidence of the preceding age in steady progress toward a world-order of pacific and co-operating nations. The nationalism which overspread the world proved to be a divisive rather than a unifying force, and the concurrent industrial and technological advance was made to serve primarily nationalistic ends. Despite the formation of a League of Nations and the frequent repetition of peaceful protestations, there was little or no concrete evidence that the nations of the world were beating their swords into ploughshares, effecting any "moral disarmament," or lessening the causes and occasions of armed conflict. Indeed, the question uppermost in the minds of statesmen and publicists fifteen years after the conclusion of the World War was not whether there would be another world war but how soon it would come; not if it would be destructive, but whether greater destruction could be wrought by aviation than by artillery.

Contraction of Liberty

Disillusionment about Peace

It had formerly been widely held that if only the masses of mankind could be put in school and taught to read and write, they would become custodians as well as products of "enlightenment," that they would be equipped to appreciate and secure the benefits of peace, liberty, and democracy. It had accordingly been a central aim of the Era of the Enlightenment, and one of its outstanding achievements, to promote popular and secular education. So far as the promotion of public education was concerned, there was no reaction after the war. On the contrary, it was now pressed more vigorously and more universally than ever before. Under dictatorships, as in democracies, earnest and largely successful efforts were made to give everybody a schooling and to expose everybody to the supplementary instruction of newspapers, cinemas, and radios. Yet the results of all this educational endeavor were not quite in keeping with "enlightened" hopes. While the least literate nation in Europe submitted to a Communist dictatorship, the most literate stampeded to the Nazi dictatorship of Hitler. Apparently, literacy of itself did not predispose anybody to anything. It merely enlarged the opportunities for propaganda. And, in the dawning new age, expanding education became frankly and boastfully propagandist.

Propa-
gandist
Education

What has here been said is but an epitome and interpretation of the national and international events recorded in the two preceding chapters. The waning of individualistic democracy and parliamentary government, the contraction of personal liberty, the triumph of nationalism over internationalism, the failure of education to make people intelligent or critical and its extensive use to fortify dictatorship, all these were marks of a new age. But there were other marks, which we shall mention here and discuss at somewhat greater length in the following sections.

An idea of "progress" was still in evidence, confirmed by very real progress in producing material goods and creating an economy of abundance. But if material progress helped to solve old problems concerning the production of wealth, it gave rise to new and extraordinarily difficult ones affecting the distribution of wealth. For everywhere poverty was still paradoxically associated with progress.

"Prog-
ress"

Natural science continued to be cultivated and applied with ever more astonishing results. Yet in the midst of universal

reliance on the practical achievement of scientists, the scientists themselves, especially the physicists, were becoming curiously disillusioned about natural principles which had been regarded as axiomatic throughout the Era of the Enlightenment and fundamental to its philosophy. Mechanical certitudes were newly qualified by scientific doubt.

Finally, there was marked reaction against the claims of historic supernatural world-religion and the forms of classical and traditional art. In some places the reaction appeared in the guise of fanatical atheism, with attendant inculcation of materialist philosophy and encouragement of "proletarian" art. In other places the reaction involved an invocation of the "primitive" and the "tribal"—a conscious appreciation of antique and "barbarous" art, and an emotional exalting of a nation's aboriginal ancestors. The world, whose material civilization was being rapidly unified by a common industrialization, was simultaneously being rent asunder psychologically and culturally by a new tribalism. The cosmos which the Age of Enlightenment had envisaged was being reduced to chaos in an Age of Disillusionment.

2. PROGRESS AND POVERTY

The Industrial Revolution, which since its origin in England had been occurring in one country after another during the eighty years from 1830 to 1910,¹ reached a new stage of achievement in the next thirty years. Not only was the output of previously mechanized industries greatly augmented by technological improvements, but new machine industries sprang up and expanded with astounding suddenness. Not only was industrialization intensified in "capitalistic" countries, but it was sedulously fostered by the Communist régime in Soviet Russia and lavishly patronized by dictatorships in such "backward" countries as Turkey and Mexico. Not only was all Europe being swiftly mechanized, the east and south as well as the west and north, but the newest material features of what had been deemed distinctively "western civilization" were becoming common characteristics of what now appeared as "world civilization." There was no longer, in these respects, any difference be-

¹ On the Industrial Revolution from its beginnings to 1870, see above, pp. 3-46; and on its progress from 1870 to 1910, see above, pp. 206-225.

tween "West" and "East," or between Europe and the world.

Production of coal and iron—the twin bases of modern industrialization—was approximately doubled throughout the world between 1910 and 1930. The decline which appeared in Great Britain was more than offset by the gain in the United States. The coal production of both Germany and France went up by a third, and the lowering of Germany's iron output was counterbalanced by a doubling of the French output. By 1930, moreover, Russia was mining more coal than France and more iron than Great Britain. The world output of pig iron, which had risen from about 12 million tons in 1870 to about 40 million in 1910, reached almost 80 million tons in 1930.

Coal and
Iron

It was similar with the textile industries. While the world-production of cotton gained only slightly, that of wool increased by over a fifth, that of natural silk almost doubled, and that of artificial silk (or rayon) multiplied a hundredfold—mounting from 6 million pounds in 1910 to 600 million in 1933. This rayon development was one of the outstanding accomplishments of post-war industrialization. It had hardly begun before 1910, and it assumed large proportions only after 1920. From the start, too, it was a thoroughly mechanized industry: the raw material was made by machinery, and its whole manufacture of thread and cloth was by machinery. Furthermore, it became suddenly important all over the world—in almost every European country and in the United States and Argentina, Japan and Australia. The new rayon industry but emphasized the post-war trend of the older textile industries toward ever more automatic mechanizing and toward ever broader diffusion.

Textiles

Along with the textile industries advanced other well-established industries: leather, pottery and porcelain, paper and printing, typewriters, cutlery, firearms, furniture, tinware, tools, canning and refrigeration, electrical goods. There was an especially marked advance of the electrical industries. Electric power was substituted more and more for steam power. Hydro-electric power plants were multiplied. Electric lighting was immensely bettered through the use of the tungsten filament lamp which had been invented just before the World War.

Other
Industries

Undoubtedly the most striking and significant industrial developments had to do with means of communication and trans-

portation. The existing network of railways was much extended in Asia, Africa, and South America, and rail locomotives, driven by steam or electricity, conveyed prodigious numbers of persons and prodigious quantities of goods. And over the whole earth messages were carried by telegraph and telephone wires. In 1930 the mileage of telegraph wires amounted to seven million.

The existing network of steamship lines was similarly expanded, and the total tonnage of the world's merchant shipping rose from 42 million in 1910 to 65 million in 1936. Great Britain retained a larger merchant fleet than any other nation, but the ratio of its tonnage to the world-total decreased from 44 per cent to 30. The tonnage of the United States and also of Italy and the Netherlands doubled between 1910 and 1936 and that of Japan tripled, while the merchant shipping of both France and Norway increased by a half.

To telephone and telegraph, steamship and railway, which had already had revolutionary significance for communication and transportation in the nineteenth century, were now added new twentieth-century devices of automobile, motor truck, airplane, motion picture, and radio. Originating just prior to 1910, all of these were found quite practical and were greatly improved during the post-war period, when their production assumed colossal proportions as their operation wrought gigantic changes.

Production of motor cars and trucks developed principally and very rapidly in the United States. Here the annual manufacture of passenger cars rose from 181,000 in 1910 to 4¾ million in 1929, while that of trucks mounted from 6,000 in 1910 to 830,000 in 1929. Outside the United States, moreover, gradually increasing numbers of cars were produced in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, and also in Canada and Japan; and regardless of where they might be manufactured, their use was ever extending.

Aviation, just beginning in 1910, was enormously stimulated and developed by the World War, and was utilized immediately afterwards for commercial carrying of mails, passengers, and express. Regular airplane service was soon inaugurated between Paris and London and between other chief cities in Europe and also in America, and presently it was established from London to Alexandria in Egypt and on to Bagdad

and India, from Paris across northern and western Africa to Brazil, and from New York southward to Mexico and Central and South America. For most flying, airplanes were employed, but particularly in and from Germany some airships or Zeppelins continued in use. In 1929 a Zeppelin circumnavigated the globe, from Friedrichshafen (in Germany) via Tokio and Los Angeles and New York back to Friedrichshafen, in twenty days. Already, in 1927, an American aviator, Charles Lindbergh, won international fame by flying an airplane alone and without a stop from New York to Paris. By airplane an American naval officer, Admiral Richard Byrd, explored the Arctic Ocean and visited the North Pole in 1926, and then in 1929 explored the Antarctic Continent and flew over the South Pole.

The fuelling of gasoline engines for the rapidly growing number of automobiles, motor trucks, and airplanes gave a great impetus to the petroleum industry—to the production of the crude oil and to its refining and distribution. Between **Petroleum** 1910 and 1933 the world output of petroleum increased over four-fold, from 325 million barrels to 1,370 million.

Another industry, which had been comparatively an infant in 1910 but which was brought to speedy maturity by the needs of the new motor transportation, was the rubber industry. **Rubber** This, like the petroleum industry, consumed multiplying quantities of raw material, rising from 75,000 tons in 1910 to 850,000 tons in 1933. Almost all the crude rubber now came, not from "wild" trees, but from cultivated "plantations," principally in the Dutch East Indies, the Malay peninsula, and Ceylon.

Elaboration of motor highways attended the development of motor transport, and was attended in turn by an ever greater and more widespread utilization of "concrete." **Concrete** Concrete roads soon paralleled railways or provided a substitute for them, and in addition, concrete (reënforced by iron or steel) was increasingly employed for public buildings, industrial plants, garages and hangars, piers, bridges, and even shipbuilding.

Motion pictures were still another universal phenomenon of the post-war period. Though originally invented prior to 1910, they were perfected and popularized during the World War and more especially after 1920. In 1928 "sound" **Motion Pictures** pictures (or "talking movies") were first made, and very soon afterwards they were being heard, as well as seen, all over

the world. The large majority of films displayed in the British Dominions, Latin America, and most countries of Europe, were American-made, although most foreign governments were beginning to censor and limit American imports and to favor domestic production.

Accompanying the rise of motion pictures and excelling them in revolutionary effect was the development of radio. Wireless telegraphy had been in some use since the opening of the twentieth century, but it was not until 1920 that the first permanent radio broadcasting station was put into operation—by an American concern, the Westinghouse Company—and private homes began to be equipped with radio-receiving sets. Thenceforth, progress in the production and use of radios was sensationally rapid. Within fifteen years every nation in the world had broadcasting stations; and everywhere there were enough receiving-sets to enable the vast majority of mankind, whether in town or country, to receive practically simultaneous news of what was happening in Rome or Manchester, Berlin or Moscow, Tokio or Mexico City, Calcutta or Melbourne, Cape Town or Minneapolis, Jerusalem or Mecca.

From hearing at a great distance, it was only a step to seeing; and this step was initiated in the 1920's by experiments with television carried on more or less independently by several European and American physicists. In 1928 began the successful transmission of images and scenes across the Atlantic and in color.

Industrial advance of the post-war period was accompanied by an increase in the world output of foodstuffs. For the industrializing and mechanizing of agriculture continued,¹ and produced an ever larger yield of meat and grain, vegetables and fruits. In respect of grain, for example, the wheat crop of the world steadily enlarged from 3,250 million bushels in 1920 (which was about what it had been in 1900) to 4,550 million bushels in 1930, at the very time when scarcely smaller gains were being made in the world-production of rye, barley, oats, corn, and rice. Apparently the latest phase of the Industrial Revolution was providing humankind with an ampler supply of food and clothing as well as with more expeditious means of communication and a greater range of creature comforts.

¹ On the Industrial Revolution in agriculture, see above, pp. 26-29, 217-218.

And yet . . . Dogging the heels of industrial progress was dire poverty! In the midst of a boasted "economy of abundance," when there was much more for everybody to eat and wear than ever before in the world's history, a most disillusioning economic depression set in. It was by no means the first depression in modern times, but it was far more general, more severe, and more continuous than any previous one. Beginning in 1929, every country was affected in measure as it had been industrialized. Stocks and bonds depreciated in value. Factories and mills shut down. Industrial workers lost their jobs and their wages and had to be cared for by private charity or public doles. By 1932 the number of unemployed and destitute workers in western and central Europe, the United States, and Japan (the most highly industrialized portions of the earth) was estimated at 30 million. With these (and their families) thus deprived of purchasing power, the demand for the products of machine industry, and hence for raw materials and foodstuffs, markedly declined, with further deleterious effects upon industry and commerce and likewise upon agriculture. To the millions of persons who had no income at all were added many more millions whose income was terribly reduced.

Grave
Economic
Depres-
sion

Unem-
ployment

Practically, what was done in most industrial nations to cope with the new and critical situation was for government to intervene—to provide subsistence for the enlarging armies of the industrially unemployed either by giving them outright doles or by paying them wages for public works, and to meet the resulting increased expense by imposing heavier taxes upon the wealthy minority or by borrowing huge sums of money from them. Such procedures could hardly be more than temporary or transitional makeshifts. For no intelligent or conscientious person could look forward with any satisfaction to an enduring situation in which a dwindling group of men would own all property and control all industrial and agricultural machinery and from their immense profits maintain the masses of mankind in a life of more or less chronic idleness, even if idleness were shorn of some of its worst features by a most benevolent patronage of popular education and of organized sport and recreation. And there were more immediate difficulties. Industry, even the most technically perfected industry, might not

Govern-
ment In-
tervention

stand the continuing strain of governmental taxes and borrowings sufficient to provide for crowds of industrially unemployed persons ever increasing in number and demanding an ever increasing share of goods.

Government intervention was particularly conspicuous in countries subject to dictatorship, such as Russia, where the Communist régime attempted to abolish private capital altogether, and Italy and Germany, where Fascist dictatorships tried to regulate private enterprise and make it serve "national" ends. Undoubtedly the increasing vogue of dictatorial and bureaucratic government, especially after 1929, all over central as well as eastern Europe, and in many other parts of the world likewise, was enhanced by the contemporary economic crisis and by popular disillusionment about the ability of democratic government to remedy it.

But to date, Fascist dictatorships have accomplished much more in destroying personal freedom than in getting rid of poverty or lessening its causes. The Communist dictatorship, at an even greater cost of personal freedom, has succeeded in increasing industrial production and at the same time in raising the standard of living for the masses (while lowering that of the classes), but in Russia the level of general living is still pretty low, and probably, as industrialization runs its course and the masses acquire a taste for greater comforts, the Communist bureaucracy will be faced with much the same fundamental difficulty as that confronting any capitalistic group—how to retain its power and harmonize progress and poverty.

No sure and practical solution of the basic problem of progress and poverty is now in sight. Yet everyone recognizes that some such solution must be found. It is a challenge to the present and succeeding generations.

3. MECHANICAL CERTAINTIES AND SCIENTIFIC DOUBT

The latest age has witnessed, as we noted in the foregoing section, the world-wide triumph of machines of precision, speed, and mass production. It is the machine age *par excellence*. Moreover, the progressive industrializing and mechanizing of the world has been intimately associated with the accumulating achievements of technology, of engineering and applied science, and, fundamentally, of experimental

Its Ex-
tremities

Import-
tance of
Science

science. Without intensive and manifold pursuit of the natural science which had developed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the twentieth century could not be the supreme machine age which it is.

Physics and chemistry have been the twin sciences most esteemed and forwarded throughout the whole Era of the Enlightenment—from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, through the nineteenth, and up into the twentieth.¹ And now their practical applications are particularly striking. It is applied physics which has been providing man with constantly improving automobiles, airplanes, radios, electric power and lighting, and all sorts of machinery. It is applied chemistry which has been enabling him to multiply the production of field and factory, to make synthetic goods and artificial ice, to preserve foodstuffs, to “take” pictures and produce “movies.” There is, of course, no sharp cleavage between physics and chemistry. A practical application of the one has always involved some practical application of the other, and progress in the one has been accompanied by progress in the other. The physicist and the chemist are close allies—joint directors and dispensers of the marvellous realities of contemporary technology.

Physics
and
Chemistry

Biology has not had as long a vogue as physics or chemistry. It was, so to speak, an afterthought of the Era of the Enlightenment. But with its rapid rise and revolutionary progress in the second half of the nineteenth century, it had come to occupy a central position in scientific thought during the period from 1870 to 1910—and afterwards also. As it continued to be studied and applied, it ceased to be a rival of physics and chemistry and became rather their intimate associate. Indeed, in the latest age biology could almost be said to have been resolved into biophysics and biochemistry.

Biology

Biology, like physics and chemistry, has proved increasingly useful. Especially in physiology, medicine, and surgery, its utility is as certain as it has been sensational. Painstaking microscopic investigation of animal bodies has disclosed elaborate mechanisms, the existence of which had hardly been suspected previously, and has led to experimental work on them of prime significance to the physical health of human beings. For example, much has been discovered about the

Medical
Science

¹ See above, pp. 236–241.

hitherto mysterious ductless glands, or secretory organs, in animals and humans. Likewise it is demonstrated that physical health requires in the diet certain "accessory factors," to which the name of vitamins is given, and thanks to researches of biochemists several different kinds of vitamins have been discovered and their respective functions described.

On the Darwinian theory of evolution, which had made such a stir in the second half of the nineteenth century, twentieth-century biologists amassed much factual data of considerable importance. The more evidence they accumulated, the more it confirmed the basic assumption of Darwin, that the process of life on the earth had been evolutionary. At the same time, however, it made clear that the process was not as simple as Darwin had surmised and certainly not as simple as Huxley or Haeckel had maintained. As a distinguished biologist said in 1922, summarizing contemporary scientific evidence for evolution: "In dim outline evolution is evident enough. From the facts it is a conclusion which inevitably follows. But that particular and essential bit of the theory of evolution which is concerned with the *origin and nature of species* remains utterly mysterious." In other words, the particular explanations which Darwin offered of the origin of species—natural selection, sexual selection, and inheritance of acquired characteristics—does not really explain. The inheritance of acquired characteristics, though still debatable, is extremely doubtful, and a new difficulty has recently arisen from the seeming dependence of variation on elements being lost and not gained.

Mendel's basic principles of heredity have been confirmed and their application extended. Many deficiencies and abnormalities, such as color-blindness and eye cataract, have been shown to follow Mendelian rules in their descent. One of the most brilliant contributors to exact knowledge of heredity was an American, Thomas Morgan (born 1866), for many years professor at Columbia University and latterly director of the biological laboratory at the California Institute of Technology. Morgan's painstaking investigation of the cell structure of the fruit-fly revealed that within each cell-nucleus is a number of thread-like bodies which have been called "chromosomes," and that there is a numerical correspondence between the number of groups of hereditary qualities and the number of pairs of chro-

Darwinian
Evolution

Mende-
lian
Heredity

mosomes. Additional study has disclosed that there are different numbers of paired chromosomes (or "genes") in different plants and animals: four in the fruit-fly, seven in the garden pea, eight in wheat, probably twenty-four in man. It has further been demonstrated that with twenty "genes" there would be, by permutations and combinations, over a million possible kinds of germ cells, and that with the juncture of two such sets (male and female) there would be a prodigiously greater number of possible combinations. Biology thus offers a scientific explanation as to why no two individuals in a mixed race are identical.

Not only has biology become increasingly practical in combination with chemistry and physics, but earnest efforts have been made to render psychology similarly practical by treating it as an exact physical and chemical science. Fol-

Psychology as Science

lowing in the footsteps of Wundt, the "father of physiological psychology," a Russian physician, Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936), had begun in the 1890's to make detailed psychological observations of animals and humans, not in terms of supposed internal consciousness, but in those of external physical stimuli and reactions. The outcome was a physiological psychology of "conditioned reflexes," which, as subsequently developed by an American professor at Johns Hopkins University, John Watson (born 1878), became widely known after the World War as "behaviorism." According to the behaviorist, no one from outside can detect a being's consciousness, sensation, perception, or will, and consequently these concepts must be regarded by the scientific psychologist as unreal and non-existent. It suffices for him to suppose that "we talk and then we think—if indeed we think at all," and to concentrate on the study of stimulus and response.

Behaviorism

Whatever may be the doubts about the "whole truth" of behaviorism, there can be no doubt that it was of practical value, especially in the observational and experimental study of child psychology. It also contributed, along with other types of psychological research, to the contemporary vogue of "intelligence tests" and "aptitude tests." Such tests have been numerous devised and extensively applied, and although there has been a tendency to claim too much for them, some of them are doubtless useful in indicating, at least roughly, what a child is mentally equipped to undertake.

Another novel and practical interpretation of psychology was made by Sigmund Freud (born 1856), an Austrian Jew, who, after studying medicine at Vienna and Paris, became a clinical neurologist and the foremost practitioner of "psycho-analysis." Freud invested psychology with a strict determinism, explaining everything, from our most trivial mistakes to our most cherished beliefs, as due to the operation of powerful instinctive forces, which mature with the body and which, if checked or distorted, may be the cause of mental ill-health. He particularly stressed (1) the existence of the "unconscious" and its dynamic influence on consciousness, (2) the existence of intrapsychical conflicts between various sets of forces, the chief of which is "repression," (3) the existence and paramount importance of infantile sexuality, and (4) the use of psycho-analysis, that is, of resuscitating buried memories through a process of "free association," as the remedy for mental disorder.

Freudian-
ism

Freudian psychology had an immense vogue in the twentieth century. In 1908 the first international congress of psychoanalysts was held, and in 1910 a permanent international association was formed. Before long, Freudian principles and methods were being applied not only to living individuals but to historic personages and also to nations and to society at large. Many differences of emphasis arose among the disciples of Freud, and in the post-war years there has been a marked reaction against his excessive dogmatism and in favor of a considerably modified "psychiatry." Yet the latest and great vogue of psychiatry, and also of social and educational psychology, owes much, both in point of view and in method, to the pioneer work of Sigmund Freud.

Psychia-
try

Just as, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, leading psychologists insisted that they were natural and experimental "scientists," so an increasing number of students of history, anthropology, economics, politics, and sociology made similar claims. These contended, more strenuously than ever before, that their several subjects were "social sciences," susceptible of the same objective treatment and mechanical interpretation as physics or chemistry or biology—involving the same minute observation of phenomena, the same marshalling of facts, the same eventual deduction of "laws." As the natural scientists collaborated in laboratories and research

Social
Sciences

institutes, the social scientists took to coöperating in libraries, research councils, and field work. Vast masses of factual data were collected and published about man's present and past occupations and activities, about his social life, about his economic life, about his political life, about his cultural life. Never before had there been such an outpouring of doctoral dissertations, such a profusion of "scientific" monographs, such an elaboration of co-operative research and publication. Never before had governments and private corporations availed themselves so much or so consistently of the findings and advice of social scientists.

So much for the certainties of scientific and mechanical achievement in the twentieth century. But alongside the certainties, which represented a culmination of the scientific progress of the whole Era of the Enlightenment, have emerged some strange and troublesome doubts about scientific beliefs closely associated with the progress of that Era. These doubts portended the coming, in the domain of natural science, of a new Era of Disillusionment. They have done for long-flourishing scientific ideas what the World War did for pacifism, and the rise of dictatorship for democracy. Applied science might go on from its latest triumphs to still greater triumphs, but the philosophy and metaphysics of science could not confidently continue along the simply material and mechanical lines which it had been following since the seventh century.¹ For now there are doubts—very serious doubts—about Newtonian physics itself, about the very nature of matter and motion, about "natural laws," even about the conception of "cause and effect." Physicists have undergone a veritable revolution in thought, and the revolution in physics is bound to affect chemists and biologists, and in time psychologists and social scientists.

Revol-
utionary
Develop-
ments in
Science

Especially
Physics

Three developments in twentieth-century physics inaugurated the revolution: the propounding of the quantum theory by Max Planck between 1901 and 1912; the demonstration of the principle of relativity by Albert Einstein from 1905 to 1915; and new studies of atomic structure and activity, especially by Sir Ernest Rutherford and Niels Bohr. These are too technical to admit of

¹ On the materialistic and mechanistic metaphysics of modern times, see Vol. I, pp. 506-512, and the present volume, above, pp. 254-256.

any detailed description here. It must suffice to remark that they have served to outmode the mechanical and material interpretation of the universe (and of everything in it) as built up during the Era of the Enlightenment. There now seem to be processes in nature which do not operate according to mechanical laws. Besides, matter itself is now indistinguishable from energy, and substance from behavior. Indeed, the classical conception of "substance," as something extended in space and persistent in time, has been rendered quite meaningless, since neither space nor time is absolute or real. A "substance" has become a mere series of events, connected in some unknown and perhaps unknowable way, and occurring in "space-time." And just as the new atomic and quantum theories have forced a radical revolution of ideas about the ultimate character of "matter," so the theory of relativity has led to strange new hypotheses as to the ultimate nature of the universe. According to Einstein's physics, space is curved, and the farther one moves out in it, the nearer one approaches the place where one started! The universe is not infinite, but finite!

We are too near to the contemporary revolution in physical science to hazard even a guess as to just what effects it will eventually have. We are too much disconcerted by the overturn of seemingly well-established laws and principles, too much taken aback by the destructive blows which physicists of our own day have been delivering against that mechanistic and deterministic world which the scientific labors of three centuries had been building. "A few years ago," writes a famous scientist, "the exact accuracy of Newton's law of gravitation and the permanence of the chemical elements were thought to be quite certain; and in fact, the probability in favor of those principles was so great that we all should have been willing to bet our last shillings at long odds on their truth. Yet Einstein and Rutherford have proved that we were wrong, and our money would have gone to that rash gambler who had the apparent (nay real) folly to take our bets."

We should bear in mind that ever since the time of Galileo and Newton the science of physics has provided the basic models and the most persistent thought-patterns for all other sciences and would-be sciences: not only the "natural sciences" of chemistry and biology, but the social sciences and psychology and philosophy. As one after

Effects of
New
Physics
on Other
Sciences

another of these subjects became "scientific," it tended to accept the assumptions and to reënforce the teachings of physics; and chief among such assumptions had been the material and mechanistic nature of the universe. Now, however, quite a different lesson is derivable from physics; and in view of the long and solidly established premiership of physical science, it would be strange indeed if its new assumptions should not have in the future far-reaching influence upon all kinds of scientific thought.

Already there are omens of such influence—for example, in philosophy. At the close of the nineteenth century the dominant philosophy was materialistic, based on Newtonian physics and fortified by "Darwinism": its extreme expressions were those of Herbert Spencer and Ernst Haeckel. But from the beginning of the twentieth century dissident types of philosophy were growing in favor. One was "neoscholasticism," representing a serious effort to reconcile modern science with traditional Christian ideas, and latterly expounded by a brilliant French scholar, Jacques Maritain. Another, of very different complexion, represented an attempt to use biology as a road of escape from the mechanical view of things which physics apparently imposed. It had been foreshadowed, in a pessimistic way, by Nietzsche, but it was developed, and given an optimistic slant, by a French Jewish philosopher, Henri Bergson (born 1859). To him, the "élan vital"—or "vital urge"—was all important, and instinct and intuition were far more significant than reason; there might be final causes, but they did not matter, for immediate causes were moulded anew as creative evolution proceeded.

A third philosophic tendency of the new age was a marked revival of the "idealism" which stemmed from Kant and Hegel. During the nineteenth century, this alternative to "materialism," though espoused by a succession of academic philosophers, had been repellent to almost all men of scientific and "practical" bent. Then, early in the twentieth century, it attracted anew an impressive group of apostles throughout Europe, particularly the Italian, Benedetto Croce (born 1866). Croce began in 1902 the systematic exposition of his "philosophy of the spirit," divided into æsthetic, logic, ethic, and history; and by the 1920's he was exercising an increasingly profound influence on thought. To him, "spirit" is manifest in the

New
Philosophy

Maritain
and
Bergson

Croce

whole content of actual human experience, that is, in history; and the business of history is not merely to amass factual data but to give it meaning and significance in terms of purpose and "spirit."

Simultaneously, a novel psychology was emerging and winning converts. It arose in Germany and was developed, under the name of Gestalt (meaning "shape" or "form"), especially by Max Wertheimer from 1912 onwards. It combated purely physiological psychology and particularly its tendency to reduce individual behavior to a sequence of conditioned reflexes and thereby to deprive it of any meaning or significance. According to the Gestalt concept, psychology, instead of ignoring everything except physical reactions to physical stimuli, must take into account the entire nature (or "shape") of a perception. Thus, the seeing of a square does not consist in seeing four equal straight lines enclosing four right angles, but is the perception of the square as a whole. In the same way a melody is the totality of a series of tones and not just a succession of separate tones. The whole should be regarded as greater than the sum of its parts.

For the "social sciences" of economics, politics, sociology, and history, the implications of the "new physics" are staggering.

**Doubts
about
"Social
Science"**

For two centuries scholars in these fields have consciously essayed methods and goals similar to physicists', and have usually made similar assumptions concerning a universe operated by discoverable "natural laws." Most such scholars will probably be carried along for a time by the momentum of their past traditions, for there has always been a "lag" between the social and the natural sciences.

Social scientists have certainly accumulated and digested a vast deal of information during the last century. Yet today there are doubts—multiplying doubts—about the ability of social scientists to achieve any such scientific objectivity as they have sought or to substantiate from the greatest possible mass of data any such ultimate "laws" as they have posited. In 1916 Croce pointed out, in dramatic fashion, that "scientific history" was nearing its end; that its devotees, who imagined themselves to be concerned only with objective "facts," were constantly revealing their own subjectivity by their selection and organization of facts;

NOTE. The picture opposite is from an abstract modernist sculpture by Amadeo Modigliani (1884-1920), concerning whom see below, pp. 841-842.

and that, in any event, historical "truth" was not absolute but merely relative.

Of sociology, similar disillusioning criticism was voiced. It was shown how one sociological "system" after another had been put forth as "scientific"—Comte's and Herbert Spencer's and latterly Pareto's¹—only to be regarded by succeeding generations as a "dated" commentary on the thought of a particular person or group at a particular time. In the case of politics and of economics, actual occurrences of the post-war era have been even more disheartening than academic discussion has been destructive. Just as "political science" could not predict, but only describe, the rise of dictatorships, so "scientific economics" could neither prevent nor cure the depression which overspread the world in 1930.

The newer scientific doubt, especially as it affects the social sciences, has recently been epitomized by a thoughtful American scholar, Dr. Charles Austin Beard. "Deprived of the certainty which it was once believed science would ultimately deliver, and of the very hope that it can in the nature of things disclose certainty, human beings must now concede their own fallibility and accept the world as a place of trial and error, where only those who dare to assume ethical and æsthetic responsibility, and to exercise intuitive judgment, while seeking the widest possible command of realistic knowledge, can hope to divine the future and mould in some measure the shape of things to come."²

4. RELIGION IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

There had always been in Europe, especially in Catholic Europe, conflicts over the respective jurisdictions of state and church, and at least since the French Revolution a good deal of "anti-clericalism." On one historic occasion, that of the French Revolution itself, there had been a fierce but brief and unsuccessful effort to uproot Christianity altogether. Yet throughout the nineteenth century—as generally throughout earlier centuries—the large majority of Europeans (and Americans) adhered to one

¹ Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) published his *General Sociology* in 1916. It was an imposing pile of fact and conjecture, partially "positivist" and partially critical.

² C. A. Beard, *The Open Door* (1934), p. 20.

NOTE. The picture opposite, "The Crucifixion," is from the modern painting by George Bellows (1882-1925). On Bellows, see below, pp. 838-839.

or another of the Christian churches, and their governments uniformly professed respect for the Christian religion. To be sure, there was, during the latter part of the century, a marked growth of scepticism and indifferentism; and many statesmen, like many scholars and other persons, ceased to belong to any church and actively prompted secularizing policies. Nevertheless, the trend was toward securing full toleration within presumably Christian nations for dissenters and toward depriving Christian churches of special privileges.¹

Not until the twentieth century, not until after the World War and the rise of "totalitarian" dictatorships, did the trend change.

**Atheism
and Anti-
Religion**

Then, rather suddenly, conflict between church and state was transformed into conflict between religion and atheism, anti-clericalism was merged in anti-religion, and whole nations were rendered intolerant of even private practice of traditional faiths. Nor was the changed trend peculiar to Western Christendom. It has appeared, we may recall, in both Catholic and Protestant Germany and also in Catholic Mexico and Spain. But it is now most striking in Orthodox Russia and, outside Christendom, in Moslem Turkey and Moslem Iran. In some degree, indeed, it is world-wide. Just as strenuous efforts have been put forth in Germany to supplant the "imported" world-religion of Christianity with an "indigenous" tribal religion of primitive Aryanism, so in Japan the government has sedulously fostered a preference for native Shintoism as over against any "foreign" religion. Wherefore, every one of the historic world-religions is extraordinarily troubled, and its missionary endeavors seriously handicapped.

Yet, despite difficulties, old and new, with which it is confronted in the present age, despite universal progress of secularization and relative decline of ecclesiastical influence on society and on the shaping of public policies, organized supernatural religion is by no means dead. Its roots are struck deep in human habits, if not in human nature; and apparently it satisfies vital human needs and aspirations in a machine age as formerly in an age of hand-tools. What decline it may have suffered is relative rather than absolute.

Of the major Christian bodies, the Catholic Church continues to be the largest and the most intransigent. The World War

¹ See above, pp. 404-406, 413-416.

caused it immediate political embarrassments, and the Pope of the time, Benedict XV (1914-1922), had to employ all his diplomatic talents to preserve his neutrality between the belligerents, while his earnest peace pleas fell on deaf ears.¹ In several ways, however, the war years proved advantageous to the Church. They witnessed a noteworthy revival of Catholic activity and influence in France and Italy; and the political map of Europe which resulted from the war enhanced the prestige of the Church. Catholics were numerically preponderant in the newly created nations of Poland, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and the Irish Free State, and they were numerous in the enlarged states of Yugoslavia and Rumania. And for several years after the war Catholic political parties dominated or held a balance of power in the governments of Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Hungary. This improved international position of the Catholic Church was made the most of by the exceptionally able successor of Benedict XV—Pope Pius XI (1922-1939).²

Catholic
Chris-
tianity

Benedict
XV, 1914-
1922

Pius XI was scholar and statesman, as well as vigorous administrator and staunch upholder of the Catholic faith and tradition. He successfully negotiated with Mussolini the Lateran treaty of 1929, settling the "Roman question" and reestablishing, after the lapse of fifty-nine years, an independent temporal sovereignty for the papacy. True, the seat of this sovereignty—"Vatican City"—was an extremely small part of Rome, but it sufficed to symbolize to the world that the Pope was no longer a "prisoner" of Italy or subject to Italian law, but that, instead, he was a supranational figure, guaranteed as such by an international treaty.

Pius XI,
1922-1939

With most nations in Christendom, Pius XI maintained or newly established friendly relations, and with a considerable number of them he concluded significant concordats—with Latvia in 1922, with Poland in 1925, with Lithuania in 1927, with Czechoslovakia in 1928, with Italy, Portugal, and Rumania in 1929, with Germany in 1933. These concordats assured to the Pope the appointment of bishops within the countries concerned

¹ On the peace efforts of Benedict XV, see above, p. 610. An outstanding monument of his pontificate was the completion (1917) of the codification of canon law which had been begun under his predecessor, Pius X.

² Pius XI's Secretary of State succeeded in 1939 as Pius XII.

and to the Church the right of imparting religious instruction, and if in some instances they restricted political activity of the clergy they uniformly promised to respect Catholic social action.

On the other hand, there were some very serious set-backs for Catholicism. The Catholic minority in the Russian Soviet Union (largely concentrated in Ukraina and White Russia) suffered from the anti-religious policies and actions of the Communist dictatorship; and repeated protests of Pius XI were unheeded. Nor could the Pope stem the anti-clerical and anti-Christian tide in Mexico; the papal delegate was expelled from Mexico City and the National Revolutionary dictatorship of the country made few concessions. In Spain, moreover, the establishment of the Republic precipitated an acute conflict between state and church and led to a series of drastic anti-Catholic enactments, and during the ensuing civil war the Spanish clergy suffered direfully. Then, too, not all the new concordats were scrupulously observed by governments which agreed to them, and especially in the case of Germany the Nazi régime flouted the concordat of 1933 and pursued an actively and bitterly anti-Catholic policy.

Under Pius XI, the missionary activities of the Church were extended farther in Asia and Africa. To meet native nationalist objections to "European" missionary enterprise, the Pope strove, with no little success, to create native hierarchies in China, Japan, and India, for example, and to entrust to them the conduct of the missions within their respective countries. Large numbers of European (and American) priests, monks, and nuns still labor in far-away fields, but to a much greater degree than formerly their labors are supplemented by those of native clergymen.

Several important encyclical letters were addressed by Pius XI to the Catholic world, discussing current questions and indicating the attitude which Christians should take toward them. Both "totalitarian" nationalism and atheistic communism were condemned. Limitation of armaments and judicial settlement of international disputes were urged. The principles and program of Catholic social reform as outlined by Leo XIII in 1891 were reaffirmed. Unnatural means of birth-control were denounced. The traditional "rights" of the Church, especially in the education of youth, were insistently reasserted.

Of the major Christian bodies, the Orthodox Church has been hardest hit by recent developments. It had never had any such

independence of secular government as the Catholic Church has had, and, with the recent overthrow of governments on which for centuries it relied, it has suffered a notable decline and shrinkage. The final disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal have served to narrow the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople and to deprive him of any privileged position and of much of his prestige. Far more serious, and affecting indeed the large majority of the Orthodox communion, has been the revolution in Russia, with its destruction of the Tsardom, which had always supported the Church, and its establishment of the Communist dictatorship, which has zealously combated Christianity and actively championed materialistic atheism. Orthodox Christianity continues to exist and be practiced in the Soviet Union, but it is barely tolerated by the state and the vast majority of young people in Russia are being brought up in ignorance of it and usually in militant opposition to it.

Orthodox
Chris-
tianity

Elsewhere Orthodox Christianity continues to function just about as it did before the World War. It is represented by national churches in Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. It has bishops in Albania, in Palestine and Syria, and also in Hungary and Poland. It has a growing number of adherents in the United States and Canada, though most of its missionary activity has been halted by the drying-up of its Russian source.

Protestant Christianity has developed since the World War along lines which had been marked out with some clearness between 1870 and 1910.¹ There are now as many professed Protestants throughout the world as ever before, and perhaps more. But Protestantism is less than ever a single coherent movement. On the one hand, "high-church" Anglicanism—latterly styled Anglo-Catholicism—has been coming to the fore and likewise a similar "high-church" trend in Lutheranism, while ritualistic observances have been growing in most Protestant churches and in some a "fundamentalism" has continued to be preached. On the other hand, the "broad-church" or "modernist" trend has become more pronounced. With multitudes of professed Protestants, little remains of historic Protestantism, that is, of Protestant faith and practice of the sixteenth century. There is a veritable repugnance to any-

Protestant
Chris-
tianity

¹ See above, pp. 309-315.

thing savoring of dogma, a sharp reaction against "puritanism," and an absorption in "good works" and the "good life."

In the circumstances, Protestant sectarianism has lost much of its earlier distinctiveness and bitterness, and increasingly successful attempts have been made to federate, if not to unify, various Protestant denominations in particular countries. Thus, in 1922, was created an international council for coördinating Protestant missionary endeavors throughout the world. In 1925 an "ecumenical Christian conference on life and work" at Stockholm was attended by delegates of thirty-one non-Catholic bodies; it naturally refrained from discussing ecclesiastical organization and creed, but it issued a joint report on social and international morality. In 1938 an international federation of all these bodies was established.

Protestant missionary enterprise has remained impressive in Asia and Africa, though in China, at any rate, Protestant missions have been more adversely affected than Catholic missions by the rise of nationalism. And though there have been too few Protestants in Russia or Mexico to feel the heavy hand of irreligious or anti-religious dictatorships where Orthodox or Catholic Christians have most felt it, the Protestant majority in Germany have suffered from similar coercion.

Judaism has continued to comprise "orthodox" and "reformed" groups, the latter growing at the expense of the former.¹

Judaism It has continued, too, to be partly religious and partly national, to foster Zionism and to be plagued by anti-Semitism. It has latterly suffered from a systematic "racial" persecution of the most violent sort in Germany² and of some sort in Italy and throughout east-central Europe, and from a less violent but more subtle "materialistic" subversion within Russia.

Islam has begun, only since the World War, to encounter head-on the forces of opposition and criticism with which Christianity has long been confronted. But the encounter is as upsetting as it has been sudden. The Moslem Caliphate is now at an end. The process of secularization is already far advanced in Turkey and Iran, and is steadily advancing in Egypt, Syria, and India. Despite the fact that millions still profess allegiance to Allah and to Mohammed as his prophet, there is as yet no evidence of any profound or widespread revival of Islam. And

¹ See above, pp. 317-321.

² See above, pp. 715, 722, 727.

it is somewhat similar with the great traditional world-religions of the Far-East—with Hinduism and with Buddhism.

The basic religious question today is not one of "science" versus "theology." It is whether in the long run an exclusively "this-worldly" faith such as Marxian Communism or Totalitarian Nationalism can and will provide the masses of mankind with a satisfying substitute for "other-worldly" faith which from time immemorial humanity has cherished.

5. ART IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Art in the Age of Disillusionment has been symptomatically revolutionary and chaotic. Rebellion against conventions of the nineteenth century has characterized major monuments of recent twentieth-century literature, painting, sculpture, and music. But while all the different kinds of contemporary art evince a reaction, in greater or less degree, against traditions of the immediate past, every one of them displays an extraordinary variety of inspiration and goal. There is no single dominant fashion in present-day art-forms, such as "classicism" was in early modern times, or "romanticism" in the nineteenth century, or "realism" at the beginning of the twentieth. All these moods and modes still persist and are simultaneously exemplified by works of art in the latest age, but side by side with them appear strange new tendencies.

There is a novel "primitiveness," an enthusiasm for the simplicity of the antique, even of the barbarous. There is also a sophisticated "modernism," a cultivation of the abstract rather than the concrete, accompanied by much experimentation with geometrical design. There is, too, a related "functionalism," an earnest effort to render art peculiarly expressive of the massiveness and speed of the machine age and in many instances of the age's proletarian and Marxian trend. There is, moreover, an iconoclastic "futurism," a wild and willful flight from the past and even from the present, sometimes as a release for highly charged emotions of totalitarian nationalism, and sometimes as a mere stunt. At the opposite extreme, there is a reviving religious element in contemporary art, representing not so much a revival of the romantic medievalism of the nineteenth century as a novel reinterpretation of traditional religion in terms of the newest art forms (primitive or modernist or realist).

In literature the sociological and psychological interests of the

preceding "age of realism" have remained important, the psychological gradually outweighing the sociological and assuming more and more a Freudian complexion. In English literature, for example, such sociological "realists" as Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells¹ have continued to treat provocatively of a wide range of social problems, but Shaw has latterly interspersed his pleas for socialism and his plays on nationalism with strangely subjective confessions of helplessness, while Wells, after resigning himself to the World War in his *Mr. Britling Sees It Through* (1916) and becoming almost theological in his *God the Invisible King* (1917), has rushed on to outline universal history in pessimistic vein, and in optimistic vein to psycho-analyze himself.

Literature

Shaw and Wells

Galsworthy and Joyce

After all, both Shaw and Wells survive from an earlier age, and though their remarkable adaptability has assured them a continuing popularity, they are probably less representative of the new age than certain other (and mainly younger) masters of English prose or poetry whom we may mention. Thus, John Galsworthy (1867-1933) inaugurated in 1906 the long series of his *Forsyte* novels, nicely articulating the psychological with the sociological in detailed studies of the decay of an upper middle-class family, and presently he was writing plays in terse and strictly natural dialogue about disturbing ethical problems of the time. James Joyce (born 1882), an Irishman who by preference resided abroad, chiefly at Paris, combined æstheticism with a revolutionary frankness about sex in his *Portrait of Artist as a Young Man* (1916) and in his still more sensational *Ulysses* (1922).

The most accomplished French novelist of the Era of Disillusionment was Marcel Proust (1871-1922). Proust came of a gifted Parisian family, his father being a professor of medicine and his mother of Jewish extraction. As a young man he contributed to Socialist publications, translated Ruskin into French, expounded the "creative evolution" of Bergson, and played a conspicuous part in polite society. About 1902, however, failing health induced him to withdraw from active life; and his new-found leisure he employed in penning an elaborate psychological exposé of the society he had known. He planned it as a series of fifteen novels under the general title of *A la Recherche*

Proust

¹ See above, pp. 279-281.

du Temps Perdu: the first volume was published in 1913; another in 1918; the third and fourth in 1921; and three others after his death. The characters are erotic and abnormal, having little in common with the generality of mankind; they are always in process of development and change, and they are frightfully futile. Proust won some recognition in France during his life, but only after the World War and after his death has his fame spread widely and his influence become profound.

In German literature, the foremost post-war novelist was Thomas Mann (born 1875). He came of a patrician merchant family of Lübeck, and in his native city he laid the scene of a remarkable character- and period-novel, *Buddenbrooks, the Ruin of a Family*, which he published in 1903 and which established his reputation. In this and in his later work, he displays a fondness for lingering among trivial details with considerable irony and great cumulative effect, and also a wistful regret at the apparently inevitable swamping of aristocracy in a modern sea of plebeian mediocrity. Mann received the Nobel prize for literature in 1929; and after the advent of the Nazi dictatorship, he was practically exiled from Germany.

Quite a different literary trend of the last twenty-five years has been the resurgence of a distinctively Catholic literature, represented by such varied authors as Claudel, Chesterton, and Undset. Paul Claudel (born 1868), long in the consular and diplomatic service of France, is the outstanding French poet of recent times. Trained in the school of the symbolists and particularly indebted to Rimbaud,¹ he broke away from them in essential respects and produced lyrics and mystery plays of surpassing beauty of form and deeply religious meaning. Gilbert Chesterton (1874-1936), an English journalist who entered the Catholic Church in 1922, was a voluble and paradoxical literary champion of traditional religion against such "materialists" as Shaw and Wells. Essays poured from his pen, and so did ballads, biographies, literary studies, and detective stories. Never was Christian civilization defended in manner so unconventional—or so witty. Sigrid Undset (born 1882), the daughter of a Norwegian archaeologist, won local fame by a novel, *Jenny*, in 1912, and then international fame by two series of "realistic" novels of medieval

¹ See above, p. 283.

Norway. These were no romantic idealizations, but very "frank" and almost photographic expositions of life and society in the middle ages, and they were presented in an ultra-modern style.

One other development in recent literature must be mentioned—a radical revolt against everything traditional, whether of con-

**Futurist
Literature**

tent or of form, whether classicist or romantic or "realist." It has been defined as "futurism" by one of its loudest and most zealous apostles, F. T. Marinetti (born 1881), an Italian who was intimately associated with Mussolini in the early days of Fascism. In a pioneering manifesto of 1909, Marinetti denounced "the cult of the past" as the bane of all art, and went on to describe the goal of "futurist" literature in these words: "We futurists uphold the ideal of a great and strong scientific literature, which, free from all and every classicism and pedantic purism, will magnify the most recent discoveries, the new intoxication of speed, and the celestial life of aviators. Our poetry is poetry essentially and totally rebelling against all used forms. The tracks of verse must be torn up and the bridges of things already said must be blasted and the locomotives of our inspiration must be started toward the coming, toward the boundless fields of the New and the Future! Better a splendid disaster than a monotonous race daily re-run! We have put up too long with the station masters of prosody." Marinetti himself was an unbalanced egotist and hardly a literary genius, but he expressed ideas about literature which have found increasing favor in the latest age. And the result, whether it is called "futurist" or not, is the appearance in almost every country of strange new types of prose and verse—of verse that is prose, and of prose that only the author knows what if anything it means.

Of the art of painting, Paris has remained the focal point, and here the "post-impressionism" inaugurated by such artists as

Painting

Matisse

Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin has been developed and given new (and revolutionary) direction, especially by two masters—Matisse and Picasso. Henri Matisse (born 1869), in full revolt against both classicism and impressionism, began where Cézanne and Gauguin left off. He varied and exaggerated the former's use of distortion, and he intensified the latter's bright coloring. Gradually he worked out an

NOTE. The picture opposite, "A Figure," is from a painting by Matisse.

essentially new technique, rendering form quite unconventional, and treating light, not as the impressionists had done, by means of the juxtaposition of minute touches of color, but by employing pure tones on a large scale and thus producing the effect of modelling and the illusion of space. As he reacted against the traditions of "civilized" painting, he became infatuated with the art of "barbarous" peoples—Polynesians, African Negroes, and Mexican Indians—with its abbreviations and accentuations of form, its bizarre coloring, and its "rhythm."

Pablo Picasso (born 1881), a Catalan Spaniard and son of an artist and professor at the Academy of Barcelona, settled in Paris in his youth and speedily became a leading post-^{Picasso}impressionist and "naturalist." Choosing his subjects from the circus and the morbid side of life in a big city, he drew them with forceful directness and colored them with striking originality and restraint. Then, just before the World War, he took to painting still-life pictures of grouped fruit-bowls, bottles, or musical instruments, in manner more and more abstract and angular. This was a new manner, to which the name of "cubism" has been given: it was an attempt to cover the surface of a canvas with form and at the same time to reduce all form to simple geometric design. Picasso produced some attractive as well as astonishing "cubist" pictures, which enjoyed a considerable vogue and were widely imitated. After the war, however, Picasso tired of "cubism" and reverted to his "naturalist" style, applying it to both painting and sculpture. Next to Cézanne's, Picasso's is probably the greatest influence in ultra-modern art.¹

Cubism has gone on without Picasso, and in its wake have issued from Paris a swift succession of other pictorial isms: "futurism," denouncing the static quality of all past painting and striving to portray motion; "lyricism," seeking a close analogy in expression between painting and music; "sur-realism," rejecting reasoned technique and depending upon inspiration to depict dreams and states of mind; "popularism," based on the supposition that common people without any technical training produce the most naïve and sin-

"Cubism,"
etc.

¹ An illustration of "cubist" painting by one of Picasso's disciples may be found facing p. 766, above.

NOTE. The picture opposite is a self-portrait by Picasso.

cere pictures and therefore the best.¹ None of these isms—or of the many others which might be mentioned—has amounted to much in itself. Yet they are symptomatic of the turmoil into which painting has fallen, and suggestive of certain general tendencies among the large majority of contemporary painters the world over. “Naturalness” is eagerly sought after. Content matters less than form, and form must be unconventional, must convey some sense of thickness as well as of length and breadth, must express not merely concrete images but abstract conceptions.

Of course, ultra-modern painting is not just “art for art’s sake.” It is put to special uses, nationalistic, socialistic, religious. Of these, the nationalistic probably predominate, for ultra-modern forms seem peculiarly appropriate to the glorification of the primitive ancestors of one’s nation or to the symbolizing of its abstract mass and might. Striking pictures of the kind, and some good ones, have been produced in Communist Russia and in Nazi Germany, and also by the native Mexican artist Diego Rivera, who, on one huge mural after another, has portrayed the primitive Indian life and labor of his country.

Of course, too, there are many contemporary painters who cling to past traditions. But most of them betray, in greater or less degree, the influence of newer schools. For example, **Orpen** the tradition of British portrait painting has been maintained and handed on from Sargent to such a “modern” as Sir William Orpen (1878–1932). Orpen’s early work was marked by the use of quiet harmonies of gray and brown, in the manner of Whistler, but the influence of the French post-impressionists was evident in his later treatment of coloring and light. Orpen was the official British artist of the World War, and he painted the Paris Peace Congress of 1919.²

Significant, too, is an American artist, George Bellows (1882–1925). His painting represented a compromise between “realism” and “post-impressionism.” He was a good draughtsman and a master of color. With dignity of composition he combined an intense vitality. Bellows pictured numerous sporting scenes quite realistically. Besides, he produced several

¹ For examples of such “popularism,” see the painting by Henry Rousseau, facing p. 512, above, and that by Maurice Utrillo, facing p. 705.

² See the reproduction of it facing p. 635, above, and, for another example of Orpen’s art, the picture facing p. 704.

religious works; his Crucifixion, for example, was what El Greco might have done if he had lived in the Age of Disillusionment.¹

The latest age has given impetus not only to new methods and fashions of painting but also to similar developments in all the pictorial arts. Many "modern" artists have devoted themselves to engraving and etching and have produced works of unconventional but real distinction in these fields. Moreover, the art of posters, beginning in a significant way with Gauguin, has since been stimulated by the propagandist activity of governments (especially during the World War) and by advertising exigencies of capitalistic industry. Then, too, the art of caricature, being particularly prized by a disillusioned public, has commanded the services of some of the best and most original draughtsmen of the latest age. For example, Forain, the most skillful of French cartoonists,² found new inspiration for his talents in popular disillusionment about the World War and the League of Nations. And so, in only lesser degree, did the famous English caricaturist, Sir Bernard Partridge.³

Other
Pictorial
Arts

Architecture, as the most monumental and enduring of the arts, has always been more conservative than the others. It has been so in the latest age. Severely classic models have been followed, for example, in the post-war Commerce Building and Supreme Court Building in Washington, and in the War Cenotaph in London. Romantic Gothic has provided models for recent ecclesiastical edifices, notably the great Anglican cathedral at Liverpool (by Sir Gilbert Scott), and in New York the Riverside Baptist Church.

Architec-
ture

Yet architecture responds more and more to current demands for new models in stricter keeping with contemporary developments, and the result is an accelerating "modernism" in all sorts of construction. Progressive industrialization of the past quarter-century has led to a general adoption of the building technique of industrialism—steel skeleton construction, and the wide use of reinforced concrete. It has also called for new types of office building, factory, garage, hangar. Moreover, growing urbanization of the population of every country has necessitated city-

¹ Compare Bellows's *Crucifixion*, facing p. 827, above, with the painting by El Greco in Vol. I, facing p. 143. For another example of Bellows's art, see the picture in the present volume facing p. 581.

² See above, pp. 289-290; and the tailpieces on pp. 622, 667.

³ See the cartoon by Partridge facing p. 634.

planning on a large scale and a revaluation of the aims of domestic as well as public architecture. Furthermore, the expanding cult of applied science has prompted architects to seek some "scientific," or "functional," expression of the new materials, to adapt the appearance of a building to its actual use. Steel and concrete both suggest the employment of strong vertical lines, wide spans, and slim supports; and, in addition, reinforced concrete lends itself to curving forms. And architects have shared in the widespread feeling engendered by the World War that the old order was passing away, and a new and quite different one was emerging. In view of all these considerations, it is not surprising that in the post-war years architecture has become steadily more "modernist."

Function-
alism

Among preachers and practitioners of revolutionary architecture, Frank Lloyd Wright merits special mention. Born in Wisconsin in 1869, he was from 1895 a zealous advocate of "functionalism." Before the war he designed a number of "functional" structures, which were then deemed freakish, and, to secure disciples, he wrote several books and founded a training school. Then, after the war, he won international recognition by building at Tokio the great Imperial Hotel, an excellent example of the artistic beauty attainable by purely "modernist" methods.

Extreme "modernist" architecture has especially flourished in Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. Here it appears in newer public buildings and factories, in apartment houses, and in war memorials. It is impressively exemplified in the Socialist housing developments in Vienna, in the Town Hall of Stockholm, and in the Finnish railway station at Helsingfors. The last named, in grandeur, in logic of design, and in decorative richness, is now the finest railway station in Europe.

The new architecture is in evidence in almost every country. It has been employed for new church edifices. It has been widely adapted to the fashioning of "cubicle" family-houses, all of them starkly simple and some of them very ugly. For some structures of marked beauty and dignity, it has been assimilated with traditional forms, for example with the Gothic, as in the Nebraska state capitol. In general, it has served to put a premium on simplicity, on the renouncing of superfluous architectural detail, and to invite a renewed dependence upon harmonious embellishment

with sculpture, painting, and mosaics. This dependence has been beautifully achieved, in several French war memorials, in which sculpture and architecture reach a new unity of effect, fresh and unconventional, and in the interiors of certain "modernist" churches, in which mural decoration of paint and mosaic is integrated with architectural material and design.

Sculpture, like painting, has reacted sharply against traditions of the immediate past and exhibited novel and even revolutionary trends. A leading sculptor of the age, and the chief exponent of "primitivism," is the Frenchman Aristide Maillol (born 1861). Beginning as a painter, he was induced by Gauguin to abandon impressionism, and for several years he worked on tapestry design, made majolica vases, experimented with glazes, and modelled wall fountains. Then, about 1910, becoming fascinated with archaic Greek statuary of the early fifth century B.C., he took to sculpture and thereafter produced a large number of monumental statues and terra-cotta statuettes, all characterized by a naïve "primitiveness." Perhaps Maillol's most distinguished statue is the reclining goddess *Fame* which he fashioned for a memorial to Cézanne.

Sculpture

Maillol

Indeed, much of the newer sculpture is consciously archaic in inspiration and in effect. It is imitative not alone of primitive Greek art but also, in many recent instances, of even more primitive art of ancient Etruscans or modern Negroes, Redmen, and South Sea Islanders. It represents in measure a reversion to paganism and barbarism.

On the other hand, much of the newer sculpture, like much of the newer painting, tends away from the primitive and concrete and toward an ever greater abstraction. This aspect of modern sculpture may be illustrated by reference to Jacob Epstein and Amadeo Modigliani. The former, born in New York in 1880, the son of Polish Jewish parents, studied at Paris and settled in London in 1905. The large sphinx which he carved in 1909 for the monument to Oscar Wilde in the Père Lachaise cemetery (at Paris) established his fame, and thereafter he extended his abstract experimentation with surer mastery and growing popular appreciation. Eventually, however, his radicalism lessened; and the fine series of bronze portraits (including that of Lord Fisher ¹) which he executed during and after

Epstein

¹ See above, facing p. 600.

the World War were more traditional in form though still quite "modern" in feeling. **Modigliani** (1887-1920), a precocious Italian, commenced his artistic career as a "post-impressionist" painter but soon passed from "cubist" painting to a kind of "cubist" sculpture, utilizing such simple geometrical figures as the cube and the sphere as patterns for "abstract" portrait busts.¹ Modigliani and Epstein are only two of a considerable number of gifted artists who have spread the vogue of abstract sculpture.

An outstanding sculptor of the latest age is a Croatian, Ivan Meštrović, who was born in 1883 and was apprenticed in childhood by his father, a peasant, to a marble-cutter at **Meštrović** Spalato. Here he learned the trade so well and displayed such creative talent that his employer sent him to the art school at Vienna, and by 1906 his work attracted the favorable attention of Rodin. Meštrović has been thoroughly "modernist," but instead of following any one of the several modernist trends, he has managed to fuse them in a remarkable originality of his own. He is "primitive," "archaic," and at the same time "abstract," and yet not at all contemptuous of tradition.²

In some ways comparable with Meštrović is the Englishman **Eric Gill** (born 1882), who studied architecture and then sculpture, and, reaching the conclusion that art and religion are inseparable, became a Catholic in 1913. Since then, while accepting and developing "modernist" art forms—primitivism, abstraction, and all the rest—he has employed them primarily for religious ends. Some of his work has been in stone, but he has excelled in wood-carving. Notable among his creations have been *Stations of the Cross* in Westminster Cathedral and a war memorial for the University of Leeds.³

In music there has been reaction, akin to that in sculpture and painting, against tradition and convention, though more gradual and less complete. "New" music began to make itself **Music** heard in the Age of Realism, prior to 1910, and two composers associated with its origins we have elsewhere discussed, Richard Strauss and Claude Debussy. Debussy died in 1918, but during the post-war years Strauss remained productive

¹ For an example of Modigliani's sculpture, see above, facing p. 826.

² For examples of Meštrović's sculpture, see above, facing pp. 734, 735.

³ For examples of Eric Gill's art, see the tailpieces on pp. 745, 844.

and influential. New operas and pantomines he produced with a mastery of peculiar technique and gorgeous setting. And scores of younger musicians, consciously or unconsciously, have imitated his tricks and patterned their style after his.

Certain younger composers have gone much farther with "new" music. The chief of these is undoubtedly the Russian Igor Stravinsky (born 1882). A pupil of Rimsky-Korsakov, he created a sensation with his *Firebird* (1910), a ballet motivated by a Russian folk-tale but treated in quite novel musical diction. The qualities here displayed—freedom from rhythm as well as harmony, brilliant coloring, impetuous violence, and strangely penetrating charm—Stravinsky has developed and accentuated in numerous later ballets. More than anyone else, he has blazed new trails along which the latest generation of "modernist" musicians are proceeding. The general direction is toward "abstract" and "primitive" music—toward a new cosmos and perhaps a new chaos.


Stravinsky

To the reader of this book, it may appear that the latest developments in art, as in science, economics, and politics, are destructively revolutionary, that they signify a general revolt against traditional European civilization, especially against its "enlightened progress" from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, and portend a universal relapse into barbarism. There are, indeed, many thoughtful (and pessimistic) persons who regard the present age not only as one of disillusionment about the past but as one of despair for the future. Such is the burden of a big tome on *The Decline of the West* by a contemporary German philosopher, Oswald Spengler. He, at any rate, is sure that we are in the downward curve of another historical cycle comparable with that which involved the ruin of the ancient Roman Empire and its pagan civilization. As then, so now, the cosmos turns to chaos and civilization reverts to barbarism.

The world has undoubtedly been changing in our twentieth century—becoming more unified and contracted in some respects, more fragmentary and complex in others. But no past century has been without change—or without deprecation of change. A Spengler can hardly say worse of the present age than the Jewish prophet Jeremias said of the sixth century B.C., or the Christian

apologist Salvian said of the fifth century A.D. The lamentations of Jeremias were followed by the rise of Greek civilization; the lucubrations of Salvian, by the emergence of European civilization. It may well be that Spengler is but the darkness preceding the dawn of a still more glorious day in human civilization.

Nor should the student of history be unmindful of a central historical (and physical) fact, that change is always relative, that it always appears much greater at close range than from a distance. The French Revolution, for example, appeared to its contemporaries to be a complete break with the past and a veritable cataclysm; to us it seems less important for what it changed than for what it left intact or merely adapted. In all probability, the present age of world war, dictatorship, and chaotic art and science will seem to later generations progressively less revolutionary than it appears to us. And even to us it has significance only in relationship to, and as a continuation of, the whole story of mankind and particularly of that part of it which has constituted the subject-matter of this book.



APPENDICES AND INDEX

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APPENDIX I

STATES OF THE WORLD IN 1939

RANKED ACCORDING TO AREA AND POPULATION

[Note. SMALL CAPS indicate states whose language and traditional culture are European. Area is given in square miles. Population in each instance is according to the available census or estimate nearest to 1939. Imperial or colonial domains are not included.]

<i>Area</i>		<i>Population</i>	
1. RUSSIA.....	8,144,228	1. China.....	422,707,868
2. CANADA.....	3,694,863	2. India.....	336,747,616
3. BRAZIL.....	3,285,319	3. RUSSIA.....	168,000,000
4. AUSTRALIA.....	2,974,581	4. UNITED STATES...	122,775,046
5. UNITED STATES...	2,973,776	5. GERMANY.....	85,840,746
6. China.....	2,903,475	6. Japan (proper)....	69,254,148
7. India.....	1,571,545	7. GREAT BRITAIN...	46,189,176
8. ARGENTINA.....	1,078,278	8. ITALY.....	42,527,561
9. MEXICO.....	767,198	9. FRANCE.....	42,013,506
10. Iran (Persia).....	628,000	10. BRAZIL.....	41,569,147
11. BOLIVIA.....	506,792	11. POLAND.....	32,347,300
12. PERU.....	482,133	12. Manchukuo.....	29,606,117
13. SOUTH AFRICA...	471,917	13. SPAIN.....	24,583,096
14. Manchukuo.....	460,383	14. RUMANIA.....	19,933,363
15. COLOMBIA.....	443,985	15. MEXICO.....	16,552,722
16. Egypt.....	383,000	16. Turkey.....	16,158,018
17. VENEZUELA.....	352,051	17. Egypt.....	15,904,525
18. Turkey.....	294,492	18. Iran (Persia).....	15,000,000
19. CHILE.....	286,322	19. YUGOSLAVIA.....	13,934,038
20. ECUADOR.....	275,936	20. ARGENTINA.....	12,561,361
21. Afghanistan.....	245,000	21. PHILIPPINES.....	12,082,366
22. GERMANY.....	243,657	22. Afghanistan.....	12,000,000
23. FRANCE.....	212,659	23. Siam.....	11,506,200
24. Siam.....	198,189	24. CANADA.....	10,376,786
25. SPAIN.....	196,607	25. HUNGARY.....	10,248,319
26. SWEDEN.....	173,157	26. SOUTH AFRICA...	9,530,649
27. POLAND.....	150,013	27. COLOMBIA.....	8,698,634
28. Saudi Arabia (He- jaz).....	150,000	28. NETHERLANDS....	8,556,849
29. Japan (proper)....	148,756	29. BELGIUM.....	8,330,959
30. FINLAND.....	134,557	30. GREECE.....	6,936,900
31. PARAGUAY.....	130,647	31. PORTUGAL.....	6,825,883
32. NORWAY.....	124,556	32. AUSTRALIA.....	6,677,167
		33. PERU.....	6,500,000

<i>Area</i>		<i>Population</i>
33. ITALY.....	119,744	34. SWEDEN..... 6,250,506
34. Iraq.....	116,600	35. BULGARIA..... 6,077,939
35. PHILIPPINES.....	114,400	36. Nepal..... 5,639,092
36. RUMANIA.....	113,886	37. CHILE..... 4,626,508
37. NEW ZEALAND.....	103,415	38. SWITZERLAND..... 4,066,400
38. YUGOSLAVIA.....	95,558	39. CUBA..... 4,011,088
39. GREAT BRITAIN...	94,278	40. DENMARK..... 3,706,349
40. URUGUAY.....	72,153	41. FINLAND..... 3,667,067
41. Syria (and Lebanon).....	57,900	42. Syria (and Lebanon)..... 3,630,000
42. HUNGARY.....	54,509	43. VENEZUELA..... 3,451,677
43. Nepal.....	54,000	44. BOLIVIA..... 3,226,296
44. GREECE.....	50,257	45. SLOVAKIA..... 3,000,000
45. NICARAGUA.....	49,200	46. HAITI..... 3,000,000
46. GUATEMALA.....	45,452	47. EIRE (IRISH FREE STATE)..... 2,965,854
47. LIBERIA.....	45,000	48. Iraq..... 2,857,077
48. HONDURAS.....	44,275	49. NORWAY..... 2,814,914
49. NEWFOUNDLAND ..	42,734	50. ECUADOR..... 2,756,552
50. CUBA.....	41,164	51. GUATEMALA..... 2,466,227
51. BULGARIA.....	39,814	52. LITHUANIA..... 2,358,783
52. ICELAND.....	39,709	53. URUGUAY..... 2,065,986
53. PORTUGAL.....	35,490	54. LATVIA..... 1,950,502
54. PANAMA.....	33,667	55. NEW ZEALAND... 1,548,909
55. EIRE (IRISH FREE STATE).....	26,601	56. SANTO DOMINGO .. 1,544,549
56. LATVIA.....	25,402	57. Saudi Arabia (Hajaz)..... 1,500,000
57. COSTA RICA.....	23,000	58. LIBERIA..... 1,500,000
58. LITHUANIA.....	20,431	59. SALVADOR..... 1,459,578
59. SANTO DOMINGO ..	19,325	60. NICARAGUA..... 1,133,572
60. ESTONIA.....	18,355	61. ESTONIA..... 1,126,383
61. Bhutan.....	18,000	62. ALBANIA..... 1,003,068
62. DENMARK.....	16,575	63. HONDURAS..... 962,685
63. SWITZERLAND.....	15,940	64. PARAGUAY..... 931,799
64. SALVADOR.....	13,173	65. COSTA RICA..... 591,862
65. NETHERLANDS ..	12,692	66. PANAMA..... 467,459
66. BELGIUM.....	11,775	67. DANZIG..... 410,000
67. SLOVAKIA.....	11,000	68. Bhutan..... 300,000
68. ALBANIA.....	10,630	69. LUXEMBURG..... 296,913
69. HAITI.....	10,204	70. NEWFOUNDLAND .. 284,872
70. LUXEMBURG.....	999	71. ICELAND..... 116,948
71. DANZIG.....	754	72. MONACO..... 23,956
72. ANDORRA.....	191	73. SAN MARINO..... 13,948
73. LIECHTENSTEIN...	65	74. LIECHTENSTEIN... 10,213
74. SAN MARINO.....	38	75. ANDORRA..... 5,231
75. MONACO.....	8	76. VATICAN..... 1,006
76. VATICAN.....	1/6	

APPENDIX II

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The most reliable and useful bibliography on special topics in modern European history is to be found in the *Guide to Historical Literature* (1931), edited, under the auspices of the American Historical Association, by G. M. Dutcher, H. R. Shipman, S. B. Fay, A. H. Shearer, and W. H. Allison. It should be in every college and school library, and should be consulted by every student interested in detailed investigation.

A "select bibliography" is provided in the first and unabridged edition of the present work, Vol. I (1932), pp. 812-840, and Vol. II (1936), pp. 1158-1181.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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
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


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


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
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


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


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





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
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
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
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
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
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


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"MOSE IN EGITTO!!!"

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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